Philosophy of Johann Fichte. Philosophy of Fichte - briefly Biography of Fichte briefly
Fichte Johann Gottlieb (1762 - 1814) - one of the most prominent representatives of German classical philosophy, studied in Jena, in Leipzig at the Faculty of Theology. He was greatly influenced by the ideas of I. Kant, his successor and critic. In 1792, after the publication of the work “An Essay on the Critique of All Revelation,” which was first attributed to Kant, it became widely known. Professor, since 1810 - first elected rector of the University of Berlin.
Fichte builds a system of man’s relationship to the world, in which he strives to overcome the Kantian dualism of philosophical foundations (“pure reason”, on the one hand, and “things in themselves”, on the other). In Fichte's system, the object of knowledge - the external world and the subject - I are a single whole. In his main treatise “On the concept of scientific teaching or the so-called. philosophy" (1794) tries to substantiate the possibility of philosophy and its importance as the foundation of all knowledge. In search of the foundations of knowledge, philosophy, according to Fichte, must make a choice in favor of rationalism and idealism, on the side of which are rationality, activity, independence and freedom of the “I”. At the same time, he understands consciousness as a producing basis, as an active relation to the world, which precedes the theoretical-contemplative one: the relation here is not given, it is already given, generates itself in action. Therefore, the first position of his scientific teaching and understanding of man is not just the position: “I am,” but “I posits itself.” Knowledge begins with this act. To know an action means to produce it, and this is the generation of one’s own spirit, one’s own freedom. “Establish your Self, create yourself!” - with this, Fichte begins the formation of man and philosophy. The main question, according to Fichte, is how can one derive the entire existing world from self-consciousness “I am I”, how can one derive from self-reflection to the Other? Solving it involves turning to another foundation of science and human existence - “not-I” or “I posits “not-I”. “I” and “not-I” are opposites that unite in the absolute “I”. The Absolute “I” acts both as that which mutually posits “I” and “not-I” and as that which unites them. It is in this mutual position that the formation of both the individual – the Self – takes place, as well as the formation of everything that is opposed to this “I”: the idea of the world, the attitude towards it, the way of knowing, actions, etc. The activity of the “I” is a self-sufficient, absolute activity that provides itself with tasks and overcomes them. The world and nature are generated by the unconscious activity of the absolute “I”, but at the same time they are not self-sufficient; they act as obstacles for the practical subject (“I”) to overcome, overcoming them, the subject improves, approaching the ideal: identity with itself and the coincidence of the individual “I” with the absolute “I”, although their complete coincidence is impossible - this led would lead to the cessation of human activity.
Having briefly outlined Fichte's rather complex system human existence and his self-formation, we offer several excerpts from his work “The Purpose of Man. Book One,” where the reader himself can feel the tension of the philosopher’s thoughts. Here Fichte asks himself questions, and he gives the answers in the second book of the same work.
BUT WHAT IS ME MYSELF, AND WHAT IS MY PURPOSE?
An unnecessary question! It has been a long time since I completed my studies on this subject, and it would take too much time to repeat everything that I heard, taught and believed about it in such detail.
But how did I come to this knowledge, which, as I vaguely remember, I had? Driven by a burning thirst for knowledge, have I overcome the unknown, doubts and contradictions? Did I give preference to what appeared to me as something worthy of trust, did I check again and again what seemed probable, did I clear it of all unnecessary things, did I make comparisons - until the inner voice, powerful and irresistible, did not cry out in me: “Yes, this is exactly how it is, and not otherwise, I swear on it”? No, I don't remember anything like that. Instructions were offered to me before I felt the need for them; They answered me when I didn’t ask any more questions. I listened to them because I could not avoid them. What of all this remained in my memory depended on chance; without checking and even without participation on my part, everything was put in its place.
But how could I then convince myself that I really had knowledge about this subject of thought? If I know only this and am convinced only of what I myself have found - if I really possess only the knowledge that I myself have acquired, then I truly cannot claim that I know anything about my purpose; I only know that others know about it - if you believe their words; and the only thing I can really vouch for here is that I have heard others say such and such about it<…>
But if they know something really true, how can they know it except through their own reflection? And why can’t I then, by the same reflection, arrive at the same truth, since I exist exactly the same as they? To what extent have I still humiliated and despised myself! I want it to stop happening like this! From this moment on, I want to come into my own and take possession of the dignity that rightfully belongs to me. Let everything that belongs to you be left behind. I want to explore on my own. Yes, I must confess that I have a secret, intimate desire as to how the research should end, there is a preferential inclination towards certain statements, but I forget them and reject them, and will not allow them to have the slightest influence on the direction of my thoughts. I will undertake the task with complete rigor and diligence, and I will be frank with myself. I will gladly accept whatever I accept as true - whatever it may be. I want to know. With the same certainty with which I reveal that this earth, when I step on it, will hold me, that this fire, when I approach it, will burn me - with the same certainty I want to know what I myself am and what I will be. And if this turns out to be unattainable, at least I will know that it is impossible to get an answer to the question posed. I am ready to submit even to this outcome of the study if I come to it and recognize the truth in it. I am in a hurry to begin solving my task.
I take nature, always hurrying further, in its run and stop it for a moment; I capture the present moment and reflect on it! - I reflect on this nature, in the study of which my thinking abilities have so far developed, in accordance with the conclusions that are valid in its field.
