Transcendental reduction - see e
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Phenomenological reduction- one of the central concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology, associated with the process of liberating consciousness from a naturalistic attitude. The origins of this practice can be found in Descartes' radical doubt. Phenomenological reduction literally means the reduction of things to phenomena and the exclusion of discussion of their real status. Husserl calls this transition from a natural attitude to a transcendental-phenomenological one the “Copernican revolution.”
Phenomenological reduction is carried out along with epoch - abstention from preliminary judgments about the real world.
“Phenomenological reduction” as a whole is a set of various reductions: phenomenological-psychological, eidetic And transcendental. Phenomenological-psychological and eidetic reduction allow us to make a turn from the perception of the world into natural installation to focus on the experiences of consciousness themselves, and then move from considering experiences in their individuality to considering their essences. Next, the transcendental reduction reveals pure consciousness: the empirical components of consciousness are bracketed, the existence of the empirical subject and the phenomena of his mental life cease to be the subject of attention. A noetic-noematic structure of consciousness is revealed.
Natural and phenomenological attitudes
Phenomenological-psychological reduction
By making a phenomenological-psychological reduction, we turn off the natural attitude: we, as it were, bracket the world, things in a natural attitude, refrain from judging their physical, “spatio-temporal existence here,” “from making a decision about the existence or non-existence of the world” - and we direct our gaze not at what is perceived, but at the perception itself (phenomenon, experience of consciousness). There is a reduction of the transcendental “to the purely mental”; “is not the [external] world or part of it, but the “meaning” of the world.” If in the natural attitude the intentional object, transcendental to the act, was realized, now attention is transferred to the act in which it appears. We do not live in intentional acts, we do not dissolve in them, but we reflect on them. Now “real existence” does not matter, that is, whether what is observed turns out to be a hallucination, illusion, etc. - the phenomenological composition of perception does not depend on this. We are considering the perception of the color red, and not the transcendental perceived color itself inherent in the real object.
In other words, we are performing a phenomenological era(epoché - abstinence from judgment, which is “combined with an unshakable or even unshakable - for obvious - conviction" in its truth). We do not reject the indication of the existence of a real thing inherent in the phenomenon (the experience of consciousness), but we only refrain from judging this and confine ourselves to the phenomenon itself, and we consider this indication as part of it.
I look at everything as if in a dream, in a daydream: there is no external space-time world, only experiences remain as facts of my consciousness, ““states” of such and such a human “I”, in the succession of which the identical mental properties of a person reveal themselves.” That is, I continue to exist as a concrete soul, an empirical subject, in whose consciousness concrete experiences causally connected with each other take place (as concrete facts, and not as entities) - although, as it were, in the absence of the external world, and therefore in absence of one's own body.
When carrying out phenomenological-psychological reduction, all sciences about nature, as well as sciences about the spirit (since they are all also based on a natural attitude), are subject to “switching off”.
Eidetic reduction
Eidetic reduction - purification of the phenomena of consciousness from factuality. Carrying out phenomenological-psychological reduction cleared phenomena from external reality, turning them into experiences of consciousness, but they remained facts consciousness, realities of consciousness. In the mode of eidetic reduction, “we can neglect the factual side of our phenomena and use them only as “examples”.” In other words, experiences of consciousness are taken not as given concrete phenomena existing at a given moment in time, but as such like timeless essence, “just as an example of a certain soil for ideation.” “Phenomenological reduction reveals the phenomena of truly internal experience; eidetic reduction - essential forms of the sphere of mental existence." “The typical feature of any mental fact becomes apparent.”
So, eidetic reduction is a transition when considering the experiences of consciousness from existence to essence, from facts to their essences (eidos), seen in ideation.
See also: Ideation (philosophy)Transcendental reduction
After the phenomenological-psychological reduction, which “turned off” the natural attitude, there is no longer an external world for us, we are limited by internal experience, the field of consciousness, it has become our “reality”. It is now necessary to make consciousness itself (cogito), its content, the subject of research: the amazing fact that I am aware of something, experiencing something, even regardless of whether some reality corresponds to these experiences. It is now necessary to do with consciousness itself (as the consciousness of an empirical subject) the same thing as previously with the natural external world. .
Phenomenological-psychological reduction, even together with the eidetic one, is still limited to the real world (as the semantic horizon of the “internal” experience of the subject, since the subject of mental life is still thought of as a part of this world). Transcendental reduction (alternative terms: transcendental-phenomenological reduction; transcendental epoché) raises the question of what consciousness is in general and real world, “manifesting” in consciousness. This question also covers the existence of any ideal world (the world of entities) and its “being-for-us”. Entities, although they are not part of reality perceived in a natural setting, are nevertheless just as alien, transcendental to the immediate composition of consciousness, as real things.
The facts of internal experience and the “psychological Self” remaining after the phenomenological-psychological reduction also turn out to be part of the world, transcendental in relation to the transcendental Self. Now we turn off not only the external world, but also the internal one, that is, empirical subjectivity.
“Transcendental reduction can be considered as a continuation of the reduction of psychological experience. The universal now reaches the next stage. From now on, “bracketing” extends not only to the world, but also to the sphere of the “mental.” The psychologist reduces the familiar, stable world to the subjectivity of the “soul,” which itself forms part of the world in which it lives. The transcendental phenomenologist reduces psychologically already purified subjectivity to the transcendental, that is, to that universal subjectivity that constitutes the world and the layer of “soul” in it.”
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Encyclopædia Britannica article]. §3
Transcendental reduction reveals not only “disembodied”, but also “soulless” consciousness, that is, not constituting the “empirical “I”-subject” in the same way as material experiences constitute intentional objects. Consciousness is now taken not as the mental experiences of a certain living being, “the components of a person’s mental life,” “the “states” of such and such a human “I,” in the succession of which the identical mental properties of a person express themselves,” but as “absolute,” “pure experiences ", "pure, or transcendental" (absolute, transcendentally pure) consciousness - consciousness in itself, completely cleared of reality. What remains is the “pure experience of the act” and the pure “I” - a transition occurs from empirical consciousness and the empirical “I” to pure consciousness And pure "I". Being transcendental ego and him cogitationes(taken, of course, as essences) - apodictic evidence, which could not be discovered before the transcendental reduction, since it is not part of objective world. “Thus, in reality, the natural existence of the world - the one about which I only speak and can speak - is preceded as a more primary existence in itself by the existence of pure ego and him cogitationes. The natural soil of being is secondary in its existential significance; it always presupposes the transcendental.”
Thus, transcendental reduction reveals the noetic-noematic structure of consciousness. In place of the world perceived in the natural setting now - in pure consciousness - its meaning (noema) remains. “Transcendental reduction makes εποχή regarding reality - however, what it preserves from reality includes noemas with the noematic unity contained in them, and thereby the way in which the real is recognized and given in a specific sense in consciousness.”
