Prolegomena as any future of metaphysics. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics
FOREWORD
These prolegomena are intended not for students, but for future teachers, and even for the latter they should serve as a guide not for teaching an already existing science, but for creating this science itself.
There are scientists for whom the very history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is their philosophy; our prolegomena are not written for them. They should wait until those who are trying to draw from the sources of the mind itself have finished their work, then it will be their turn to inform the world about what has happened. Otherwise, nothing can be said that, in their opinion, has not already been said, and this could really be considered an infallible prediction for everything that will meet in the future; in fact, since the human mind has dreamed of innumerable objects in different ways for centuries, nothing is easier than to find something old, somewhat similar to everything new, to everything new.
My intention is to convince all those who consider the pursuit of metaphysics a worthy task that it is absolutely necessary to postpone their work for the time being, to recognize everything that has been done so far has not been done, and first of all to raise the question: is what is called metaphysics possible at all?
If metaphysics is a science, why can't it, like other sciences, win universal and permanent approval? If it is not a science, how is it that it is nevertheless constantly magnified under the guise of science and misleads the human mind with hopes that are never extinguished, but never fulfilled? So, whether we show our knowledge or ignorance, something certain must someday be established about the nature of this pretentious science, because it cannot remain in the same position. It seems almost ridiculous that, while every other science is incessantly advancing, in metaphysics, which wants to be wisdom itself and to whose prophecies everyone turns, it has to constantly mark time without taking a single step forward. It has lost many of its adherents, and it is imperceptible that those who consider themselves capable of shining in other sciences want to risk their glory in this science, where every person, ignorant in all other subjects, allows himself a decisive judgment, since in this area really there is no true criterion (Mass und Gewich) to distinguish solidity from idle chatter.
However, it is not unusual that after a long development of some science, when they think that it has gone God knows how far, someone will finally come up with the question: yes. Is such a science possible at all, and if so, how? Indeed, the human mind is so prone to building that many times it has erected a tower, and then again demolished it to see if its foundation is strong. It's never too late to take up the mind; but if understanding comes late, it is more difficult to use it.
The question of whether this or that science is possible presupposes a doubt about its validity; but such a doubt offends anyone whose entire property perhaps consists of this imaginary jewel, and therefore he who allows himself to express this doubt must always expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their old, and therefore revered rightful possession, with their metaphysical compendiums in their hands, will look at it with contempt; others who see only one thing - that which is identical with what they have already seen somewhere, will not understand it; and for a while everything will remain as if nothing had happened that would give reason to fear or hope for an imminent change.
Nevertheless, I undertake to predict that the independently thinking reader of these prolegomena will not only doubt his former science, but will also be fully convinced later that such a science cannot exist at all, unless the requirements expressed here, on which its possibility depends, are satisfied; and since this has never yet happened, [the reader will be convinced] that there is as yet no metaphysics at all. But since, nevertheless, the demand for it can never disappear, because the interest of the general human mind is too closely connected with it, the reader will recognize that, however opposed to this, a complete reform, or rather, a new birth of metaphysics according to hitherto unknown plan.
Since the "Experiments" of Locke and Leibniz, or rather, since the very beginning of metaphysics, there has not been an event so decisive for its fate as the attacks that David Hume subjected it to. He shed no light on this kind of knowledge, but knocked out a spark from which a fire could be lit if a suitable tinder were found, the decay of which would be diligently maintained and intensified.
Hume proceeded mainly from one but important concept of metaphysics, namely, from the concept of the connection between cause and effect (hence, from the concepts of force and action that follow from this, etc.); he demanded from reason, which claims to have generated this concept, to answer, by what right does it think to itself that something can be such that, thanks to its positing, something else must necessarily be posited (for such is the meaning of the concept of causality)? He irrefutably proved that it is absolutely impossible for the mind to think such a connection a priori and from concepts, since this connection contains necessity, and meanwhile it is impossible to understand how, from the fact that something exists, something else must also be necessary and, therefore, how can one introduce a priori the concept of such a connection? From this he concluded that the mind completely deceives itself by this concept and mistakenly takes it for its own offspring, while it is nothing but a bastard of the imagination, which, fertilized by experience, has subordinated certain ideas to the law of association and an objective, conscious necessity (aus Einsicht ) replaced by the subjective necessity arising from this, that is, by habit. From this Hume also concluded that the mind is completely incapable of even thinking of such connections at all (since in this case its concepts would be mere inventions) and that all its pseudo-a priori knowledge is nothing but ordinary experience, but incorrectly designated, or, by other to say that there is and cannot be any metaphysics at all.