I am surrounded by objects that I feel forced to consider as existing in themselves and mutually separated from each other: I see plants, trees, animals. I attribute to each individual object properties and characteristics by means of which I distinguish them from each other; This plant is characterized by this form, that by another; This tree has one form of leaves, that another.
Each item has its own certain number properties, not one more, not one less. To every question whether this object is such or not, a person who fully knows it can answer either a decisive “yes” or a decisive “no,” which puts an end to any doubts regarding the presence or absence of a given property. Everything that exists has it: has a certain color or does not have it, colored or not colored, tasty or tasteless, tangible or intangible, etc.
Every object has each of these properties to a certain extent. If there is any scale for a given property and if I can apply it, then I can find a certain measure that is no more and no less than this property...Everything that exists is completely determined; it is what it is, and not anything else.
This does not mean that I generally cannot think of anything floating somewhere in the middle between certain properties. Of course, I imagine indefinite objects, and more than half of my thinking deals with them. I'm thinking now about wood in general. Does this tree have fruit at all or not, does it have leaves or not, and if it has any, what is their number? What type of tree does it belong to? How big is it? And so on. All these questions remain unanswered; my thinking thus remains indefinite, since I am not thinking about one specific tree, but about a tree in general. But on the other hand, I deny this tree any real existence at all, precisely because it is not fully defined.<…>
But nature hastens further in its eternal process of transformation, and while I am still talking about the moment in question, it has already disappeared and everything has changed; Before I could grasp this new moment, everything became different again. The way things were and the way I view everything, it wasn’t always like that: it became that way. But why, on what basis did everything become like this...; Why did nature, out of the infinitely varied series of states that it can assume, at that moment accept exactly the one it actually accepted, and not some other? Because they were preceded by precisely those states that preceded them, and not by any others from among the possible ones; and because those currently available obviously followed them, and not any others.
<…>Nature, without stopping, moves through an endless series of its possible states, and the change of these states does not occur randomly, but according to strictly defined laws. Everything that happens in nature necessarily happens the way it happens, and it is absolutely impossible for it to happen any other way. I enter into a closed chain of phenomena, where each link is determined by its previous one and determines its subsequent one; I find myself in the midst of a strong mutual dependence, and, starting from any given moment, I could by mere reflection find all the possible states of the universe; I would go backward if I explained a given moment, I would go forward if I drew conclusions from it; in the first case, I would look for the reasons through which it, this given moment, could only be realized, in which are the consequences that it must necessarily have.
<…>So, what exactly is what I just found? When I take in my statements as a whole at one glance, I find the following as their general idea: before each becoming I must presuppose a certain being from which and through which the event was realized; before each state I must presuppose another state; before each being another being. , and I absolutely cannot allow anything to come out of nothing.
<…>My research is complete and my curiosity is satisfied. I know what I am in general and what the essence of my kind is. I am some manifestation of a natural force defined by the entire universe that determines itself. It is impossible to examine my special personal properties and indicate their causes, because I cannot penetrate into the inner essence of nature. But I have direct awareness of them. After all, I know very well what I am at the moment; for the most part I can remember what I was before, and I recognize what I will become.
To take advantage of this discovery for my activity - such a thought cannot occur to me, because I myself do not show any activity at all, but nature acts in me; to turn me into something else, something that nature made me - I don’t want to do that either, because I don’t make myself at all, but nature makes me and everything that I become. I can repent, and rejoice, and accept good intentions - however, strictly speaking, I cannot even do this; everything in me happens on its own, if it is determined to do so, and I, of course, with no repentance, no intentions, can change even the slightest thing in what I must become. I am in the inexorable power of strict necessity; since she intends me to be a fool or a vicious person, then I become, without a doubt, a fool or a vicious person; She intends me to be a sage and kind, then I become, without a doubt, a sage and kind. This is neither her nor my fault or merit. She is under her own laws, and I am under her laws; Once I understand this, the most reassuring thing is to subordinate my desires to her as well: after all, my being is subordinate to her in everything.
Oh, these conflicting desires! For why should I hide any longer the melancholy, horror and disgust that gripped my being, as soon as it became clear to me how the research would end? I sacredly promised myself that my inclinations would not have any influence on the course of my thoughts, and in fact I deliberately did not allow this to happen. But don’t I dare admit to myself, having completed the research, that its result contradicts my deepest and most intimate aspirations, desires and demands? And how can I, despite the correctness and complete reliability of the evidence, which, as it seems to me, differs from my reasoning, believe such an explanation of my existence, which so decisively contradicts the deepest roots of this existence and the purpose for which only I can exist and without which I curse my existence?
But why should my heart grieve and break from something that calms my mind so well? At a time when nothing in nature contradicts itself, is it really only man who contains contradiction within himself? – Or, perhaps, not a person at all, but only me and those who look like me? Or should I not part with that sweet dream that I had before, keep myself in the area of direct consciousness of my existence and never touch the question of its causes - a question the answer to which now makes me unhappy? But if this answer is correct, I should have addressed this issue; It was not I who touched it, but it was my thinking nature that touched it in me. I was destined for misfortune, and in vain I mourn the lost innocence of my spirit, which will never return.
