Direct discretion is knowledge that arises without awareness of paths. Intuition and its role in cognition
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Thinking is an active process: an object is, as it were, presented to consciousness. Thinking always occurs at the conscious level, that is, it is a conscious process.
2. What thinking techniques are called analysis, synthesis and comparison?
Thinking is impossible without analysis, synthesis and comparison. Analysis as a method of thinking is the mental decomposition of an object into its constituent parts or sides. This helps to visually present, as it were, a set of names of what an object consists of, to specify its properties, and makes cognition a real process accessible to humans. But it is impossible to know the essence of an object only by breaking it down into its component parts. It is necessary to establish connections between them. Synthesis helps to do this. Synthesis, Thus, there is a mental unification of elements dissected by analysis.
The most important thinking technique is comparison. To find out what this or that object is, it is necessary to compare it with other objects, to identify the similarities or differences between them. Hence, comparison is the establishment of similarities or differences between objects.
In the process of thinking, man gradually discovered an increasing number of laws in the world around him, that is, the main, repeating, stable connections of things. Having formulated laws and using them in further knowledge, man began to actively influence nature and social life.
3. What role do concepts, judgments and inferences play in thinking?
The main forms of thinking are the above-mentioned concepts, as well as judgments and inferences.
Let us clarify that concept is a thought that reflects objects in their general and essential characteristics. If a representation is an image of an object, then a concept is a thought about an object. With the help of concepts, a person penetrates into such aspects of a cognizable object that are inaccessible to sensations, perceptions and ideas. Thus, a person is not able to perceive the speed of light, the processes occurring in the brain. But he can reflect these phenomena with the help of concepts that exist in a person’s head not in isolation, but in connection with each other, that is, in the form of judgments.
Judgment- this is a form of thought in which, with the help of a connection of concepts, something about something is affirmed or denied. In speech, judgments are expressed in the form of sentences. For example, “The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea.” Judgment can be derived both on the basis of direct observation and indirectly - using inference.
Inference is a thinking process that allows one to derive a new judgment from two or more judgments. A typical conclusion: all metals conduct electricity; copper – metal; therefore, copper conducts electricity.
4. What is speech?
Thinking is inextricably linked with speech, which is a form of communication through language (a system of signs that exists and is realized through speech). Speech is not only a means of communication between people, but also a tool of thinking. A person thinks in words. Speech– a universal means of forming and expressing thoughts. Thinking occurs on the basis of language, which actively participates in the thinking process itself. With the help of language, thought is not only formulated, but also formed. For example, a writer, working on the form of presentation of a thought, improves and clarifies the thought itself. Speech has external (sound and written) and internal expression. The internal silent speech process by which we think is called inner speech. There is often a situation when a person says: “I understand everything, but I can’t say it.” This does not indicate that there can be thinking without speech, but only that this person There are no developed skills for translating internal speech into external speech.
Opinions, judgments, facts
Deduction plays a more significant role in science than expected English philosopher F. Bacon (1561–1626). Often, in order to test a hypothesis, one has to go through a long deductive journey from the hypothesis to some consequence that is verified by observation. Deduction is usually associated with mathematics, and in this sense Bacon underestimated the importance of this science in scientific research. Therefore, there is real benefit both in the process of deduction, which is directed from the general to the general or from the general to the particular, and in the process of induction, directed from the particular to the particular or from the particular to the general.
In deductive reasoning there are one or more propositions called parcels. From them a judgment is derived, called a conclusion.
Knowledge, in my view, is a much less precise concept than is usually thought, and is more deeply rooted in the nonverbal behavior of animals than most philosophers have been inclined to believe. “Knowledge” is an imprecise concept; there are two reasons for this. First, the meaning of words is always more or less imprecise outside of logic and pure mathematics; secondly, everything that we consider to be knowledge is more or less uncertain, and there is no method of determining what degree of uncertainty is necessary for an opinion not to be worthy of the name "knowledge", just as there is no way of determining what degree of hair loss makes a person bald ( ).
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It just so happens that when we talk about knowledge and science, we usually mean knowledge about the world. The overwhelming number of scientific institutions and universities belong to the field of natural science and technology. It is believed that this is where strict objectivity and truth are found. Here laws are discovered that help man control the forces of nature. However, today there is an understanding that this tradition is outdated. At one time, the term “high technology” came into use; today in developed countries they talk more about high hum, emphasizing the priority of humanitarian knowledge and social technologies. Indeed, what could be more important for a person than knowing how to live next to another person?.. How to achieve peace and harmony - that’s what you need to know first of all ( V. V. Skoda, writer).
Tests and assignments
A) 1. Cognition is:
a) form of leisure
b) reflection of reality in the human mind
c) comprehension of ourselves by the forces of nature
2. Images of objects and phenomena that once influenced human senses are called:
a) hypotheses
b) concepts
c) ideas
3. Insert in place of the blank.
______________ is a logical inference from the general to the particular, from general judgments to particular conclusions.
4. Insert in place of the blank.
______________ is a logical conclusion, an inference in the process of cognition from the particular to the general.
5. Insert in place of the blank.
Induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, generalization, formalization, modeling are ______________ methods of cognition.
6. Complete the sentence.
“Direct discretion”, knowledge that arises without awareness of the ways and conditions for its acquisition, a certain insight that befalls a person - this is ______________.
B) 1. French philosopher K. Helvetius wrote: “Knowledge of some principles easily compensates for ignorance of some facts.”
If you agree with this statement, provide examples to support it.
2. The German philosopher F. Nietzsche argued: “To see and yet not to believe is the first virtue of the knower; appearance is the greatest tempter of the knower.”
What difficulty of knowledge did the philosopher have in mind?
1. Diversity of ways of knowledge.
2. Knowledge and faith.
§ 5. Scientific knowledge
Forms of human knowledge. Each form of social consciousness has its own form of knowledge: history has historical knowledge, philosophy has philosophical knowledge, economics has economic knowledge, religion has theological knowledge, etc.
There are also conceptual knowledge (in those areas that are based on precise concepts; this is primarily the scientific sphere), artistic and figurative knowledge (for example, works fiction, in addition to influencing feelings and imagination, they often impart specific knowledge to readers).
In the early stages of human development, the basis of knowledge was everyday practical knowledge - the simplest information about what people saw around them.
However, there is also knowledge that rather obscures the picture of the world than clarifies it. This is unscientific - scattered, unsystematic knowledge (for example, observation of celestial bodies by a person who does not have astronomical training); parascientific – incompatible with scientific knowledge (for example, telekinesis – movement of bodies “by force of will, mind”). Pseudoscientific knowledge (the so-called removal of damage, etc.) uses people’s prejudices. Frankly fantastic knowledge (for example, the concept that the Earth is hollow and we are on its inner side) also distorts the picture of the world.
Truth and its criteria. In the process of cognition, a moment comes when it is necessary to evaluate the acquired knowledge from the point of view of its value, correspondence to reality, i.e. the problem of truth and its criteria.
The famous painting by the Russian artist N. N. Ge depicts Jesus Christ, to whom the Roman procurator of Judea Pontius Pilate asks the question: “What is truth?” Why is this question addressed to the Savior? Probably because Jesus Christ, with his entire life, teaching and death, for the sake of saving sinful humanity, tried to prove that truth exists - in a broad, philosophical sense, as an explanation of the meaning of existence.
Not everyone can rise to philosophical heights on the question of truth. For many (philosophers call them “naive realists”) the truth is simple: water boils at a temperature of 100 ° C, turns into ice at 0 ° C, the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea, and a BMW car is more expensive and better than a VAZ. “Naive realists” do not need any special evidence that all these statements are true, because they compare what is said with what they are absolutely sure of, and therefore do not have any doubts. But such “knowledge of the truth” is definitely not enough, since living contemplation without the necessary theoretical analysis, synthesis and generalization can lead knowledge far from the truth.