Phenomenological reduction as a series of “switch-offs”
Carrying out phenomenological reduction, we “turn off” everything transcendental in relation to pure consciousness, with the exception of some entities and pure “I”.
Transcendent to consciousness:
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Notes
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. P. 271.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Encyclopedia Britannica article]; Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 76.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. p. 164-165, 172.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. I, § 34.
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 38.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. § 23.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Article in the Encyclopedia Britannica]. § 2.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. M.: DIK, 2001. S. 51, 337, 372-373, 382, 384-385, Vv., § 1, 3; Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. § 31-33, 50, 54, 56-57, p. 196-199.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 202-203, 219.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 21-22.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. M.: DIK, 2001. P. 372-373.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 28-30.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. Vv., § 1.
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 33-34.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Article in the Encyclopedia Britannica]. § 3.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 129, 162.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. § 11, p. 91.
- So in the English text of the Encyclopedia Britannica. In him. in the original: “...the psychologist reduces the subjectivity that has a place in the world within the world that habitually means to him to purely mental subjectivity.” - Approx. transl.).
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 54, 56-57.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. § 33, 49, 54, p. 76, 125; Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. § 14.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. § 35, 56-57, 80, p. 176.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. § 9, p. 264; Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Article in the Encyclopedia Britannica]. § 3.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. § 8.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 219.
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 56-60.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 132.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 129.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 162.
Literature
- Husserl E. M.: DIK, 1999.
- Husserl E. (link unavailable since 05/12/2013 (2304 days))/ Per. with him. D. V. Sklyadneva. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001.
- Prechtl P. (link unavailable since 05/12/2013 (2304 days)). Tomsk: Aquarius, 1999.
Links
- (article from the “Phenomenological Dictionary” by I. S. Shkuratov)
- (article by V. N. Semyonova from the encyclopedia “History of Philosophy” edited by A. A. Gritsanov (Mn., 2002))
- (M. V. Silantyeva)
Excerpt characterizing Phenomenological reduction
“I’m afraid,” said Pierre, smiling and hesitating between the trust instilled in him by the personality of a Freemason, and the habit of mocking the beliefs of Freemasons, “I’m afraid that I’m very far from understanding how to say this, I’m afraid that my way of thinking about everything the universe is so opposite to yours that we will not understand each other.“I know your way of thinking,” said the Mason, “and that way of thinking that you are talking about, and which seems to you to be the product of your mental labor, is the way of thinking of most people, it is the monotonous fruit of pride, laziness and ignorance.” Excuse me, my lord, if I did not know him, I would not have spoken to you. Your way of thinking is a sad delusion.
“Just as I can assume that you are also in error,” said Pierre, smiling faintly.
“I will never dare to say that I know the truth,” said the Mason, more and more striking Pierre with his certainty and firmness of speech. – No one alone can reach the truth; “Only stone by stone, with the participation of everyone, millions of generations, from the forefather Adam to our time, is the temple being erected, which should be a worthy dwelling of the Great God,” said the Mason and closed his eyes.
“I have to tell you, I don’t believe, I don’t... believe in God,” Pierre said with regret and effort, feeling the need to express the whole truth.
The Mason looked carefully at Pierre and smiled, as a rich man holding millions in his hands would smile at a poor man who would tell him that he, the poor man, does not have five rubles that can make him happy.
“Yes, you don’t know Him, my lord,” said the Mason. – You cannot know Him. You don't know Him, that's why you're unhappy.
“Yes, yes, I’m unhappy,” Pierre confirmed; - but what should I do?
“You don’t know Him, my sir, and that’s why you are very unhappy.” You don't know Him, but He is here, He is in me. He is in my words, He is in you, and even in those blasphemous speeches that you have uttered now! – the Mason said in a stern, trembling voice.
He paused and sighed, apparently trying to calm down.
“If He didn’t exist,” he said quietly, “you and I wouldn’t be talking about Him, my sir.” What, who were we talking about? Who did you deny? - he suddenly said with enthusiastic sternness and authority in his voice. – Who invented Him if He doesn’t exist? Why did you have the assumption that there is such an incomprehensible creature? Why did you and the whole world assume the existence of such an incomprehensible being, an omnipotent being, eternal and infinite in all its properties?... - He stopped and was silent for a long time.
Pierre could not and did not want to break this silence.
“He exists, but it’s difficult to understand Him,” the Freemason spoke again, looking not at Pierre’s face, but in front of him, with his senile hands, which from internal excitement could not remain calm, turning over the pages of the book. “If it were a person whose existence you doubted, I would bring this person to you, take him by the hand and show him to you.” But how can I, an insignificant mortal, show all His omnipotence, all eternity, all His goodness to the one who is blind, or to the one who closes his eyes so as not to see, not to understand Him, and not to see and not to understand all his abomination and depravity? – He paused. - Who are you? What you? “You dream of yourself that you are a wise man, because you could utter these blasphemous words,” he said with a gloomy and contemptuous grin, “and you are stupider and crazier than a small child who, playing with parts of a skillfully made clock, would dare to say that , because he does not understand the purpose of this watch, he does not believe in the master who made it. It is difficult to know Him... For centuries, from the forefather Adam to the present day, we have been working for this knowledge and are infinitely far from achieving our goal; but in not understanding Him we see only our weakness and His greatness... - Pierre, with a sinking heart, looking into the Freemason’s face with shining eyes, listened to him, did not interrupt, did not ask him, but with all his soul believed what this stranger was telling him. Did he believe those reasonable arguments that were in the Mason’s speech, or did he believe, as children believe, the intonations, conviction and cordiality that were in the Mason’s speech, the trembling of the voice that sometimes almost interrupted the Mason, or those sparkling, senile eyes that grew old in that the same conviction, or that calmness, firmness and knowledge of his purpose, which shone from the whole being of the Mason, and which especially struck him in comparison with his dejection and hopelessness; - but he wanted to believe with all his soul, and believed, and experienced a joyful feeling of calm, renewal and return to life.
“It is not comprehended by the mind, but is comprehended by life,” said the Mason.
“I don’t understand,” said Pierre, fearfully feeling the doubt rising within himself. He was afraid of the ambiguity and weakness of his interlocutor's arguments, he was afraid not to believe him. “I don’t understand,” he said, “how the human mind cannot comprehend the knowledge you are talking about.”
The Mason smiled his gentle, fatherly smile.
“The highest wisdom and truth are like the purest moisture that we want to absorb into ourselves,” he said. – Can I receive this pure moisture into an unclean vessel and judge its purity? Only by internal purification of myself can I bring the perceived moisture to a certain purity.
- Yes, yes, that's true! – Pierre said joyfully.
– The highest wisdom is not based on reason alone, not on those secular sciences of physics, history, chemistry, etc., into which mental knowledge is divided. There is only one highest wisdom. The highest wisdom has one science - the science of everything, the science that explains the entire universe and the place of man in it. In order to embrace this science, it is necessary to purify and renew one’s inner man, and therefore, before knowing, one must believe and improve. And to achieve these goals, the light of God, called conscience, is embedded in our soul.
