When and how did Aristotle create 10 categories. Aristotle's doctrine of categories
Which lists all the possible types of what can be the subject or predicate of a proposition.
Aristotle puts every thing about which it is possible to make a statement under one of ten categories - the highest genera (known to medieval authors under the name praedicamenta). They are intended to enumerate everything that can be expressed without composition or structure, that is, everything that can be either the subject or the predicate of a proposition.
Introductory provisions (Chapters 1-3)
The text begins by explaining what is meant by "eponymous" items, what is meant by "same-name" items, and what is meant by "nominal" items.
Everything we say about the things we say:
- Without connection with other objects, that is, a name/subject or a verb/predicate separately - “man”, “bull”, “wins”, etc.;
- In connection with other objects, that is, we create a statement (sentence) - “the man wins,” “the man runs.”
Ten Categories (Chapters 4-9)
- Substance, or " essence"(ancient Greek. οὐσία ). The word “predicate” means a predicate of essence if the corresponding characteristic of a thing is not based on anything other than itself. “This single person” or “this single tree” are entities. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particular essences "first essences" distinguishing them from the "second essences" which are universals. Therefore, "Socrates" is the first essence, while "man" is the second essence.
- Quantity(ancient Greek τὸ πόσον - “how much”) - spatial-numerical characteristics of a thing. All medieval disputes about the nature of the continuum, endlessly large quantity and infinitely divisible are a long commentary on the text of Chapter 6. It had a great influence on the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late scholastic periods.
- Quality(ancient Greek τὸ πόιον “what”) is a predicate that characterizes all non-quantitative properties of an object. These properties do not coincide with the nature (essence) of a thing.
- Attitude(ancient Greek τὸ πρὸς τί - “that in relation to which”) is the way in which one thing can be related to another.
- Space(where) - the position of a thing relative to its immediate environment.
- Time(when) - the position of a thing relative to the sequence of events.
- State(situation) - the position of the parts of an object relative to each other.
- Possession- the presence of a constantly external circumstance of a thing (for example, “dressed”).
- Action(ancient Greek τὸ ποιει̃ν - “act”) - the product of a change in some other subject.
- Enduring- acceptance of change from some other subject.
The first four are dealt with in detail in chapters 5-8, the last six are only lightly touched upon in the short chapter 9, since their meaning is self-evident. Later texts by scholastic philosophers also reflect this disparity in detail.
Final provisions (Chapters 10-15)
- Opposites and opposites (chapters 10-11)
- Antecedent and Subsequent (Chapter 12)
- Given Together (Chapter 13)
- Types of movement (chapter 14)
- Second Analysis of Possession (Chapter 15).
Meaning
According to Stanford University professor of antiquity Raviel Netz (English)[[|Russian]], Aristotle's categories have largely served as the foundation for the study of logic throughout the history of Western thought.
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Notes
Links
- Aristotle on the portal “Philosophy in Russia”
Excerpt characterizing the Categories (Aristotle)
At this time, the countess entered shyly, with quiet steps, in her current and velvet dress.- Ooh! my beauty! - the count shouted, - better than all of you!... - He wanted to hug her, but she pulled away, blushing, so as not to crumple.
“Mom, more on the side of the current,” Natasha said. “I’ll cut it,” and she rushed forward, and the girls who were hemming, did not have time to rush after her, tore off a piece of smoke.
- My God! What is this? It's not my fault...
“I’ll sweep it all away, it won’t be visible,” Dunyasha said.
- Beauty, it’s mine! - said the nanny who came in from behind the door. - And Sonyushka, what a beauty!...
At a quarter past ten they finally got into the carriages and drove off. But we still had to stop by the Tauride Garden.
Peronskaya was already ready. Despite her old age and ugliness, she did exactly the same thing as the Rostovs, although not with such haste (this was a common thing for her), but her old, ugly body was also perfumed, washed, powdered, and the ears were also carefully washed , and even, and just like the Rostovs, the old maid enthusiastically admired her mistress’s outfit when she came out into the living room in a yellow dress with a code. Peronskaya praised the Rostovs' toilets.
The Rostovs praised her taste and dress, and, taking care of her hair and dresses, at eleven o'clock they settled into their carriages and drove off.
Since the morning of that day, Natasha had not had a minute of freedom, and not once had time to think about what lay ahead of her.
In the damp, cold air, in the cramped and incomplete darkness of the swaying carriage, for the first time she vividly imagined what awaited her there, at the ball, in the illuminated halls - music, flowers, dancing, the sovereign, all the brilliant youth of St. Petersburg. What awaited her was so beautiful that she did not even believe that it would happen: it was so incongruous with the impression of cold, cramped space and darkness of the carriage. She understood everything that awaited her only when, having walked along the red cloth of the entrance, she entered the entryway, took off her fur coat and walked next to Sonya in front of her mother between the flowers along the illuminated stairs. Only then did she remember how she had to behave at the ball and tried to adopt the majestic manner that she considered necessary for a girl at the ball. But fortunately for her, she felt that her eyes were running wild: she could not see anything clearly, her pulse beat a hundred times a minute, and the blood began to pound at her heart. She could not accept the manner that would make her funny, and she walked, frozen with excitement and trying with all her might to hide it. And this was the very manner that suited her most of all. In front and behind them, talking just as quietly and also in ball gowns, guests entered. The mirrors along the stairs reflected ladies in white, blue, pink dresses, with diamonds and pearls on their open arms and necks.
Natasha looked in the mirrors and in the reflection could not distinguish herself from others. Everything was mixed into one brilliant procession. Upon entering the first hall, the uniform roar of voices, footsteps, and greetings deafened Natasha; the light and shine blinded her even more. The owner and hostess, who had already been standing for half an hour front door and those who said the same words to those entering: “charme de vous voir,” [in admiration that I see you] greeted the Rostovs and Peronskaya in the same way.