A classic example is the question of whether the Sun revolves around the Earth, or, conversely, the Earth revolves around the Sun. Remember how influential ministers perceived the discovery of N. Copernicus (1473–1543) catholic church of that time, reflecting the opinion of the absolute majority of fellow citizens. After all, “it is clear to every person,” who, without further ado, limits himself only to visual observation “from the Earth,” that it is the Sun that makes circles around our home planet. And it is absolutely obvious to the same “realist” that the weak must submit to the strong, the poor to the rich, the unarmed to the armed, the woman to the man, etc., etc. All logical objections to such “knowledge” are often perceived very strongly by their supporters painful. And if one of the “naive realists” turns out to be able to believe counter-arguments, then he may have a certain suspicion that truth does not exist at all, if the “absolutely obvious” can be so convincingly refuted.
However, the truth exists. True- this is the process of adequate (correct, correct) reflection of reality in the human mind. There are simple truths (“water boils at a temperature of 100 °C”), and there are those that require theoretical comprehension, serious evidence, and definition of criteria. This is what philosophy has been doing for a long time.
What are the criteria (evidence, justification) for truth? The main, basic criterion of truth is experience, practice. Until some position, expressed in the form of a theory, concept, conclusion, is tested experimentally, is not translated into practice, into real life, it remains only a hypothesis (assumption). There are other criteria. These are compliance with laws logic, previously discovered laws of nature. The most compelling scientific theories are simple in nature and expressed in concise form. IN exact sciences Elegant and beautifully formulated concepts are especially appreciated. And in physics of recent decades, the criterion of truth (somewhat ironically) has become the paradoxical nature of the idea.
Scientific knowledge. Receipt true knowledge, comprehension of truth is the main goal of scientific knowledge (see § 4).
Scientific knowledge is distinguished from ordinary comprehension of the surrounding world by objectivity, truth of knowledge, and the ability to check and double-check (usually using mathematical calculations) the data obtained. With the help of scientific knowledge, phenomena, connections, and relationships that exist objectively, that is, regardless of the will and opinions of people, become comprehensible. For example, no one can “cancel”, refute, or question the laws of thermodynamics formulated in physics, since they are objective. Even the very directions of scientific research are determined by ideas about the picture of the world that is based on objectively obtained, irrefutable data. Attempts to create a perpetual motion machine or the philosopher's stone cannot be called truly scientific research and development, because they contradict objective reality.
Social cognition. One of the areas of scientific knowledge is social cognition, which deals with the disclosure of patterns, features, mechanisms, processes of social life. Of the sciences, the subject of knowledge of which are various spheres of social life ( history, sociology, political science, law, economics, demography, ethnography etc.), history is closest to ordinary people, non-professionals. This science uses a small number of specific terms and in its descriptiveness and eventfulness, not fictional, but real, sometimes it is not only not inferior in fascination to fiction and journalism, but often surpasses them.
The fascination and relevance of historical research, unfortunately, is sometimes combined with unconvincing interpretations of events, facts, and processes. One could even say this: what comes to the fore in these studies is not confirmed facts and scientific conclusions drawn on their basis, but only interpretations of events, not always supported by factual material. In historical literature, historical facts and events are often arbitrarily assessed and interpreted. And if this kind of work is published in mass quantities and at the same time advertised by the media, young people receive incorrect information about certain historical events and figures. Thus, among modern youth in the United States there are often judgments that during the Second World War, the Soviet Union fought on the side of... fascist Germany, which was defeated by the United States and Great Britain, and not the USSR, interacting with the allies at the last stage of the war.
Unfortunately, young people don’t know very well recent history. Recently a survey was conducted among students at Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov on the question of which of the earthlings was the first to fly into space. Many correctly named Yuri Gagarin, but at the same time clarified that he was... just the first of the Soviet cosmonauts. In their opinion, the first conqueror of outer space was an American (in fact, the American astronaut flew a month after Gagarin).
If events that in one way or another determined the political and moral background of the actions of historical forces and characters are hushed up, then instead of proven facts, myths appear, sometimes reflecting diametrically opposed positions. For example (if we consider the Russian history of the 20th century), there is still no complete clarity on the question of the real number of victims of the October Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War in Russia, the period of Stalinist repressions of the 30s–50s. etc.
That is why one should be critical of sensational publications, it is necessary to soberly and deeply analyze the interpretations of events, facts, etc. given in them.
Questions
1. What forms of human knowledge exist?
2. What is truth and what are its criteria?
3. What scientific knowledge differs from other forms of knowledge of the surrounding world?
4. What sciences carry out social cognition?
5. What is the difficulty of comprehending social reality?
Problems and aspects
1. What types of truths are there?
In accordance with existing classification truths are objective, absolute and relative.
Objective truth is knowledge that does not depend on the subject of knowledge, on man and humanity. It is not nature that is true, it exists objectively. A person’s knowledge about it can be true (objectively). Having agreed that objective truths exist, it is logical to ask the following question: can human ideas express objective truth absolutely, definitively, or is truth possible only in an approximate, relative form? In other words, are there absolute truths (i.e. complete, accurate, exhaustive knowledge) or are all truths relative (i.e. limited)? The short answer to this question is this: all objective truths are relative (it would seem that it could be more absolute than knowing that water boils at a temperature of 100 ° C, but it turns out that high in the mountains, boiling begins at 80 ° C). However, every relative truth contains a grain of absolute truth. Absolute truth consists of relative ones. The more relative truths we obtain, the closer we get to the absolute truth.
2. How is scientific knowledge carried out?
Scientific knowledge begins with the formulation of a problem. It is often called the knowledge of ignorance. The very idea of what is still unknown, but what is necessary and possible to study, make understandable and useful, is an important stage scientific activity. Often decades or even centuries pass from the formulation of a problem to its solution, but this does not make the scientific value of this stage of research less.
Next comes the formulation of a hypothesis. A hypothesis precedes scientific research and, as it were, gives it a start. Hypothesis- This is a conjectural judgment about phenomena in the absence of proven or observable factors. An important stage of research is the establishment, accumulation, and selection of facts. In social studies (for example, in the field of history), fact is a valuable form of knowledge. Many scientific studies end with the creation of concepts and theories. Concept– a multi-valued concept, its main meanings are an idea, a plan, a point of view, a system of views united by a common logic, a guiding principle, an interpretation. Theory is on a par with the concept, but this form of scientific knowledge is larger than the concept. Theory is a system of basic ideas, a set of scientific principles in any branch of knowledge united by a common principle.
Thus, the results of scientific research appear in certain forms. Summarizing what has been said, we can conclude that the forms of scientific knowledge (i.e. forms of scientific production) are a problem (question), a hypothesis, a concept, a theory.
Scientific knowledge has developed a system of scientific research methods. Method– is a means of knowing the object of study. Among scientific methods, empirical and theoretical ones stand out. Empirical methods include experiment, observation, comparison and other methods; theoretical methods include induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, generalization, formalization, modeling, etc.
3. How did the process of learning about society develop?
For a long time, people have sought to uncover the secrets of social phenomena, to identify the patterns of certain events and relationships in society. In the ancient era, the brilliant thinkers Aristotle, Socrates (c. 470–399 BC), Plato (428 or 427–348 or 347 BC) and others expressed many guesses, conceptual judgments, theories about the life of society and state, the laws of human society, the role of man in public life. During this period, the first major works on history appeared.
An outstanding contribution to the treasury of world thought about society in the 16th–18th centuries. contributed by European philosophers F. Bacon, T. Hobbes (1588–1679), J. Locke (1638–1704), S. L. Montesquieu (1689–1755), J. J. Rousseau (1712–1778). The doctrine of the laws of economic development, the relevance of which remains to this day, was created by A. Smith (1723–1790).