However rash and incorrect Hume's conclusion was, it was based at least on a study that was worth it for the best minds of his time to unite to solve the problem as successfully as possible in the sense in which he posed it, which would soon lead to a complete science reform.
But fate, which has long been unfavorable for metaphysics, was pleased that Hume should not be understood by anyone. It is impossible to watch with indifference how his opponents - Reed, Oswald, Beatty and, finally, Priestley - completely did not touch the essence of his problem and how they, constantly taking for granted exactly what he doubted, with fervor and most often with great immodesty proved something that he never thought of doubting; they so misunderstood his call for improvement that everything remained as it was, as if nothing had happened. The question was not whether the concept of causality is correct, whether it is suitable and necessary for the whole knowledge of nature: Hume never doubted this; the question was whether this concept is conceived a priori by the mind and whether it thus has an inner truth independent of any experience, and therefore an application not limited to the objects of experience alone - this is what Hume expected an answer to. After all, it was only about the origin of this concept, and not about the need for its application; if its origin were explained, then the conditions of its application and the scope of its applicability would become clear by itself.
But in order to accomplish this task, the opponents of this glorious man would have to penetrate deeply into the nature of the mind, since it deals only with pure thinking, and this was not to their liking. Therefore, they invented a more convenient way to persist without any understanding, namely, to refer to ordinary human reason. Indeed, it is a great gift from heaven to have a direct (or, as they recently began to say, simple) human reason. But you need to prove it by deeds, by the depth and prudence of your thoughts and words, and not by referring to it as an oracle when you don’t know what to say reasonable in favor of its justification. When understanding and knowledge come to an end, then, and not before, to refer to ordinary human reason is one of those ingenious inventions of modern times, thanks to which the most vulgar talker can boldly start and endure an argument with the most thorough mind. But as long as there is even a small remnant of understanding, everyone will beware of resorting to this extreme remedy. If we consider carefully, then that appeal [to common sense] is nothing but a reference to the judgment of the crowd, from the approval of which the philosopher blushes, and the wit who pleases the crowd triumphs and persists. But I think: Hume could just as well claim to common sense like Beatty, and besides something else that Beatty obviously did not possess, namely, critical reason, which keeps ordinary reason within the boundaries, so that he would not be carried away by speculations and would not wish to decide anything about them, without being he is able to substantiate his principles; for only in this way will he remain sane. An ax and a saw are fine for cutting timber, but copper engraving requires an engraving needle. Thus, both common sense and speculative reason are suitable, but each in its own sphere: the first - in judgments that have their direct application in experience, the second - in general judgments from pure concepts, for example, in metaphysics, where common sense, which calls so himself, but often per antiphrasin, has no judgment.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) - the great German philosopher, the founder of the German classical philosophy. The work of I. Kant is divided into two periods: pre-critical - before 1770 and critical - after 1770. In the first period of his creative activity, I. Kant developed problems of natural science: cosmology, mechanics, anthropology, physical geography. In the second period, the philosopher focused his attention on the problems of epistemology. The work of I. Kant belongs to the second period of the philosopher's creative activity.
In the work "Prolegomena ..." Kant reflects on the cognitive capabilities of the human mind. All knowledge, Kant believes, begins with experience, but cannot be reduced to it. A certain part of our knowledge has a priori, i.e. inquisitive character. Kant distinguishes between synthetic judgments, which expand knowledge, and analytical ones, which explain knowledge. All experiential judgments are synthetic. But how are a priori synthetic judgments possible, "how is knowledge possible from pure reason?" Kant divides this general question into four questions:
1. How is pure mathematics possible?
2. How is pure natural science possible?
3. How is metaphysics possible at all?
4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?