Two girls in white dresses, with identical roses in their black hair, sat down in the same way, but the hostess involuntarily fixed her gaze longer on thin Natasha. She looked at her and smiled especially at her, in addition to her masterful smile. Looking at her, the hostess remembered, perhaps, her golden, irrevocable girlhood time, and her first ball. The owner also followed Natasha with his eyes and asked the count who was his daughter?
- Charmante! [Charming!] - he said, kissing the tips of his fingers.
Guests stood in the hall, crowding at the front door, waiting for the sovereign. The Countess placed herself in the front row of this crowd. Natasha heard and felt that several voices asked about her and looked at her. She realized that those who paid attention to her liked her, and this observation calmed her somewhat.
“There are people just like us, and there are people worse than us,” she thought.
Peronskaya named the countess the most significant people who were at the ball.
“This is the Dutch envoy, you see, gray-haired,” said Peronskaya, pointing to an old man with silver gray curly, abundant hair, surrounded by ladies, whom he made laugh for some reason.
Chapter first
[Same name, sonominal, denominate]
Those objects that have only a common name are called things of the same name, and the speech about the essence (logos tes oysias) corresponding to this name is different, as, for example, dzoon means both a person and an image. After all, they only have a common name, and the speech about the essence corresponding to this name is different, for if we indicate what it means for each of them to be dzoon, then [in both cases] a special concept (logos) will be indicated.
Those objects are called co-nominal if they have a common name and the speech about the essence corresponding to this name is the same, as, for example, a “living being” (dzoon) is both a man and a bull. In fact, both man and bull are called common name“living being” and the talk about the essence [of them] is one and the same. After all, if you indicate the concept of both, what it means for each of them to be dzoon, then the same concept will be indicated.
Finally, denominative objects are those that receive a name from something in accordance with its name, while differing in the ending of the word, such as, for example, from “grammar” - “grammar”, from “courage” - “courageous”.
Chapter two
[Predicate about the subject and located in the subject]
Of what is said, some are said in connection, others without connection. One in connection, for example: “a man runs”, “a man wins”; other without connection, for example: “man”, “bull”, “runs”, “wins”.
Of the existing things, one thing is said about some subject, but is not found in any subject, for example, a person; the subject - an individual person - is spoken of as a person, but the person is not in any subject; the other is in the subject, but is not spoken of about any subject (I call that which, not being a part, cannot exist separately from what it is in) being in the subject; for example, a certain ability to read and write is in the subject - in the soul, but no subject is spoken of as a certain ability to read and write. And the definite white is in the subject - in the body (for every color is in the body), but no subject is spoken of as a definite white. But something else is said about the subject and is in the subject, as, for example, knowledge is in the subject - in the soul - and the subject - the ability to read and write - is spoken of as knowledge. Finally, something else is not in the subject and is not said about any subject, for example, an individual person and an individual horse. Neither one nor the other is in the subject and is not said about the subject. And in general, everything that is singular and everything that is one in number is not said about any subject, but nothing prevents something like that from being in the subject. Indeed, a certain ability to read and write belongs to what is in the subject, but no subject is spoken of as a certain ability to read and write).
Chapter Three
[Gender as a predicate. Species differences]
When one thing is predicated about another as a subject, everything that is said about the predicate applies to the subject, for example: “man” is predicated about an individual person, and “living being” is about “man”, therefore, “living being” will be predicated and about an individual person: after all, an individual person is both a person and a living being. For things that belong to different and not subordinate genera, their species differences are also different, for example, a living being and knowledge. The species differences in a living creature are “living on land”, “bipedal”, “winged” and “living in water”, but none of them is a species difference in knowledge: after all, one knowledge differs from another not in that it bipedal. However, no one prevents the species differences within subordinate genera to be the same: after all, the higher genera are predicated on those subordinate to them, and therefore, as many species differences as the predicate has, the subject will have the same.
Chapter Four
From what has been said without any connection, each means either an essence, or “how much”, or “which”, or “in relation to something”, or “where”, or “when”, or “to be in some position” ", or "to possess", or "to act", or "to endure". An entity, in short, is, for example, a person, a horse; “how much” is, for example, two cubits long, three cubits long; “what” - for example, white, able to read and write; “in relation to something” - for example, for double, half, more; “where” - for example, in the Lyceum, in the square; “when” - for example, yesterday, last year; “to be in some position” - for example, lying, sitting; “possess” - for example, shod, armed; “act” - for example, cuts, burns; “to endure” - for example, they cut him, burn him. Each of the above does not in itself contain any statement; an affirmation or negation is obtained by combining them: after all, every affirmation or negation must be assumed to be either true or false, and from what is said without any connection, nothing is true or false, for example, “man”, “white”, “runs”, "wins".
Chapter Five
[Essence]
The essence so called in the most basic, primary and unconditional sense is that which is not spoken of or in any subject, such as an individual man or an individual horse. And the second essences are those to which, as species, belong the essences so called in the primary sense - both these species and their genera; for example, an individual person belongs to the species "man", and the genus for that species is "living being". Therefore they are spoken of as second entities, such as “man” and “living being”.