In the 19th century From philosophy, special social sciences emerged, the object of study of which was society itself. In this regard, we should name the philosopher O. Comte (1798–1857), who was the founder new science about society, which he called sociology. D. Mill (1806–1873) and D. Ricardo (1772–1823) continued A. Smith’s research in the field of economics. Through the efforts of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), a talented follower of the Renaissance thinkers N. Machiavelli and G. Grotius, who made a significant contribution to the study of politics, science was established political science. Rapidly developed cultural studies, cultural anthropology, ethnography, religious studies and etc.
In the 20th and 21st centuries. history, sociology, social philosophy, jurisprudence, economics, geography and anthropology.
Opinions, judgments, facts
My definition of truth is this: a belief is true when it corresponds to a fact. But how do I get this correspondence to a fact? I would answer that although we do not get as many facts as we would like, we do come to some: we get our own feelings and sensations that can confirm our previous beliefs.
What we firmly believe is called knowledge when it is either intuitive or derived (logically or psychologically) from the intuitive knowledge from which it logically follows. What we firmly believe is called a delusion if it is not true. That of which we are firmly convinced, when it is neither knowledge nor error, and also that of which we are not very convinced, because it is derived from something not of the highest degree of self-evidence, may be called probable opinion ( B. Russell, philosopher, mathematician).
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Historical treatises (especially of recent times), which are actively circulated, are literally filled with myths of the most opposite content. For example, the myth of Rus' as an integral and prosperous part of the Golden Horde and the myth of the bloody three-century reign of the Mongol-Tatars. The myth of Ivan the Terrible as an enlightened builder of the Russian state - and the myth of him as a bloody maniac who sadistically destroyed everyone around him. The myth of Peter I as a revolutionary tsar who “cut a window to Europe”, who led Rus' from medieval darkness into the light of European civilization - and Peter I - a libertine, murderer, Antichrist, drunkenly destroyed the splendid life of the Muscovite kingdom, littering the Finnish swamps with the bones of hundreds of thousands of peasants during the construction of St. Petersburg. The myth of Emelyan Pugachev - an active fighter against tsarist despotism and serfdom - and Pugachev - an unbridled rebel who dishonestly declared himself Tsar Peter III, a murderer, a hangman. The myth about the Decembrists - the holy knights of justice and honor, who sacrificed their lives for the freedom and happiness of the Russian state - and the myth about them, Freemasons and oathbreakers who hatched plans for the physical eradication of the royal family and the establishment of a totalitarian regime in Russia, etc.
Numerous myths are also dedicated to the Soviet period of Russian history. It can be said that the entire history of this period, created by its apologists and opponents, is a motley collection of fascinating myths. So, Lenin - a brilliant leader, the creator of a new type of state - and Lenin, who, out of revenge for his executed brother, destroyed traditional Russia, started a war with his own people, in which many millions of innocent people died. Stalin is a great leader and teacher, who received the country with a plow, and left it with an atomic bomb, and Stalin is a sadist, in attacks of paranoia (chronic mental illness) he destroyed the flower of the Leninist guard, the army, science, literature and art. The Soviet Union, which won a difficult but heroic victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, and the Soviet Union, which (judging by the number of losses and the degree of economic damage) lost this war. As a result of perestroika 1986–1991. and reforms of the last decade of the 20th century. the collapse of the USSR occurred and a market economy began to establish itself in Russia, contributing to the ultimate prosperity of Russian society - and as a result of the reforms of the 80s. XX century the powerful and united Soviet Union was destroyed, the economy degraded, and the bulk of the people began to live much worse than they lived before 1991, etc.
What does this active use of myths in interpretations of history and, of course, in real political life indicate? According to political scientist A. Tsuladze, it indicates that myths are “an effective tool for constructing reality.” Unable to adequately represent historical and current reality, people use mythology as a very successful substitute for reality, which also allows them to explain current reality and history from the point of view of their interests and benefits.
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Truths are born in disputes and die in squabbles ( modern aphorism).
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You don't have to drink the whole sea to know that the water in it is salty ( proverb).
* * *
Simplicity is a sign of truth ( aphorism).
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An undoubted sign of true science is the awareness of the insignificance of what you know in comparison with what is revealed ( L. N. Tolstoy, writer).
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History is like a play in which costumes, scenery, names are updated characters. The content remains unchanged ( E. Sevrus, writer).
* * *
What is history if not a lie that everyone agrees with? ( Napoleon I, statesman).
Tests and assignments
A) 1. Indicate among the listed parascientific knowledge:
b) D. can verbally divide and multiply four-digit numbers
c) K. uses her husband’s photograph to determine when he will return to the family
d) M. is able to name some of his diseases based on the condition of a person’s eyes
2. By example ordinary knowledge is the statement:
a) distance from the Sun to Mars – 228 million km
b) the average radius of the Earth – 6371.032 km
c) the distance between the villages of Orekhovka and Sukhoi Korsun - half an hour by cart
3. The criteria of truth are:
a) experience, practice
b) expert opinion
c) compliance with the prevailing teaching in society
d) compliance laws of logic
B) 1. Tell us about the writers and their works from which you gained knowledge about the world around you, people, etc.
2. L.N. Tolstoy wrote: “The task of science should be to know what should be, and not what is.”
Do you agree with the writer's opinion?
3. The outstanding Italian artist and thinker of the Renaissance Leonardo da Vinci stated: “No human research can be called true science if it has not gone through mathematical proof. And if you say that sciences that begin and end in thought have truth, then we cannot agree with you on this, but should be rejected for many reasons, and first of all because experience, without which, is not involved in such purely mental reasoning. there is no certainty."
Give an example of sciences that “begin and end in thought.” To what extent do they use mathematical proofs? Do you agree with Leonardo that these sciences cannot be called true?
Topics for abstracts, messages, discussions
1. Sensory and rational knowledge.
2. Sciences that study society.
Ideation(alternative terms: eidetic intuition, categorical intuition, contemplation of essence) - the concept of E. Husserl's phenomenology, meaning direct observation, contemplation of the essence.
The doctrine of ideal and the possibility of its direct contemplation ( ideas) is one of the foundations of Husserl's philosophy.
Entities
An example of meaning is, for example, the number 5 - “an ideal form that has its own individual cases in known acts of reckoning, just as, for example, how red - as a type of color - relates to acts of perception of red.” Every judgment as such is ideal (for example, “2x2 = 4” - taken not as this specific judgment, but as identical in every such judgment).
“What is “meaning” can be given to us just as directly as what is color and sound is given to us. It cannot be further defined; it is descriptively ultimate. Whenever we perform or understand an expression, it means something to us; we are actually aware of its meaning. This act of understanding, the act of giving meaning, the act of realizing meaning is not the act of hearing the sound of a word or the act of experiencing some simultaneously occurring fantasy image. And just as we are clearly given phenomenological differences between sounds that appear, we are also given differences between meanings.”
Eidetic units and kinds of entities
There are eidetic units and, on the other hand, the highest kinds of entities, and between them there are intermediate stages. Any concrete experience has an essence. Taken in all its concreteness, but devoid of individuality, becoming a model, taken as a self-identical entity that can be repeated, it becomes ideal. Every sound, every material thing has a certain “essential structure” - these are eidetic units. But “sound”, “material thing”, “color”, “perception” as such are also entities. In the field of formal entities, “meaning in general” is the highest genus, and every definite form of a sentence, every definite form of a member of a sentence, is an eidetic singularity, a sentence in general is a mediating genus. In the same way, number in general is the highest genus. And “two”, “three”, etc. are lower differentiations, or eidetic units of such.”
The ideality of entities is not normative
The ideality of entities “does not have the meaning of normative ideality, as if we are talking about the ideal of completeness, about the ideal ultimate value, which is opposed to individual cases of its more or less detailed implementation.” This is not Kant’s “ideal,” which is actually unattainable, but the directly contemplated ideality of the species.