“Yes, yes,” Pierre confirmed.
– Look with spiritual eyes at your inner man and ask yourself if you are satisfied with yourself. What have you achieved with your mind alone? What are you? You are young, you are rich, you are smart, educated, my sir. What have you made of all these blessings given to you? Are you satisfied with yourself and your life?
“No, I hate my life,” Pierre said, wincing.
“You hate it, so change it, cleanse yourself, and as you cleanse yourself you will learn wisdom.” Look at your life, my lord. How did you spend it? In violent orgies and debauchery, receiving everything from society and giving nothing to it. You have received wealth. How did you use it? What have you done for your neighbor? Have you thought about the tens of thousands of your slaves, have you helped them physically and morally? No. You used their works to lead a dissolute life. That's what you did. Have you chosen a place of service where you can benefit your neighbor? No. You spent your life in idleness. Then you got married, my lord, took on the responsibility of leading a young woman, and what did you do? You did not help her, my sir, to find the path of truth, but plunged her into the abyss of lies and misfortune. A man insulted you and you killed him, and you say that you don't know God and that you hate your life. There is nothing fancy here, my sir! – After these words, the Mason, as if tired from a long conversation, again leaned his elbows on the back of the sofa and closed his eyes. Pierre looked at this stern, motionless, senile, almost dead face, and silently moved his lips. He wanted to say: yes, a vile, idle, depraved life - and did not dare to break the silence.
The Mason cleared his throat hoarsely and senilely and called to the servant.
- What about horses? – he asked, without looking at Pierre.
“They brought the change,” answered the servant. -Aren't you going to rest?
- No, they told me to lay it down.
“Will he really leave and leave me alone, without finishing everything and without promising me help?” thought Pierre, standing up and lowering his head, occasionally glancing at the Freemason, and starting to walk around the room. “Yes, I didn’t think so, but I led a despicable, depraved life, but I didn’t love it and didn’t want it,” thought Pierre, “but this man knows the truth, and if he wanted, he could reveal it to me.” . Pierre wanted and did not dare to tell this to the Mason. The person passing by, having packed his things with the usual, old hands, buttoned up his sheepskin coat. Having finished these matters, he turned to Bezukhy and indifferently, in a polite tone, told him:
-Where do you want to go now, my sir?
“Me?... I’m going to St. Petersburg,” Pierre answered in a childish, hesitant voice. - Thank you. I agree with you on everything. But don't think I'm so stupid. I wished with all my soul to be what you would have me to be; but I never found help in anyone... However, I myself am primarily to blame for everything. Help me, teach me and maybe I will... - Pierre could not speak further; he sniffed and turned away.
The Mason was silent for a long time, apparently thinking about something.
“Help is given only from God,” he said, “but the measure of help that our order has the power to give, he will give to you, my lord.” You are going to St. Petersburg, tell this to Count Villarsky (he took out his wallet and wrote a few words on a large sheet of paper folded in four). Let me give you one piece of advice. Having arrived in the capital, devote the first time to solitude, discussing yourself, and do not take the old path of life. Then I wish you a happy journey, my lord,” he said, noticing that his servant had entered the room, “and success...
The person passing was Osip Alekseevich Bazdeev, as Pierre learned from the caretaker’s book. Bazdeev was one of the most famous Freemasons and Martinists back in Novikov’s time. Long after his departure, Pierre, without going to bed and without asking for horses, walked around the station room, pondering his vicious past and, with the delight of renewal, imagining his blissful, impeccable and virtuous future, which seemed so easy to him. He was, it seemed to him, vicious only because he had somehow accidentally forgotten how good it was to be virtuous. There was no trace of the former doubts left in his soul. He firmly believed in the possibility of a brotherhood of men united for the purpose of supporting each other in the path of virtue, and this was how Freemasonry seemed to him.
Arriving in St. Petersburg, Pierre did not notify anyone of his arrival, did not go anywhere, and began to spend whole days reading Thomas a à Kempis, a book that was delivered to him by an unknown person. Pierre understood one thing and one thing while reading this book; he understood the still unknown pleasure of believing in the possibility of achieving perfection and in the possibility of brotherly and active love between people, opened to him by Osip Alekseevich. A week after his arrival, the young Polish Count Villarsky, whom Pierre knew superficially from the St. Petersburg world, entered his room in the evening with the official and solemn air with which Dolokhov’s second entered his room and, closing the door behind him and making sure that there was no one in the room There was no one except Pierre, he turned to him:
“I came to you with an order and a proposal, Count,” he told him without sitting down. – A person very highly placed in our brotherhood petitioned for you to be accepted into the brotherhood ahead of schedule, and invited me to be your guarantor. I consider it a sacred duty to fulfill the will of this person. Do you wish to join the brotherhood of free stonemasons on my guarantee?
The cold and stern tone of the man whom Pierre almost always saw at balls with an amiable smile, in the company of the most brilliant women, struck Pierre.
“Yes, I wish,” said Pierre.
Villarsky bowed his head. “One more question, Count,” he said, to which I ask you not as a future Freemason, but as an honest man (galant homme) to answer me with all sincerity: have you renounced your previous convictions, do you believe in God?
Pierre thought about it. “Yes... yes, I believe in God,” he said.
“In that case...” Villarsky began, but Pierre interrupted him. “Yes, I believe in God,” he said again.
“In that case, we can go,” said Villarsky. - My carriage is at your service.
Villarsky was silent the whole way. To Pierre's questions about what he needed to do and how to answer, Villarsky only said that brothers more worthy of him would test him, and that Pierre needed nothing more than to tell the truth.
Having entered the gate of a large house where the lodge was located, and walking along a dark staircase, they entered a lighted, small hallway, where, without the help of a servant, they took off their fur coats. From the hall they went into another room. Some man in a strange attire appeared at the door. Villarsky, coming out to meet him, said something quietly to him in French and went to a small closet, in which Pierre noticed clothes he had never seen before. Taking a handkerchief from the closet, Villarsky placed it over Pierre's eyes and tied it in a knot from behind, painfully catching his hair in the knot. Then he bent him towards him, kissed him and, taking him by the hand, led him somewhere. Pierre was in pain from the hair being pulled in by the knot; he winced in pain and smiled from shame for something. His huge figure with his arms hanging down, with a wrinkled and smiling face, moved with uncertain timid steps behind Villarsky.
After walking him ten steps, Villarsky stopped.
“No matter what happens to you,” he said, “you must endure everything with courage if you firmly decide to join our brotherhood.” (Pierre answered in the affirmative by bowing his head.) When you hear a knock on the door, you will untie your eyes,” Villarsky added; – I wish you courage and success. And, shaking Pierre’s hand, Villarsky left.