From what has been said, it is obvious that what is said about the subject necessarily has both a name and a concept about the subject; so, for example, a person is said about the subject - about an individual person - and about him, of course, the name [of a person] is said: after all, you will call an individual person a person and the definition of a person will be said about an individual person, because an individual person is both a person and a living being. Thus, both the name and the definition will affect the subject. On the contrary, for that which is in the subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition affects the subject; in some cases, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being said about the subject, but the definition cannot be said about it. Thus, white, being in the body as a subject, is predicated about the subject (after all, the body is called white), but the concept of white can never be predicated about the body. And everything else [besides the first essences] is either said about the first essences as subjects, or is found in them as subjects. This becomes clear if we take individual cases: a living being, for example, is expressed about a person, therefore it will also be expressed about an individual person; after all, if it did not apply to any of the individual people, it would not apply to man in general. Next, color is in the body; therefore, in a separate body. If he were not in any of the individual bodies, he would not be in the body at all. Thus, everything else [besides the first essences] is either said about the first essences as subjects, or is found in them as subjects. Therefore, if the first entities did not exist, nothing else could exist.
Philosophical system
The philosophical teaching of Aristotle in our days, and even in ancient times, was considered and called a “system”. An important caveat needs to be made here. Word " system», « system"(ancient Greek σύστημα) is a term of Stoic philosophy. It is no coincidence that the word is not translated into any language, and remains so in modern languages. Of course, Aristotle, if not the father of the early Stoics, was certainly the godfather, contributed greatly to the formation of the Stoic philosophical teaching in its specificity. What is meant by systematicity, system, vision of philosophy as a system? The world itself is a system, i.e. organic interconnection, continuity with the necessity of interconnected parts. From a Stoic point of view, you can start philosophizing from any position: you can start from logic, you can start from physics, you can start from ethics. Wherever you start your journey, final goal the path will be the same.
As for Aristotle, we can of course talk about the systematic nature of his philosophical concept, but first of all this concerns theoretical sciences. Let me remind you that theoretical sciences, knowledge that is cultivated within these boundaries - theoretical, contemplative - this knowledge has its own goal. Hence the difficulty: it is very difficult, when discussing theoretical sciences, physics, or first philosophy, philosophy in the proper sense of the word, to find some starting point, and starting from it, move on. In relation to practical sciences, this is easier to do, because the goals are external.
You can begin to reason, for example, in the ethical sphere, starting from the concept of good: this is where the Nicomachean Ethics begins. One can talk about political sciences starting from the idea that What there is a family: this is where Aristotle’s “Politics” begins, in the literal sense of the word. Due to the presence of external goals, i.e. internally not quite organically inherent in practical knowledge itself, one can, starting from this external need, from external concerns and goals, reason further, expanding the circle of one’s scientific interest.
As for theoretical sciences, there are a lot of difficulties here. I repeat that, according to Aristotle, as can be seen in the texts, and this corresponds to the logic of his reasoning, it is impossible in the theoretical sphere to find some initial point, rely on some solid foundation, and starting from it, reason further. As a matter of fact, if we take the text of “Metaphysics” or “Physics”, then in these works Aristotle always argues as if he were in the middle of a conversation that had begun without him, from within some current situation. According to Aristotle, in principle, it is impossible in the sphere of contemplative knowledge to reason about the nature of things as if we were in airless space, as if we were reasoning from some kind of cosmic vacuum.
We, our destiny and life, are inextricably linked with science as such. Man is a rational animal by nature, this is inevitable. Hence, of course, to argue that What there is philosophy as such, the first philosophy (later, already in the first centuries of our era, it began to be called “ metaphysics"; and then, not earlier than the 17th century, it began to be called “ ontology“- Aristotle did not know this word), it is almost impossible to talk systematically about this theoretical philosophy. We must decide for ourselves How, in what order understand, interpret and expound what Aristotle called “philosophy as such.” In Aristotle's texts there is no indication of where we should begin to reason when we approach higher philosophy, first philosophy, or science as such.
In the European tradition, certain rules have developed for considering the theoretical philosophy of Aristotle (we are now talking about first philosophy, metaphysics and ontology), rules, partly artificial, to reason within the following scheme. Theoretical philosophy is artificially divided under three headings, in the texts themselves we do not find such a strict division:
- The doctrine of categories.
- The doctrine of causes.
- The doctrine of what exists in reality and what exists in possibility.
Origin of the concept "category"
As for Aristotle's doctrine of categories. Firstly, what is category? This word was not invented by Aristotle - “ category"(ancient Greek κατηγορία). This word was used before Aristotle and is also found in Plato. This is a term, and Aristotle uses it precisely in a terminological manner. This word is taken from legal practice. It has long been noted that philosophy, as a specific type of knowledge, did not immediately acquire its own concepts.
Friedrich Nietzsche said that philosophical concepts they are frozen metaphors. But where did these metaphors come from? It has long been noted that the most ancient terms of philosophical science in Ancient Greece mostly came from the fields of law and medicine. It just so happened historically that people learned to deceive, kill, get sick and die before philosophizing: both terminology and the corresponding disciplines developed earlier than philosophy in the modern sense of the word.
Let's say we know that the word " fusis"(Ancient Greek φύσις) - nature, - comes from medical practice, medical experience. Let's say the words " dike"(ancient Greek δίκη), or " dikayosune"(Ancient Greek δικαιοσύνη) - justice, - from legal. Regarding the word " category" is a term that came from legal practice and began to be used by philosophers. What is meant? In our domestic usage the word “ category" means two things:
- This is the most general concept about things, about anything, the most general ontological characteristic.
- The final affirmative form of judging things (“I categorically affirm”).
So, the categorical nature of statements about things and the universality of the message, provided for in these categorical statements, are also associated with the specific life practice of the ancient Greeks and ancient Romans, among others. Respectively, category– this is literally “what was said in the agora”, i.e. publicly, in the open, in the presence of the gods - God knows, things are this way and not otherwise. As for philosophical practice, all this is provided for, all this is implied, but, as a rule, it is not specifically stated. Category– this is the most universal, final and general ontological existential characteristic of something.