Entity Sciences
Sciences about essences (about the ideal) - “pure logic, pure mathematics, pure doctrine of time, space, motion, etc.” . Thus, in mathematical “axioms, pure essential relationships are expressed - without the slightest comparison of experimental facts.” These eidetic sciences are independent of the factual sciences; the latter, on the contrary, have an eidetic foundation (each has its own: for example, in the natural sciences - “the eidetic science of physical nature in general (ontology of nature)”, as well as geometry - “an ontological discipline associated with ... the spatial form" of thingness). In the first volume of Logical Investigations, Husserl criticizes psychologism and defends the independence of logic, the subject of which is ideal objects.
Mistakes in understanding the ideal
Husserl examines common errors in the history of philosophy in understanding the true nature of the ideal. The general (essences, ideal types), he says, does not really exist either in thought ( psychological hypostatization general - Locke), nor outside of thinking - in the divine mind ( metaphysical hypostatization general - Plato). The general is neither a part of thinking as a real mental process, nor something that really exists outside of thinking. Beyond thinking real existence it can not be [ ], but this does not mean that the general should be in thinking, - after all being is not reducible to real being. Husserl calls the third mistake the denial of the general ( nominalism): the general is understood here as a product of attention (Berkeley, Mill), representation (Berkeley).
Contemplation of essences (ideation)
Ideation is direct perception, contemplation of essences.
Here is an example of the discretion of the entity “thing”:
“...We start from a verbal, perhaps even completely dark, representation of a “thing” - from the very one that we only have right now. Freely and independently we generate visual representations of such a “thing” in general and clarify for ourselves the vague meaning of the word. Since we are talking about a “universal idea,” we must act based on example. We generate arbitrary contemplations of fantasy things - let them be free contemplations of winged horses, white crows, golden mountains, etc.; and all these would also be things, and the representations of them serve the purposes of exemplification no worse than the things of actual experience. Using such examples, when performing ideation, we grasp with intuitive clarity the essence of “thing” - the subject of universally limited noematic definitions.”
Ideation is accomplished through variation. This is how, for example, the perception of the essence “perception” occurs:
“Based on the individual perception of this table, we vary the object of perception - the table - completely arbitrarily, but still in such a way as to retain the perception as the perception of some - any - object, starting, for example, by completely arbitrarily imagining its shape. color, etc., keeping only the perceived phenomenon identical. In other words, by refraining from positing the existential significance of the fact of this perception, we turn it into a pure possibility, along with other completely arbitrary pure possibilities - but pure possibilities of perception. […] The universal type of “perception” thus obtained hangs, so to speak, in the air - in the air of absolutely pure possibilities of the imagination. Freed from all factuality, he became the eidos of perception, the ideal volume of which is made up of all idealiter possible perceptions as pure possibilities of imagination."
The material for ideation can be either living experience (perception) or imagination.
Using the example of objective essences, Husserl shows that no amount of contemplation-examples will allow one to grasp the essence adequately, in its entirety, only an unlimited approximation is possible.
Meaning as kind and expressed meaning
It is necessary to distinguish between “meaning “in itself”” (meaning as an ideal form, essence) and expressed meaning. Expressed meaning is an essence realized “in human mental life,” embodied in a concept, tied to a sign, that is, meaning expressions. The essence itself is “that which can receive “expression” through meaning...”. (Cf. a similar distinction between the idea in itself and in thought (word, concept) in Plato.)
“...The meaning in which a species is conceived and its object, the species itself, are not one and the same. Just as in the realm of the individual we made a distinction, for example, between Bismarck himself and ideas about him, say, [in a sentence] Bismarck - the greatest German statesman etc., we also, in the domain of the specific, make, for example, a distinction between the number 4 itself and representations (that is, meanings) that have 4 as an object, such as [in a sentence] the number 4 is the second even number in a series of numbers etc. Thus, the universality that we think of does not dissolve in the universality of the meanings in which we think of it.”
For entities “to be thought or expressed are contingent circumstances.” Not every essence is expressed in human concepts or at least accessible to humans - “due to the limitations of human cognitive powers.”
Material and formal entities
In addition to ordinary ones filled with content material entities exist formal essences - although they are essences, they are completely “empty” - forms that are suitable for all possible essences, prescribing laws for them. Formal entities (including such “modifications of an empty something” as formulas of syllogistics, arithmetic, ordinal numbers, etc.) are the subject of pure logic.
Formal entities are divided into:
A) “subject in general” (pure (formal) subject categories): something, subject, property, state of affairs, relation, identity, unity, set, totality, connection, quantity, order, ordinal number, whole, part, magnitude, etc. ... - which “are grouped around the empty idea of something, or an object in general”; b) “meaning in general” (categories of meaning): types of sentences and their members (concept, statement; subject, predicate, basis and consequence, conjunction, disjunction, conditional connection, inference, etc.).
Independent and non-independent entities
Notes
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. M.: DIK, 2001. P. 325.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 1 // Husserl E. Philosophy as a strict science. Novocherkassk: Saguna, 1994. pp. 294-295.
Tests and assignments
A) 1. Cognition is:
a) form of leisure
b) reflection of reality in the human mind
c) comprehension of ourselves by the forces of nature
2. Images of objects and phenomena that once influenced human senses are called:
a) hypotheses
b) concepts
c) ideas
3. Insert in place of the blank.
______________ is a logical inference from the general to the particular, from general judgments to particular conclusions.
4. Insert in place of the blank.
______________ is a logical conclusion, an inference in the process of cognition from the particular to the general.
5. Insert in place of the blank.
Induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, generalization, formalization, modeling are ______________ methods of cognition.
6. Complete the sentence.
“Direct discretion”, knowledge that arises without awareness of the ways and conditions for its acquisition, a certain insight that befalls a person - this is ______________.
B) 1. The French philosopher C. Helvetius wrote: “Knowledge of some principles easily compensates for ignorance of some facts.”
If you agree with this statement, provide examples to support it.
2. The German philosopher F. Nietzsche argued: “To see and yet not to believe is the first virtue of the knower; appearance is the greatest tempter of the knower.”
What difficulty of knowledge did the philosopher have in mind?
Topics for abstracts, messages, discussions
1. Diversity of ways of knowledge.
2. Knowledge and faith.
§ 5. Scientific knowledge
Forms of human knowledge. Each form of social consciousness has its own form of knowledge: history has historical knowledge, philosophy has philosophical knowledge, economics has economic knowledge, religion has theological knowledge, etc.
A distinction is also made between conceptual knowledge (in those areas that rely on precise concepts; this is primarily the scientific field), and artistic-figurative knowledge (for example, works of fiction, in addition to influencing feelings and imagination, often convey specific knowledge to readers).
In the early stages of human development, the basis of knowledge was everyday practical knowledge - the simplest information about what people saw around them.
However, there is also knowledge that rather obscures the picture of the world than clarifies it. This is unscientific - scattered, unsystematic knowledge (for example, observation of celestial bodies by a person who does not have astronomical training); parascientific – incompatible with scientific knowledge (for example, telekinesis – movement of bodies “by force of will, mind”). Pseudoscientific knowledge (the so-called removal of damage, etc.) uses people’s prejudices. Frankly fantastic knowledge (for example, the concept that the Earth is hollow and we are on its inner side) also distorts the picture of the world.
Truth and its criteria. In the process of cognition, a moment comes when it is necessary to evaluate the acquired knowledge from the point of view of its value, correspondence to reality, i.e. the problem of truth and its criteria.
The famous painting by the Russian artist N. N. Ge depicts Jesus Christ, to whom the Roman procurator of Judea Pontius Pilate asks the question: “What is truth?” Why is this question addressed to the Savior? Probably because Jesus Christ, with his entire life, teaching and death, for the sake of saving sinful humanity, tried to prove that truth exists - in a broad, philosophical sense, as an explanation of the meaning of existence.
