The main characteristic of the concept of the thing-in-itself is. Immanuel Kant's thing-in-itself
[German] Ding an sich], a philosophical term denoting the being of things in themselves, regardless of their knowledge (how they "are" or are known).
V. in s. is the central concept of the philosophy of I. Kant, in its foundation ascending to that already accepted in ancient philosophy concept of being itself. The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle uses the constructions of αὐτὸ ἐφ᾿ αυτοῦ (Plat. Theaet. 152 b) and αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτό (Theaet. 157a; arist. En. 1095a 27) - the thing “by itself”, the phenomenon “in itself” , - suggesting distinctions between being in oneself and being for another; in the Phaedo dialogue, discussing the problems of the beautiful, good, just and sacred “in itself”, Plato raised them to the concept of “being in itself (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι)” (Phaedo. 75d), implying the idea, Aristotle in Metaphysics 'understood form as 'being in itself' (Met. 1051b 29). Carefully considered by Plato in the Parmenides dialogue, the ontological problematic of the One “in itself” and “in itself” in relation to the “other” (Mind) and “other” (Parm. 143a - 160b) was of exceptional importance for all ancient philosophy; as a philosophical justification for theism and understanding of God as the Absolute, it had a great influence on the development of Hellenistic philosophy. In the teachings of Plotinus and Proclus, the constructions “in itself”, “in itself”, “one-in-itself” act as the basis for distinguishing between the One and the Mind.
Dr. V.'s source in s., related to antiquity, is associated with the doctrine of knowledge, with Parmenides' division of knowledge according to "truth" and according to "opinion" and the identification of truth with being, and opinion with the phenomenal world, with the concept developed on this basis primary and secondary qualities in Democritus, as well as with the logical and metaphysical problems of the doctrine of substance and accident in Aristotle.
This issue, together with the translations of Aristotle into Lat. language was inherited by philosophy cf. centuries; after blj. Augustine, Boethius and others. The terms “per se ipsum”, “per se”, “in itself” have found the widest distribution in the teachings about God and substance. In a modified form, it retained its significance in modern Europe. philosophy with its general orientation towards the theory of knowledge and the doctrine of method and a negative attitude towards scholasticism. In the disputes between the representatives of rationalism and empiricism (R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, J. Locke, J. Berkeley, D. Hume, G. W. Leibniz, etc.), a special place is occupied by the existence of substance (in itself), its knowability , relations of substance and accidents. Descartes, Locke, T. Hobbes, and others draw a line between the thing itself and how it appears to the cognizing subject, opposing the spatial and geometric properties of the things themselves (the so-called primary qualities) to the properties of things mediated by the perceptions of the subject (secondary qualities ). In him. philosophy, the term "an sich" (trans. Lat. in se), "in itself", is found in M. Mendelssohn, H. Wolf and A. G. Baumgarten.
On the history of the formation of the concept of "thing in itself" by Kant
V.'s problem in with. in Kant's teaching it is one of the most difficult problems of his philosophy; its interpretation gave rise to an extensive literature. Kant categorically rejected any attempts to abolish V. in s. The fact that V.'s problem in s. and its further development remained the most difficult and even mysterious for Kant himself, say the changes he made to the 2nd ed. "Critique of Pure Reason"; in other books, up to the last unfinished - "The transition from the metaphysical principles of natural science to physics", this problem continued to excite Kant (From the manuscript heritage. S. 450, 481, 486). The main difficulties that he encountered and tried to resolve by developing his doctrine “on the basis of distinguishing all objects in general into phenomena and noumena” were related to two interrelated aspects of this problem - understanding V. itself in s. and the possibility of its adequate expression in the language.
The division into noumena and phenomena appears in Kant's 1770 dissertation "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis" (On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world). Distinguishing sense cognition(appearances, phenomena) from the rational and intelligible (noumena), Kant referred to the “ancient schools” (Coll. Vol. 2, p. 390), “the excellent custom of antiquity to talk about the nature of phenomena and noumena” (Ibid., p. 393 ) and defined the difference between them: “... sensually cognized is a representation of things - as they appear to us, and rational representations - as they exist [in fact]” (Ibid., p. 390). Kant has not yet delimited with all definiteness and clarity the sphere of competence of reason and reason, theoretical and practical reason in relation to phenomena and noumena. In the same dissertation, general view 2 out of 4 antinomies, which, according to Kant, woke him “from a dogmatic sleep” (Letter to Harve dated September 21, 1798 // Treatises and Letters. P. 617), however, these mathematical antinomies, due to the lack of a special doctrines about V. in with. given without relying on the concept of V. in s. proofs of theses and antitheses, which was done later in the Critique of Pure Reason. In a letter written in connection with his dissertation to J. G. Lambert (dated September 2, 1770), Kant considered it possible to preface metaphysics with a special science - phaenomenologia generalis (general phenomenology), the task of which would include the definition of boundaries, “principles of sensibility, in order to prevent their impact on judgments about the objects of pure reason” (Ibid., p. 522). In a letter to M. Hertz (dated February 21, 1772), Kant wrote about his research in theoretical philosophy that he “still lacks something essential”, that he, “like others, has lost sight of ... the key to the whole mystery metaphysics…” (Works, Vol. 2, p. 430). There is reason to believe that this “key” was a new understanding of the noumenon as V. in s., a distinction in connection with the doctrine of the transcendental deduction of phenomena and V. in s. in their relation to sensibility, reason and reason, the definition of the metaphysical status of V. in s. in relation to freedom, morality and God.