Left alone, Pierre continued to smile the same way. Once or twice he shrugged his shoulders, raised his hand to the handkerchief, as if wanting to take it off, and lowered it again. The five minutes he spent with his eyes tied seemed like an hour. His hands were swollen, his legs were giving way; he thought he was tired. He experienced the most complex and varied feelings. He was afraid of what would happen to him, and even more afraid of not showing fear. He was curious to know what would happen to him, what would be revealed to him; but most of all he was joyful that the moment had come when he would finally embark on that path of renewal and actively virtuous life, which he had dreamed of since his meeting with Osip Alekseevich. Strong knocks were heard on the door. Pierre took off the bandage and looked around him. The room was black and dark: only in one place was a lamp burning, in something white. Pierre came closer and saw that the lamp stood on a black table, on which lay one open book. The book was the Gospel; that white thing in which the lamp was burning was a human skull with its holes and teeth. Having read the first words of the Gospel: “In the beginning was the word and the word was to God,” Pierre walked around the table and saw a large open box filled with something. It was a coffin with bones. He was not at all surprised by what he saw. Hoping to enter into a completely new life, completely different from the previous one, he expected everything extraordinary, even more extraordinary than what he saw. The skull, the coffin, the Gospel - it seemed to him that he expected all this, expected even more. Trying to evoke a feeling of tenderness in himself, he looked around him. “God, death, love, brotherhood of people,” he said to himself, associating with these words vague but joyful ideas of something. The door opened and someone entered.
This term is used in different sciences. Verbatim reduction- this is reduction, bringing back, erection.
Interpretation of the concept in question depending on the science
Within mathematics, logic reduction is a special logical and methodological technique that allows you to reduce the complex to the simple.
IN astronomy, geodesy- the process of bringing the results of observations, changes from one reference system to another through the introduction of a number of corrections determined by the influence of certain reasons. The latter are being introduced due to the fact that angular measurements are carried out for sighting purposes. Their vertical axes do not coincide with the existing point centers. The above-mentioned amendment is introduced into such measurements that were made at an adjacent point.
IN chemistry reduction is deoxidation, i.e. the process opposite to oxidation. In other words, the process of reduction from oxide.
In a science like biology, the concept under consideration is a development that leads to a simplification of the internal structure of the organism.
IN technology reduction is a decrease, reduction in the force of movement or tension.
Within sociology the term in question means a theoretical approach, the essence of which is to substantiate social behavior from the point of view of psychology and physiology.
Also reduction is ( In russian language) weakening in the unstressed position of the sound of vowels.
The concept under consideration can also be interpreted as the alienation of crown lands from the aristocracy, which was carried out by the royal authorities of a number of European states (XVI-XVII centuries).
Reduction also refers to the Paraguayan Indian settlements directly controlled by the Jesuit Order.
Vowel reduction
It is known that this is a change in the vowel sound in a weak position (unstressed). Vowel reduction can be qualitative and quantitative. In the first case, a radical change in sound occurs in the unstressed position, and its qualitative characteristics change. Thus, a qualitative reduction of vowels is observed in changes in sounds such as [o], [e], [a].
In the second case, only the duration of pronunciation is affected (shortening the sound), while the main characteristics do not change, which is why even in an unstressed position the pronounced sound is always recognizable. Quantitative reduction of vowels in the Russian language is observed in the pronunciation of sounds such as [i], [u], [th].
Degrees of reduction
The process under consideration depends on the position of the unstressed syllable in which the sound is used. So, in the first pre-stressed, unstressed syllable or combination of vowels, the degree of their change is much less than in other unstressed syllables.
Thus, Russian vowels, which are subject to qualitative reduction, have 2 degrees. As is already known, the 1st degree is a change in vowels either in the first pre-stressed syllable, or in an open one, or in a combination of vowels, and the 2nd is their change in subsequent syllables - pre-stressed, post-stressed.
Pronunciation of reduced vowels depending on the hardness/softness of the preceding consonant
Reduction in words spring, farmhand, sixth, nickel, water, fly, etc.. the same, that is, under stress it is the same sound, despite the fact that, in fact, the sounds are different.
More recently, the so-called ekaya was considered the literary norm of pronunciation (it was necessary to use sounds that had an e-shaped overtone, like between letters And And uh). The norm was to pronounce sounds close to [ы] and [и], in an unstressed position in the place of shock e.
It is known that after hard consonants, in accordance with the rules, the following sounds are pronounced:
- [a] (milk [malako]);
- [s] (soap maker [mylavar], turn yellow [zhylt "et"], belly [zhivot], horses [lashyd "ey"]).
After soft sounds:
- [and] (worlds [m "iry", lie [l "izhat"], hours [h "isy"]);
- [y] (to love [l"ub"it"]).
From the above examples it is clear that the same unstressed vowel sound can be represented in writing by different letters, namely:
- [a] - with the letters o (for example, bed [pas "t"el"]) and a (for example, heat [heat];
- [i] - with the letters e (for example, honey [m "idok]), i (for example, rows [r "ida]), and (for example, piston [p "iston]), and (for example, chasok [h "isok]);
- [y] - with the letters yu (for example, bureau [b "uró]) and y (for example, empty [empty"]);
- [s] - letters and (for example, life [zhyz"n"]), s (for example, thinker [mysl"it"il"]), and (for example, to regret [zhyl"et"].
All of the above regarding the correspondence between unstressed vowels and the letters denoting them can, for convenience, be presented in the form of a table.
Russian linguistics
This science is represented by the following sections that study modern literary language:
- lexicology;
- morphology;
- phonetics;
- morphemics and word formation;
- syntax.
It is important to note that graphics and spelling, as a rule, are not studied independently. So, the first is included in the section of phonetics, and the second - word formation, phonetics, morphology.
A section such as stylistics is studied in speech development lessons, and punctuation is studied in the study of syntax.
Object of study of linguistics
Its sections describe the language in many ways, which is why they have independent objects:
- phonetics - sounding speech;
- word formation - the production of a linguistic unit;
- morphology - words as parts of speech;
- morphemics - the composition of a linguistic unit;
- lexicology - vocabulary of the sign system;
- syntax - sentences, phrases.
Syntax together with morphology forms grammar.
The linguistic term discussed in this article belongs to the section of phonetics.
Unstressed vowels
As mentioned earlier, in an unstressed position, vowels are pronounced more briefly, with less muscular tension of the speech organs, than under stress. This process within linguistics is called reduction. So, vowels in an unstressed position change their quality and are thus pronounced differently from stressed ones.
In our language, only 4 vowel sounds are distinguished in unstressed position: [u], [i], [a], [s]. They differ, in terms of pronunciation, from their corresponding drums. These sounds are not only shorter, but also have a slightly different timbre, which is caused by less muscular tension during pronunciation, which results in a shift of the speech organs to a resting position (neutral position). In this regard, their designation using the same transcription signs as for stressed vowels is to a certain extent arbitrary.
