Existence. Philosophical Dictionary What is existing existence
In becoming, being and nothingness are only vanishing moments. The transition of being into nothing is disappearance, nothing into being is emergence. “Thanks to its internal contradiction, becoming falls into a unity in which both moments are sublated. The result of becoming, therefore, represents existence” (227). In the main text, therefore, Hegel used the concept of contradiction, which as a category should appear for him only in the doctrine of essence.
Existent being is the resolution of the contradiction of pure being and nothingness; it is already a definite being. In becoming, the result of the contradiction between being and nothingness becomes one of them - being, which contains within itself the negation of nothingness, i.e. become being.
In the movement from being through nothingness and becoming to a definite, established being, the direction of development is revealed from simple, indefinite to more and more definite, complex, from lower to higher, richer content. However, Hegel does not yet formulate the idea of directionality explicitly. The idea of directionality is carried out through the sequence of categories chosen by the philosopher. This idea acts as fundamental in the hidden foundation of constructing a system of categories.
Development from being through nothingness and becoming to a certain being is the result of the movement of contradiction. In the notes, Hegel once again gives a vivid description of the dialectical way of thinking. “...There is absolutely nothing at all in which we could not and would not be forced to detect a contradiction, that is, opposite definitions” (227). Rational thinking is unable to grasp both opposites; when faced with a contradiction, it usually concludes: “Consequently, this contradiction is nothing” (227). Thus, Zeno, in his aporia, initially showed that motion “contradicts itself, and then concluded that it therefore does not exist” (227).
Reason stops only on the negative side of the result and does not reach the positive, the truth. He does not see that nothing “contains being, and in the same way being... contains nothing” (227). In this case, the contradiction is resolved in a positive concept - in a certain being.
Becoming does not always remain just becoming. It is an unrestrained movement in which being and nothingness completely transform into each other and sublate each other. Becoming “is itself something that disappears, a fire that goes out in itself, having consumed all its material” (228). The result of becoming is not empty nothingness, but actual, determinate being.
“Case being is being that has certainty, which is immediate, or essential certainty, is quality” (228).
Quality is a certainty identical with being. Reflected into oneself, i.e. reflected into itself, in relation to itself, a determinate existence is something.
Hegel argues that quality, as the immediate certainty of being, exists only in logic and the kingdom of nature. In the kingdom of the spirit, it is found only in the form of something subordinate, for example, it is found in a painful state of spirit. The exclusion of quality from the sphere of spirit looks artificial.
Quality, as certainty, appears as negation, but not in the form of the former abstract nothing, but in the form of otherness, another. In contrast to what is contained as negation, quality appears as reality. Hegel, thus, arbitrarily assigns the extremely important concept of reality in philosophy to the immediacy of being, quality.
In relation to oneself, i.e. in its reality, quality acts as being-in-itself, in relation to another, i.e. in its negativity - as being-for-another. For the first time in philosophical thought, Hegel introduces well-conditioned and meaningful concepts of relationship to oneself and relationship to another, which are an essential acquisition of the human intellect. The concept of self-relation (not in its ordinary sense) appeared in its original form long before Hegel. Thus, the definition of substance introduced by Spinoza as “the cause of itself” should be considered a huge achievement of thought. However, the concept of relationship to oneself, relationship with oneself acquires true strength and content only in Hegel’s dialectical philosophy. In Hegel, the attitude towards oneself turns out to be an expression and mechanism of the internal activity of the logical idea, its self-movement. Pure being, in relation to itself, turns out to be nothing. Nothing in relation to itself means being. Being in relation to itself as nothing is becoming being, which itself defines itself as existing being. The latter defines itself as another and, therefore, as being-in-itself and being-for-another. The active, creative relationship of every being to itself is one of the true discoveries of Hegel's dialectics.
Existence, posited as negation, is a boundary, a limit. Something, due to its quality, is finite and changeable. The boundary contains a contradiction, for, on the one hand, it constitutes the reality of existence, and on the other, its negation. The border is not an abstract nothing at all, but a definite nothing, something else. The thought of something entails the thought of something else. “...Something is in itself other than itself, and in the other its own boundary is objectified for it.” Something and another “are the same thing” (231).