Not everyone can rise to philosophical heights on the question of truth. For many (philosophers call them “naive realists”) the truth is simple: water boils at a temperature of 100 ° C, turns into ice at 0 ° C, the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea, and a BMW car is more expensive and better than a VAZ. “Naive realists” do not need any special evidence that all these statements are true, because they compare what is said with what they are absolutely sure of, and therefore do not have any doubts. But such “knowledge of the truth” is definitely not enough, since living contemplation without the necessary theoretical analysis, synthesis and generalization can lead knowledge far from the truth.
A classic example is the question of whether the Sun revolves around the Earth, or, conversely, the Earth revolves around the Sun. Remember how the discovery of N. Copernicus (1473–1543) was perceived by influential ministers of the Catholic Church of that time, who reflected the opinion of the absolute majority of their fellow citizens. After all, “it is clear to every person,” who, without further ado, limits himself only to visual observation “from the Earth,” that it is the Sun that makes circles around our home planet. And it is absolutely obvious to the same “realist” that the weak must submit to the strong, the poor to the rich, the unarmed to the armed, the woman to the man, etc., etc. All logical objections to such “knowledge” are often perceived very strongly by their supporters painful. And if one of the “naive realists” turns out to be able to believe counter-arguments, then he may have a certain suspicion that truth does not exist at all, if the “absolutely obvious” can be so convincingly refuted.
And the need for direct comprehension of religious truths is affirmed in the works of Byzantine theologians and medieval scholastics.
Concept of N.Z. is actively being developed in empiricism and rationalism of the New Age. In empirical concepts under N.Z. is understood as a set of sensory sensations, impressions given to consciousness and recorded in language. At the same time N.z. is considered as the beginning and basis of the entire system of knowledge. In rationalism, the initial act of cognition is recognized as immediate, comprehension of the deep essence of consciousness. The axiom of R. Descartes “” (“I think, therefore I exist”) is proclaimed a self-evident, reliable truth, logical basis all knowledge, and N.Z. how the direct perception of truth is placed above the indirect.
The problem of interaction between direct and mediated knowledge is addressed in it. classical philosophy, and then in Marxism, which asserts the mediation of any act of perception by cultural-historical traditions and subject-practical cognitive activity subject.
Special problem N.Z. acquired at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. in the process of methodological criticism of classical rationalism. Holistic concepts of intuitive knowledge are being developed. (A. Bergson, B. Croce, I.O. Lossky, S.L. Frank, etc.). E. Husserl creates the doctrine of ideation, of the essential vision of the phenomenal within its own limits, thanks to which N.Z. How is included in the principles of philosophy? anthropology and existentialism, becomes a special way of human self-realization.
The specific form of manifestation of N.Z. is the so-called , embodied in perceptual patterns, bodily skills and practical mastery, comprehensively studied by M. Polanyi.
Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004 .
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE
Philosopher concept denoting such knowledge that is achieved through direct discretion (as if directly “given” by the corresponding object) and is not consciously justified, verified or evaluated by the subject. In the history of philosophy, the doctrine of science. (understood as absolutely immediate) developed in close connection with the solution of the problem of substantiating knowledge. In various empirical concepts of N. z. understood as a set of elementary feelings. impressions given to the consciousness of an individual subject or fixed in language (sensations, “sensory data” of Anglo-American neorealism, “” logical positivism and etc.) . Considering N. z. as the basis of a cognitive system, he tried to reduce all types and forms of knowledge to it. In a number of rationalist concepts, the highest principle of knowledge was recognized as “abs.” reflection, understood as immediate. “grasping” by the subject of the deep essence of his consciousness. Associated with reflection was the possibility of intellectual intuition, i.e. directly comprehension of some theoretical true So, eg, according to Descartes, the position is “cogito ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”) is genetic. and logical the basis of every etc. knowledge precisely because it not only contains an indication of its own, but also directly guarantees own obviousness and . The criterion of truth, understood by Descartes as distinctness (i.e. directly obviousness), correspond only to those provisions that are correlated with the act of reflection (e.g., principles of mathematics). In Husserl's phenomenology N. z. refers not only to individual objects, but also to essences, “eidos”, universals, acting as a direct result. “perception” of essence in the act of transcendental reflection (i.e. directly setting so-called with his “pure” consciousness own deep basis - the transcendental “I”).
The doctrine of N. z. develops in non-Marxist philosophy also within the framework of irrationalism. criticism of intelligence, intellectual knowledge and science. In Bergson's philosophy N. z. appears as some kind of fundamentally illogical. directly "grasping" reality.
Dialectical rejects abs. N. z. At the same time, in relation to the definition. cognitive system activity one or another type of N. z. can act as relatively direct. Each type and knowledge expresses a specific. dialectical method interaction of direct and mediated knowledge. Thus, in relation to thinking that operates with abstractions, it acts as directness. givenness of the object. However, perception as a type of knowledge is not identical to sensory information, a simple result of the influence of an object on a person. Any elementary act of perception is repeatedly mediated - both culturally and historically, and objectively and practically. and knowledgeable. activity of the subject.
In developed scientific cognition as N. z. is the recording of experimental results (experience). However, this knowledge can be considered as direct only in relation to theoretical activity itself, since the statement of experience in science usually involves the use of conceptual means of theories.
A special form of N. z. is so-called implicit (non-reflective) knowledge, which represents elementary forms of self-awareness (unlike its higher forms, which have reflections): differences between your consciousness and ext. objects, awareness of the spatiotemporal position of one’s body and etc. To N. z. also include those implicitly accepted in one or another theoretical theory. system of assumptions and idealizations, which within its framework act as self-evident. Tacit knowledge can be the subject of reflection, as a result of which it turns into and reveals its mediated character. Theoretical reflection on a system of knowledge presupposes its dismemberment, clarification, and in some cases the rejection of implicitly accepted premises (the procedure of justification in mathematics and in a number of etc. sciences). What previously seemed clear, immediately obvious and understandable, as a result of reflection turns out to be quite complex and often problematic, and sometimes simply erroneous. In the process of reflection, one goes beyond the existing system of knowledge and generates new knowledge.
V. A. Lektorsky.
Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. editor: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. 1983 .
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE
a term meaning knowledge obtained by direct judgment, without justification by evidence. N. z. otherwise called intuitive, or intuition. In the history of philosophy, two concepts of knowledge have been put forward: 1) feelings. N. z., or contemplation through the senses, and 2) intellectual N. z., or contemplation through the mind. Representatives of the first concept in antiquity. philosophies were Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and at the time - Feuerbach, who, in a polemic against Hegel's teaching on the mediated nature of all knowledge, argued that true is "... only that... which is directly certain through itself... "; but “... unconditionally undeniable, clear as the sun... only sensual,” and therefore the secret of N. z. “concentrated in feeling” (“Fundamental provisions of the philosophy of the future”, see Selected philosophical works, vol. 1, M., 1955, p. 187). However, Feuerbach warned against the absolutization of feelings. spontaneity of cognition and separation of thinking from sensuality.
Second N. z. also originated in ancient Greek philosophy and was spontaneously dialectical. character. Thus, Plato explained that ideas are prototypes of things of the senses. world - there is a N. z., which comes like a sudden insight. A necessary condition for such contemplation should be, according to Plato, duration. preparing the mind. Thus, directly. contemplation turns out to be simultaneously mediated. Aristotle also taught about the same unity. “We, on the contrary, affirm,” Aristotle wrote, “that not every science is a demonstrative science, but that knowledge of immediate (principles) is unprovable” (“Second Analytics”, I, 3, 72 in 18–20; Russian translation [ L.], 1952). The initial immediate and general principles of knowledge are revealed in special acts of speculation, or intellectual intuition. But since, according to Aristotle, it is inseparable from the individual, Aristotle interpreted the very perception of the general in the individual as the result of the process of cognition starting from individual facts, which he called induction. Because directly The beginning of proof is not derived from other truths, but is discovered by the mind, that is, it is no longer a form of inference, but research.