<…>The fact that I am necessarily destined to be a wise man and good or a fool and evil, that I cannot change anything in this certainty, that in the first case there is no merit behind me, and in the last - no guilt - that’s what which filled me with disgust and horror. The cause of my being and all the properties of this being located outside of me, the manifestations of which are again determined by other causes external to this one, is what pushed me away with such force. That freedom, which is not my own freedom, but the freedom of an alien force outside of me, and even then only conditioned, only half, such freedom did not satisfy me. I myself, i.e. that very thing of which I have consciousness as about myself, as about my personality, and which in this teaching seems to be a simple manifestation of something higher - I myself want to independently represent something, by myself and for myself, and not with something else and not through something else; and as something independent - I want to be the last foundation, the last reason for what defines me. I myself want to occupy the place that every original natural force occupies in this teaching, with the only difference that the nature of my manifestations should not be determined by forces alien to me. I want to have an inherent strength within me; I want one that manifests itself in infinitely varied ways, just like those natural forces of nature, and, moreover, one that would manifest itself exactly as it manifests itself, without any reason, simply because it manifests itself that way - and not as forces of nature manifesting itself under the influence of known external conditions.
But what then, according to this desire of mine, should be the place and focus of this special power inherent in my self? Obviously not my body; I recognize it as a manifestation of the forces of nature, at least in its essence, if not in its further properties; in the same way, it is not my sensual aspirations, which I consider to be the relation of these forces of nature to my consciousness; What remains is my thinking and desire. I want to freely will according to a freely chosen goal; I want this will as the final cause, i.e. not determined by any other higher causes, could set in motion, first of all, my body, and through it everything around me, and produce changes in it. My active natural force must be under the control of the will and not set in motion by anything other than it. - This is how things should be; the best must exist according to the laws of the spirit; I must be free to seek that best until I find it, and to recognize it as such when I find it; if I don't find it, it must be my fault. I should be able to want this best, simply because I want it; and if I want something else instead, then it must be my fault. My actions must flow from my will, and without it not a single action of mine can take place, because there should be no other possible force directing my actions other than my will. Only then should my power, determined by the will and under its control, take part in the course of natural events. I want to be the master of nature, and she must serve me. I want to have an influence over her commensurate with my strength; she shouldn't have any influence on me.
This is the content of my desires and demands. They are fundamentally contradicted by research that satisfied my reason. If according to the first, i.e. my desires, I must be independent of nature and in general from any law that I did not set for myself, then according to the second, i.e. research, I represent one link in the chain of nature, strictly defined in all its properties. The question is whether such freedom as I want is even conceivable, and if it must be so, then do not the reasons lie in the most consistent and complete reflection that force me to recognize it as valid and attribute it to myself? – Which, therefore, would refute the result of the previous study.
I want to be free - this, as shown, means: I want to make myself what I will be. I must - here lies the most unacceptable, and at first glance completely absurd, that follows from this concept - I must, in a certain sense, already in advance be what I will become, in order to thus have the opportunity to become such; I must have two kinds of being, of which the first would contain the cause of those and not other properties of the second. If, with this in mind, I begin to consider my immediate self-consciousness in wanting, then I will find the following. I imagine a variety of possible actions, among which, it seems to me, I can choose any one I want. I mentally run through them one after another, add new ones to them, figure out one or the other separately, compare them with each other and weigh them. Finally, I choose one of them, direct my will accordingly, and according to the volitional decision, some action follows. Here, imagining my goal in advance, I certainly was already what I later, by virtue of this very idea, actually became through desire and action. As something thinking, I was already in advance what I later, by virtue of thinking, became as something acting. I make myself: my being - by my thinking, my thinking - by thinking. It may even be supposed that every definite stage in the manifestation of a simple force of nature, as in a plant, for example, is preceded by a stage of indeterminacy, in which there are given many different definite states, which the force will assume if that force is left to itself. The basis of these different possible states is given, of course, in her, in her own power, but not for her, since she is incapable of forming concepts, she cannot choose, she cannot of herself put an end to uncertainty; there must be external determining causes limiting it to one of all possible states, i.e. doing what she herself cannot do. In a plant, its determination cannot take place before its determination; for it can be determined only in one way - only by its active being. This is the reason that I found myself forced above to assert that the manifestation of any force must receive its full and complete definition from the outside. Without a doubt, I was thinking then only of those forces that manifest themselves exclusively through being and are therefore incapable of consciousness. Regarding them, the above statement is true without the slightest limitation; with the presence of intelligence, this statement no longer holds, and it would therefore be too hasty to extend it to these cases as well.
The freedom that I demanded above is conceivable only in intellects, and in them it is undoubtedly such. But even with this assumption, man, just like nature, is completely intelligible. My body and my ability to act in the sensory world are, just as in the above system, a manifestation of the limited forces of nature; and my natural inclinations are nothing more than the relations of this manifestation to my consciousness. Simple knowledge of what exists without my participation occurs under this assumption of freedom in exactly the same way as in that system; and up to this point both are quite consistent with each other. But according to that system - this is where the disagreement between both teachings begins - according to that system, my ability for sensory activity remains in the power of nature, it is precisely this force that is always put into action, generated by it, and thought always remains only a spectator; according to new system, this ability, as soon as it is present, falls under the power of a force that rises above all of nature and is completely freed from the action of its laws - the power of the concept of purpose, willpower. Thought no longer remains a simple spectator, but action itself emanates from it. There exist external forces, invisible to me, that put an end to my indecision and limit my activity to one point, as well as the immediate consciousness of the latter - my will, just as they limit the in itself indefinite activity of a plant; here I myself, freely and independently of the influence of all external forces, put an end to my indecision and define myself through the knowledge of the best that freely occurs within me.