Something is finite, changeable, passes into something else due to obligation.
In the concepts of reality, negation, finitude, border, variability, transition, obligation, the concept of development introduced gradually by Hegel, which is not yet fully defined, but which, according to the construction of his philosophy adopted by the philosopher, actually operates latently, becomes increasingly clear. Let us recall that the movement of being into itself is at the same time, according to Hegel, the unfolding, the identification of the concept together with its inherent development.
Being, according to Hegel, is a “concept in itself.” The movement of being into itself, which is carried out through self-determination and consists of transitions from one thing to another, is at the same time the self-unfolding of the concept.
If becoming is the truth of being, then change is the truth of existence, quality.
Existent being, as a determinate being, appears as a certain whole, which then defines itself as something and another, another of another, and so on ad infinitum. Based on a series of concepts of the level of existence, or quality, Hegel introduces a very deep concept of infinity. Infinity initially appears as the negation of every finite, every finitude. Hegel defines this understanding of infinity as rational. The infinite is a series of finite things that has no end. But such an understanding of infinity - as a constant change of finite ones - is a superficial idea, “which never leaves the realm of the finite” (233). There is nothing here but sterile repetition and boredom. The Infinite is understood in this case as something purely negative. Between the finite and the infinite there appears “an abyss, an impassable abyss; the infinite remains on one side, and the finite on the other” (235). Hegel thoughtfully notes that such infinity, which is compared with the finite as another, itself turns out to be understood at the level of the finite, the particular.
Calling rational infinity bad, Hegel put forward a deep understanding of true infinity as the result of the dialectical negation of negation, leading to a positive result, to infinity understood positively. Returning to the dialectic of something and other, from which, when first considered, a “bad” infinity followed, Hegel shows that in the transition from one to the other, to the other of the other, etc. not only the negation as such is revealed, but also the positive affirmation. “Since that into which something passes is the same as the thing itself (they both have the same definition, namely to be different), then in its transition something merges with itself, and this relationship with itself in itself in the transition and in the other there is true infinity" (234).
Infinity is the negation of every finite, including everything finite. If we keep in mind the pure meaning of such an understanding of infinity, purified from Hegelian idealism, then we must admit that the philosopher created a completely scientific definition of infinity, beyond which modern science, including philosophy, did not go. Hegel contrasted his understanding of infinity with Spinoza’s infinity, which absorbs and destroys everything finite in itself, instead of generating it from itself.
Bad infinity meant a barren dead end of thought; Hegel’s true infinity allowed thought to move on, constructing ever more complex and rich forms of being.
Being defined as infinite, which appears as including everything finite, is being-for-itself. In the concept of being-for-itself, Hegel further introduces the concept of ideality, which actually acts as a specific characteristic of thought, a logical idea. The introduction of this concept is important point Hegelian philosophy, containing the key to understanding its advantages and disadvantages. Ideality, according to Hegel, is the way of existence of the finite in the infinite. Existence, as immediate or affirmative, has reality. In the infinite, the finite exists in a canceled or sublated form, i.e. perfect. Ideality is the truth of the ultimate. Hegel considers the question of the ideal as the most important question of philosophy, its fundamental question. “This ideality of the finite,” he writes, “is the fundamental position of philosophy” (236). Therefore, Hegel assures, only idealism can be a true philosophy.
Hegel’s definition of the ideal is, in our opinion, very weak and lacking in substance. In essence, ideality appears as the subordinate existence of parts as a whole (even in an infinite whole), as the “sublation” of parts as a whole. What the philosopher understands by “sublation” is not too complex in nature - the “sublated” remains to exist, but in a dependent form on the whole, infinite form. To call this ideality is a simple and biased idea. IN scientific philosophy the ideal will be defined incomparably more complexly and meaningfully. Hegel introduces his understanding of the ideal without any justification or empirical material. However, since we have accepted his "rules of the game", we must go further to see what happens.