Aristotle's Ten Categories
According to Aristotle, there are at least ten such ways of categorically speaking about things. Aristotle generally speaks of ten categories, although full list These categories are found only twice: in the work with this name - “Categories” - in the first part, which in the Middle Ages began to be called “Predicamenta” (lat. praedicamenta), and in the first book of the work “Topic”.
As a rule, Aristotle speaks only about one category or another. But this list is not, according to Aristotle, final. Let me remind you that our world is structured in such a way that physical reality is not subject to quantitative reliable calculation. Strictly speaking, according to Aristotle, it is impossible to compile a complete list of anything: virtues, categories, etc. For example, in one place in Metaphysics the eleventh category is found - movement. But still, as a rule, we are talking about ten categories.
There is no reliable explanation that satisfies everyone as to why there are ten of them. The most common explanation is due to the fact that Aristotle had ten fingers on his hands, and when characterizing anything categorically, he folded one finger at a time, and thus it turned out that there were at least ten universal ontological characteristics. I would like to remind you that Aristotle’s enemies - apparently there were reasons for this - characterized him categorically as such a “dandy”: he wore beautiful hair, and had a ring on each finger; one can assume that he used these rings in pedagogical purposes - sparkling with rings, he categorically characterized certain circumstances.
But there is an explanation closer to Aristotle himself: he talks about this in Metaphysics, in the 28th chapter of the 5th book. Let me remind you that this book is a kind of “ philosophical dictionary", has a partly independent, intercalary character. Each chapter is devoted to consideration of the meaning of one or another important concept. So, at the end of the 28th chapter, Aristotle reports that there are as many categories (this particular word is used) as there are ways to use the verb “ be" in the meaning of the copula, copulas, speaking the language of modern linguistics.
I would like to remind you that the ancient Greek language and many Western European languages also use the verb “to be” as a linking verb. In Ancient Greek, Latin, German, English, French, etc. - in order to say: “the table is rectangular,” you must say: “the table is rectangular,” or “the table is yellow.”
Quite often, various tables appear in teaching practice, this is partly due to the fact that the teacher gives his lectures in an auditorium filled with tables, but in general this example goes back to the medieval tradition. The fact is that in medieval grammar schools the first word of the first declension with the stem “a” was the word that appears in the first line of Homer’s “Odyssey”, it catches the eye - this is the word “muse” (Latin musa). The first declension includes nouns with the stem ending in “a”, because the first word that was declension in ancient schools was the word “muse”. But in the Middle Ages, using the word “muse” became something reprehensible; it turned out that the word “muse” meant a pagan deity. In Christian medieval schools, it seemed strange to many to use this term, so based on consonance they chose another word: not “muse”, but “ mensa"(Latin mensa), i.e. table. So, in our Russian language we make do with a pause: “the table is rectangular.” In Western European languages we use the verb "to be": is, ist etc.
So, according to Aristotle, as he himself reports, there are as many categories as there are ways to use the verb “to be” in the meaning of the connective. We say: “a table is something”, “a table is some kind”, “a table is in some respect”, “a table is present here, is present now”. Through this enumeration of ways to use the verb “to be” in the meaning of a copula, we discover how many most universal ontological characteristics of things exist: at least ten.
- Essence
- Quantity
- Quality
- Place
- Time
- Attitude
- Position
- Action
- Enduring
- Possession
Two subgroups of categories
All these ten categories, the most universal ontological characteristics of things, as they said in the Middle Ages - substances, – this group is divided into two subgroups. The first group includes one category, this category essence, i.e. a unique characteristic that alone answers the question “what is this?” All other characteristics have an indirect meaning. If we use the language of medieval scholasticism (and we are forced to use this language, since our European tradition has developed in such a way that, when speaking about Aristotle, we are forced to use Latin terminology. This partly simplifies a lot.
Let me remind you that, according to Aristotle, language is absolutely conventional, and Aristotle was repeatedly “reproached” for being unstable in his philosophical use of words, i.e. depending on the context, he can use the same word in different meanings. This gives rise to various confusions, but over time, Latin translators and interpreters, medieval scholastics constructed a system of terms, a kind of grid that can be used to “catch” Aristotle), then ten fundamental characteristics are divided into two subgroups. First: substantial category, or category essence. All the others (nine) in medieval scholasticism began to be called “ accidental».
Word " accident"(lat. accidentia) is not translated into any language, and is an equivalent, not entirely successful, but well-established for the ancient Greek term, most likely invented by Aristotle - “τὸ συμβεβηκώς" (“ then sumbebekos"). How to translate the word “τὸ συμβεβηκώς” is also not very clear. Latin translators racked their brains for a long time and came up with their own word - “accident”. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to translate either that term or this one, but it is possible to convey the meaning within the meaning. What is an accident? This is some kind of random, incidental, optional, non-essential characteristic of a thing. If the substantial category of an entity is essential, obligatory, indicating that What there is this thing, then other, optional, partly random, incidental characteristics do not indicate that What there is this thing, and they say which she, V which in relation, in what place, at what time located .
What is important? There is an essential category - essence. There are accidental characteristics. In what way is there not a complete correspondence between the Latin term “accidentia” and the Greek “τὸ συμβεβηκώς”? The fact is that τὸ συμβεβηκώς is literally some optional characteristic of a thing, located in move(motion is a fundamental characteristic of any natural thing, something in which the nature of a thing manifests itself). But accidentia is also an optional characteristic of a thing, but in her static, i.e. movement is not implied here. This is an important difference between these terms. An accidental characteristic is a characteristic that does not provide anything for understanding what this particular thing is.