The ambiguity of the term "thing in itself" in Kant's writings
Developed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, the doctrine of V. in s. (noumena) and things for us (phenomena) occupies a central place in his philosophy and is the inner basis that links together all parts of the Kantian system and determines its true novelty and originality. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the initial premise of the separation of phenomena (nature) and V. in s. knowledge emerges. Kant wrote: “Knowledge refers only to phenomena, while the thing-in-itself remains unknown to us” (Soch. Vol. 3, p. 89). Understanding phenomena as things given to us in sensory contemplation (intuition, Anschaung) and, due to this, conceivable through reason, Kant contrasted phenomena (nature) with V. in s., which are not given to us in any sensory experience and are unknowable, since the theoretical knowledge, according to Kant, involves the synthesis of sensibility and reason. Critics of Kant asked a well-founded question: if V. in s. unknowable, then on what basis can we talk about its existence and is it needed at all?
In his doctrine of knowledge, which combines rationalism and empiricism, experimental and a priori knowledge, Kant proceeded from certain fundamental premises, in particular, he believed that true knowledge is of an experimental nature, but experience itself is determined by the pre-experimental transcendental structures of sensibility and reason. Distinguishing between the material and formal conditions of experience, Kant referred to the former that “something” (relatively speaking, a thing) that affects us, causing sensations, and called it the “matter” of experience; to the form of experience (assuming it to be determinant), he attributed the a priori forms of sensual contemplation and the a priori categories of reason. The variety of sensations (the matter of experience) in the phenomenon is “ordered”, receives a certain meaning only when it is brought to unity by the a priori forms of sensory contemplation inherent in us (this means that the object is given) and is brought under the a priori categories of reason, which allow this object think. Applying the indefinite concept of “something” (V. in s.), “a certain x”, acting on us, Kant tried to avoid justified reproaches that a thing (as a phenomenon) owes its existence to a cognizing subject, which in this case acts not only as a necessary formal condition for its meaning, but also forms the "matter" of its existence. This metaphysical status of V. in s., despite its apophatic character, seems to be one of the foundations of all Kantian philosophy.
Considering space and time as a priori forms of sensory contemplation, Kant wrote: “... space and time are not definitions of things in themselves, but of phenomena: what things are in themselves, I don’t know and I don’t need to know this, because a thing can never appear me otherwise than in the appearance” (Ibid., p. 325). Thus, Kant distinguishes things in general, objects, objects (etc.) from V. in s., which in the strict sense of the word are not things. Due to the fact that the basis for distinguishing between phenomena and phenomena (or V. in s.) is the cognizing subject, even during the life of Kant, the opposition of cognizable phenomena to their unknowable essence (V. in s.), external to internal, arose. This erroneous interpretation, separating and opposing the phenomenon and essence in things, partly owes its origin to Kant himself, to-ry called V. lying in the “basis of phenomena” in p. “intelligible essences” (Prolegomena ... // Works. Vol. 4 (1), p. 134), referring to the possible “transcendental” application of the categories of reason outside of experience; at the same time, Kant was not always consistent and precise in his formulations, on the one hand, he invariably emphasized that nothing could be known about such an “intelligible essence” (its theoretical knowledge is impossible), moreover, the correct application of “essence” as an a priori category of reason permissible only in relation to natural phenomena (i.e., within the limits of possible experience); with others - he argued that it would be a mistake to believe "our experience is the only possible way of knowing things", therefore, one cannot consider "our contemplation in space and time as the only possible contemplation, and our discursive mind as a prototype of any possible mind" and accept “principles of the possibility of experience beyond the universal conditions of things in themselves” (Ibid., pp. 174-175).
Kant connected the desire to know what V. in s. is with the nature of man, with the metaphysical need inherent in the human mind to think the unconditional. Considering V. in with. as "unconditional", he contrasted them with phenomena, things for us, as "conditioned" by a priori structures of sensibility and reason. Relying on the proposition, “if the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions is given, i.e., the unconditional, thanks to which the conditioned was the only possible” (Coll. T. 3, p. 257), Kant made an attempt to explore the “unconditional”, i.e. ie V. in s., in 3 directions: as an absolute (unconditional) unity of the subject (the question of the soul); as the absolute unity of a number of conditions of phenomena (the question of the world as a whole); as the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general (the question of God). Trying to cognize the unconditional and moving from the conditioned to the unconditioned, the theoretical mind gets entangled in contradictions, Kant noted, goes beyond the limits of possible experience and uses rational concepts intended to cognize things for us (“conditioned”), as a means of knowing V. in s. ("unconditional"). The soul, the world as a whole, God (i.e., what constitutes the “absolutely unconditional”, V. in s.), according to Kant, cannot be the subject of an experimental theoretical knowledge, they are ideas; their non-experimental study (in the form of rational psychology, cosmology and theology) is of no scientific value for Kant.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, distinguishing between the real basis of existence and the logical one, formulated an extremely important proposition regarding the understanding of things and their difference from V. in s. According to Kant, “the possibility of a thing can be proved only by supporting the concept of this thing with contemplation corresponding to it, but it can never be proved by reference to the mere absence of contradiction in the concept of a thing” (Soch. Vol. 3, p. 308). That. with the help of the doctrine about V. in with. a demarcation line is drawn between the spatio-temporal world and the world that lies outside space and time, between what belongs to the metaphysics of nature, and what lies beyond its borders and belongs to the field of practical reason, to morality, religion. This is the boundary, which should help to avoid the supersensible application of theoretical reason to "things" that lie outside the limits of experimental knowledge, it separates experimental and non-experimental knowledge. In theoretical philosophy, Kant called V. in s. “a problematic concept”, a concept that “does not contain any contradiction ... but the objective reality of which cannot be known in any way” (Ibid., p. 309), and substantiated the unknowability of V. in p. by the fact that it is not an object or an object (Ibid., pp. 332-333).