Hegel's logic begins with the analysis of being, which is the starting point of the process of the idea reaching the highest state of the Absolute Idea. Below we will consider the original dialectical triad of being-nothingness-becoming of the doctrine of being, which underlies Hegel’s logic.
Hegel's logic begins with being. Being is everything that exists. It represents the most abstract of all concepts, being is pure uncertainty and emptiness. In other words, according to Hegel, being is negativity, that is, nothing. For Hegel, both being and nothingness are empty concepts, and he sees very little difference between them.
Hegel further argues that the unity of being and nothingness is becoming. Being and nothingness are empty abstractions, while becoming, which is the unity of two opposites, is the first concrete thought.
It was on the basis of the logical triad of being-nothingness-becoming that the logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis and the logic of affirmation-denial-negation of negation, etc., which are usually considered as Hegel’s method, were built.
Existence
Having examined being-nothingness-becoming, let us move on to a discussion of existence. Existent being is being that has a definite form, being considered concretely. If being is everything that exists, existence is something. In a word, the transition from the stage of being-nothing-becoming to existence is a transition from the abstract to the concrete. Becoming is a contradiction that contains being and nothingness, through which becoming goes beyond its limits and becomes actual being.
Thus, existence is a definite being that has quality. Hegel called the certainty of existence quality. But although we may use the term "definite", it is necessary to understand that what is meant is simple certainty.
Determination, which makes being a concrete being, implies the affirmative content of something and at the same time limitation. Therefore, the quality that makes something what it is is reality - from the point of view of the affirmative aspect of something, and at the same time negation from the point of view of the fact that it is not something else. Thus, in existing existence there is a unity of reality and negation, or affirmation and negation. Then existing existence passes into the state of being-for-itself. Being-for-itself is a being that is not connected with another, does not transform into something else, but always remains itself.
Existence
(Dasein) - (empirical) presence (Vorhandensein) of a thing or person, as opposed to the certainty of being (property, Was-Sein) and (metaphysical) being. But from an ontological point of view, a property is just as present as a thing. There is no determinate being (Sosein) without determinate being (Dasein) and there is no determinate being without determinate being. Every determinate being of something “is” also the determinate being of something, and every determinate being of something “is” also the determinate being of something. Only “something” is not the same thing. For example: the actual existence of a tree in its place is in itself also a definite existence of the forest, for without it the forest would be different, and therefore would have different properties; the concrete existence of the branch on the tree is the determinate existence of the tree; the present being of the branch on the branch is the determinate being of the branch, etc.
The existence of one is always at the same time the determinate existence of another. This row can be extended in both directions and also turned over. The term "Dasein" has acquired a new meaning in modern existential philosophy. The actual existence of a person, since it is most accessible to our knowledge, is used through the analytics of actual existence in order to reveal the essence and meaning (existing in human existence) of existence (existential philosophy = fundamental ontology); see also Existence; Essentia; World.
Here on my blog I publish what I translated.
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Objective logic: the doctrine of being
Determined being (quality)
Note on notation:
- italics categories from Hegel's philosophy are indicated (for example, being, nothing, formation);
- bold categories from Hegel's philosophy are indicated when they are first used;
- underlining logical stress is indicated.
This is not the only possible notation. It was possible to denote categories from Hegel's philosophy using capital letters, and logical stress using italics, as is done in the English version of the article, however, such a notation scheme is not generally accepted for the Russian language (where only the first word in a sentence is written with a capital letter, and never - words inside a sentence).
Being
A. Genesis
B. Nothing
Nothing, more precisely, h true nothingness, “is simple equality with oneself, complete emptiness, the absence of any definition or content.” Thus, nothing identically being, except that think What being is the complete opposite of this nothing. Therefore, the difference between being And nothing is not given by their internal nature, but is postulated by the thinking subject himself.
B. Becoming
Pure being And pure nothingness are one and the same, but are completely different from each other. This contradiction is resolved through their immediate disappearance and transition, one into another. The resulting movement, called c formation, takes the form of suppressing each other emergence of being And disappearance of existence .