English language: reduction
To correctly pronounce English words, it is worth remembering that they cannot be pronounced separately. English speech sounds quite smoothly, which is achieved with the help of special laws of pronunciation of individual English words in the general flow of speech - reduction, combination of sounds. So, reduction in English language- this is the loss of some vowel sounds of their strong form or their complete loss from words.
In English, both syllables in a word and the words themselves within a sentence can be stressed or unstressed. Some lexical units sound quite strongly, which is why they are significant, others are unstressed, they are auxiliary. Natural reduction or loss of individual sounds occurs in unstressed words, since the sounds in them also sound weak.
If you turn to the dictionary (transcription section) of function words: articles, conjunctions, prepositions, you will notice that there are 2 variants of them: weak and strong form. It is the first one, as a rule, that is heard in English speech, since function words in sentences are unstressed. Exactly the same picture is observed with pronouns, auxiliary, modal verbs, due to the fact that they quite often perform an auxiliary, service function and are thus unstressed.
For comparison, the following examples can be given:
![](https://i1.wp.com/syl.ru/misc/i/ai/187284/782231.jpg)
Types of reduction in English
Just as in Russian, in English the linguistic term in question can be divided into the following types:
1. Quantitative reduction. With it, the sound loses its longitude, for example:
- replaced by [u];
- goes to [i].
2. High quality reduction (examples are given earlier and below). The sound changes significantly:
- [ɑ:] goes into [ə];
- [ʌ] changes to [ə];
- [æ]is replaced by [ə];
- [ʊ] goes into [ə].
3. Zero reduction. There is a complete loss of sound, for example: she is - [ʃi ɪz] (She is a good girl [ʃi z ə ɡʊd ɡɜːl]).
Thus, to summarize, we can say that reduction in language (both English and Russian) is a linguistic term and is divided into qualitative and quantitative. These are the laws of pronunciation.
Reduction from a philosophical point of view
This is her main phenomenological method. Its understanding, according to E. Husserl, affects the awareness of phenomenology as a whole. This German philosopher believed that it is the most difficult task of philosophy, which as a result determines both the authenticity of existing philosophical reflection and the meaning of human life itself.
Its difficulties are connected, firstly, with unnaturalness. If we consider the situation with the usual natural attitude, characteristic of everyday scientific experience, then it is carried out in accordance with hypothetical ideas. The phenomenological one (achieved through reduction) is the complete opposite of nature.
In this regard, we can say that reduction does not deny the world, it represents a radical reduction of existing consciousness to the level of “itself” (to the original givens of man). Thus, the world does not become less existing, it only becomes its phenomenon. The so-called reduction mode allows exclusively noetic-noematic structures of consciousness. However, this is very difficult to implement, due to the fact that people are accustomed to seeing only the objective. It is even more difficult to turn it inward, along with the endless obstacles present in the form of habits of empirical-subjectivist, objectivist thinking.
Three types of reduction according to Husserl
He highlighted:
- psychological;
- transcendental;
- eidetic reduction.
Each of the above types corresponds to a specific level of phenomenological research. Thus, psychological reduction covers the area of descriptive phenomenology, transcendental – universal transcendental, and eidetic – essential.
Psychological reduction
The essence is a return to one’s own experience or to “pure” indicators of psychological self-research. The subject immediately faces such a difficult circumstance as the intertwining of his psychological side of life with information from “external” experience, which determines the former with extrapsychic reality.
Reality perceived from the outside belongs to a special intentional consciousness, despite the fact that the latter includes a person’s very perception of his external reality. This is where the need for epoche (abstinence from judgment) comes into play. Thus, the phenomenologist excludes any objective attitude, together with all judgments regarding the objective world. As a result, only experience remains in the form of intuitive self-givenness: a single tree, a house, the world as a whole (experience is the essence of the subject).
Stages of psychological reduction:
- A systematic, radical era is at the head of any objective point of view within the framework of experience, which is practiced when considering individual objects and the attitude of consciousness as a whole.
- Experienced insight, description, analysis of various kinds of “phenomena”: here the essence is already “semantic unities”, and not “objects”. The phenomenological description itself is formed from the characteristics of noematic objects and poetic acts.
Eidetic reduction
The ideation method allows the researcher to treat the actual aspects of phenomena categorically, in other words, to consider them as “examples” of their invariant “essence.” Thus, in order to study the a priori forms of phenomena, a phenomenologist abstracts from their particular forms. In the entire community of noetic acts, he is interested only in unchanging structures that must be seen, since without them no perception is possible.
So, if the first type of reduction exposes the phenomena of internal experience, then the second one captures its essential forms. It is worth considering that the phenomenology under consideration, which is empirically based on the descriptive, at the same time determines it a priori, as a result of which the genetic post factum turns out to be a logical prius.
Transcendental reduction
It is the deepest, and therefore the most difficult, stage of the entire procedure. Here the era is produced over eidetic and descriptive phenomenology. This is due to the fact that they still have roots in the realities of the psychic world.
When a phenomenologist works on the epoch and over existing mental subjectivity, then a region is revealed to him that is in no way connected with the objective world and which acts as the self-givenness of pure subjectivity, expressed by the formula “I am.”
Transcendental reduction purifies consciousness to absolute subjectivity, which constructs the world. According to Husserl, the structure of this subjectivity is threefold: ego, cogito, cogitatum. In other words, the transcendental “I”, the original noetic acts, their noematic referents.
In general terms, the significance of the concept under consideration for phenomenology is due to the fact that reduction underlies the phenomenological method and radically changes the traditional philosophical ideas of both naive realism and subjective idealism regarding the relationship between consciousness and nature.
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1
No. 20 [Orthodox community, 1994]
The magazine “Orthodox Community” was published from 1990 to 2000 by the publishing house of the Moscow Higher Orthodox Christian School (modern name: St. Philaret Orthodox Christian Institute). The editor-in-chief of the magazine is priest Georgy Kochetkov.
The triumph of individuality, at least to the extent that the individual is not a reduction, but<...>It is well known what the Asian export products called " transcendental <...>I am inclined to think about the onset of sophisticated syncretism in transcendental unity of religions, starting from<...>PERSONALITY BEYOND REDUCTION The third point is to offer a renewed perception of the Good News.
Preview: Orthodox community No. 20 1994.pdf (0.5 Mb)2
Social phenomenology textbook. allowance
The textbook on social phenomenology is a consistent examination of the themes and problems of philosophical phenomenology, taken from the point of view of its social aspect and social phenomenology as such. Philosophical phenomenology is considered starting from its prehistory, but not a historical, but a logical approach to the presentation of its main content is adopted. Social phenomenology is represented by a transition from philosophical issues to the study of modern methodology for studying society.
During execution transcendental reduction “in brackets” remains transcendental"I", "out of brackets"<...>That's why it's necessary transcendental reduction<...>Transcendental reduction allows us to revise the results of eidetic reduction.<...>Doctrine of transcendental reductions can be considered not only as the completion of the doctrine of reductions,<...>What's happened transcendental reduction? 18.