Which of the two opinions should I accept? Am I free and independent, or am I nothing in myself, and exist only as a manifestation of an external, extraneous force? It just became clear to me that neither of these statements is sufficiently substantiated. Nothing speaks in favor of the first except its conceivability; for the second, I extend the position, which in itself and in its field is completely correct, further than is possible by its own essence. If the intellect is only a manifestation of nature and nothing more, then I am absolutely right in extending this position to it; but can this be said about the intellect - that is the question; it must be answered by deducing consequences from other provisions, and not assume a one-sided answer already at the beginning of the study and not again deduce from it what you yourself first put into it. In short, none of these opinions can be proven.
Direct consciousness solves this question just as little. I can never have consciousness either of external forces that determine me according to the system of universal necessity, or of my own strength, through which I, according to the system of freedom, determine myself. Therefore, whichever of the two views I accept, I will not accept it otherwise than simply because I accept it.
The system of freedom satisfies, but the opposite one kills and destroys my heart. To stand cold and dead and only look at the change of phenomena, to be only a mirror obediently reflecting the images flying by - such an existence is unbearable for me, I reject and curse it. I want to love, I want to dissolve myself in sympathy, I want to be happy and sad. The highest object of this sympathy for me was myself and the only thing in me through which I can constantly exercise it - my actions. I want to do everything in the best possible way; I want to be happy with myself if I have done something well; I want to grieve for myself if I have done something bad; but even this grief will be sweet to me, for it contains self-compassion and a guarantee of improvement in the future. Only in love is life, without it there is death and destruction.<…>
Undoubtedly, it was the love for this love, the interest in this interest that prompted me, without the participation of my consciousness, to consider myself free and independent without any restrictions, as it was before, before the start of this research, which plunged me into confusion and despair; undoubtedly, it was precisely thanks to this interest that I raised to the level of conviction such an opinion, which has nothing for itself except my inner inclination and the unprovability of the opposite ... "
(Fichte I.G. Several lectures on the purpose of a scientist; The purpose of a person; Main features modern era; Collection. // Minsk, 1998. – P. 65 – 93).
Now let's see what Fichte sees as the goal and purpose of science in general, and first of all the science of sciences - philosophy. In his lectures “On the Appointment of a Scientist,” he examines this issue in detail. “...All philosophy,” says Fichte, “all human thinking and teaching...
It does not have in mind any other goal than the answer to the questions posed, and especially to the last, highest one: what is the purpose of man in general and by what means can he most accurately achieve it? .. The question that I want to answer in my public lectures is what is the purpose of a scientist, or - what is the same... - the purpose of the highest, most true person, is the final task for every philosophical research, just as his first task is to ask what is the purpose of man in general. ..” (5, 58-59). Philosophy, therefore, must, according to
Fichte, answer the main question - what is the goal? human life, including the life of the “highest, truest man” - the scientist, that is, the philosopher himself. Of course, every scientist is first of all a man, and therefore he has a goal common to all other people; but besides this, as a scientist, he also has his own specific calling, his own special duty.
Just by the task Fichte assigns to science, one can see that it takes on functions that were previously performed by religion. It is no coincidence that entry into the sphere of scientific teaching requires an act of birth in freedom, birth in the spirit: a scientist is a priest of truth, his service to it is sacred, let the uninitiated not enter.
What is the highest purpose of man? What is the purpose of his existence? “... Since it is obvious,” says Fichte, “that man has a mind, he is his own end, that is, he exists not because something else must exist, but simply because he must exist: his bare (blos - ses) being (Sein) is the last goal of his existence...” (ibid., 60 - 61).
We recognize here the principle of Kantian ethics, according to which man, as a “rational being, is an end in itself and cannot be considered merely a means for something (or someone) else. But precisely as a rational being; what concerns him as a being sensory, i.e. finite, empirical, then as such it cannot be considered as a goal. To be free means to subordinate one’s sensory inclinations to reason, to overcome one’s empirical nature. Freedom is nothing more than the principle of self-identity and determination. itself. On the contrary, the empirical principle, nature, is that which is determined not by itself, but by another; if freedom is expressed as the principle of identity, then nature, the empirical, the finite, is always difference, non-identity, as Fichte explains. can only be presented negatively, as the opposite of the non-I, the characteristic feature of which is diversity, therefore, as complete and absolute sameness, it is always the same and never different. Consequently, the indicated formula can be expressed as follows: a person must always agree with himself; he should never contradict himself. It is the pure Self that can never be in contradiction with itself, since there is no difference in it, it is always the same; the empirical, defined and determined by external things I can contradict itself, and every time it contradicts itself, this is a sure sign that it is not determined by the form of the pure I, not by
means of oneself, but through external things (see.
So, the goal and purpose of man is himself, but not as empirical, finite, but as rational, infinite, as self-determining, and not determined by external things, as free, and not natural. The last purpose of man is at the same time his last determination, about which Fichte writes: “The last determination of all finite rational beings is therefore
absolute unity, constant identity, complete agreement with oneself” (ibid., 63). But since man is at the same time a sensual being, achieving this definition is his endless task, to which he must always strive. To subjugate everything unreasonable, to master it freely and according to one’s own law - this, according to Fichte, is final goal person. This ultimate goal is completely unattainable and must remain forever unattainable, unless man must cease to be a man in order to become a god. It is inherent in the very concept of man that his path to achieving his final goal must be endless. Consequently, the purpose of man is not to achieve this goal, but he can and must move closer and closer to this goal; and therefore, approaching this goal to infinity is his true purpose as a person, as a rational, but finite, as a sensual, but free being (see 4, 66 - 67).