In the preface to the 2nd ed. "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant wrote: "I cannot ... even admit the existence of God, freedom and immortality for the purposes of the necessary practical application reason, if I do not take away from the speculative reason also its claims to transcendental knowledge…”; and further: “... I had to limit (aufheben) knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Ibid., p. 95)
The transition from theoretical to practical reason, according to Kant, presupposes a change in t. sp. on V. in s., to-paradise now receives a new meaning. If in the theoretical philosophy of V. in with. predominantly considered in a negative sense, as a boundary, then in practical terms - V.'s understanding in s. as being outside nature and natural necessity dominating in nature, allow Kant to connect V. in s. with freedom, develop the principles of autonomous ethics, the doctrine of the individual, the immortality of the soul, eternal life, retribution, faith in God and religion. Kant did not oppose practical reason to theoretical reason, but delimited their areas. The area of application of practical reason is the area of freedom (“unconditional”), V. in s., understood as the world of ideas. Freedom, according to Kant, is the essential definition of man; as a natural being, man is subject to natural necessity and belongs to the spatio-temporal world, but as a being possessing a soul (V. in s.), he belongs to the timeless moral world and asserts his freedom by establishing a moral law for himself. In his morality, a person, Kant believed, rises to faith in God, the Creator, the Judge. God, the soul, the immortality of man, according to Kant, are inaccessible to theoretical reason, cannot become the subject of experimental research; this is V. in s., the ideas of practical reason, the postulates of faith. Rejecting experimental knowledge of God and dogmatic theology, Kant opposed them with philosophical faith, his own version of moral theology.
V.'s problem in with. in post-Kantian philosophy
I. G. Fichte, who considered himself a follower of Kant, considered V. in p. as unnecessary for transcendental philosophy - this could not but cause an angry rebuke from Kant (Statement on the Science of Fichte // Treatises and Letters, pp. 624-626). Before Fichte, F. G. Jacobi spoke about the contradictions associated with the concept of V. in s., who, at the same time, understood the significance of this doctrine for Kant's philosophy. F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel criticized the doctrine of V. in s.; in their theoretical constructions, they adhered to the principle of the identity of being and thinking, which excluded the existence of V. in the village. in the Kantian sense. For Hegel, the terms "in itself", "for the other", "in itself and for itself", understood as thesis, antithesis and synthesis, form a triad. A. Schopenhauer highly appreciated Kant's doctrine of V. in s., but believed that he spoiled this doctrine in the 2nd ed. "Critique of Pure Reason"; besides, according to Schopenhauer, Kant did not understand the main thing that V. in with. is the will. F. Nietzsche rejected the doctrine of V. in s. as fixing the division of the world into earthly and heavenly, he caustically ridiculed him, arguing that V. in s. "worthy of" Homeric laughter "" (PSS. T. 3. S. 5-7, 25-27). In neo-Kantianism, the theme of V. in s. occupied an important place: for G. Cohen, P. Natorp, and others. not being, but the principle of purpose, the “boundary concept” (Grenzbegriff), without which the theory of knowledge cannot do; V. Windelband saw Kant's mistake in his denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition as a special ability, by means of which the Divine spirit creates V. in s. M. Heidegger, a representative of existentialism, explained the noumenon as the unknowable posited in pure reason, which forms the basis of phenomena, and thereby denied the ontological status of V. in s.
Religious philosophy and theology in Russia about V. in s.
P. D. Yurkevich in his work “Reason according to the teachings of Plato and experience according to the teachings of Kant” drew an analogy and explored the differences that exist between a thing and an idea, a phenomenon and V. in a village. (S. 498-500). Vl. S. Solovyov is the main drawback of the Kantian doctrine of V. in the village. saw in his absence of a thoughtful doctrine of transcendental subject, “the universal mind, whose thinking creates and determines all objects and phenomena with its universal and necessary forms and categories” (Kant, p. 373). S. N. Trubetskoy in Art. “On the nature of human consciousness” noted the dual nature of V. in s.: it is “the idea of reason” and “irrational source” (p. 52) of empirical knowledge; he considered erroneous understanding of V. in s. (“undoubtedly” absolute) outside the “universal consciousness” (p. 55). GG Shpet in his work "The problem of causality in Hume and Kant" adhered to a strictly phenomenalist interpretation of Kant's doctrine of knowledge; believed that only t. overcome the contradictions associated with the doctrine of V. in the village. (S. 186). L. M. Lopatin in Art. “Kant’s Teachings on Cognition” wrote that Kant’s criticism of the evidence for the existence of God and the opposition of the phenomenal world to the noumenal world creates the appearance of the priority of the phenomenal world, in fact, outside the sensual consciousness it is “nothing”, while the noumenal world (V. in s.) there is a world of reason, morality, faith, the only conceivable world (p. 62). N. O. Lossky in his "Introduction to Philosophy" considered the doctrine of V. in the village. dogmatic premise of Kant's philosophy and associated with him all the shortcomings of his theory of knowledge (p. 227). E. N. Trubetskoy in the book. “Metaphysical Assumptions of Cognition” noted contradictions in the understanding of V. in s.: contrary to Kant’s assertions about its unknowability, the Critique of Pure Reason contains both “very definite negative knowledge” about it (p. 120) and positive knowledge (V. in pp. as "an unknown reality x" - S. 122). Holy Pavel Florensky considered V. in the village. one of those metaphysical postulates of Kant, which fix the isolation and isolation of man from God, justify subjectivism and an erroneous understanding of religion within reason; in the cycle of works "Philosophy of the cult" he interpreted V. in p. Kant as "cult-struggle" (p. 106), considering them only in relation to phenomena.
In some works of the XIX century. according to the Orthodox dogmatics accepted the division into "in itself" and "in relation" to the world. Yes, Mr. Macarius (Bulgakov) in "Orthodox Dogmatic Theology" (St. Petersburg, 1868) adhered to the following main division: "God in Himself" and "God in His general relationship to the world and man." This division, close in form to Kant's teaching, has nothing in common with him in content. Metropolitan Macarius noted the main conditions of "our" knowledge of God in Himself: 1) "God was pleased to reveal to us about Himself"; 2) The Church is the guardian of Revelation (T. 1, p. 74).