Preview: Social phenomenology.pdf (0.2 Mb)3
Selected works [Ideas towards pure phenomenology; Paris reports; Amsterdam reports; Intentional objects”, etc.]
M.: Territory of the Future
Phenomenology is one of the main philosophical innovations of the 20th century. The “breakthrough of phenomenology” as a philosophical direction occurred in 1900–1901. and was associated with the publication of two volumes of Logical Investigations by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). In 1900, two more works were published by those who were to play a significant role in the history of early phenomenology: Alexander Pfender's Phenomenology of the Will and Max Scheler's Transcendental and Psychological Method. Phenomenology was born as a branch of German university philosophy, but was able to transcend its historical and social context. Individual fragments of what Edmund Husserl understood by phenomenology have entered a variety of currents of modern philosophical thought, various philosophical disciplines and social sciences. The works presented in this edition do not pretend to be a complete and systematically coherent presentation of Husserl's phenomenology. However, they provide an opportunity to get acquainted with all periods of his phenomenological creativity. The works are ordered chronologically and are reproductions of already existing publications, scattered, however, across a variety of publications (some of them are currently difficult to access).
Transcendentally-phenomenological reduction and transcendental appearance of doubling If now rises<...>Transcendental field of being, as well as the method of accessing it - transcendental reduction is the essence<...>Reduction to my own transcendental sphere or to my transcendental specific I-myself<...>When I'm in transcendental reduction I reflect on myself, transcendental Ego then I am given<...>reduction, intentional self-interpretation revealed through this reduction transcendental
Preview: Fav. essays (“Ideas towards pure phenomenology”; “Paris reports”; “Amsterdam reports”; “Intentional objects”, etc. with a foreword by Vitaly Kurennoy).pdf (0.2 Mb)4
The article analyzes the phenomenon of perception in the context of phenomenological-aesthetic methodology. Based on Husserl's phenomenology, the author emphasizes the key role of perception in the structure of consciousness. In the installation of phenomenological reduction, these structures of consciousness are revealed, and aesthetic perception turns out to be awareness of any reality. Analyzing the intentional structure of consciousness as the structure of intentional experience, the basic elements that determine the phenomenological-aesthetic approach to the problem of perception are identified
The phenomenological method includes the following operations transcendental consciousness: phenomenological<...>installation, reflection, phenomenological reduction, epoch, eidetic reduction and method of variations.<...>given in a natural attitude, and move on to focusing on the experiences of consciousness themselves; then transcendental <...>During the period of Husserl's "Ideas", when these problems are already considered in the installation transcendental <...>reduction, a pair of noesis and noema arises.
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The article examines the criticism of the Cartesian principle in phenomenological philosophy, namely the self-identity of the cogito and its “substantialization”. Phenomenology comes from an understanding of the existence of consciousness, its temporality and the interpretation of its genesis as the formation of semantic structures. Therefore, the subject of phenomenological criticism is the Cartesian closedness of ideas, an indication of the presence of a pre-reflective cogito, the idea of agentive experiences representing simultaneously kinesthetic and intentional acts, an indication of bodily experience as constitutive for the genesis of consciousness in general
As a result of phenomenological Erpchz and subsequent phenomenological reduction, we are presented with pure<...>But “... one thing is clear in advance: having made such a reduction, we are in a stream of diverse experiences - in this<...>Of course, when committing transcendental of reduction there remains a remainder (Residium) – the very “I can” of reduction<...>The primary layer of Lebenswelt is transcendental subjectivity as a living presence that<...>Despite the rejection of the postulate about transcendental“I” precisely for the purpose of preventing the loss of all corporeality
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After F. Brentano in European philosophy again turned to the question of the origin of consciousness of time, Husserl and Heidegger proposed two options for the constitution of temporality as a special form of organization of our experience. The article examines both of these options, as well as the main problems that arise in connection with the denial of the “original” nature of time for our experience.
<...>transcendental <...> transcendental reduction<...> <...> transcendental phenomenology.
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After F. Brentano in European philosophy again addressed the question of the origin of the consciousness of time, Husserl and Heidegger proposed two options for the constitution of temporality as a special form of organization of our experience. The article examines both of these options, as well as the main problems that arise in connection with the denial of the “original” nature of time for our experience.
When, according to his own testimony, he discovered the method of phenomenological reduction.<...>transcendental phenomenology: 1) natural attitude; 2) epoché and phenomenological reduction;<...>Husserl 3) eidetic reduction; 4) transcendental reduction<...>Husserl discovered the method of reduction, and it was reflections on the origin of time consciousness that became<...>the impetus for the beginning of the transition from descriptive psychological to transcendental phenomenology.
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The article represents the first part of a study of the evolution of the problem of understanding from antiquity and medieval exegesis to its postmodern interpretations. This section is dedicated to brief history development of the problem and its solutions up to the phenomenology of E. Husserl and the “new ontology” of M. Heidegger
Such a reduction of meanings to meanings can be interpreted as the replacement of understanding with explanation<...>How is it possible for transcendental the subject simultaneously had a phenomenal status in relation to<...>Husserl solves the problem of understanding the Other with his fundamental method transcendental <...>Transcendental understanding of the Other, which presupposes, as described above, a “turn” from the natural<...>Thus, Husserl comes to the idea of the necessity " transcendental hermeneutics" as research
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No. 4 [Philosophy of Science, 2017]
Published since 1995. This is the first Russian magazine devoted to problems of philosophy, logic, methodology and history of natural sciences. The main directions of the journal: analysis of philosophical, methodological and logical problems of modern natural science (physics, chemistry, geology, biology, medicine) and mathematics; history of natural science in the context of the development of its philosophy, logic and methodology; in the “From the Archives” section, works that are unknown or forgotten for various reasons, but have not lost their relevance, are published famous philosophers and natural scientists.
"(or "phenomenological") and "eidetic" reductions, about the absolute nature of existence transcendental <...>Meaning transcendental, or phenomenological, reduction consists in the resulting volitional effort<...>era and transcendental reduction, instead of "bracketing" speaks of "suspending", and also<...>to his immanent transcendental(pure) phenomenon, eidetic reduction is directed from facts and<...>It is in relation to the procedure of eidetic reduction that Husserl uses the well-known concept transcendental
Preview: Philosophy of Science No. 4 2017.pdf (0.2 Mb)10
Phenomenology and art are very close; does this mean that we can try to describe phenomenological activity in terms of aesthetic theory? This article proposes an interpretation of Marc Richir’s phenomenology in the language of Russian formalism. Richir radicalizes Husserl's phenomenological reduction by introducing “hyperbolic reduction,” which serves as a kind of “unmasking of the technique” (Jakobson, Tomashevsky), returning the effectiveness of the previous philosophical technique. The conditional, simulative, illusory nature of the new reduction reveals the artificiality and illusory nature of the self-identical Self. The internal unity and self-identity of the Self are not given initially, but rather created; Having the status of an artistic creation, I constantly “flickers” between “pretend” and “really” (Shklovsky), between being and non-being
<...>Transcendental <...>simulacrum transcendental transcendental <...>Concept “ transcendental Transcendental dialectics":<...>tongue out transcendental
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Introduction to phenomenology: theory and practice monograph
M.: FLINTA
The publication examines the background and history of the phenomenological movement, general theoretical problems of foreign phenomenology of the 20th century, the state of phenomenology in modern Russia, its application in psychotherapy, religious studies and cultural studies. The monograph can be used as a textbook for the humanities. The book also addresses questions that will be of interest to the general reader: What does it mean to “be yourself”? How many meanings does life have and is it necessary to invent them? What is "holy horror"? Who is a “religious person”? What is the mission of the mythical hero? What are the specifics of the Slavic understanding of holiness and the essence of the spiritual feat of St. Boris? Can a work of artistic culture claim to be “truthful” (truthful)? and etc.