Feelings are a natural external source of knowledge, but they are random, subjective. Knowledge of mathematics is universal and necessary. How does sense data acquire a universal and necessary character? Kant explains this by the fact that there are a priori forms of sensibility - space and time. Space systematizes external sensations, time systematizes internal ones. This is the only reason why the science of magnitudes, mathematics, is possible.
Feelings give data about things, reason comprehends these data. Reason operates with categories, i.e. extremely broad concepts. Categories are a priori; they constitute, as it were, the skeleton of knowledge. Only because they exist is "pure natural science" possible.
Only the world of experience is accessible to the senses and reason. What is beyond experience is the sphere of activity of the mind, the highest, cognitive ability of man. The mind operates with ideas about the soul, about God, about the world, but since these ideas are outside of experience, the mind cannot give an unambiguous answer to any of the worldview questions. He is entangled in contradictions. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be called a science, but it can be one. The source of knowledge in metaphysics is the mind, and not the external world, as in other sciences, new discoveries are impossible in it. And after the mind is fully aware of the limits of its ability, metaphysics can be completed. In other words, metaphysics is possible, but only as a science of the limits of knowledge.
Note-taking questions
1. What is the distinguishing feature of metaphysics?
2. What is analytical judgments? What are synthetic judgments? What are the differences between them?
3. What is a priori knowledge?
4. What is space and time? What is their role in cognition?
5. What are the possibilities sensory knowledge?
6. What is nature in Kant's understanding?
7. What cognitive role reason?
8. How do you understand Kant's statement that “the understanding does not draw its laws (a priori) from nature, but prescribes them to it”?
9. What are the cognitive possibilities of reason?
10. What is the mind? Why is reason the highest level of knowledge?
11. In what way is reason inferior to reason?
12. Can metaphysics become a science?
Literature
1. Kant I. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that can arise in the sense of science. - M., 1993.
Immanuel Kant. "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may appear as a science"
Two things fill the soul with ever new and growing wonder and reverence more often than the longer we meditate on them, the starry sky above me and the moral law in me.
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Konigsberg in the family of a saddle maker. After graduating from a local university, he worked as a home teacher, and from 1755 he lectured at the University of Königsberg. Only in 1770 did he receive a professorship in logic and metaphysics. In 1781, the "Critique of Pure Reason" was published, in 1783 Kant published a summary of this work entitled "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics ..." In 1790, the "Critique of the Power of Judgment" appeared, and in 1797 - "Metaphysics of morals".
Kant is usually called "the founder of German classical philosophy", "the founder of German idealism". Indeed, almost all types of classical and modern philosophizing in one way or another go back to the work of this thinker. His writings marked the beginning of a significant tradition in European spiritual development. Its essence lies in the fact that each further step forward is seen as a rethinking of the accumulated theoretical wealth, which is carefully stored, but does not turn into a fetish.
Kant is compared with Socrates, for his philosophy is humane. The ancient Greek scientist for the first time in the history of philosophy was distracted from the cosmos and began to study human nature. For Kant, the problem of man comes first. He does not forget about the universe, but main topic for him - a man. He thought about the laws of being and consciousness with only one goal: to make a person more humane. Kant's ideas have undergone a transformation, but they continue to live. They sound especially relevant at this stage in the development of human society - in the period of humanization of all branches of knowledge, including philosophy.
Kant makes a revolution in philosophy, considering knowledge as an activity proceeding according to its own laws. For the first time, not the nature and structure of the cognized substance, but the specificity of the cognizing subject is considered as the main factor that determines the method of cognition and constructs the object of knowledge.
So, let's proceed directly to the analysis of the work "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may appear as a science."
Prolegomena- summary works by I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason. Kant wrote this work himself in 1783
Prolegomena- concept means preliminary remarks, reports, introduction to science.
In the preface, he says that “These prolegomena are not intended for students, but for future teachers, and for the latter they should serve as a guide not for teaching an already existing science, but for creating this science itself.”
There are scientists for whom the very history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is their philosophy; our prolegomena are not written for them. They should wait until those who are trying to draw from the sources of the mind itself have finished their work, then it will be their turn to inform the world about what has happened. Otherwise, nothing can be said that, in their opinion, has not already been said, and this could really be considered an infallible prediction for everything that will meet in the future; in fact, since the human mind has dreamed of innumerable objects in different ways for centuries, nothing is easier than to find something old, somewhat similar to everything new, to everything new.