Determined Being
A. Existence
Transition between becoming And a) cash existence (definite-being-in-itself) achieved by removing . This term is the traditional Russian translation for the German word aufheben- means the moment of development, “in which both negation and preservation, affirmation are combined” (Marx, Karl. Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1844). Hegel argues that sublation is one of the most important concepts in philosophy. Being And nothing were complete opposites, the internal unity of which needed to be expressed, or mediated, something third: becoming. After reaching formation through mediation, them (i.e. being And nothing) unity becomes direct. Contrasting being And nothing still surviving in formation, the end has come. From a new point of view - from the point of view of immediacy, formation turns into existence, in which being And nothing are no longer separate concepts, but necessarily connected “moments” that existence kept inside. Sublation is thus the end of the logical process, but at the same time it begins it from a new point of view.
How moments a certain being, being And nothing acquire a new form - the form of aspects b) quality. Inside quality, being comes to the fore, and, like quality, is reality; nothing, or nothingness, fades into the background and disappears into the background being, and serves only to separate some particular being from others, and by doing this, nothing becomes denial at most general view , i.e. quality becomes a form of absence of something. Quality, thus, contains both what definite being is, and what it is is not, which was what made him from the very beginning (i.e. definite being) by what was something certain. Inside quality, nevertheless, reality And negation are still separate from each other, still mediated, just like being And nothing were once mediated in formation. Taken in their unity, in their immediacy, as will happen with another sublation, they now become moments of some c) something .
Something is the first time in the Science of Logic that the “negation of the negation” occurs. The first negation, negation in its most general form, is simply what definite being is not. Hegel calls this "abstract negation." When this negation is negated, which is called "absolute negation", then what definite being is, no longer depends on what it is Not for the purposes of defining oneself, but instead becomes a valid particular something in its particular manifestation: being-within-itself. Denial of this (what exactly? needs to be clarified; presumably - denial of the first something); what it is not is now “cut off” from it (from what? to be made clear; presumably from the first something) and becomes different something, which, from the point of view of the first something, is d) others in the most general form. In the end, just like formation mediated being And nothing, change now mediates something And another .
B. Limb
a) Something and more are separate from each other, but each of them contains, within itself, as moments, their former unity, which they had in a certain being. These moments now appear again as being-in-itself, i.e. any something something only as long as it opposed to another; And being-for-others, i.e. any something, which is any particular something only as long as it is in some respect With others. (Hegel's view in this regard is the opposite of Kant's noumenon, the unknowable "thing in itself": being-in-itself, isolated from being-for-others, is nothing but an empty abstraction, and to ask what it is is to ask a question that is formulated in such a way that it cannot be answered.)
Something is no longer isolated something, but is in both a positive and negative relationship with others. This attitude, however, is reflected back to this something How isolated(to be clear: the word "isolated" refers to something that is reflected in something, or to yourself something), i.e. How in itself(needs to be made clear) and makes it even more specific. How something is V opposition To to another, eat it (this something) b) certainty; how something is in respect To to another eat it (this something) constitution .
The moment when something stops being himself and becomes others, There is limit this something. This limit also divided others this something, which itself is some something and different from the first one something only because it is on the other side limit. Thus, it is with the help of their common limits,something And other mediated by one another, and mutually determine each other, their internal quality .
From point of view limit, something is any private something only as long as it is not something else. This means that the self-determination of this something is only relative and entirely dependent on it not being what it must not be in order to be. So this is something is only temporary, and contains its own cessation of being within itself, and is c) final, i.e. doomed sooner or later stop yours being. For final things, “the hour of their emergence is at the same time the hour of their disappearance.” At this border (it must be clarified: where something contains its own cessation of being? or when something disappears? or when something ceases to be separate from another?) (and why when disappearing something, limit gets inside it something which has disappeared and not inward another, which remained - apparently because something And other connect), limit ceases to play its mediating role between something And others, i.e. denied, and climbs back into one / unity with another - being-within-itself- y something, and turns into limitation for this something, i.e. to the border beyond which it is something will cease to exist. The downside to this, however, is that limit also takes with it the denial of it something(those. another) when this limit climbs back into something, and this negation is others(for original something), but now located inside this something and given a role definitions for this very thing something. In conditions when something its own limitation applies, then quality, which from the very beginning determined something, becomes others for oneself; it's not easy anymore is those quality, But must be the one quality.Limitation And duty are connected with each other, contradictory moments final .