V. N. Lossky in his “Dogmatic Theology” used the phrases “God in Himself” and “God Who Reveals Himself”, he connects with the first - apophatic knowledge (“we cannot think of God in Himself, in His essence, in His innermost secret "(p. 204), with the second - the path of cataphatic knowledge. Lossky proceeds from the principle of the inseparable unity of the immanent and transcendent, apophatic and cataphatic, a unity rooted in the mystery of the Trinity and revealed in trinity theology.
Source: Kant I . Cit.: In 6 vols. M., 1964-1966; he is. Treatises and letters. M., 1980; he is. From the manuscript heritage. M., 2000.
Lit.: Windelband W . Über die verschiedenen Phasen der kantischen Lehre vom Dinge an sich // Zeitschr. Wiss. Phil. I. 1877; Lehman R. Kants Lehre vom Ding an sich. B., 1878; Shcherbina A . M . Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself. K., 1904; Yurkevich P . D . Reason according to the teachings of Plato and experience according to the teachings of Kant // Philos. prod. M., 1990. S. 466-526; Spat G. The problem of causality in Hume and Kant. K., 1907; Trubetskoy S. N . On the nature of human consciousness // Op. M., 1908. T. 2. S. 1-110; Solovyov V . WITH . Kant // Collection. cit.: In 10 t. Pg.,. T. 10. S. 345-380; Brysz S. Das Ding an sich und die empirische Anschauung in Kants Philosophie. Halle, 1913; Lopatin L . M . Kant's doctrine of knowledge // aka. Philos. characteristics and speech. M., 1914. S. 56-69; Vysheslavtsev B . P . Fichte's ethics. M., 1914; New ideas in philosophy. SPb., 1914. No. 12; Trubetskoy E. N . Metaphysical Assumptions of Cognition: The Experience of Overcoming Kant and Kantianism. M., 1917; Lossky N . ABOUT . Introduction to philosophy. Pg., 19182. Part 1; Adikes E ., von . Kant und das Dinge an sich. S.l., 1924; Noll B. Kants und Fichtes Frage nach dem Ding. fr. /M., 1936; Heimsoeth H. Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein und Dinge an sich // Studien zur Philosophie I. Kants. Bonn, 1956. Bd. 1; Schaw G. Das Problem des Dinges an sich in der englischen Kant-interpretation. Bonn, 1967; Prauss G. Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. Bonn, 1974; Heidegger M . Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernuft. WS. 1927/28 // GA. Fr./M., 1977. Bd. 25; Gaidenko P . P . Monadology of Leibniz and Kant's concept of "things in themselves" // Ethics of Kant and modernity. Riga, 1989; Kant and Philosophy in Russia. M., 1994 [Bibliography]; Cassirer E. The Life and Teachings of Kant. SPb., 1997; Florensky P ., Priest . Philosophy of the cult. M., 2004. S. 99-125.
A. T. Kazaryan
In connection with the epistemological problem of the objectivity of human cognition: is it capable of giving knowledge about the “true” being, or is it forced to confine itself to subjective knowledge about the “manifestations” of being? The terms “in ourselves” and “for us” were first used by A.G. Baumgarten. The concept "B. in with.” became one of the main in the philosophy of I. Kant. According to Kant, it is limited to some phenomena, and “V. in with.” there is that basis of these phenomena, which a person is not able to touch either with feelings or with reason. Criticism of Kant's "V. in with.” went in several directions: the objective “V. in s"; their existence was recognized, but their unknowability was criticized; it was argued that there was no difference between the phenomenon and "V. in with.” no, but there is only a difference between what is already known and what is not yet known.
Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .
THING IN ITSELF
according to Kant, existing for itself, regardless of the cognizing subject, "true" being, whose "manifestations" are empirical things, and to which these "manifestations" point. see also Cipher; Reality.
Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2010 .
THING IN ITSELF
THING IN ITSELF (German selbst) - philosophical, the content of which is the whole set of objects of the external world, independent of the consciousness and will of people. The concept of the thing-in-itself is organically connected with the development of materialism. According to J. Locke, there is “knowledge of the beginnings, properties and actions of things, what they are in themselves” (Thoughts about education .- Soch., vol. 3. M., 1982, p. 586). This materialistic principle J. Berkeley opposed "objects in themselves (objects in themselves) or outside the mind" (Treatise on the principles of human knowledge.-Coll. M., 1978, p. 182). Unlike Berkeley, D. Hume believed that there is “some unknown, necessary as the cause of our perceptions” (Study of human knowledge.-Soch., vol. 2. M., 1965, pp. 158-159).
I. Kant, who developed not without the influence of Humean skepticism, combines the recognition of the objective reality of the thing in itself (one of the foundations of his teaching) with the categorical denial of their knowability: “Things are given to us as objects of our senses that are outside of us, but about what they are by themselves, we know nothing, but we know only their phenomena, i.e., the representations that they produce in us, influencing our feelings ”(Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, which could appear as .-Op. in 6 volumes, vol. 4, part 1. M., 1965, p. 105). Things in themselves, in Kant's understanding of them, are not things at all, since they are interpreted as non-spatial (and therefore not extended), timeless, something whose existence, Kant claims, is beyond doubt, since phenomena presuppose what appears; this alone can be things in themselves. It remains, however, unexplained why things in themselves, once they are, remain absolutely unknowable: the gap between the fundamentally unknowable objective reality of things in themselves and the fully cognizable subjective reality of the world of appearances is the main feature of Kant's theory of knowledge.