His intention is to convince all those who consider the pursuit of metaphysics a worthy task that it is absolutely necessary to postpone their work for the time being, to recognize everything that has been done so far has not been done and, first of all, to raise the question: is what is called metaphysics possible at all?
In this work, Kant asks:
If metaphysics is a science, why can't it, like other sciences, win universal and permanent approval? If it is not a science, then how is it that it is nevertheless constantly magnified under the guise of science and misleads the human. – And in the book he reveals it and answers this question
At the beginning, Kant gives preliminary remarks about the peculiarities of any metaphysical knowledge, where the sources of metaphysics are considered and the synthetic and analytical types of judgments are compared. Further, the question is raised about the possibility of metaphysics as such and about the possibility of knowledge from pure reason. Kant breaks the main transcendental question into four sub-questions and considers each of them in turn:
How is pure mathematics possible?
How is pure natural science possible?
How is metaphysics possible at all?
How is metaphysics possible as a science?
On the difference between synthetic and analytical types of judgment:
“Metaphysical knowledge must contain only a priori judgments: this is required by the distinctive feature of its sources. But no matter where judgments originate and whatever logical form they may have, they differ in content, due to which they are either only explanatory and do not add anything to the content of knowledge, or they expand and multiply this knowledge; the former may be called analytic, the latter synthetic judgments.
Analytic judgments express in the predicate only what has actually been thought in the concept of the subject, although not so clearly and not with the same consciousness. When I say: all bodies are extended, I do not in the least expand my concept of the body, but only decompose it, since extension was really thought about this concept even before the judgment, although it was not clearly expressed; it is therefore an analytic proposition. The proposition some bodies are heavy contains in the predicate something that is really not yet conceivable in the general concept of a body; therefore, this proposition multiplies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and therefore it must be called a synthetic judgment.”
A few points from the first part:
Synthetic and analytical judgments are different.
The general principle of all analytical judgments is the law of contradiction. (All analytic judgments are wholly based on the law of contradiction, and by their very nature are a priori cognitions, no matter whether the concepts that serve as their material are empirical or not.)
Synthetic judgments need a different principle than the law of contradiction.
Divides synthetic propositions into classes:
Judgments of experience are always synthetic
All mathematical judgments are synthetic
How is pure mathematics possible?:
Any mathematical knowledge has the peculiarity that it must first show its concept in contemplation, and, moreover, a priori, therefore, pure, and not empirical: without this means, mathematics cannot take a single step, therefore its judgments are always intuitive. Space and time are the very contemplations that pure mathematics makes the basis of all its knowledge and judgments. Mathematics must first show all its concepts in contemplation, and pure mathematics in pure contemplation, that is, it must construct them. Geometry is based on the pure contemplation of space. Arithmetic creates the concepts of its numbers by successively adding one in time; but especially pure mechanics can create its concepts of motion only through the representation of time. But both of these representations are only contemplations. If from the empirical contemplation of bodies and their changes (movement) we exclude everything proper empirical, namely that which belongs to sensation, then only space and time remain, which are thus pure intuitions, a priori underlying the empirical ones. Precisely because they are pure a priori intuitions, they prove that these are only forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, that is, the perception of real objects.