A science teacher, or philosopher, is a person who, in a certain sense, is already involved in what humanity is moving toward in its progressive development. He knows where it should go and what exactly is needed for its progressive movement towards its cherished goal - the improvement of the human race, the bringing of each individual closer to the ideal of a free being. And since the scientist knows this, he must instill in people a sense of their true needs and introduce them to the means of satisfying them. According to his purpose, he is a teacher of the human race (ibid., 111). However, the scientist must not only indicate the goal towards which humanity should go. Since he alone is able to understand exactly what point of the path humanity is at now and what specific tasks are awaiting completion today.
opinion, then he must, so to speak, define the task of the present moment. And the scientist is able to show the right path because, as Fichte writes, “he sees not only the present, he also sees the future; he sees not only the present point of view, he also sees where the human race must now move if it wants to remain on the path to its final goal and not deviate from it and not go back along it... In this sense, the scientist is the educator of humanity "(5, 112).
Since such a responsible mission is entrusted to the scientist, corresponding demands are also placed on him - it is no coincidence that Fichte’s lectures were very similar to sermons. “The words with which the founder of the Christian religion addressed his disciples actually refer entirely to the scientist: you are the salt of the earth; If salt loses its potency, then what should you add salt with? If the chosen ones among men are corrupt, where else should we look for moral goodness? (ibid., 113 -114). The purpose of the scientist, therefore, is also to serve as a moral example for others; a scientist must represent the highest level of moral development possible in a given era. Fichte even dares to call the scientist a “witness to the truth.” Truth is Fichte’s passionate faith, and his words about it are filled with truly religious pathos: “I am the priest of truth, I serve it, I have pledged to do everything for it, both to dare and to suffer. If for her sake I had been persecuted and hated, if I had died in her service, what special thing would I have done then, what would I have done beyond what I simply had to do? (ibid., 114-115). If a scientist is a dispassionate investigator of truth, then the question arises: why such pathos? But because the purpose of science is the moral ennoblement of man, its first principle is the requirement for man to be free, to be himself. And it is not surprising, therefore, that the first principle that we spoke about above is self-evident because it is a symbol of faith.
Here it is especially clearly visible what the fundamental difference is between the science of Fichte and the critical philosophy of Kant. Kant cannot even speak of uniting two spheres with each other: the sphere of scientific knowledge, or theoretical reason, and
the sphere of moral action, or practical reason. On the contrary, Kant proceeds from the fact that these two spheres are separated from one another and that only such a separation guarantees science non-interference from religion and theology, that is, complete freedom of research, and guarantees moral action its absoluteness, which could be shaken , if a moral action had the same field with scientific knowledge. But since the sphere of science is the study of the laws of the empirical world, and the sphere of moral action is the intelligible world, then due to this, both science and faith can, according to Kant, calmly coexist. The division of the world into the sensory and the intelligible was made by Kant in order to substantiate the possibility of, on the one hand, science, and on the other, “morality, so that the assumption of natural necessity does not exclude the possibility of moral freedom of the individual.
Fichte removes this Kantian division; for him there are no more two different worlds, and therefore science receives all those functions that previously belonged to religion. “As you undoubtedly know,” Fichte addresses his listeners, “the sciences were not invented for the idle pursuit of the mind and not for the needs of refined luxury... All our research must go towards the highest goal of humanity - the ennoblement of the race of which we are joints; from the nurses of the sciences must spread, as from the center, humanity in the highest sense of the word” (3.56). This is very far from Kant’s intention to limit the claims of science in order to give room to faith. Let us not forget that Fichte, as well as Schelling and Hegel, unlike Kant, are theologians by training. Man, by his essence, by his definition, is a free being. But this definition of him is at the same time the goal of his aspirations; he must still realize what he is, or, as Fichte expresses this thought, “he must be what he is.”
Now let us remember what the first principle of Fichte’s philosophy is. This is the principle of I am I, that is, the very principle of the identity of I with myself, which should be the eternally unattainable goal of the aspirations of the human race, the very goal whose implementation
swarm is an endless process! It turns out that the first principle, on the immediate reliability of which all science must rest, is not what is, but what should be. This means that Fichte’s demand for the beginning philosopher: “Thoughts of yourself,” that is, “be yourself,” “be identical to yourself,” and therefore be “free,” is a call “here and now” to realize what is the goal of the endless movement of humanity and that cannot be realized, otherwise the goal of history would be achieved and the entire historical movement would cease. Therefore, the teaching of science represents the implementation (in the philosopher’s thought) of precisely what humanity as a whole must accomplish in the infinitely long process of its development.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 - 1814) adopted Kant's ethical philosophy, which made the assessment of human activity dependent on its consistency with a priori duty. Therefore, for him, philosophy appears primarily as a practical philosophy, in which “the goals and objectives of the practical actions of people in the world, in society were directly defined.” However, Fichte pointed out the weakness of Kant's philosophy, which, in his opinion, was not sufficiently substantiated precisely at the moment of combining the theoretical and practical parts of philosophy. The philosopher places this task at the forefront of his own activities. Fichte's main work is “The Purpose of Man” (1800).