Let's take our table. The fact that it is a table is the responsibility of the category of essence, which answers the question “what?” But the table is located Here, at that time, in this regard etc. – these are accidental, i.e. random and incidental characteristics. If this table at some point time(accidental characteristic) move to another place(accidental characteristic), then this table will not become less what it was before, i.e. as it was a table, so it will remain. In this regard, the substantial characteristic of an entity is obligatory and necessary, and all other characteristics speak only of what happens or does not happen to this thing under certain circumstances. An important characteristic of a scientist, from Aristotle’s point of view, is the ability to distinguish essential And unimportant. It's not very simple. This ability is not innate, but develops. It appears in a person around the age of thirteen or fourteen, i.e. Children are not able to distinguish between the essential and the non-essential.
Origin of the concept "essence"
As for the category of essence. Here Aristotle complicates the conversation. There are two ways to talk about essence. It is worth noting that the very concept of essence does not arise immediately in Aristotle. He borrows this term from the Platonic tradition. Let me remind you that Aristotle is a Platonist, but an apostate Platonist, a heretic Platonist. Plato and Aristotle asked the same questions, although they gave different answers.
So, the word “essence”, in Greek “ usia"(ancient Greek οὐσία), as Plato reports in the dialogue "Cratylus", goes back to the Pythagorean tradition. We do not know exactly the specifics of the Pythagorean use of this terminology, but Plato himself refers us precisely to this partly previous, partly contemporary Pythagorean tradition. He says that the Pythagoreans and Italians said osiya, or esiya, but in the Attic dialect, in which Plato himself wrote, as well as Aristotle, this word began to sound like usia.
What is meant primarily by the word “essence”? This word is borrowed from everyday life, it is not fiction ancient philosophers. But they began to terminologically use it to their own advantage. This means something real estate property, i.e. we are talking about a thing, or a collection of things, that exist in an unshakable way, exist in such a way that they simply There is and that’s it – the thing simply exists. This obligation, immutability, indispensability of existence, designated by the word “οὐσία”, passed into the terminology of ancient philosophy.
According to Aristotle, the category of essence is the result of a reduction of the term “ existence"(ancient Greek τὸ ὄν). Repeatedly in Aristotle’s texts, the formulation sounds like a kind of spell: “Τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχώς”, i.e. literally “things are spoken of in various meanings.” Generally speaking, according to Aristotle, all things are spoken of in different meanings, but things are different, i.e. there are things of a more “challenging” way of being, more “persistent.” According to Aristotle, anything is said about beings in different meanings. We say: “the table exists,” “good exists,” “red exists,” “rectangular exists.” In our usual conventional usage, we call whatever we want “existing”. But, according to Aristotle, here too a certain reduction from of existence To essence, – in the strict sense of the word, there is only that which is essence.
This is a categorical analysis of existence: we highlight the essential, answering the question “what?”, and reduce the non-essential to a set of random characteristics. We thus limit, in a strict philosophical conversation, the entire totality of truly existing things to one thing - essence. Those. everything that falls under the characteristics of quality, quantity, relationship, place, time - according to Aristotle, is not an essence.
According to Aristotle, there is no such thing as time. Time does not exist, just as place does not exist. This is specifically stated in the 4th book of Physics. In antique philosophical tradition the overwhelming majority of philosophers, representatives of one school or another, rejected the truth that time is an existing thing. Time does not exist either from the point of view of the Stoics, or from the point of view of the Epicureans, or from the point of view of the Peripatetics. The main characteristic of existence is the immutability, independence, autonomy of existence. Things are entities.
Essence one and essence two
So, essence should be spoken of in two respects. There is an essence first, there is an essence second. Aristotle specifically discusses this in his essay “Categories”. Let me remind you that in Greek usage the word “first” does not imply belonging to the order of enumeration, but the unique specificity of this particular thing. This is a characteristic of her autonomous, full-fledged, full-fledged existence. The first one means “in the proper sense of the word.” It’s the same with the first entity: the first entity is just an entity. The second essence is an essence with some clarifications, an essence with reservations.
What is meant by the first essence in the essay “Categories”? There is a classic definition: the first essence is that which “does not affect any subject and is not in any subject". What is meant by the word " subject"? Behind this word lies the Greek word “τὸ ὑποκείμενον” (“ That gyupokeymenon") is a word with a difficult fate. The word “subject” in our language is a literal translation of the Greek word “τὸ ὑποκείμενον”, i.e. The translation is almost letter to letter. In Aristotle, this word takes on different meanings in different contexts.
In order not to get confused, medieval translators came up with three words to translate one single “τὸ ὑποκείμενον”. The initial "ὑπο" in Latin strictly corresponds to the prefix "sub" (for example, as in the word "submarine", i.e. submarine). So, three Latin words: “ subjectum» ( subject), « substantia» ( substance), « substratum» ( substrate). These are three translations of the same word. Subject– this is the subject of our statement. In the structure of the utterance it corresponds to predicate.
For example: “Socrates is a man.” Socrates is the subject of the statement, and man is the predicate of the statement. Substance- this is a separate physical thing that exists on its own: this table, this chair. According to Aristotle's definition, physical substance– this is something that exists separately and moves. Substrate- this is the material basis of the existence of a substance, in a sense, with reservations, this is matter. Means: subject, substance, substrate– hidden behind all this is the word “ subject».
The first essence is “this is it”
So, the first essence is that which is not predicated of any subject. Doesn’t affect – that means it doesn’t predicated, i.e. cannot appear in the structure of an utterance as a predicate. For example: “Socrates is a man.” Man is a predicate in relation to the subject of Socrates, but, according to Aristotle, we cannot reverse this relation. We cannot transform what occupies the position of subject into a predicate, i.e. we cannot say: “The man is Socrates.” If we said so, then we would exclusively consider Socrates a man. The first entity in our statement occupies the position of subject and cannot act as a predicate. Non-predicativeness– this is the fundamental characteristic of the first entity according to the text of the “Categories”.