However, the concept of a thing-in-itself refers Kant not only to a transcendent something that evokes sensible
acceptance. After all, if man, as a cognizer, creates (it is true, by means of things in themselves independent of him) phenomena, then he cannot be only a phenomenon, i.e., only a representation. Therefore, a person, according to Kant, is not only, but also a thing in itself. This applies in particular to the human will, which is not free as empirical, but free as a thing-in-itself. Kant also distinguishes between empirically conditioned and pure reason, not free from sensual impulses, which “is not a phenomenon and is not subject to any conditions of sensibility”, that is, it is also a thing in itself (Critique of Pure Reason.-Coll. in 6 vol., vol. 3. M., 1964, p. 491). Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected the concept of the thing-in-itself as an unacceptable concession to materialism. So did the neo-Kantians, for whom the thing-in-itself is nothing more than the concept of the limit of knowledge. Meanwhile, Kant's "things in themselves" makes sense: a fundamental denial of what goes beyond the boundaries of possible experience and, therefore, a denial of the transcendent as an object of knowledge.
T. I. Oizerman
New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001 .
Synonyms:
See what "THING IN ITSELF" is in other dictionaries:
thing in itself- THE THING IN ITSELF (German Ding an sich, Ding an sich selbst, sometimes Gegenstand an sich) is one of the central concepts of the critical philosophy of I. Kant, known, however, in one or another version and in the previous philosophical tradition. In the German... ... Encyclopedia of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
- "THING IN ITSELF" (German Ding an sich, Ding an sich selbst), a philosophical concept, the most important in Kant's philosophy. This term had a fairly wide circulation even before Kant (see KANT Immanuel), in particular, in the Wolffian (see WOLF Christian) school. IN… … encyclopedic Dictionary
- (Ding an sich; thing in itself; chose en soi; cosa in se) - philosophy. a term meaning things as they exist in themselves (or in themselves), as opposed to how they are for us - in our knowledge. This difference has been discussed in... Philosophical Encyclopedia
Thing In Itself- Thing In Itself ♦ Chose En Soi A thing considered as such, regardless of our perception or our knowledge of it. In particular, Kant - regardless of the a priori forms of sensory perception (space and time) and reason ... ... Philosophical Dictionary of Sponville
- (Ding an sich; things in itself; chose en soi; cosa in se), philos. a term meaning things as they exist in themselves (or "in themselves"), as opposed to as they are "for us" in our knowledge. The difference has been considered... Philosophical Encyclopedia
- (“Thing in itself”) is a philosophical term meaning things as they exist in themselves (or “in themselves”), as opposed to how they are “for us” in our knowledge. This difference was considered in antiquity, but of particular importance ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
- 'THING IN ITSELF' is one of the central concepts of epistemology, and then of Kant's ethics. This concept, denoting things as they exist outside of us, in themselves (in themselves), in contrast to how they are 'for us', existed in philosophy before ... ... History of Philosophy: Encyclopedia
One of the central concepts of epistemology, and then of Kant's ethics. This concept, denoting things as they exist outside of us, on their own (in themselves), in contrast to what they are “for us”, existed in philosophy before Kant and was ... ... Newest philosophical dictionary
- (German Ding an sich), a philosophical concept meaning things as they exist in themselves (in themselves), as opposed to how they appear to us in knowledge; one of the central concepts of I. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ... Modern Encyclopedia
In the second half of the XVIII - first half of the XIX century. in Germany there were several outstanding thinkers living at different times who created grandiose philosophical teachings. Their intellectual activity went down in history under the name German classical philosophy. Its ancestor was Immanuel Kant.
The starting point of his views is the assertion that, before knowing the world, it is necessary to find out whether we can, in principle, know it, and if so, how much. It is necessary to establish the possibilities of our knowledge, its limits. The main cognitive tool is the mind, therefore, first of all, it is necessary to find out the abilities and capabilities of our mind. Kant called their comprehensive study criticism, and philosophy, in his opinion, should not be a comprehension of the external world, but a criticism of the mind, that is, the study of its structure, specifics and laws. The German philosopher said that the teachings of David Hume prompted him to this conclusion. Let us recall the latter’s assertion that the world is inevitably hidden from us and therefore knowledge is possible not about it, but about one’s own states (sensations, feelings, thoughts, etc.) or that the subject of philosophy can be quite accessible to us subjective (internal, mental, spiritual) reality, but by no means objective (external). Kant also thought the same: how can we know what the world is like if we are not dealing with it itself, but with its reflection in our consciousness, due to which the latter can and should be the main object of philosophical attention.
That which exists by itself, he called noumenon or a "thing in itself" that is unknowable; what we see, how the really existing appears to us, he designated by the term phenomenon, or "a thing for us". The main question is to what extent the first corresponds to the second, or to what extent phenomena can provide us with information about noumena. Following Hume, Kant argued that these two areas are strictly demarcated, what we see is not at all the same as it really is. Our mind contains certain innate or a priori(pre-experimental) forms of consciousness, under which we, as it were, adjust the world around us, squeeze it into them, and it exists in our representation not at all in the form that it really is, but in the way it can only be in these a priori forms.
Let us recall the teaching of Sextus Empiricus: every living being is arranged in a certain way, and therefore it perceives reality not as it is in itself, but always sees only what it can and should see due to its structure. In humans, Kant says, the sense organs and mind are also arranged in a special way, and we perceive the world around us exactly as it should be according to our ideas, that is, consciousness does not conform to real things, knowing them, but, on the contrary, things - with forms of consciousness. In other words, we endow the world with our original, innate, pre-experimental knowledge and comprehend in reality what we ourselves put into it.
For example, we believe that time really exists. But let's think about this concept, because it exists only in the human mind, being a specific term that no other living being has. And if there were no man on earth at all, then who would talk about time, because in this case this concept could not exist anywhere, in any way and never. What then is "time": reality or our fiction, which we are trying to endow with reality? But the same can be said about everything else. Let's mentally remove a person from the world, imagine a reality without him. What will the world be like then? Is it really the same as now? But then who will call one object a tree, another an animal, and a third a river, who then will say that a mountain is higher than a plant, that spring foliage is bright green, that birds fly, and the like? After all, there is no being who could pronounce all these concepts and see reality through their prism. We are simply too accustomed to our idea of the world and consider it to be the world itself, our subjective perception of reality is so firmly stuck to it that we have not noticed for a long time that this reality is not at all what we imagine it to be.