As a fundamental principle that allows for the unification of theory and practice of a philosophical approach to the world, Fichte identifies the principle of freedom. Moreover, in the theoretical part, he concludes that “recognition of the objective existence of things in the surrounding world is incompatible with human freedom, and therefore the revolutionary transformation of social relations must be supplemented by philosophical teaching that reveals the conditionality of this existence by human consciousness.” This philosophical doctrine he designated it as “scientific teaching”, acting as a holistic justification of practical philosophy.
As a result, his philosophy rejects the possibility of interpreting the Kantian concept of “things in themselves” as objective reality and concludes that “a thing is what is posited in the I,” i.e., its subjective-idealistic interpretation is given.
Fichte draws a clear divide between materialism and idealism based on the principle of their solution to the problem of the relationship between being and thinking. In this sense, dogmatism (materialism) comes from the primacy of being in relation to thinking, and criticism (idealism) - from the derivativeness of being from thinking. On the basis of this, according to the philosopher, materialism determines the passive position of a person in the world, and criticism, on the contrary, is inherent in active, active natures.
Fichte's great merit is his development of the doctrine of the dialectical way of thinking, which he calls antithetical. The latter is “a process of creation and cognition, which is characterized by a triadic rhythm of positing, negating and synthesizing.”
Philosophy of Friedrich Schelling
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775 - 1854) turned out to be a kind of connecting link between the philosophy of Kant, the ideas of Fichte and the formation of the Hegelian system. It is known that he had a huge influence on the development of Hegel as a philosopher, with whom he maintained friendly relations for many years.
At the center of his philosophical reflections is the task of building a unified system of knowledge by considering the specifics of knowledge of truth in particular areas. All this is realized in his “natural philosophy,” which acts as, perhaps, the very first attempt in the history of philosophy to systematically generalize the discoveries of science from the point of view of a single philosophical principle.
This system is based on the idea of “the ideal essence of nature,” based on the idealistic dogma about the spiritual, immaterial nature of activity manifested in nature.” The great achievement of the German philosopher was his construction of a natural philosophical system, which is permeated with dialectics as a kind of connecting link in explaining the unity of the world. As a result, he was able to grasp the fundamental dialectical idea that “the essence of all reality is characterized by the unity of opposing active forces. Schelling called this dialectical unity “polarity.” As a result, he was able to give a dialectical explanation of such complex processes as “life”, “organism”, etc.
Schelling's main work is “The System of Transcendental Idealism” (1800). Schelling, within the framework of his classical tradition, separates the practical and theoretical parts of philosophy. Theoretical philosophy is interpreted as the substantiation of the “highest principles of knowledge.” At the same time, the history of philosophy appears as a confrontation between the subjective and objective, which allows him to highlight the corresponding historical stages or philosophical eras. The essence of the first stage is from the initial sensation to creative contemplation; the second - from creative contemplation to reflection; the third - from reflection to an absolute act of will. Practical philosophy examines the problem of human freedom. Freedom is realized through the creation of a rule of law state, and this is the general principle of human development. At the same time, the specificity of the development of history lies in the fact that living people act in it, so the combination of freedom and necessity takes on special significance here. Necessity becomes freedom, Schelling believes, when it begins to be cognized. Solving the question of the necessary nature of historical laws, Schelling comes to the idea of the kingdom of “blind necessity” in history.
IN Western European philosophy In the 17th-18th centuries, the topic of epistemology (the question of human cognition) rose to one of the most important places. The head of the empirical school, John Locke, believed that the spirit of a person at birth is a blank slate (tabula rasa). There are no “innate ideas”, and the only source of our knowledge is experience. The data of experience leave “imprints” in us, from which entirely a picture of the world is emerging.
In the second half of the 18th century, Locke's views were criticized by the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant. According to Kant's philosophy, the main forms of human perception are intuition space and time, as well as 12 primary categories reason (concepts of reality, cause, effect, possibility, etc.) - cannot be obtained from experience and exist in our spirit as innate, preceding any practice a priori given. This a priori content conditions experience, determining the fundamental ways in which the external world (“things-in-themselves”) appears to our knowledge. We do not know what things in themselves really are, because in the process of experience we deal not with them directly, but with their images, presented in the above-mentioned a priori forms of our epistemological ability. " Criticism» Kant gained great popularity as a strong objection to Locke and the empiricists.
Immanuel Kant
Fichte's epistemology and criticism of Kant's ideas in it
An attempt to develop Kant's ideas was made by his younger contemporary, the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). A strong-willed man, very prone to mental independence, Fichte expressed these properties of his character in the philosophical system he created.
Fichte believed that Kant did not fully develop the following aspects of his philosophical teaching:
1) Having declared that the true essence of “things in themselves” is unknowable, Kant still did not dare to eliminate this world external to man entirely and, without strict evidence, insisted on its reality. Fichte believed that the very idea of things in themselves should be recognized as the fruit of the mental activity of the human ego.
2) The structure of a priori forms of understanding in Kant is quite complex. He himself outlined (in the form of so-called schemes) the connection between space-time intuitions and the 12 basic logical categories. But, according to Fichte, this part of metaphysics was not sufficiently developed by Kant, because he never indicated a single principle of knowledge, from which both intuitions and categories would follow with immutable necessity.