The withdrawal occurs again. Limitation And duty indicate "outside" it final something, one is negative and the other is positive. This "outside" in which they unite is infinity .
Notes
- .
- Hegel (1969), §93
- Hegel (1969), §132. www.marxists.org. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
- Hegel (1969), §133. www.marxists.org. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
- Hegel (1969), §179. www.marxists.org. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
- Hegel (1969), §184-§187. www.marxists.org. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
- Hegel (1969), §195-§198. www.marxists.org. Retrieved June 23, 2016.
In becoming, being as identical with nothing and nothing as identical with being are only vanishing moments; Thanks to its internal contradiction, becoming falls (fällt) into a unity in which both moments are sublated. The result of becoming, therefore, represents existence.
Note. Having reached this first example, we will once and for all recall what we indicated in § 82 and the note to it, namely, that there is only one way in which the movement and development of science can be ensured - to consolidate the results in their truth. When a contradiction is discovered in any object or concept (and there is absolutely nothing in which we could not and would not be forced to discover a contradiction, i.e., opposing definitions; rational abstraction is nothing more than the forcible consolidation of one certainty , the effort of consciousness to obscure and remove the other determinacy contained in it), when such a contradiction is recognized, they usually draw the conclusion from this: “Consequently, this contradiction is nothing.” Thus, for example, Zeno first showed regarding motion that it contradicts itself, and then concluded that it therefore does not exist. Or another example: the ancients recognized emergence and disappearance as untrue definitions - these two types of becoming - and expressed this view in such a way that the one, that is, the absolute, does not arise and does not disappear. This dialectic, therefore, stops only on the negative side of the result and abstracts from what is really presence along with this, from the determinate result, which here is pure nothingness, but nothingness that contains being, and likewise the being that contains nothingness. Thus: 1) existence is the unity of being and nothingness, in which the immediacy of these definitions has disappeared and, therefore, in their relation their contradiction has disappeared - unity,
in which they are still only moments; 2) since the result is a contradiction removed, it is in the form of simple unity with itself, that is, it itself is a kind of being, but a being containing negation or certainty; it is becoming, posited in the form of one of its moments, in the form of being.
Addition. Even our ordinary idea of becoming implies that where there is becoming, something comes out, and becoming therefore has a result. But here the question arises: how does becoming come to the point of not remaining just becoming, but also having a certain result in addition? The answer to this question follows from the nature of becoming, as it was revealed to us above. Becoming contains being and nothingness and contains them in such a way that both of them completely transform into each other and mutually sublate each other. Becoming, thus, turns out to be an uncontrollable movement, but it cannot be maintained in this abstract mobility, for since being and nothingness disappear in becoming, and only this disappearance constitutes the concept of becoming, it, therefore, is itself something that disappears, fire, which goes out in itself, having devoured its material.
But the result of this process is not empty nothingness, but that being identical with negation, which we call existence, and the meaning of which is most immediately revealed in being something that has become.
α) Existent being is being that has certainty, which is immediate, or essential certainty, is quality. Existing being, reflected in this determinateness into itself, is a present existence, something. We note the categories that develop in existing existence only in summary.