How is pure natural science possible?:
In this section, Kant gives several tables:
LOGICAL TABLE of judgments
By quantity: General / Special / Single
By quality: Affirmative / Negative / Infinite
By modality: Problematic / Assertoric / Apodictic
TRANSCENDENTAL TABLE OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS
By quantity: Unity (measure) / Multiplicity (magnitude) / Wholeness (whole)
By quality: Reality / Denial / Limitation
Relative to: Substance / Cause / Communication
By modality: Possibility / Existence / Necessity
A PURE PHYSIOLOGICAL TABLE of the general principles of natural science
Axioms of contemplation
Anticipations of perception
Experience analogies
The result is this: the matter of the senses is to contemplate, the matter of the mind is to think. To think, on the other hand, means to combine representations in consciousness. This connection occurs either only in relation to the subject, then it is accidental and subjective; or else it unconditionally occurs, in which case it is necessary, or objectively. The combination of representations in consciousness is a judgment. Therefore, to think is the same as to form judgments, or to relate representations to judgments in general. Therefore, judgments are either only subjective when representations refer to consciousness in a single subject and are united in it, or they are objective when representations are united in consciousness in general, i.e., they are necessary. The logical moments of all judgments are the various possible ways of connecting representations in the mind. If they are concepts, then they are concepts about the necessary combination of representations in consciousness, therefore, the principles of objectively valid judgments. This union in consciousness is either analytic, through identity, or synthetic, through the combination and addition of different ideas to each other. ©
How is metaphysics possible at all?:
The main question that Kant poses to the reader is whether Metaphysics is possible at all:
“My intention is to convince everyone who considers the pursuit of metaphysics a worthy business that it is absolutely necessary to postpone their work for the time being, to recognize everything that has been done so far has not been done and, first of all, to raise the question: is it possible at all that which is called metaphysics.”
A few theses and rebuttals:
1 Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and a limitation also in space.
Antithesis: The world in time and space is infinite.
2 Thesis: Everything in the world consists of simple things. Antithesis: Nothing is simple, everything is complicated
3 Thesis: There are free causes in the world.
Antithesis: There is no freedom, everything is nature.
4 Thesis: Among the causes of the world there is a certain necessary essence.
Antithesis: There is nothing necessary in this series, everything in it is accidental.
Kant believes that metaphysics is possible only as a purely a priori knowledge.
“We have thus set forth in detail metaphysics - from the point of view of its subjective possibility - as it is really given in the natural inclination of the human mind, namely, in what constitutes the main goal of its study. Meanwhile, we have found that this purely natural application of such a faculty of our reason, in the absence of a discipline that restrains and puts it within the framework, which is possible only thanks to scientific criticism, confuses us into partly illusory, and partly even contradictory dialectical conclusions that go beyond what is permitted. Moreover, such mental metaphysics not only does not contribute to the knowledge of nature, but even harms it. That is why there still remains a task worthy of investigation - to discover those ends of nature towards which this inclination to transcendental concepts inherent in our nature can be directed, since everything that is in nature must first be assigned to some useful purpose.
How is metaphysics as a science possible?:
“In metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, one can never refer to ordinary human reason; this is appropriate only when we are forced to leave it and renounce (under certain circumstances) all pure speculative knowledge, which must always be knowledge, therefore, renounce metaphysics itself and its teachings; then only faith based on reason is possible for us, which will turn out to be sufficient for our needs (and perhaps even more beneficial than knowledge itself). Indeed, in this case, the whole situation changes completely. Metaphysics, not only as a whole, but also in all its parts, must be a science, otherwise it is nothing, because as a speculation of pure reason, it actually has only one support - universal views. However, outside of metaphysics, plausibility and common human sense can, of course, have their useful and legitimate application, but according to very special principles, the significance of which always depends on the relationship to the practical.
This is what I consider myself entitled to demand for the possibility of metaphysics as a science.”
In conclusion, Kant concludes that metaphysics in its main features is embedded in us by nature itself, perhaps stronger than any other science, and it is impossible to look at it as a product of free choice, or as an accidental extension or development. experience.
Thus, in the "Prolegomena ..." Kant takes decisive steps towards the destruction of metaphysics as an ontology and puts the question of knowledge in the first place. In Kant, philosophy and metaphysics turn predominantly into epistemology.
Space and time do not exist outside of man. There is a "thing in itself"
Space and time - forms of perception
Natural bodies are formed by man in consciousness
FORMS OF SENSING PERCEPTION
Nature is the subject of knowledge and it is constructed
Time and space are forms of constructing the phenomena themselves
Mind / sanity
Reason - as a specific feature of intelligence - the ideas of God / immortal soul / substance / free will
IDEAS Transcendent - go beyond experience
Why did metaphysics fail? All philosophers thought as objects and they can be thought of in terms of reason
Not man revolves around nature, but nature revolves around man!
Ideas of the mind
Kant said that man must be divided into empirical and transcendental (more real than it is possible / precede experience and make it possible) - these abilities precede nature and make experience possible. explore nature
Jean Baptiste Bekoev is at the origins of all social sciences. (a person can only know what he himself created)
Kant - man created nature, therefore he can understand it / only man is capable of both good and evil.