Already from the formulation of these questions it is clear that Kant’s criticism was supposed to receive an even more pronounced subjectivist bias in Fichte’s philosophy. Fichte considered his theory " subjective idealism"a direct continuation of Kant's "critical idealism", although Kant himself disapproved of it.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Fichte developed the main provisions of his epistemology in a series of works under the general title “Science”. At the center of everything, he, like Descartes, recognizes the irrefutable fact of self-consciousness. According to Fichte, already in this primary feeling of our own “I” all Kantian categories are contained. “I am” means: “I am I,” “I am identical with my own I.” This is where the category of identity arises. I am real, and this cannot be doubted - therefore, the fact of self-consciousness also contains the Kantian category of reality. Our self-consciousness necessarily presupposes the concept of the external, of an object that opposes the thinking subject. From here we get the categories of contradiction, negation (“I am not the Not-I”), limitation and interaction. Since I and Not-I (subject and object) cannot exist without each other, they must be considered as two inseparable parts of one common essence. This is where the categories of substance – belonging – come from. In a similar way, Fichte derives all other Kantian categories from self-consciousness.
The act of self-consciousness breaks down into three inevitable moments: 1) self-awareness of the Self, 2) the idea of the Not-Self, 3) the awareness that without the Not-Self there is no Self. The concept of these three moments of the manifestation of the spirit introduced in Fichte’s philosophy is - thesis, antithesis and synthesis- was then widely developed in the systems of Schelling and Hegel.
Fichte, in contrast to Kant, treats the intuitions of space and time not as something a priori given to a person, but as a creation of our very “I”. Fichte generally represents consciousness active, while Kant is more inclined to consider it passive-contemplative. This is the root of the difference between their systems; this is where all their main differences arise.. The activity of the mind, according to Fichte's philosophy, consists of a constant transfer of attention from one object to another: conscious acts separate, are consistent and are directed alternately to different objects. In order for these acts to be such, our “I” and creates intuitions of spatial extent and temporal sequence, rather than placing things in " already existing» space and time. Space and time are products of the creative activity of the mind. Fichte proves this by saying that there is no “empty space” and “empty time”. They are conceivable only in specific conscious acts associated with things and processes. Therefore, these two fundamental intuitions are being created by these acts themselves, but not determine their.
The freedom of the human self is clearly expressed in activity voluntary attention. We, writes Fichte, have “absolute freedom... to direct attention to a known object or to divert it from another object.” But, despite the constant desire to make the human I completely independent of everything external, Fichte still has to admit that he himself the primary act of consciousness by which I and Not-I, subject and object are created, does not depend onfree will individual. The occurrence of this act cannot be explained without the hypothesis of the presence, along with our personal Self, of another - absolute, supra-individual self. It, like God, gives the initial impetus to the activity of the mind, which, having received it, then proceeds freely.
The highest goal of the activity of the I, according to Fichte’s philosophy, is to spiritualize, intellectualize the Non-I that opposes it, raise it to the highest level of consciousness, and subordinate it to the law of reason, identical to the law of conscience. But the realization of my freedom is possible only on the condition that I am surrounded not only by soulless things, but also by other free beings similar to me. Only they will be able to show an arbitrary, not predictable in advance, not governed by any laws reaction to my actions. The superindividual Self creates a mass of such beings that interact and encourage each other to collectively overcome the inert opposition of the Not-Self.
Fichte is a famous German philosopher, today considered a classic. His basic idea was that a person shapes himself in the process of activity. The philosopher influenced the work of many other thinkers who developed his ideas.
Biography
Fichte Johann Gottlieb - philosopher, an outstanding representative of the direction of German classical philosophy, who also studied social activities. The Thinker was born on May 19. 1762 in the village of Rammenau in a large family engaged in peasant labor. With the assistance of a wealthy relative, after graduating from a city school, the boy was accepted to study at an elite educational institution, intended for nobles - Pfortu. Johann Fichte then studied at the Universities of Jena and Leizipg. Since 1788, the philosopher has worked as a home teacher in Zurich. At the same time, the thinker met his future wife, Johanna Rahn.
Introduction to Kant's ideas
In the summer of 1791, the philosopher attended lectures by Immanuel Kant, then held in Konigsberg. Acquaintance with the concepts of the great thinker predetermined the entire further course of I. G. Fichte’s philosophical work. Kant responded positively to his work entitled “An Essay on the Critique of All Revelation.” This essay, the authorship of which was initially erroneously attributed to Kant, revealed to the scientist the possibility of obtaining professorship at the University of Jena. He began working there in 1794.
The biography of Johann Fichte continues with the fact that in 1795 the thinker began to publish his own journal, called the “Philosophical Journal of the Society of German Scientists.” It was during that period that his main works were written:
“Fundamentals of General Science” (1794);
“Fundamentals of natural law according to the principles of scientific teaching” (1796);
“The First Introduction to the Study of Science” (1797);
“The second introduction to science for readers who already have philosophical system"(1797);
“A system of teaching about morality according to the principles of scientific teaching” (1798).
These works influenced the philosophers of Fichte's contemporaries - Schelling, Goethe, Schiller, Novalis.
Resignation from Jena University, final years
In 1799, the philosopher was accused of atheism, which was prompted by the publication of one of his articles. In it, Fichte said that God is not a person, but represents a moral world order. The philosopher had to leave the walls of the University of Jena.
Since 1800, Fichte has lived and worked in Berlin. In 1806, after defeat in the war with Napoleon, the Prussian government was forced to move to Königsberg. Fichte followed his compatriots and began teaching at the local university until 1807. After some time, he moved to Berlin again, and in 1810 he became rector of the University of Berlin.