Addition. Quality is generally identical with being, a direct certainty, in contrast to the quantity considered after it, which, however, is also the certainty of being, but no longer directly identical with the latter, but a certainty indifferent to being, external to it. Something is, thanks to its quality, what it is, and, losing its quality, it ceases to be what it is. Further, quality is essentially only a category of the finite, which
therefore, it finds its true place only in the kingdom of nature, and not in the world of spirit. Thus, for example, in the kingdom of nature, the so-called simple substances (oxygen, carbon, etc.) must be considered as existing qualities. On the contrary, in the kingdom of the spirit, quality is found only in the form of something subordinate, and it does not exhaust any specific image (Gestalt) of the spirit. Considering, for example, the subjective spirit, which constitutes the subject of psychology, we can, however, say that what is called character is, in its logical meaning, a quality, but this should not be understood to mean that character is the same penetrating soul and directly identical with it there is certainty, as is the case with the above-mentioned simple substances in the kingdom of nature. More definitely, as such, quality is revealed in the spirit insofar as the latter is in an unfree, painful state. This happens in a state of passion, and especially in a state of passion that has reached the point of madness. About madness, when consciousness is completely imbued with feelings of jealousy, fear, etc., we can rightfully say that this consciousness can be defined as a quality.
Quality as an actual certainty in opposition to the negation contained in it, but different from it, is reality. Negation, being no longer an abstract nothing, but a certain existence and something, is only a form in the latter, it is an other being. Since this otherness, although it is its own definition of quality, is still most closely different from it, then quality is being-for-another - the breadth of existing existence, something. The being of quality as such, in contrast to this relation with another, is being-in-itself.
Addition. The basis of all certainty is negation (omnis determinatio est negatio, as Spinoza says). Thoughtless opinion regards certain things as only positive and fixes them under the form of being. However, the matter does not end with bare existence, for it, as we saw earlier, is completely empty and unstable. In the confusion of existence as determinate being with abstract being indicated here, there is, however, something correct, namely, that
in existing being, the moment of negation is actually contained only, as it were, hidden, and only in being-for-itself does this moment of negation appear freely and achieve its right. If we, further, consider existence as an existent determinateness, then we then have in it what is understood by reality. So, for example, they talk about the reality of a certain plan or some intention and understand by this that the plan, or intention, is no longer just something internal, subjective, but has received real existence. In the same sense, one can also call the body the reality of the soul and law the reality of freedom, or the entire Universe in general the reality of the divine concept. But they often talk about reality in another sense and understand by it that something behaves in accordance with its essential definition or its concept. So, for example, they say: this is a real occupation or: this is a real person. Here we are not talking about immediate, external existence, but rather about the correspondence of a certain existence to its concept. But reality understood in this way no longer differs from ideality (der Idealität), which we will most closely become acquainted with as being-for-itself.
β) Being fixed as distinct from certainty, as being-in-itself, would be only an empty abstraction of being. In existing existence, certainty is one with being, and at the same time, posited as negation, it is a boundary, a limit. Otherness is therefore not something indifferent to existing being, located outside it, but its own moment. Something, due to its quality, is, firstly, finite and, secondly, changeable, so that finitude and changeability belong to its being.
Addition. Negation in existence is still immediately identical with being, and this negation is what we call the boundary. Only within its boundary and thanks to it is something what it is. It is impossible, therefore, to consider the boundary as only external to existing existence; on the contrary, it permeates all existing existence. The understanding of the border as only an external definition of existence is based on the confusion of the qualitative border with the quantitative one. Here we are talking about a qualitative boundary. If we, for example, consider a plot of land the size of three morgens, then this is its quantity
vein border. But this piece of land is, moreover, a meadow, and not a forest or a pond, and this constitutes its qualitative boundary. Man, insofar as he wants to be real, must exist, must limit himself. To whom the finite is too abhorrent, he does not achieve any reality, but remains in the realm of the abstract and decays within himself without a trace.