The corresponding reduction is the reduction of a psychological phenomenon to pure “essence”, or in the ultimate<...>eidetic reduction.<...>Other reductions are specific transcendental- “cleanse” psychological phenomena from what it gives<...>This operation is transcendental reduction; in no case can it be psychophenomenological<...>reduction (Derrida J.
Preview: Introduction to phenomenology theory and practice (1).pdf (1.1 Mb)12
No. 2 [Personality. Culture. Society, 2007]
"LiKO" is a magazine that conceptually combines the original categories of social sciences and humanities, which express the main aspects of modern society - Personality, Culture and Society. The priority areas of publication of the journal were the methodology of a comprehensive study of man, culture and society, social theory, theory of culture and personality, theory of organizations and management, psychology, theory of state and law, gender studies, scientific studies, cross-cultural studies, Russian studies, social technologies and applied developments, pedagogy and methods of teaching social and humanitarian disciplines. The magazine is intended, first of all, for professionals interested in deep and comprehensive knowledge of the matter, and not concerned about their belonging to any corporate community - “narrow” specialists and one-sided pragmatists. A journal for scientists and practitioners seeking to overcome “disciplinary boundaries” between sciences and solve problems of social life.
It is stated that transcendental reduction changes the nature of consciousness: it loses its ontic status<...>The concept of ontic and transcendental reduction Having completed the phenomenological one, putting everything in brackets<...>Of course, when committing transcendental reduction remains the remainder (Residium) – the very “I can”<...>Thus, transcendental subjectivity, thanks to eidetic reduction, appears in its<...>“I” and the empirical “I” are one and the same, since when transcendental reduction remains the same
Preview: Personality. Culture. Society No. 2 2007.pdf (0.2 Mb)13
No. 1 [Territory of new opportunities. Bulletin of Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service, 2014]
In the journal, teachers, researchers, graduate students, undergraduates and students of VSUES publish the results of their own research work in the field of economics, political science, law, innovation and high technology, as well as materials on the results of scientific conferences
It consists of three steps - psychological, eidetic and transcendental reduction.<...>Eidetic reduction removes the forms of cognitive operations, and transcendental focuses Copyright<...>Event transcendental reduction consists in discovering a significant difference between “something as something” –<...>In the theoretical-cognitive aspect transcendental reduction serves to open up the possibility of clarification<...>In the ontological aspect, reduction opens up a new transcendental the sphere of experience as the sphere of the absolute
Preview: Territory of new opportunities. Bulletin of Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service No. 1 2014.pdf (0.3 Mb)14
Two approaches to the problem of the Other are compared: the approach presented by E. Husserl in “Cartesian Meditations” and the point of view of J.-P. Sartre, as set out in his work “Being and Nothingness”. Despite the fact that they both call their method phenomenological, the difference in their understanding of this method from the very beginning leads to a different context for posing the problem of the Other.
<...>Unlike the latter, the “pure ego” is not influenced by phenomenological reduction...” [A.<...>Having completed the reduction, Husserl completely excluded from consideration the question of the existence of phenomena outside consciousness.<...> transcendental Ego<...> transcendental
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The concept of lexical eidos proposed in the article as a set of the most essential universal semantic components, which are determined intuitively during phenomenological reduction, constitute the semantic formula of the word, controlling the process of updating meanings. It can be deciphered as a universal construct, through which it becomes possible to understand the existential entities with the help of which a person sees, understands and speaks
universal semantic components that are determined intuitively during phenomenological reduction<...>determine the true meaning transcendental phenomenology.<...>the role of introspection in the reduction process is quite large.<...>analysis can also be carried out on natural soil, abandoning transcendental installations.<...>The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology / E. Husserl; lane with him. D.V.
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The modal nature of consciousness: on the example of the concepts of Zen and Chan Buddhism
The article is devoted to the analysis of the fundamental aspects of the concept of consciousness presented in the philosophy of Chinese and Japanese Mahayana. The analysis is aimed at identifying signs of a modal understanding of consciousness, as well as searching for points of contact between the Buddhist version of consciousness and the concepts of modern European philosophy.
In work " Transcendentality ego" he asks the question: "Is personality (and even such an abstract<...>problematic and thinks of it as if on the other side of the question of being or non-existence, existence and non-existence: “ Transcendental <...>reduction as a universal method of cognition and self-knowledge consists in not presuming at the beginning as<...>in the words of Sartre, “we follow Husserl in all his wonderful descriptions, where he shows how transcendental <...>Transcendentality ego. Sketch of a phenomenological description // Logos. – 2003, No. 2 (37).
Preview: The modal nature of consciousness on the example of the concepts of Zen and Chan Buddhism.pdf (0.7 Mb)17
No. 10 [Philosophical Sciences, 2008]
problem", " transcendental motive" and " transcendental story".<...>in the "Cartesian Meditations" of primordial reduction, "reduction to the sphere of one's own" (understood as<...>“Historical reduction” is close in meaning to the phenomenological era and phenomenological reduction.<...>philosophy", dedicated to the theory transcendental reduction.<...>The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. pp. 103 – 104.)
Preview: Philosophical Sciences No. 10 2008.pdf (0.1 Mb)18
Studies in the phenomenology of consciousness [fel. work]
M.: Territory of the Future
The book consists of two studies: 1. Time and consciousness; 2. Discernment and experience. The first study examines the relationship between consciousness, time and reflection in phenomenological philosophy. Held comparative analysis the teachings of I. Kant, E. Husserl and M. Heidegger. The main theme of the second study is consciousness as the primary experience of discrimination. The dilemma of mentalism and reductionism finds its resolution in a new understanding of the correlation of consciousness, objectivity and the world as a distinction, a differentiated and a hierarchy of distinctions. The methodological distinction between analysis and interpretation serves as a basic guideline in identifying the difference between phenomenological description and the basic principles in Husserl's phenomenology. Distinction is seen as non-aggressive consciousness, in contrast to synthesis and identification, and deformations of experience, including crisis and aggression, are seen as a lack of distinction.