Aristotle uses a special expression both here and in other texts; in Greek it sounds like this: “τόδε τι” (“ then you"). “Τόδε τι” are two words. What is the first entity? This is τόδε τι. Literally translated like this: this is it. Those. to the question “what is the first essence?” (non-predicative), according to Aristotle, the most accurate answer would be to point with a finger: “What is the first essence? “This is it.” Once we begin to refine our understanding of What there is the first essence, i.e. saturate our cognition with some predicates, some accidental characteristics, we immediately leave the field of discussion of the first essence, i.e. we go beyond the limits of knowledge that is recorded exclusively in the expression “this is this.” We cannot say anything more meaningful about the first essence.
What is a “second entity”
What's happened second essence? Its fundamental characteristic according to the text of the “Categories” is predicativity. To the question “what is this?” There are two ways to answer this. For example: “This is this” - what is meant by this expression corresponds to the non-predicative first essence. And when we say: “This is a table,” we are expressing a predicative essential characteristic (the second essence).
Let us return to the example of Socrates: “Socrates is a man” - what we call the name “Socrates” in the structure of this statement corresponds to the non-predicative first essence, and what is understood by the word “man” corresponds to the predicative second essence. Both the subject and the predicate in the structure of a statement answer the question “what?” – these are substantial characteristics, but they are radically different from each other. The first essence is as empty as possible.
I remind you that scientific knowledge is general knowledge; single, i.e. what Socrates is in his unique “Socraticness” is the object of reliable scientific knowledge can never be; we can't say anything more meaningful about this Here except that it is Here This- this is the limit of our relationship to the first essence. And all our content knowledge is connected with what is meant by the second essence, the predicative essence. “This is a man” - about this Here we can only know as much as we are aware of What it means for this thing to be human etc.
Object of scientific knowledge
What is the object of scientific knowledge? According to the text, “Categories” is the second entity. How is our concept formed? Aristotle's idea of concepts allowed many in antiquity to accuse Aristotle of skepticism and agnosticism. From the side of Epicurean philosophy, these accusations were heard very often. According to Aristotle, we will never be able to construct the most adequate concept of a thing. We can endlessly approach and refine our understanding. How are these concepts formed? It is clear that the language is conventional. Words are tags and shortcuts that we create for ease of communication with each other. What's behind the words? Words are tags for concepts, not for things. Concepts are not formed immediately. This requires experience and intuition. We intuitively and experimentally isolate and abstract in relation to this or that thing the entire set of its essential characteristics. For a scientist (and for any person, since a person is a person to the extent that he is a philosopher), it is fundamentally important to see the essential, and to distinguish between the essential and the inessential. The more we abstract away the essential characteristics of a given thing, the firmer and stricter will be our understanding of what this something is.
Accidental characteristics are not included in the concept of a thing. Those. The concept of a table does not include characteristics of time, place, quality (color), attitude, etc. We must highlight the most universal and essential characteristics. The result of this procedure (abstraction and synthesis of characteristics) is one or another concept, which we denote by the word of the language.
So, the object of knowledge is the second essence. She happens to be predicative, generic And species. Scientific reasoning is a procedure for bringing particular cases under a general rule. We know, What there is a thing in its specificity to the extent that we understand that this individual thing - τόδε τι - fits into one or another type of thing, into one or another kind of thing to which this individual substance necessarily belongs. Only that common thing that allows us to deal with this thing as something special is the object of scientific knowledge.
The second essence is view things, in Greek εἶδος ( eidos), it is genus things, in Greek γένος ( genos), it is nature things, in Greek φύσις ( fusis), it is form things, in Greek μορφή ( morphe). When we read “form” in Aristotle, we are always talking about a specific and generic predicative second essence. Aristotle coined an expression to denote the second essence: “τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι” (“ toti en einai"). Strictly speaking, it is impossible to translate into any language, but in meaning it sounds something like this: what makes a thing what it is.
Latin translators came up with their own Latin equivalent, a literal translation word for word. In Latin texts, starting from the 13th century, we constantly encounter this expression when talking about Aristotle and the teachings associated with him: “quod quid erat esse” (“ quarter Quid erat essay"). Since the medieval scholastics were preacher-lecturers, this four-word expression became loose over time, and the cumbersome "quod quid erat esse" began to sound like "quidditas" (" quidditas"). If you translate from Latin into Russian, it literally turns out like this: whatness. quod quid erat esse – quidditas [quidditas], whatness
We said: “Socrates is a man.” Socrates is Here This Here. Aristotle had a direct image of Socrates in front of him, and could point with his finger - this is it. After all, we are not just talking about some specimen from a certain set of Socrates, “Socrates” was quite popular name in Ancient Greece, we are talking about Socrates this here, we are talking about the well-known Socrates, who was executed by sentence of the Athenian heliei in 399 BC according to our chronology.
Criticism of Platonic philosophy
It's worth noting here important point, which is an element of Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic philosophy. According to Plato, behind every positive characteristic of a thing lies a sufficient reason to believe so, i.e. if we say “table”, then there is table How such, if we say “rectangular”, then there is sufficient reason to believe something is rectangular, some idea rectangularity. According to Plato, there is color idea, exists red color idea, yellow, any color, any size: behind any positive characteristic there is hidden a sufficient, ontologically cognitive basis to believe that it exists in one way and not another, in one way and not in another way, and exists and is cognized as such.