Has free will
Dual (the ability to do good approaches the angels and God, and the animal nature)
Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may appear as a science
FOREWORD
These prolegomena are intended not for students, but for future teachers, and even for the latter they should serve as a guide not for teaching an already existing science, but for creating this science itself.
There are scientists for whom the very history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is their philosophy; our prolegomena are not written for them. They should wait until those who are trying to draw from the sources of the mind itself have finished their work, then it will be their turn to inform the world about what has happened. Otherwise, nothing can be said that, in their opinion, has not already been said, and this could really be considered an infallible prediction for everything that will meet in the future; in fact, since the human mind has dreamed of innumerable objects in different ways for centuries, nothing is easier than to find something old, somewhat similar to everything new, to everything new.
My intention is to convince all those who consider the pursuit of metaphysics a worthy task that it is absolutely necessary to postpone their work for the time being, to recognize everything that has been done so far has not been done, and first of all to raise the question: is what is called metaphysics possible at all?
If metaphysics is a science, why can't it, like other sciences, win universal and permanent approval? If it is not a science, how is it that it is nevertheless constantly magnified under the guise of science and misleads the human mind with hopes that are never extinguished, but never fulfilled? So, whether we show our knowledge or ignorance, something certain must someday be established about the nature of this pretentious science, because it cannot remain in the same position. It seems almost ridiculous that, while every other science is incessantly advancing, in metaphysics, which wants to be wisdom itself and to whose prophecies everyone turns, it has to constantly mark time without taking a single step forward. It has lost many of its adherents, and it is imperceptible that those who consider themselves capable of shining in other sciences want to risk their glory in this science, where every person, ignorant in all other subjects, allows himself a decisive judgment, since in this area really there is no true criterion (Mass und Gewich) to distinguish solidity from idle chatter.
However, it is not unusual that after a long development of some science, when they think that it has gone God knows how far, someone will finally come up with the question: yes. Is such a science possible at all, and if so, how? Indeed, the human mind is so prone to building that many times it has erected a tower, and then again demolished it to see if its foundation is strong. It's never too late to take up the mind; but if understanding comes late, it is more difficult to use it.
The question of whether this or that science is possible presupposes a doubt about its validity; but such a doubt offends anyone whose entire property perhaps consists of this imaginary jewel, and therefore he who allows himself to express this doubt must always expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their old, and therefore revered rightful possession, with their metaphysical compendiums in their hands, will look at it with contempt; others who see only one thing - that which is identical with what they have already seen somewhere, will not understand it; and for a while everything will remain as if nothing had happened that would give reason to fear or hope for an imminent change.
Nevertheless, I undertake to predict that the independently thinking reader of these prolegomena will not only doubt his former science, but will also be fully convinced later that such a science cannot exist at all, unless the requirements expressed here, on which its possibility depends, are satisfied; and since this has never yet happened, [the reader will be convinced] that there is as yet no metaphysics at all. But since, nevertheless, the demand for it can never disappear, because the interest of the general human mind is too closely connected with it, the reader will recognize that, however opposed to this, a complete reform, or rather, a new birth of metaphysics according to hitherto unknown plan.
Since the "Experiments" of Locke and Leibniz, or rather, since the very beginning of metaphysics, there has not been an event so decisive for its fate as the attacks that David Hume subjected it to. He shed no light on this kind of knowledge, but knocked out a spark from which a fire could be lit if a suitable tinder were found, the decay of which would be diligently maintained and intensified.