In Europe Middle-century philosophy concept of N. z. developed in both chapters. branches of the church philosophy - scholasticism and mysticism, applied not only to issues of the theory of knowledge in its own right. sense, but also in application to issues of the so-called. religious comprehension. This interpretation of N. z. carried out under the influence of Augustine's Neoplatonism and representatives of Byzantine philosophy.
In philosophy of the 17th century. two concepts of N. z. were defined. In the first, rationalist (Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, as well as the materialist Spinoza), the immediacy of axioms was characterized not only as their unprovability, but at the same time as their unconditional evidence. Rationalistic theories of N. z. modern times suffer from a lack of dialectics: the unity of direct and mediated knowledge disappears in them; N. z. are sharply opposed to the mediated; carrier of N. z. is proclaimed (intellect), which is decisively opposed to sensuality - both in the form of sensation and in the form of images of “imagination” (imagination). Feelings knowledge is characterized as incapable of becoming a source of the most important features of reliable knowledge - its unconditional necessity and the same unconditional universality. But also in the sphere of intellectual knowledge N. z. is placed above the mediated - as a direct insight into the truth. In the theory of knowledge of the rationalists of the 17th century. concept of N. z. played a huge role, in particular in their theory of deduction. According to Descartes, the transition of deduction from each of its links to the next must be immediate. the evidence of intuition (see “Rules for guiding the mind,” XI, in the book: Selected works, [M.], 1950, pp. 112–114). From this view. deduction, he argued, “...should be considered as intuition when it is simple and obvious...” (ibid., p. 118).
The second concept (developed by representatives of materialism and sensationalism - Bacon, Hobbes, Locke), considering sensations as the beginning of all knowledge, did not consider feelings. knowledge by "intuitions", taking into account specific. variety of sensations. Locke, preserving “intuition,” applied it not to images of things arising from sensations, but to the knowledge of certain relationships between “ideas,” i.e. relationships between images or representatives of things. Locke called intuitive knowledge of relations if between two ideas is seen directly. obviousness. This understanding was no longer rationalistic in the sense of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, but it did not yet contain a reaction against rationalism.
In the 18th century part of the bourgeois philosophers who gravitated toward religion recoiled from rationalism. theories of knowledge. These philosophers used the weaknesses of rationalism - one-sided and exaggerated rationality, inability to satisfy demands, misunderstanding of dialectics - to fundamentally criticize rational methods of cognition. In place of the concept of intellectual knowledge, they put the concept of “intuition of feeling” and even “intuition of faith.” These are the teachings - in France - J. Rousseau, in Holland - Hemsterhuis, in Germany - Hamann and Jacobi. The concept of feeling becomes ambiguous among these philosophers. In some cases, it is understood, as in 17th-century philosophy, as sensations of external feelings, in others - movements, internal. feelings. The concept of both the object of knowledge and the organ of this knowledge changes. Already partly Rousseau, and to an even greater extent Haman and Jacobi, are the object of N. z. - feelings or faith - proclaim not so much really existing objects of the external world, but rather God. At the same time, rationality develops, but also reason as such. N. z., as intuition of feeling, is contrasted with the concepts of the mind, comprehension of the “heart” - with evidence, conclusions and intuitions of the mind, in the doctrine of N. z. a stream of mysticism penetrates. The views of Hamann and Jacobi, who used the teachings of Nicholas of Cusa and Bruno on the coincidence of opposites in the absolute. being, meant a certain success of dialectics. And yet neither Hamann nor Jacobi were able to apply dialectics to the problem of N. z. itself. N. z. is especially characteristic of Jacobi. mediated knowledge, the importance of which he belittled not only because he considered it incapable of comprehending the unconditional and verifying the external world, but also because it leads to naturalism and atheism.
In the systems of Fichte and especially Hegel, the problem of N. z. posed as a problem of dialectics: valid. cognition is considered as the opposite of mediated and N. z., and direct. discretion or awareness of the truth is understood only as a result, which precedes. Emphasizing the opposition of their views to those of Jacobi, romanticism (see Romanticism) and, to a certain extent, even Schelling, they criticized rational concepts not only for the fact that they were not dialectical, but also for the fact that they were concepts, because, according to their conviction, not a concept, but only directly. (Jacobi) or intellectual intuition (F. Schlegel, Schelling) can be a form of adequate cognition. Hegel highly valued concepts as logical. scientific form knowledge. Where necessity reaches knowledge, immediacy turns out, according to Hegel, to be no longer sufficient: contemplation is only the beginning of knowledge, and all knowledge presupposes reflection as necessary (see Werke, Bd 15, Tl 2, V., 1845, S. 320– 21). But H. z. - not only the beginning, that which at a certain stage of knowledge appears to consciousness as an immediately obvious truth, is itself in fact the result of a previous long mediation. At the same time, Hegel understood mediation in some of his statements quite broadly: it is practical. actions, events, inventions, etc., necessary for a certain perception or comprehension to be presented to consciousness as immediate (see ibid., Bd 15, V., 1836, S. 549). However, the mediated and scientific theory developed by Hegel was idealistic. In the overwhelming majority of cases, by the mediation of knowledge, Hegel understood only the mediation of thoughts by thoughts that precede them in justification.
In the development of the bourgeoisie. philosophy after Hegel N. z. loses the achievements of Hegelian dialectics. Condition N. z. proclaimed consciousness from the suggestions of practice and practicality. interest, and N. z. itself sharply contrasts with the mediated. And if Schopenhauer and Schelling have N. z. was still endowed with the properties of intellectual knowledge, then in Bergson it is declared to be completely opposite to the latter. In parallel with Bergson's illogical understanding of N. z. (intuition) Croce announced N. z. pre-logical and independent of logically formed concepts. An attempt to return to rationalism. understanding N. z. was the teaching of Husserl, who revived in the theory of “essential contemplation” Plato’s teaching about the intellectual contemplation of “eidos”, or ideas, supposedly detached from everything sensory and empirical, motionless and self-identical, alien even to that idealistic. dialectics, in the development of which was strong point Plato's philosophy.
In the teaching of dialectical materialism, the mediation of knowledge was first fundamentally understood as the mediation of thoughts not by thoughts, but by material societies. human practice. In the problem of N. z., dialectic. materialism distinguishes between two questions: 1) there is a natural law. how, 2) if it exists, then how to explain it. To the first dialectic. materialism gives affirmation. answer: there are truths, axioms, etc., which we recognize as immediately reliable, “obvious.” Moreover, as a fact of cognition, not only feelings exist. intuition, but also intellectual intuition, the spontaneity of certain insights of the mind. Such, for example, are, according to Lenin, figures of logic that have “... the strength of prejudice, an axiomatic character...” (Works, vol. 38, p. 209).
Answering the second question, dialectic. materialism reveals the basic The defect of all theories of N. Z. – the static view of knowledge as a motionless contemplation, revealed either to sensuality or to the mind as only immediately given. Dialectical Materialism includes in logic itself, the process of testing thinking by practice. Lenin found and approved an approach to this within the framework of idealism in Hegel’s “Science of Logic” (see ibid., p. 193). But, in Hegel, Lenin put “the process of cognition, including human practice and technology...” (ibid., p. 192) second only to “life.” This understanding of cognition also predetermines the question of the relationship between knowledge and knowledge. to mediated knowledge, the fundamental solution of which was given by Engels. The self-evidence of the axioms, Engels noted, is imaginary. It "...is inherited by us. They are provable dialectically, since they are not pure tautologies" ("Dialectics of Nature", 1964, p. 223). Since cognition is a process in which each link is conditioned and mediated by the links preceding it, then knowledge taken as a whole is characterized not by immediacy, but rather by mediation. Man’s reflection of nature, Lenin explained, “... is not simple, not immediate, not integral, but a process of a series of abstractions, formation, formation of concepts, laws...” (ibid., p. 173). Exactly how to know. process, the approach of the human mind to a separate thing “... is not a simple, immediate mirror-dead act...” (ibid., p. 370). In the light of these provisions, materialistic. dialectics recognition of the fact of the existence of N. z. is subject to important restrictions.