Let us recall an operation well known to everyone since childhood: a simple word (for example, “pan”) must be repeated 30–50 times, while constantly pondering its meaning. After a few dozen repetitions, this word will lose its meaning for us, turn into an absurd set of sounds, and we will be surprised to ask ourselves: why is this thing called just such a “strange” term, and not another? We are used to the fact that one object is called a “cat”, another is called a “planet”, and the third is called a “flower”, and we don’t think at all about the connection of the name with the object itself, we never ask ourselves why a tree is a “tree”. In the same way, we do not think about the connection between our ideas about the world and the world itself (although in fact there is no connection) and do not ask ourselves whether reality is really the way we see it (without suspecting that it is completely different).
But if we do not know anything about the world, then how to navigate in it and live in general. Here Kant, just like Hume, says that there is nothing terrible in our ignorance of reality, in theoretical ignorance, it is enough that we can live in an incomprehensible world and orientate ourselves quite well in it. It is only necessary to find out whether there is (or can be) something common and unconditional for all people, some idea, or conviction, or knowledge, in which no one could doubt at all. Such a principle is the innate idea of goodness, which is invariably represented in the minds of any normal (not mentally ill) person. Each of us knows perfectly well what is good and what is bad, what can and cannot be done, and considers good, like evil, to be something really existing, and not just a human invention. Suppose you were offered to kill a person, guaranteed that there would be no legal punishment, and also presented convincing arguments in favor of the fact that good and evil are nonsense and just a fantasy of the mind, that in reality they do not exist and therefore everyone is free to do absolutely everything. You have been proved that you can kill, will you kill? Of course not. Something is holding you back from this, you, in spite of any arguments, see that this cannot be done, that this is evil and a crime. You do not need any proof, since you know this for sure, or rather, you do not know, but you believe in it completely and unconditionally.
Such faith is the innate idea of goodness, which is firmly embedded in our consciousness, its integral part and keeps us from impermissible actions. After all, if we sincerely considered good to be an arbitrary fiction, then we would create everything in a row. This means that we unequivocally believe that goodness exists in itself as a kind of reality. Where does this idea come from in our mind? From there, where the sun is in the sky, the heart is in the chest, the wings of the bird. What follows from it? After all, if good, as we believe, actually exists, then there must be some eternal source of it or some unshakable guarantor, which can only be God. In other words, if we inevitably believe in the existence of good in reality, then, as a result, we also necessarily believe in God as the indispensable cause of this good. This reasoning is Kant's famous proof of the existence of God, which is most often called the moral argument. It will be the sixth in a row after the five we have considered in the chapter on medieval philosophy.
Kant says that it is impossible to prove or disprove the existence of God in any logical way. Therefore, his thought can only conditionally be called an argument, because in it God is derived from morality. Do we want, asks the German philosopher, to live in a world that is organized according to the laws of evil, where the villains triumph and the innocent suffer, where only lies and meanness, violence and cruelty flourish, where crime is considered a virtue and only injustice is possible, where the most terrible and unimaginable things? Of course you don't want to. We involuntarily believe that the world in which we live is not like that, that there is truth, justice, goodness, and order in it. And since we are so firmly convinced of this, we must necessarily recognize the existence of God as a guarantee of the reality and inviolability of all of the above. Such an assumption is necessary, since without it our existence is unthinkable. Thus, if God did not exist, then we still could not believe in him, which means that he should have been created, or - if God does not exist, then he still exists. This is how paradoxical, but at the same time quite convincing, the Kantian argument sounds.
The idea of goodness, inevitable for our consciousness, can and should become the universal principle of relationships between people. How much better and happier human life will be if everyone observes one simple rule: treat others as you would like to be treated yourself. How many misfortunes and misfortunes could be avoided if all of us were always guided by this moral requirement and considered it unconditional, undoubted and obligatory!
check yourself
1. What needs to be clarified before knowing the world, from the point of view of Kant?
2. Why is Kantian philosophy called critical or critique of reason?
3. What are noumena and phenomena in Kant's teaching?
4. What did Kant call a priori forms of consciousness? What new idea of knowledge was proposed by him?
5. What does Kant's moral argument for the existence of God sound like?
Kant's "things in themselves" and "things for us"
For the first time, Kant asks the question of the limits of human knowledge. In his opinion, all objects and phenomena ("things") are divided into two classes. He calls the first class "things in themselves." Things in themselves are objects and phenomena that exist independently of our consciousness and cause our sensations. About what is beyond our consciousness, we cannot say anything definite. Therefore, according to Kant, it would be more correct to refrain from judging this at all. Kant calls the second class of objects "things for us". It is a product of the activity of a priori forms of our consciousness. An example of this opposition can be the antinomy of the concepts of "gravity" and "mass". The first cannot be understood and measured, but can only be experienced. The second is quite understandable and researchable.
Space and time, according to Kant, are not objective forms of the existence of matter, but only forms of human consciousness, a priori forms of sensual contemplation. Kant raised the question of the nature of the basic concepts, categories, with the help of which people cognize nature, but he also solved this question from the standpoint of apriorism. So, he considered causality not an objective connection, a law of nature, but an a priori form of human reason. All categories of reason, as already noted above, Kant declared a priori forms of consciousness of philosophical thought.
a thing in itself, a thing for us
“Thing-in-itself” and “Thing-for-us” are philosophical terms that mean: first, things as they exist: by themselves, independently of us and our knowledge; the second - things as they are revealed by a person in the process of cognition. These terms acquired special meaning in the 18th century. in connection with the denial of the possibility of knowing "things in themselves". Stated by Locke, this proposition was substantiated in detail by Kant, who argued that we are dealing only with a phenomenon that is completely divorced from the “thing in itself”. For Kant, the “thing in itself” also means supernatural, unknowable, essences inaccessible to experience: God, freedom, etc. Dialectical materialism, proceeding from the possibility of an exhaustive knowledge of things, considers knowledge as the process of transforming a “thing in itself” into a “thing for us » based on practice (Cognition, Theory and Practice).