According to Aristotle, predicativity (to use the scholastic formula) is a sign non-substantiality, i.e. everything that in the structure of our statement acts as a predicate (second essence) in relation to the first essence indicates that what is hidden behind the second essence is not a substance, i.e. does not exist as a separate individual physical thing - with this one is not. Predicativity is a sign non-substantiality. When we say: “This is a table,” it does not exist. table as such. When we say: “This is rectangular,” it does not exist. rectangularity as such. By virtue of action law consistency, if we distinguish between subject and predicate in the structure of a statement, then they are not the same thing. If by subject we mean a single physical thing - Socrates, then the second predicative essence is not a single physical thing, a substance - man. Does not exist person as such, does not exist table as such, rectangularity, place, time, etc., due to the predicative nature of the structure of the statement. Predicativity is a sign of non-substantiality.
Aristotle. Works in four volumes. T. 2. Ed. 3. N. Mikeladze. M., “Thought”, 1978. Categories (2a). Instead of the word “affects” in the translation there is the word “says”. – Approx. ed.
Literature
- Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L. Minio-Paluello. Oxonii: E typographeo Clarendoniano, 1949 (repr. 1974) (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis).
- Aristotle's Metaphysics. A Revisited Text with Introduction and Commentary by W.D. Ross. Vols. I-II. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924 (repr. 1997).
- Düring I. Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens. Zweite Auflage. Unveränderter Nachdruck der Ausgabe von 1966. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2005.
- Frede M., Patzig G. Aristoteles, “Metaphysik Ζ”. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar. Bde. I-II. München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1988.
- Logik und Erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles. Hrsg. von F.-P. Hager. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972 (Wege der Forschung; Bd. 226).
- Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles. Hrsg. von F.-P. Hager. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969 (Wege der Forschung; Bd. 206).
- Aristotle. Metaphysics. Per. from ancient Greek A.V. Kubitsky (1934) // Aristotle. Works in four volumes. T. 1. Moscow: “Thought”, 1976 (Philosophical Heritage, vol. 65).
- Aristotle. Categories. Per. from ancient Greek A.V. Kubitsky (1939) // Aristotle. Works in four volumes. T. 2. Moscow: “Thought”, 1978 (Philosophical Heritage, vol. 76).
Ideas do not have a separate reality, do not exist outside of individual things, the best pupil of his Academy, Aristotle, objected to Plato.
He was born into the family of the doctor Nicomachus in the distant Greek colony of Stagira. He was naturally thin and homely, had a lisp, and was distinguished by an obstinate and impudent disposition. Aristotle was seventeen when he entered Plato's Academy. There he became a different person and spent twenty years entirely devoted to scientific pursuits.
After Plato's death, Aristotle left the Academy. The Macedonian king Philip invited him to raise his son Alexander. Aristotle was already over fifty when he returned to Athens to found his own school there, the Lyceum. Meanwhile, the Athenians did not forgive the philosopher for his proximity to the Macedonian invaders: Aristotle had to flee to the island of Euboea, where he soon died, according to rumors, after taking poison.
Plato failed specifically explain how a single thing comes from a general idea.
And without this, to assert about ideas “that they are examples and that everything else is involved in them means idle talk and speaking in poetic allegories... It should, apparently, be considered impossible for the essence and that whose essence it is to exist separately from each other.” There is; how can ideas, if they are the essence of things, exist separately from them? [Aristotle: Metaphysics].
The general and the individual, essence and phenomenon can only exist together. Nothing common exists separately, by itself, Aristotle repeats again and again. Unless in abstract thinking the definitions common to many things can be torn off from these things. The idea of “horseness,” the horse as such, does not exist separately from real horses. There is no "smart place" where pure ideas reside. This heavenly home of ideas is just a poetic mirage drawn by Plato’s imagination.
Moreover, ideas that relate to many things at once and to none separately cannot be considered entities. Each thing must have its own individual essence, Aristotle postulates.
“The essence of each thing is that which belongs only to it and is not inherent in another, and the general is that which relates to many, for what is called general is precisely that which by its nature is inherent in more than one” [Metaphysics].
The individual also does not exist separately from the general. Things that have nothing in common with other things could not be known. Any science studies a certain class, or "genus", of things and establishes laws common to of this kind of things.
Aristotle did not even think of rejecting the value of general ideas. For him, as for Plato, the real “object of knowledge is the general.” However, he insists that the general be understood specifically, in inextricable connection with the individual.
Aristotle credits Socrates with defining the “beginnings of knowledge”—general ideas. Moreover, Socrates did not separate these ideas from individual things:
“Socrates did not consider either generalities or definitions to be separate from things. Supporters of ideas separated them and called this kind of existence ideas” [Metaphysics].
Plato's call to “turn away with all your soul” from individual, sensory-given phenomena meant a renunciation of experimental knowledge. Plato valued only two “speculative” sciences – mathematics and dialectics. Aristotle again turns philosophy to the sensory world and seeks to logically substantiate experimental knowledge. He himself does a lot of research into physical phenomena, living organisms, forms of government, and creates the first economic theory. However, most of all the philosopher is still interested in the human soul and thinking.
The soul has the ability to perceive the idea of a thing separately from its matter. Thus, the soul becomes similar to the perceived thing and takes on a form identical to the form of its object. Aristotle compares the soul to soft wax, on which the geometric outline of the external thing is imprinted. The rational soul is such an absolutely plastic and universal idea, capable of absorbing and cognizing all other ideas - the “idea of ideas.”
In the process of sensory perception, the ideal forms of things are purified, getting rid of their material substrate 4 . Next, reason comes into play: the subject of its activity is no longer individual things, but the pure forms of their existence - “ideas” as such.