The first of them consists in pointing out that only the beginning of knowledge can be immediate, only in which - with the reduction of knowledge into the past - Marxist dialectics sees the source of all possible knowledge: "A concept is not something immediate... - directly only feeling of “red” (“this is red”), etc.” (ibid., p. 276). As deserving of special attention, Lenin noted Hegel, according to whom “there is... nothing that does not simultaneously contain both immediacy and mediation...” (ibid., p. 91). This statement is true primarily in relation to being, but no less in relation to knowledge. Ch. the content of logic is transitions, i.e. the mediation of concepts, rather than the fixation of immovable immediacy. contemplations or intuitions. These transitions are revealed in logic, not as the consciousness of thoughts alone, but “... as reflections objective world"(ibid., p. 188). An important type or form of mediated knowledge is one that follows the uniqueness of the forms and connections of being.
The second concept of N. z. lies in the fact that the “immediacy” of knowledge loses its character: to the truths that are in the present. time is realized as “immediate”, as “self-evident”, knowledge has come and comes as a result of a long mediation of their material, generally known practice. That. dialectical materialism has deprived the concept of N. z. any signs of mysticism, stripped away from him the veil of the supersensible, as it was clothed in idealism. systems, developed it on the basis of dialectics.
Lit.: Asmus V.F., The problem of intuition in philosophy and mathematics, M., 1963; Bergson H., Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, P., 1889; Vialatoux J., Le discours et l'intuition, Leçons philosophiques..., P., 1930.
V. Asmus. Moscow.
Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by F. V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970 .
knowledge obtained without the help of proof, direct contemplation of truth as something that is self-evident, in contrast to discursive or demonstrative knowledge, which is always mediated not only by the data of experience, but also by logical reasoning. There are the following types of knowledge: sensual, irrational and intellectual (sensual, supersensible and intellectual intuition), which were sharply opposed to each other in metaphysical teachings. Before Kant, sensual N. z. has always been regarded as knowledge experiential in its source. Kant argued that in addition to such N. z. There are also (a priori) forms of sensory knowledge that precede any experience. (space and time). Kant rejected the possibility of intellectual intuition for the human mind, admitting its inherent nature, however, in a mind more perfect than human. Intellectual N. z. It was recognized in ancient times by Plato and Plotinus, and in the 17th century by the rationalists Descartes and Spinoza. Leibniz, late 18th and early 19th centuries. - German idealists Fichte, Schelling, in the 20th century - Husserl, understanding by it the ability of the mind to “see” truth “through the eyes of the mind,” and moreover directly, without proof; For example, the axioms of geometry were considered such truths. However, in the 20th century. In the formalistic direction of geometry, a view arose that identified axioms with definitions and deprived them of the character of immediate evidence. The doctrine of supersensible science. in the form of “insight” as a divine revelation is characteristic of many religious constructions (Augustine and others) and as an emotional intuition - for him. romantics (F. Schlegel, Hamann, late Schelling, etc.), existentialists and a number of other irrationalists, who often reinterpreted intellectual science in this way. Hegel criticized the theories of science that preceded him. as non-dialectical. In N. z. he saw the unity of direct and mediated knowledge. But he mistakenly considered developing thinking itself to be the basis of this unity. Dialectical materialism sees the basis for the unity of direct and mediated knowledge in the development of material practice: truths mediated by practice and the thinking determined by it become, due to their repeated reproduction, directly reliable. In addition, the problem of N. z. Now it is connected with the research of the mechanisms of intuition and scientific creativity.
Great definition
Incomplete definition ↓
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE
a term meaning knowledge obtained by direct judgment, without justification by evidence. N. z. otherwise called intuitive, or intuition. In the history of philosophy, two concepts of knowledge have been put forward: 1) feelings. N. z., or contemplation through the senses, and 2) intellectual N. z., or contemplation through the mind. Representatives of the first concept in antiquity. philosophies were Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and in modern times – Feuerbach, who, in a polemic against Hegel’s teaching on the mediated nature of all knowledge, argued that “... only that is true... which is directly certain through itself... "; but “... unconditionally undeniable, clear as the sun... only sensual,” and therefore the secret of N. z. “concentrated in feeling” (“Fundamental provisions of the philosophy of the future”, see Selected philosophical works, vol. 1, M., 1955, p. 187). However, Feuerbach warned against the absolutization of feelings. spontaneity of cognition and separation of thinking from sensuality. The second concept of N. z. also originated in ancient Greek philosophy and was spontaneously dialectical. character. Thus, Plato explained that contemplation of ideas is the prototype of things of the senses. world - there is a kind of N. z., which comes like a sudden insight. A necessary condition for such contemplation should be, according to Plato, duration. preparing the mind. Thus, directly. contemplation turns out to be simultaneously mediated. Aristotle also taught about the same unity. “We, on the contrary, affirm,” wrote Aristotle, “that not every science is a demonstrative science, but that the knowledge of immediate (principles) is unprovable” (“Second Analytics”, I, 3, 72 in 18–20; Russian translation. [L.], 1952). The initial immediate and general principles of knowledge are revealed in special acts of speculation, or intellectual intuition. But since, according to Aristotle, the general is not separable from the individual, Aristotle interpreted the very perception of the general in the individual as the result of the process of cognition starting from individual facts, which he called induction. Because directly Since the beginning of the proof is not deduced from other truths, but is discovered by the mind, then induction is no longer a form of inference, but a method of research. In Europe Middle-century philosophy concept of N. z. developed in both chapters. branches of the church philosophy - scholasticism and mysticism, applied not only to issues of the theory of knowledge in its own right. sense, but also in application to issues of the so-called. religious comprehension. This interpretation of N. z. carried out under the influence of Augustine's Neoplatonism and representatives of Byzantine philosophy. In philosophy of the 17th century. two concepts of N. were determined. h. In the first, rationalist (Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, as well as the materialist Spinoza), the immediacy of axioms was characterized not only as their unprovability, but at the same time as their unconditional evidence. Rationalistic theories of N. z. modern times suffer from a lack of dialectics: the understanding of the unity of direct and mediated knowledge disappears in them; N. z. are sharply opposed to the mediated; carrier of N. z. the mind (intellect) is proclaimed, which is decisively opposed to sensuality - both in the form of sensation and in the form of images of “imagination” (imagination). Feelings knowledge is characterized as incapable of becoming a source of the most important features of reliable knowledge - its unconditional necessity and the same unconditional universality. But also in the sphere of intellectual knowledge N. z. is placed above the mediated - as a direct insight into the truth. In the theory of knowledge of the rationalists of the 17th century. concept of N. z. played a huge role, in particular in their theory of deduction. According to Descartes, the transition of deduction from each of its links to the next must be immediate. the evidence of intuition (see “Rules for guiding the mind,” rule XI, in the book: Selected works, [M.], 1950, pp. 112–114). From this view. deduction, he argued, “...should be considered as intuition when it is simple and obvious...” (ibid., p. 118). The second concept (developed by representatives of materialism and sensationalism - Bacon, Hobbes, Locke), considering sensations as the beginning of all knowledge, did not consider feelings. elements of knowledge by "intuitions", taking into account specific. variety of sensations. Locke, retaining the term “intuition,” applied it not to images of things arising from sensations, but to the knowledge of certain relationships between “ideas,” i.e. relationships between images or representatives of things. Locke called intuitive knowledge of relations if the relation between two ideas is seen directly. obviousness. This understanding was no longer rationalistic in the sense of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, but