4 option
Rational ethics of Socrates
The ethics of Socrates is the ethics of individual personal responsibility. The responsible action of a person is an action for which a person can and is obliged to answer, because it completely depends on him. Socrates is just looking for such a set of actions, the last and decisive word about which would belong to the individual himself - these are actions that are based on knowledge. Knowledge is the channel through which a person exercises control over his choice. They indicate the area of responsible behavior.
Anyone who wants to really refute Socrates must prove that there are some other grounds, besides knowledge, that allow a person to act responsibly, to control his own behavior. Virtue asserts itself in the form of knowledge. It is also the most important goal of knowledge. Reason is not given to man in order to explore what is “in the heavens and under the earth,” but in order to become perfect. Socrates believes that it is necessary "to take care first and most of all not about the body and not about money, but about the soul, so that it is as good as possible."
The state of human morals does not allow anyone to be considered wise. Thus, with the thesis “virtue is knowledge”, Socrates defines morality as a space for the responsible behavior of an individual, and with the thesis “I know that I know nothing”, he elevates it to a personality-forming factor, more important than power, money, other external and bodily goods.
Transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism
The Ptolemaic system, although with great difficulty, made it possible to calculate the orbits of the planets, which was important for astrology. Adhering to the teachings of Aristotle, the church supported the geocentric system of the world.
Nicolaus Copernicus proposed a simpler heliocentric system of the world for calculations and calculated the radii of the planets' orbits in relation to the radius of the Earth's orbit (in astronomical units) and calculated the sidereal periods of the planets, and most importantly, simply explained the loop-like motion of the planets. In the Middle Ages, the church severely persecuted supporters of the heliocentric system. So, according to the verdict of the Inquisition, the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno, a follower of the teachings of Copernicus, was burned in Rome.
Dualism in the philosophy of Descartes
5. The scientific method of Descartes - deduction.
6. The doctrine of "innate ideas" and the purpose of philosophy.
1. The founder of rationalismcounts Rene Descartes(1596 - 1650) 1 prominent French philosopher and mathematician. The merit of Descartes before philosophy is that he:
substantiated the leading role of reason in cognition;
put forward the doctrine of substance, its attributes and modes;
put forward a theory about the scientific method of cognition and about "innate ideas".
2. The fact that the basis of being and knowledge is the mind,Descartes proved as follows:
· there are many things and phenomena in the world that are incomprehensible to a person (do they exist? what are their properties? For example: is there a God? is the Universe finite? etc.);
On the other hand, absolutely any phenomenon, any thing can be doubted (does the world around exist? Does the Sun shine? Is the soul immortal? etc.)
Therefore, the doubt really exists, this fact is obvious and does not need proof;
Doubt is a property of thought, which means that a person, doubting, thinks;
a real person can think;
Therefore, thinking is the basis of both being and cognition;
· since thinking is the work of the mind, then the basis of being and cognition can be only mind.
3. studying the problem of being Descartes tries to deduce basic concept, which would characterize the essence of being. As such, the philosopher derives the concept of substance.
Substance- is everything that exists, not needing for its existence in anything but itself. Only one substance has such a quality (the absence of the need for its existence in anything other than itself) and it can only be God, who is eternal, uncreated, indestructible, omnipotent, is the source and cause of everything.
Being the Creator, God created the world, also consisting of substances. Substances created by God (single things, ideas) also have the main quality of substance - they do not need their existence in anything other than themselves. Moreover, the created substances are self-sufficient only in relation to each other. In relation to the highest substance - God, they are derivative, secondary and dependent on him (since they were created by him).
Descartes divides all created substances into two kinds: material (things), spiritual (ideas).
At the same time, it highlights root properties (attributes) each kind of substances: extension - for material; thinking is for the spiritual.
This means that all material substances have a feature common to all - extension (in length, width, height, depth) and are divisible to infinity.
Nevertheless, spiritual substances have the property of thinking and, conversely, are indivisible.
The remaining properties of both material and spiritual substances are derived from their root properties (attributes) and were named by Descartes modes.(For example, the modes of extension are form, movement, position in space, etc.; the modes of thought are feelings, desires, sensations.)
Man, according to Descartes, consists of two substances that are different from each other - material (bodily-extended) and spiritual (thinking).
Man is the only creature in which both (both material and spiritual) substances are combined and exist, and this allowed him to rise above nature.
4. Based on the fact that a person combines two substances in himself, the idea follows dualism(duality) of man.
From the point of view of dualism, Descartes also solves the "basic question of philosophy" - the dispute about what is primary - matter or consciousness, is meaningless. Matter and consciousness are combined only in a person, and since a person is dualistic (combines two substances - material and spiritual), then neither matter nor consciousness can be "primary - they always exist and are two different manifestations of a single being.
5. When studying cognition problems Descartes places special emphasis on the scientific method.
The essence of his idea is that the scientific method, which is used in physics, mathematics, and other sciences, has practically no application in the process of cognition. Consequently, by actively applying the scientific method in the process of cognition, it is possible to significantly advance the cognitive process itself (according to Descartes: "to transform knowledge from handicraft to industrial production").
As this scientific method, it is proposed deduction(but not in a strictly mathematical sense - from the general to the particular, but in a philosophical one).