His lectures, which were given after the defeat of the Prussian troops at Jena, called on German townspeople to resist the French occupiers. These speeches made Fichte one of the main intellectuals of the then resistance to Napoleon's regime.
The philosopher's last days were spent in Berlin. He died on January 29, 1814 due to typhoid infection from his own wife, who was then caring for the wounded in the hospital.
Fichte's attitude towards Kant
The scientist believed that Kant in his works shows the truth without demonstrating its foundations. Therefore, Fichte himself must create a philosophy like geometry, the basis of which will be the consciousness of the “I”. He called such a system of knowledge “scientific teaching.” The philosopher points out that this is the ordinary consciousness of a person, acting as detached from the individual himself and elevated to the Absolute. The entire world around us is a creation of the “I”. It is effective, active. The development of self-awareness occurs through the struggle between consciousness and the surrounding world.
Fichte believed that Kant did not fully develop several aspects of his teaching. First, by declaring that the true meaning of each “thing in itself” is unknowable, Kant was unable to eliminate the external world given to the individual and, without any rigorous evidence, insisted that it was real. Fichte believed that the very concept of a “thing in itself” should be recognized as the result of the mental work of the “I” itself.
Secondly, the scientist considered the structure of a priori forms of consciousness in Kant to be quite complex. But at the same time, Fichte believed that this part of metaphysics was not sufficiently developed by his colleague, because in his works he did not derive a single principle of knowledge, from which various categories and intuitions would follow.
Other famous works of Fichte
Among the famous works of the scientist, the following works should be highlighted:
“On the appointment of a scientist” (1794);
“On the Purpose of Man” (1800);
"A message clear as the sun to the general public about true essence modern philosophy. An attempt to force readers to understand" (1801);
"The Main Features of the Modern Age" (1806).
The main ideas of Johann Fichte were presented in a series of works published under the general title “Science”. The philosopher, like Descartes, recognizes the fact of self-consciousness as the center of all existence. According to Fichte, this sensation already contains all the categories that Kant derived in his works. For example, “I am” is equivalent to the expression “I am I.” Another concept follows from this concept. philosophical category- identity.
The idea of freedom
In the philosophical works of Johann Fichte, two main periods are distinguished: the stage of the concept of activity and the stage of the concept of the Absolute. By the activity of consciousness, the philosopher primarily understood the moral behavior of a person. Finding freedom and achieving activity that can overcome any obstacles is the moral duty of every person.
The philosopher comes to the most important conclusion that a person can come to the realization of freedom only in certain historical conditions, at a certain stage of development of society. But at the same time, Johann Fichte believed that freedom itself is inseparable from knowledge. It can only be acquired with high level development of the spiritual culture of the individual. Thus, culture, together with morality, makes all the work of an individual possible.
Practical activity in the works of the thinker
One of the most valuable ideas of Fichte's philosophy is the consideration of activity through the prism of removing intermediate goals using all kinds of means. In the process of human life, practical contradictions are inevitable and arise almost constantly. That is why the process of activity represents an endless overcoming of these conflicts and incompatibilities. The philosopher understands activity itself as the work of practical reason, but at the same time the question of activity forces philosophers to think about their nature.
One of the most important achievements of Fichte's philosophy is the development dialectical method thinking. He says that everything that exists is contradictory, but at the same time the opposites are in their unity. Contradiction, the philosopher believes, is one of the most important sources development. Fichte considers categories not simply as a collection of a priori forms of consciousness, but as a system of concepts. These systems absorb the knowledge that a person acquires in the course of his “I” activity.
A question of freedom
Personal freedom, according to Fichte, is expressed in the work of voluntary attention. A person, the philosopher writes, has absolute freedom to direct the focus of his attention to the desired object or to distract it from another object. However, despite the desire to make the personality independent of the external world, Fichte still recognizes that the very primary activity of consciousness, through which it is separated from the external world (the “I” and “Not-I” are separated), does not depend on the free will of an individual person.
The highest goal of the activity of the “I,” according to Fichte, is to spiritualize the opposing “Not-I” and raise it to a higher level of consciousness. At the same time, the realization of freedom becomes possible provided that the “I” is surrounded not by soulless objects, but by other free beings similar to it. Only they can show an arbitrary, and not predictable, reaction to the actions of the “I”. Society is a mass of such beings, constantly interacting with each other and encouraging them to collectively overcome such external influences of the “Not-I”.
Philosopher's subjectivism
Johann Fichte's subjectivism can be briefly defined by his famous phrase:
The whole world is me.
Of course, this expression of the philosopher should not be taken literally. For example, the main thought of another philosopher, David Hume, was the idea that the entire world around us is a collection of sensations experienced by a person. This position is not interpreted literally, but is understood in the sense that the entire surrounding reality is given to people through their sensations, and no one knows what it really is.
Ontology problem
The philosopher was also interested in the question of what ontology is. The definition of this concept is as follows: ontology is a system of knowledge of a metaphysical nature that reveals the features of a category philosophical understanding being. Fichte introduces a new concept into science - the ontology of the subject. This existence is a dialectical process of cultural and historical activity of all human civilization. In the process of revealing its essence, the “absolute I” contributes to the limitation of a certain empirical individual, and through him knows himself.
The activity of the “I” is revealed in rational intuition. It is precisely this that represents the guiding thread that helps to move from the status of an empirical subject through practical activity to an absolute subject. Thus, Fichte considers the question of what ontology is in the context of the historical and cultural activity of the individual and the transformations that occur to him in the process of this activity.
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