it did not yet contain a reaction against rationalism. In the 18th century part of the bourgeois philosophers who gravitated toward religion recoiled from rationalism. theories of knowledge. These philosophers used the weaknesses of rationalism - one-sided and exaggerated rationality, inability to satisfy the needs of feelings, misunderstanding of dialectics - to fundamentally criticize rational methods of cognition. In place of the concept of intellectual knowledge, they put the concept of “intuition of feeling” and even “intuition of faith.” These are the teachings - in France - J. Rousseau, in Holland - Hemsterhuis, in Germany - Hamana and Jacobi. The concept of feeling becomes ambiguous among these philosophers. In some cases, it is understood, as in 17th-century philosophy, as sensations of external feelings, in others - emotions, movements, internal. feelings. The concept of both the object of knowledge and the organ of this knowledge changes. Already partly Rousseau, and to an even greater extent Haman and Jacobi, are the object of N. z. - feelings or faith - proclaim not so much really existing objects of the external world, but rather God. At the same time, a critique of rationality, but also of reason as such, develops. N. z., as intuition of feeling, is contrasted with the concepts of the mind, comprehension of the “heart” - with evidence, conclusions and intuitions of the mind, in the doctrine of N. z. a stream of mysticism penetrates. The views of Hamann and Jacobi, who used the teachings of Nicholas of Cusa and Bruno on the coincidence of opposites in the absolute. being, meant a certain success of dialectics. And yet neither Hamann nor Jacobi were able to apply dialectics to the problem of N. z. itself. Especially characteristic of Jacobi is the opposition of N. z. mediated knowledge, the importance of which he belittled not only because he considered it incapable of comprehending unconditional being and verifying the reality of the external world, but also because it leads to naturalism and atheism. In the systems of Fichte and especially Hegel, the problem of N. z. posed as a problem of dialectics: valid. cognition is considered as a unity of the opposites of mediated and cognition, and direct. insight or awareness of truth is understood only as a result, which is preceded by mediation. Emphasizing the opposition of their views to those of Jacobi, romanticism (see Romanticism) and, to a certain extent, even Schelling, they criticized rational concepts not only for the fact that they were not dialectical, but also for the fact that they were concepts, because, according to their conviction, not a concept, but only directly. feeling (Jacobi) or intellectual intuition (F. Schlegel, Schelling) can be a form of adequate knowledge. Hegel highly valued concepts as logical. scientific form knowledge. Where thinking reaches the knowledge of necessity, immediacy, according to Hegel, is no longer sufficient: contemplation is only the beginning of knowledge, and all knowledge presupposes reflection as a necessary condition (see Werke, Bd 15, Tl 2, V., 1845, S. 320–21). But H. z. - not only the beginning, that which at a certain stage of knowledge appears to consciousness as an immediately obvious truth, is itself in fact the result of a previous long mediation. At the same time, Hegel understood mediation in some of his statements quite broadly: this is a series of practical concepts. actions, events, inventions, etc., necessary for a certain perception or comprehension to be presented to consciousness as immediate (see ibid., Bd 15, V., 1836, S. 549). However, the dialectic of mediation and science, developed by Hegel, was idealistic. In the overwhelming majority of cases, by the mediation of knowledge, Hegel understood only the mediation of thoughts by thoughts that precede them in justification. In the development of the bourgeoisie. philosophy after Hegel, theory of N. z. loses the achievements of Hegelian dialectics. Condition N. z. freedom of consciousness from the suggestions of practice and practicality is proclaimed. interest, and N. z. itself sharply contrasts with the mediated. And if Schopenhauer and Schelling have N. z. was still endowed with the properties of intellectual knowledge, then in Bergson it is declared to be completely opposite to the latter. In parallel with Bergson's illogical understanding of N. z. (intuition) Croce announced N. z. pre-logical and independent of logically formed concepts. An attempt to return to rationalism. understanding N. z. was the teaching of Husserl, who revived in the theory of “essential contemplation” Plato’s teaching about the intellectual contemplation of “eidos”, or ideas, supposedly detached from everything sensory and empirical, motionless and self-identical, alien even to that idealistic. dialectics, the development of which was the strong point of Plato's philosophy. In the teaching of dialectical materialism, the mediation of knowledge was first fundamentally understood as the mediation of thoughts not by thoughts, but by material societies. human practice. In the problem of N. z., dialectic. materialism distinguishes between two questions: 1) does N. z exist? as a fact, 2) if it exists, then how to explain it. To the first question dialectic. materialism gives affirmation. answer: there are truths, axioms, etc., which we recognize as immediately reliable, “obvious.” Moreover, as a fact of cognition, not only feelings exist. intuition, but also intellectual intuition, the spontaneity of certain insights of the mind. Such, for example, are, according to Lenin, figures of logic that have “... the strength of prejudice, an axiomatic character...” (Works, vol. 38, p. 209). Answering the second question, dialectic. materialism reveals the basic The defect of all theories of N. Z. – the static view of knowledge as a motionless contemplation, revealed either to sensuality or to the mind as only immediately given. Dialectical Materialism includes life in logic itself, the process of testing thinking by practice. Lenin found and approved an approach to this thought within the framework of idealism in Hegel’s “Science of Logic” (see ibid., p. 193). But, in contrast to Hegel, Lenin put “the process of cognition, including human practice and technology...” (ibid., p. 192) in second place after “life.” This understanding of cognition also predetermines the solution to the question of the relationship between science and knowledge. to mediated knowledge, the fundamental solution of which was given by Engels. The self-evidence of the axioms, Engels noted, is imaginary. It "...is inherited by us. They are provable dialectically, since they are not pure tautologies" ("Dialectics of Nature", 1964, p. 223). Since cognition is a process in which each link is conditioned and mediated by the links preceding it, then knowledge taken as a whole is characterized not by immediacy, but rather by mediation. Man’s reflection of nature, Lenin explained, “... is not a simple, not immediate, not integral reflection, but a process of a series of abstractions, formation, formation of concepts, laws...” (ibid., p. 173). Exactly how to know. process, the approach of the human mind to a separate thing “... is not a simple, immediate mirror-dead act...” (ibid., p. 370). In the light of these provisions, materialistic. dialectics recognition of the fact of the existence of N. z. is subject to important restrictions. The first of them consists in pointing out that only the beginning of knowledge, only sensation, can be immediate, in which - with the reduction of knowledge to the past - Marxist dialectics sees the source of all possible knowledge: "The concept is not something immediate ... - directly only the feeling of “red” (“this is red”), etc.” (ibid., p. 276). Lenin noted Hegel’s statement as worthy of special attention, according to which “there is... nothing that does not simultaneously contain both immediacy and mediation...” (ibid., p. 91). This statement is true primarily in relation to being, but no less in relation to knowledge. Ch. the content of logic is transitions, i.e. the mediation of concepts, rather than the fixation of immovable immediacy. contemplations or intuitions. These transitions are revealed in logic, not as the movement of thoughts alone immanent to consciousness, but “... as reflections of the objective world” (ibid., p. 188). An important type or form of mediated knowledge is evidence that follows the uniqueness of the forms and connections of being. The second limitation of the concept of N. z. is that the “immediacy” of knowledge loses its unconditional character: to the truths, which in the present. time is realized as “immediate”, as “self-evident”, knowledge has come and comes as a result of a long mediation of their material, generally known practice. That. dialectical materialism has deprived the concept of N. z. any signs of mysticism, stripped away from him the veil of the supersensible, as it was clothed in idealism. systems, developed it on the basis of dialectics. See also Art. Intuitionism, Intuitionism, Intuition, Irrationalism and lit. with these articles. Lit.: Asmus V.F., The problem of intuition in philosophy and mathematics, M., 1963; Bergson H., Essai sur les donn?es imm?diates de la conscience, P., 1889; Vialatoux J., Le discours et l´intuition, Le?ons philosophiques..., P., 1930. V. Asmus. Moscow.
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