The meaning of the philosophical epistemological method of Descartes is that in the process of cognition to rely only on absolutely reliable knowledge and with the help of reason, using completely reliable logical methods, to obtain (deduce) new, also reliable knowledge. Only using deduction as a method, according to Descartes, the mind can achieve reliable knowledge in all areas of knowledge.
Also, Descartes, when using the rationalistic-deductive method, suggests applying the following research methods:
allow in the study as starting points only true, absolutely reliable, proven by reason and logic, knowledge beyond any doubt;
to divide a complex problem into separate, simpler tasks;
consistently move from known and proven issues to unknown and unproven ones;
strictly observe the sequence, the logical chain of the study, do not miss a single link in the logical chain of the study.
6. At the same time, Descartes puts forward the doctrine of innate ideas. The essence of this theory is that most knowledge is achieved through cognition and deduction, but there is a special kind of knowledge that does not need any proof. These truths (axioms) are initially obvious and reliable. Such axioms Descartes calls "innate ideas" that always exist in the mind of God and the Mind of man and are transmitted from generation to generation. These ideas can be of two types: concepts, judgments.
The following can serve as an example of innate concepts: God (exists); "number" (exists), "will", "body", "soul", "structure", etc.; innate judgments: "the whole is greater than its part", "nothing comes from nothing", "one cannot be and not be at the same time".
Descartes was a supporter of not abstract, but practical knowledge. The goals of knowledge, according to Descartes, are:
expansion and deepening of human knowledge about the world around;
using this knowledge to extract the maximum benefit of nature for man;
invention of new technical means;
improvement of human nature.
As ultimate goal knowledge philosopher saw the dominance of man over nature.
"Thing in itself" - perhaps one of the most loosely interpreted in colloquial language philosophical concepts. Someone designates them a system closed on itself, someone - any mysterious phenomenon, and some call so secretive acquaintances who are difficult to understand. The dictionary allows the last two interpretations, but the original philosophical meaning of the concept is much more complex and interesting. In the new issue of the "Vocabulary" column on T&P - about how the mind sets us free and what sound a falling tree makes when no one is around.
A variety of interpretations of the term have arisen, among other things, due to a controversial translation. The Russian translation of the expression "Ding an sich" - "thing in itself" - appeared in the 19th century and began to be used in all philosophical publications. But in the 20th century it was criticized as insufficiently accurate, because the literal meaning of the German expression "an sich" is "in itself", "independent". The Russian combination “in itself”, firstly, does not mean independence, and secondly, it adds to the concept of mysticism: one can imagine a kind of black box with unknown contents. Therefore, in some modern translations of Kant, a more accurate translation is used - "the thing in itself."
This concept has a long history. Even the ancient Greek philosophers thought about the fact that things that exist on their own and are not perceived by consciousness differ from the same things in our perception. This is how the Platonic concept of eidos appeared - an idea (or a kind of ideal model) of a thing, which in different versions is embodied in real world. For example, there is the eidos of the table - the ideal and universal concept of the table, which is the prototype of all tables in the world. Real-life furniture is only an imperfect embodiment of this concept.
When it seems to us that we are interacting with the outside world, we are not dealing with it, but with our ideas about it. So we cannot comprehend the thing-in-itself
The idea of the objective existence of things finally took shape in the 18th century in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant interprets the "thing in itself" as something that exists independently of consciousness and acts on our senses. The world of "things in themselves" becomes the source material for our knowledge of the world. It turns out that our experience is a synthesis of the sensual content (matter) that we receive from the world of things in themselves, and the subjective form that this matter takes in our consciousness. An illustrative example is the famous philosophical question posed by Kant's predecessor philosopher George Berkeley: "Is the sound of a falling tree heard in the forest if no one is around?"
At first glance, it seems that in the absence of an observer, the same thing happens to the tree that would happen in our presence. But there is a snag - from the point of view of not only philosophy, but also physics. Here is how the editors of Scientific American answered this question: “Sound is the vibrations of the air transmitted to our senses through the ear system and recognized as such only in our nerve centers. A falling tree or other mechanical impact will vibrate the air. If there are no ears to hear, there will be no sound.”
When things in themselves act on our sense organs, we perceive them as phenomena, impressions. And, in fact, when it seems to us that we are interacting with the outside world, we are not dealing with it, but with our ideas about it. So we cannot comprehend the thing-in-itself - we can only know our own reactions to it. “It is impossible not to recognize as a scandal for philosophy and universal human reason the need to accept only on faith the existence of things outside of us ... and the impossibility of opposing any satisfactory proof of this existence, if someone thought to question it,” Kant summed up.
It turns out that the world of "things in themselves" is inaccessible to the senses. What about the mind? Theoretical reason (that is, science), according to Kant, is also inaccessible. But there is a loophole: this world opens up to the so-called practical reason, or rational will. Practical reason is the reason that guides human actions, establishes moral principles and gives us freedom.
Freedom, according to Kant, is independence from the causal relationships of the sensually perceived world. Indeed, in the “real” world, no event occurs without a reason. And in the world of inner freedom, a rational being can start a logical chain from anything, creating its own laws. Therefore, Kant calls the human will autonomous, and he also considers a person in some way a “thing in itself”.
However, not all philosophers agreed with Kant's concept. For example, Hegel believed that the thing in itself is only the initial moment, a stage in the development of the thing. “So, for example, a person is a child in himself, a sprout is a plant in itself ... All things are first in themselves, but the matter does not stop there.” The thing-in-itself, firstly, develops by entering into diverse relationships, and, secondly, it can be known through our impressions of it.
How to say
Wrong: "This smart home is a thing in itself: it regulates the temperature and is responsible for security." That's right - "self-regulating system".
Correct: "God is a thing in itself: he is unknowable, and we cannot present empirical evidence of his existence."
That's right: "I still can't understand Colin's motives: he's a thing in itself."