Hume proceeded mainly from one but important concept of metaphysics, namely, from the concept of the connection between cause and effect (hence, from the concepts of force and action that follow from this, etc.); he demanded from reason, which claims to have generated this concept, to answer, by what right does it think to itself that something can be such that, thanks to its positing, something else must necessarily be posited (for such is the meaning of the concept of causality)? He irrefutably proved that it is absolutely impossible for the mind to think such a connection a priori and from concepts, since this connection contains necessity, and meanwhile it is impossible to understand how, from the fact that something exists, something else must also be necessary and, therefore, how can one introduce a priori the concept of such a connection? From this he concluded that the mind completely deceives itself by this concept and mistakenly takes it for its own offspring, while it is nothing but a bastard of the imagination, which, fertilized by experience, has subordinated certain ideas to the law of association and an objective, conscious necessity (aus Einsicht ) replaced by the subjective necessity arising from this, that is, by habit. From this Hume also concluded that the mind is completely incapable of even thinking of such connections at all (since in this case its concepts would be mere inventions) and that all its pseudo-a priori knowledge is nothing but ordinary experience, but incorrectly designated, or, by other to say that there is and cannot be any metaphysics at all.
However rash and incorrect Hume's conclusion was, it was based at least on a study that was worth it for the best minds of his time to unite to solve the problem as successfully as possible in the sense in which he posed it, which would soon lead to a complete science reform.
But fate, which has long been unfavorable for metaphysics, was pleased that Hume should not be understood by anyone. It is impossible to watch with indifference how his opponents - Reed, Oswald, Beatty and, finally, Priestley - completely did not touch the essence of his problem and how they, constantly taking for granted exactly what he doubted, with fervor and most often with great immodesty proved something that he never thought of doubting; they so misunderstood his call for improvement that everything remained as it was, as if nothing had happened. The question was not whether the concept of causality is correct, whether it is suitable and necessary for the whole knowledge of nature: Hume never doubted this; the question was whether this concept is conceived a priori by the mind and whether it thus has an inner truth independent of any experience, and therefore an application not limited to the objects of experience alone - this is what Hume expected an answer to. After all, it was only about the origin of this concept, and not about the need for its application; if its origin were explained, then the conditions of its application and the scope of its applicability would become clear by itself.
But in order to accomplish this task, the opponents of this glorious man would have to penetrate deeply into the nature of the mind, since it deals only with pure thinking, and this was not to their liking. Therefore, they invented a more convenient way to persist without any understanding, namely, to refer to ordinary human reason. Indeed, it is a great gift from heaven to have a direct (or, as they recently began to say, simple) human reason. But you need to prove it by deeds, by the depth and prudence of your thoughts and words, and not by referring to it as an oracle when you don’t know what to say reasonable in favor of its justification. When understanding and knowledge come to an end, then, and not before, to refer to ordinary human reason is one of those ingenious inventions of modern times, thanks to which the most vulgar talker can boldly start and endure an argument with the most thorough mind. But as long as there is even a small remnant of understanding, everyone will beware of resorting to this extreme remedy. If we consider carefully, then that appeal [to common sense] is nothing but a reference to the judgment of the crowd, from the approval of which the philosopher blushes, and the wit who pleases the crowd triumphs and persists. But I think: Hume could have just as much a claim to common sense as Beatty, and moreover, to something that Beatty obviously did not possess, namely, critical reason, which keeps ordinary reason within the boundaries so that he is not carried away by speculation. and would not wish to decide anything about them, not being himself able to substantiate his principles; for only in this way will he remain sane. An ax and a saw are fine for cutting timber, but copper engraving requires an engraving needle. Thus, both common sense and speculative reason are suitable, but each in its own sphere: the first - in judgments that have their direct application in experience, the second - in general judgments from pure concepts, for example, in metaphysics, where common sense, which calls so himself, but often per antiphrasin, has no judgment.
Immanuel Kant - the founder of German classical philosophy - was born in 1724 in Königsberg in the family of a saddle maker. After graduating from a local university, he worked as a home teacher, and from 1755 he lectured at the University of Königsberg. In 1770 he received a professorship in logic and metaphysics. In 1781, the "Critique of Pure Reason" was published, in 1783 Kant published a summary of this work under the title "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics ..."
According to Kant, knowledge is divided into experimental (posteriori) and pre-experimental (a priori). The method of formation of this knowledge is different: the first is derived inductively, i.e. based on generalizations of experience data. It may contain misconceptions and errors. For example, the proposition - "All swans are white" seemed true until a black swan was seen in Australia. And although the nature of much knowledge is based on experience, this does not mean that all knowledge can be obtained only by experience. The very fact that experience never ends means that it does not provide universal knowledge. Kant believes that every universal and necessary knowledge is a priori, i.e. inexperienced and inexperienced in principle.