Ideas of individual things form, so to speak, “leaves” on the tree of knowledge. Their definitions depend entirely on general ideas. For example, this is a house, it is high or low, white or yellow, stone or wood. All these definitions, in turn, are defined through even more general ones: a house is a type of structure, high and low are types of size, white or yellow are colors, etc.
Each subsequent definition is more general than the previous one. Ultimately, the mind comes up against definitions that cannot be imagined as “types” of something. These universal ones, i.e. Aristotle calls extremely general ideas “categories” (kategoria, Greek “accusation”).
essence
quantity and quality
place and time
position, condition, possession
action and suffering
"None of the others<категорий>, except essence, does not exist separately, they all speak about the subject “essence”” [Aristotle: Physics].
Categories form a kind of “skeleton” of nature and mind. These are universal forms of both being and thinking. In categories, the real merges with the conceivable, and this identity receives the definition of “truth” from Aristotle.
Categories are logically primary in relation to things. They refer to everything that exists at once and to no single thing. - Wait, how can that be? After all, Aristotle, in his dispute with Plato, rejected the reality of pure ideas, and categories are precisely that. They are not at all abstract creations of the human mind - on the contrary, it is our mind that owes its existence to them.
Trying to cope with this problem, Aristotle comes to the concept of a higher Mind, which is the primary source of categories and the creator of the universe. Setting everything in motion, the Mind remains unchanged and motionless.
So, ultimately, Aristotle made peace with Plato, admitting that there is one absolutely pure essence in the world, “separated from sensory things” - Reason. Following the example of the teacher, Aristotle calls the highest Reason “divine”, and even directly awards the title “God”.
Aristotle's God does not need praise, prayer or sacrifice. Instead, it requires that a person strive think as deeply, clearly and logically as possible. The temple of this deity is the entire Universe, and his priests are all thinking beings who have a love for wisdom.
Socrates brought philosophy down to earth. Isn't it better, instead of speculation about distant luminaries, to think about human affairs? A philosopher cannot reach the stars, but he can look inside the human soul and figure out how to make his thoughts harmonious and strict, and people’s actions reasonable.
Socrates also set an example of how one should take up the matter of reflection and self-knowledge. Plato and Aristotle were able to fulfill his philosophical behest - to create a full-fledged theory of the “ideal man”. In the Middle Ages, the works of these two geniuses of antiquity were almost equated with the Holy Scriptures and served as a kind of “Bible for philosophers.” For two thousand years, the ideal models of the universe they built seemed unattainable models. And during this time they themselves managed to grow together and merge with their models, turning into ideal types human life and thoughts.
“Plato and Aristotle! - Heinrich Heine exclaimed. – These are not only two systems, but also two different types of human nature, from time immemorial, in all costumes, more or less hostilely opposing each other. Throughout the Middle Ages, right up to the present day, this enmity lasted” [On the history of religion and philosophy in Germany, 1834].
Dreamy, mystical, platonic natures in all areas of life are opposed to practical, ordering natures - Aristotelian. Plato's thought hovers high above the earth, in the ether of pure ideas; Aristotle is, first of all, a scientist, prudent and sober, standing with both feet on the solid ground of experience and facts. Their debate about the nature of ideas would resume with renewed vigor in medieval universities, and to this day it is far from over.
1. Aristotle(384 - 322, BC) - ancient Greek philosopher of the classical period, student of Plato, educator of Alexander the Great.
In his philosophical activity Aristotle went through three main stages:
367 - 347 BC e. (20 years old) - worked, starting from the age of 17, at Plato’s Academy and was his student (until Plato’s death);
347 - 335 BC e. (12 years) - lived and worked in Pella, the capital of the Macedonian state, at the invitation of King Philip; raised Alexander the Great;
335 - 322 - founded his own philosophical school - the Lyceum (peripatetic school) and worked in it until his death. Aristotle's most famous works include:
“Organon”, “Physics”, “Mechanics”, “Metaphysics”, “On the Soul”, “History of Animals”, “Nicomachean Ethics”, “Rhetoric”, “Politics”, “Athenian Politics”, “Poetics”.
2. Aristotle divided philosophy into three types:
theoretical, studying the problems of existence, various spheres of existence, the origin of all things, the causes of various phenomena (received the name “primary philosophy”);
practical - about human activity, the structure of the state;
poetic.
It is believed that in fact Aristotle distinguished as the fourth part of philosophy logics.
3. Considering the problem of being, Aristotle came up with criticism of Plato's philosophy, according to which the surrounding world was divided into the “world of things” and the “world of pure (incorporeal) ideas”, and the “world of things” as a whole, like each thing separately, was only a material reflection of the corresponding “pure idea”.
Plato's mistake, according to Aristotle, is that he separated the "world of ideas" from real world and considered “pure ideas” without any connection with the surrounding reality, which has its own characteristics - extension, rest, movement, etc.
Aristotle gives his interpretation of this problem:
There are no “pure ideas” that are not associated with the surrounding reality, the reflection of which is all things and objects of the material world;
There are only isolated and specifically defined things;
These things are called individuals(translated as “indivisible”), that is, there is only a specific horse in a specific place, and not the “idea of a horse”, the embodiment of which this horse is, a specific chair located in a specific place and having its own characteristics, and not the “idea of a chair” , a specific house with precisely defined parameters, and not an “idea of a house,” etc.;
Individuals are the primary essence, and the types and genera of individuals (horses in general, houses in general, etc.) are secondary.
4. Since being is not “pure ideas” (“eidos”) and their material reflection (“things”), the question arises: what is being?
Aristotle tries to answer this question (what is being) through statements about existence that is, through categories(translated from ancient Greek - sayings).
Aristotle highlights 10 categories, which answer the question posed (about being), and one of the categories says what being is, and the other 9 give its characteristics. These categories are:
Essence (substance);
Quantity;