Looking closer at the border, we find that it contains a contradiction and, therefore, turns out to be dialectical, namely: the border constitutes, on the one hand, the reality of existence, and on the other hand, it is its negation. But further, the boundary as the negation of something is not an abstract nothing at all, but an existing nothing or what we call “other.” The thought of something entails the thought of something else, and we know that there is not only something, but also something else. But the other is not something that we only find, so that something could also be thought without it, but something is in itself another of itself, and in the other its own limit is objectified for it. If we now ask the question what is the difference between something and another, it turns out that they are both the same thing; this identity finds its expression in Latin in the designation aliud-aliud 50. Another, opposing something, is itself a certain something, and therefore we say: something else. In the same way, on the other hand, the first something, opposed to another, also defined as something, is itself something else. When we say: something else, we first imagine that something taken by itself is only something and the definition of “other” is given to it only by purely external consideration. We think, for example, that the moon, which is something other than the sun, could exist even if there were no sun. But in fact, the moon (as something) has its other in itself, and this constitutes its finitude. Plato says: “God made the world from the nature of one and the other (του έτερον); he united them and formed from them a third, which has the nature of one and the other” 51. These words generally express the nature of the finite, which, as something, does not indifferently oppose another, but is in itself another of itself and, therefore, changes. Change reveals the internal contradiction that plagues existing existence from the very beginning and which forces it to go beyond its limits. For presentation
existence is seen at first as a simple Positive and at the same time as calmly remaining within its borders. We, however, also know that everything finite (and such is existing existence) is subject to change. This variability of existing existence is seen, however, by representation as only a possibility, the implementation of which has no basis in itself. In fact, variability lies in the concept of existence, and change is only the discovery of the fact that existence exists in itself. The living dies, and dies precisely because it, as such, carries within itself the germ of death.
Something becomes something else, but the other is itself something; it, therefore, itself in turn also becomes some other, etc. ad infinitum.
This infinity is a bad, or negative, infinity, since it is nothing other than the negation of the finite, which, however, arises again and, therefore, is not removed; or, in other words, this infinity expresses only the necessity of the sublation of the finite. Progress into infinity does not go further than the expression of the contradiction that is contained in the finite, namely, the finite is both something and its other; this progress is an eternal and incessant change of these determinations leading to each other.
Addition. Considering the moments of existence - something and another - in their separateness, we get the following: something becomes different, and this other itself is a certain something, which, as such, changes in turn, etc. ad infinitum. Reflection believes that here it has reached something lofty and even the highest. But this progress into infinity is not the truly infinite, which consists, on the contrary, in the fact that in its other it abides with itself, or (expressing the same thing as a process) consists in the fact that in its other it comes to itself . It is very important to properly understand the concept of true infinity and not stop at the bad infinity of endless progress. When they talk about the infinity of space and time, they usually mean infinite progress. They say, for example, “this time”, “now” and for-
they continually go beyond this boundary forward and backward. The situation is exactly the same with space, the infinity of which provides edification-loving astronomers with material for many empty declamations. At the same time, it is also usually argued that thinking must certainly fail when it begins to consider this infinity. It is true in any case that we finally stop moving further and further along the path of such consideration, but we do so not because of the sublimity of this activity, but because it is boring. Looking at this endless progress for too long is boring because the same thing is constantly repeated here. First they set a boundary, then they cross it, and so on ad infinitum. We have here, therefore, nothing more than a superficial change, which never leaves the realm of the finite. If they think that by going out into this infinity we are freed from the finite, then it must be said that in fact this is the liberation that is given by escape. But the one running away is not yet free, because in his flight he is still conditioned by what he is running away from. If they further say that the infinite is unattainable, then this is absolutely correct, but correct only insofar as the infinite is defined as abstractly negative. Philosophy does not bother with such an empty and only otherworldly thing. What philosophy deals with is always something concrete and entirely present. The task of philosophy was also seen to be to answer the question of how the infinite decides to go beyond its limits. To this question, which is based on the premise of the existence of a sharp opposition between the finite and the infinite, one can only answer that this opposition itself is untrue and that the infinite in fact eternally goes beyond and does not go beyond its limits. However, by saying: the infinite is the non-finite, we have already in fact expressed the truth, for since the finite itself is the first negation, the non-finite is the negation of negation, a negation identical with itself and, therefore, at the same time a true affirmation.
The infinity of reflection considered here is only an attempt to achieve true infinity, an unsuccessful midway (Mittelding). This is generally the philosophical point of view that has been put forward in modern times
in Germany. According to this point of view, the finite must be sublated, and the infinite must be recognized not only as negative, but also as something positive. This ought always contains impotence, which manifests itself in the fact that something is recognized as legitimate, and yet this, recognized as legitimate, cannot pave the way for itself. Kantian and Fichtean philosophy did not go further in their ethical teaching than this point of view of obligation. Continuous approach to the law of reason is the greatest that can be achieved on this path. In addition, the same postulate also substantiates the immortality of the soul.