In turn, Kant divides a priori judgments into two types: analytical (when the predicate only explains the subject) and synthetic (when the predicate adds new knowledge about the subject). In a word, synthetic judgments always yield new knowledge. Kant raises the question: how are synthetic a priori judgments (knowledge) possible? This question, he believes, will help him answer questions such as:
- How is mathematics possible?
- How is natural science possible?
- How is metaphysics (philosophy) possible?
The philosopher considers three spheres of knowledge: feelings, reason, mind. By means of feeling objects are given to us; by reason they think; the mind is directed to the mind and is not at all connected with experience.
Reason in Kant is not some general category and not an object of worship. He, like everyone else, must stand the critical test, and then he will act as a support for knowledge. After all, without defining the boundaries of knowledge, it is dangerous to embark on this path. The cognizing subject, according to the philosopher, has three kinds of abilities: sensuality, reason and reason. Sensuality is manifested in the fact that the data collected from the outside world, this chaos of sensations, collected with the help of the senses, is given order, clothed in unity. This is done with the help of a priori concepts of space and time that exist only in the mind of the subject. The mind cannot visualize anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Their combination is necessary, since "the mind does not draw its laws from nature, but prescribes them to her." In this activity, he relies on a priori categories, the criterion for grouping which Kant borrowed from Aristotle:
- Concepts of quantity: unity, plurality, wholeness.
- Concepts of quality: reality, negation, limitation.
- Concepts of relation: inherentness and independence, cause and effect, interaction.
- Concepts of modality: possibility - impossibility, existence - non-existence, necessity - chance.
These categories, like all a priori concepts, belong to our consciousness; all dependencies in the world are realized not due to objective connections, but because consciousness, thanks to the corresponding categories, connects phenomena in this way. Natural processes are changeable, but the laws of the mind (which are at the same time the laws of nature are different:
- constancy and stability;
- manifest themselves absolutely identically in the present, past and future of absolutely all people.
The question arises: how, under such conditions, is it possible scientific knowledge? Kant is sure that our consciousness itself creates objects, that is, our mind finds and can find in the external world that which only itself puts into it. Thus, things in themselves are unknowable.
It is the study of the abilities of the mind that allows us to answer the question of how metaphysics (philosophy) is possible. The subject of metaphysics, as well as the subject of reason, is God, the freedom and immortality of the soul. However, when trying to give scientific meaningful knowledge about God, the soul, freedom, the mind falls into contradictions. These contradictions are different in their logical structure, and especially in content, from ordinary contradictions: a "two-sided appearance" arises, i.e. not one illusory statement, but two opposing statements, which are related as thesis and antithesis. According to Kant, both thesis and antithesis look equally well argued. If only one of the parties is heard, then "victory" is awarded to her. Kant called such contradictions antinomies.
Kant explores the following four antinomies:
I antinomy. Thesis / Antithesis. The world has a beginning in time and is limited in space / The world has no beginning in time and no boundaries in space; it is infinite in time and space
II antinomy. Any complex substance in the world consists of simple parts, and in general there is only simple and that which is composed of simple / Not a single complex thing in the world consists of simple parts, and in general there is nothing simple in the world
III antinomy. Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality from which all phenomena in the world can be deduced. To explain phenomena, it is also necessary to admit free causality (causality through freedom) / There is no freedom, everything happens in the world according to the laws of nature
IV antinomy. Belongs to the world, either as part of it or as its cause / Nowhere is there any absolutely necessary essence - neither in the world nor outside it - as its cause
These contradictions are insoluble for Kant. However, Kant refutes all existing "theoretical" proofs of the existence of God: his existence can be proved only by experience. Although one must believe in the existence of God, since this faith is required by "practical reason", i.e. our moral consciousness.
Kant's doctrine of antinomies has played an enormous role in the history of dialectics. This doctrine before the philosophical thought was set a lot of philosophical problems and above all the problem of contradiction. The question arose of understanding the contradictory unity of the finite and the infinite, the simple and the complex, necessity and freedom, chance and necessity. The antinomies served as a strong impetus for the subsequent dialectical reflections of other representatives of classical German philosophy.