γ) In reality, all that matters here is that something becomes different, and this different thing in turn becomes different. Something, being in a relationship with another, is itself already something else in relation to this latter. Since that into which something passes is the same as the thing itself (both have the same definition, namely to be different), then in its transition into another something only merges with itself, and this relationship with by itself in the transition and in the other there is true, infinity. Or, on the negative side, it is the other that changes, it becomes the other of the other. Thus, being is again restored, but as the negation of negation it is being-for-itself.
Note. Dualism, which makes the opposition between the finite and the infinite insurmountable, does not take into account the simple fact that in this way the infinite immediately turns out to be only one of these two, that it is consequently transformed into only the particular, and the finite turns out to be the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only particular, which stands alongside the finite, has, therefore, in the latter its limit and boundary, and is not what it should be, not infinite, but only finite. In such a relationship in which the finite is placed here, on this side, and the infinite there, on the other side, the finite is assigned the same dignity of independence and self-sufficiency of existence as the infinite; the being of the finite from this point of view turns into absolute being; in such dualism it stands firmly on its own. If the finite came into contact, so to speak, with this infinity,
finite, then it would be destroyed, but the finite, according to this view, cannot come into contact with the infinite, between them there is an abyss, an impassable abyss; the infinite remains on one side, and the finite on the other. The assertion about the unshakable presence of the finite on the other side of the infinite, which considers itself above all metaphysics, stands entirely on the basis of the most ordinary rational metaphysics. Here the same thing happens that we find in infinite progress: then they agree that the finite is not in itself and for itself, that it does not have independent reality, absolute being, that it is only something transitory; then they immediately forget this and imagine the finite as something merely opposed to the infinite, completely divorced from it and not subject to destruction, existing independently and for itself. Thinking believes that it thus rises to the infinite, but in fact the opposite happens to it: it comes to such an infinite, which is only the finite, and, believing that it has left the finite, it rather retains it, turns it into the absolute .
After this explanation of the inconsistency of the opposition between the finite and the infinite held by the understanding (it would be useful to compare Plato’s dialogue Philebus with this explanation), the expression can easily come to mind that, therefore, the finite and the infinite are one, that truth, true infinity, must be defined and is expressed as the unity of the infinite and the finite. Such an expression is correct to a certain extent, but it is equally inaccurate and incorrect, and what we noticed above regarding the unity of being and nothing applies to it. This expression brings upon itself the just reproach of ending infinity, of putting forward a certain finite infinity, for this expression gives reason to think that the finite is preserved here, it does not clearly and definitely express that the finite is sublated in infinity. Or, if it were taken into account that the finite, posited in its unity with the infinite, in any case cannot remain what it was outside this unity, that it must at least suffer somewhat in its definition (just as potassium loses its properties when combined with acid), then this expression would give reason to think that
the same fate befalls the infinite, that it, as negative, for its part is also dulled by the finite. This is what actually happens with the abstract, one-sided rational infinite. But the true infinite is not in the position of a one-sided acid, but preserves itself. The negation of the negation is not neutralization; the infinite is positive, and only the finite is sublated.
In being-for-itself the definition of ideality appears. Existent being, taken most closely only from the side of its being or its affirmativeness, has reality (§ 91), and, consequently, finitude also appears most closely in the definition of reality. But the truth of the finite is, on the contrary, its ideality. And in the same way, the infinite of the understanding, which he places next to the finite, is itself one of the two finites, is the untrue, the ideal (ein ideelles) 51a.
This ideality of the finite is the fundamental position of philosophy, and every truly philosophical teaching is therefore idealism. It is only important not to mistake for infinite that which, by its definition, immediately turns into special and finite. Therefore, here we paid special attention and developed this distinction in detail: the basic concept of philosophy - the truly infinite - depends on it. This distinction is fully understood by the simple and therefore seemingly insignificant, but irrefutable considerations contained in this paragraph.