However, the relationship between time and reduction is more complex: time reduction is not only one of the types<...>reduction, but also the basis of any reduction in Husserl.<...>No matter how Husserl details the concept of phenomenological reduction, for him reduction is always<...>reduction reduction transcendental), clarify it with the help of various metaphors: “bracketing<...>Reduction, like the abstract triangle, only indicates a certain experience, but reduction as such
Preview: Selected works.pdf (0.5 Mb)19
The article discusses the structure and cognitive activity pure (immortal) part of the soul in Plato's metaphysics. The essence of cognitive conditions, abilities and procedures of the soul is analyzed. The constituent elements of the pure soul (consciousness), which take part in the constitution of the object of knowledge, are explicated.
Keywords: transcendental reduction, ascent, pure soul intentionality, sensations and impressions<...>Transcendental the method (in its various variations) makes it possible to approach the understanding of consciousness<...>In other words, imagination is transcendental condition of reproduction and recognition.<...>transcendental. <...>As is known, in transcendental In knowledge, ideas act as hypotheses.
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The article examines the socio-phenomenological concept of A. Schutz, dedicated to the formation and understanding of the meaning of human actions. The ideological connection between the social phenomenology of A. Schutz and the transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl is revealed. The interpretation of the concepts by A. Schutz is analyzed: experience, life world, subjective and objective meanings of action, circles of understanding.
Husserl, creator transcendental phenomenology.<...> <...>Smirnova: “...The essence transcendentally-phenomenological reduction, according to Husserl, consists of “abstaining from<...>in the installation of phenomenological reduction.<...>“Reduction to the sphere of belonging (primordial sphere),” notes N.M.
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The article examines current problems of understanding the phenomenon of legal communication and its structure. The author pays special attention to the views of A.V. Polyakov about the relationship of communicative processes in the legal system of society. The author comes to the conclusion that the discourse of legal communication within the framework of the phenomenological approach would receive a new impetus for development if the ideas of the existential direction of phenomenology, as well as approaches to describing the collective unconscious developed by analytical psychology, are comprehended in relation to law.
Key words: communication, text, value, legal system, phenomenological reduction. S.<...>For this, Husserl introduced the concept of phenomenological reduction, which assumed the possibility of abstraction<...>Kniga-Service AgencyCopyright OJSC Central Design Bureau BIBKOM & LLC Kniga-Service Agency 10 menological reduction<...>Polyakov, “the identification of eidetic legal values is possible only as a result of phenomenological reduction<...>But since, as already said, phenomenological reduction is not a strictly scientific method, it
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M.: PROMEDIA
The article raises the question of the possibility of turning to the phenomenology of E. Husserl as a philosophical basis for the study of reflection in psychology.
Then the implementation of phenomenological comprehension of the experiences of consciousness with the help of phenomenological reduction<...>Phenomenological (or transcendental) experience.<...>IN transcendental experience, nothing from real existence is directly affirmed: “If I, living in transcendental <...>a priori, i.e. pure and necessary “in general” is carried out through phenomenological and eidetic reduction<...>I-center, which itself is a noema in phenomenological reduction, i.e. has horizontality (infinity)
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The purpose of this article is to reveal the content of the concept of “social image” in the context of recent studies of social-constructivist and phenomenological directions. The author evaluates the nature of the influence of social images on society. Research on the “disruption of intentions” of the social image shows that the phenomenon of “myth” is a special case of distortion of the social image. A radical difference is revealed between the mythogenesis and the meaning genesis of the social image, which is based on the level of “pure consciousness” of E. Husserl.
The loss of a phenomenological attitude at best leads to honest agnosticism transcendental <...>“I” in Husserl means all 4 possible statuses of the subject - psychophysical, linguistic, transcendental <...>Overcoming this level occurs with the help transcendentally-phenomenological reduction, “which<...>It is located primarily at the level of the mind or transcendental subject.<...>The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. St. Petersburg: SPbU Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, 2004. 368 p. 6.
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No. 2 [Bulletin of Voronezh State University. Series: Philosophy, 2013]
The journal “Bulletin of Voronezh State University” was founded in 1993 and was originally published in two series “Humanities” and “Natural Sciences”, which from 2000 to 2010 were transformed into 12 series of a narrower focus. The “Philosophy” series, formed in 2009, like the “Humanities” series, publishes scientific articles and short communications with original research results, as well as reviews on all sections of philosophy (in accordance with the GRNTI rubricator). The magazine is intended for researchers, teachers, graduate students and students.
However, on the one hand, in Husserlian phenomenology there is a tendency to completely reduce consciousness<...>Thus, we reach a methodological insight, according to which, along with phenomenological reduction,<...>determine the true meaning transcendental phenomenology.<...>Further, this area undergoes reduction, and the “direction” of consciousness itself, or intention, remains.<...>the role of introspection in the reduction process is quite large.
Preview: Bulletin of Voronezh State University. Philosophy Series No. 2 2013.pdf (0.9 Mb)25
No. 1 [Questions of Philosophy, 2018]
Levinas later described the method of epoch and transcendental reduction is the basis of phenomenological<...>C) Transcendental reduction is characteristic of the original version of Husserl's phenomenology.<...>E) Ontological reduction was proposed by Heidegger as radicalization or inversion transcendental <...>Husserl's reduction.<...>But I would say that he did not stop at the reduction to immanence, but developed a complete transcendental
Preview: Questions of Philosophy No. 1 2018.pdf (0.1 Mb)26
The article examines Christina Lafont's reproaches against M. Heidegger, who, in her opinion, could not maintain the premise of a single world for all, regardless of what we know or do not know about him, as well as the responses to these reproaches from Hubert Dreyfus and other defenders of Heidegger, as well as the controversy that unfolded on this issue in foreign philosophical journals. In this regard, some principles of M. Heidegger’s method are formulated, misunderstanding or rejection of which by both critics and the majority of Heidegger’s defenders became the reason for this controversy.
attitudes" and built a hierarchy of "perspectives" according to the degree of completeness of the phenomenological reduction<...>: 1) natural installation; 2) installation of phenomenological reduction; 3) installation of eidetic reduction<...>; 4) installation transcendental reduction.
27
The article examines the main methodological principle and content of modern social ontology, according to which irreductionism prescribes an unambiguous ontological status of social objects, the independence of objects from each other and their irreducibility to each other, the axiomatization of multiplicity, the unified as a local construction, a new topographical relationship between " micro" and "macro", "part" and "whole"
The object thus takes the place of this oscillation between reduction and anti-reduction.<...>Every object is constituted by this “double bind” of reduction and anti-reduction.<...>It axiomatically excludes any axiom of a priori reduction.<...>Transcendental denotes the structure of the world itself.<...>Transcendental organization is simultaneous with the world: any structure is locality.
28
Jean-Luc Marion is an eclectic philosopher, and, as we will see, he is a master of very unexpected combinations: the ideas of Heidegger and Dionysius the Areopagite, modern French philosophy and the Fathers of the Church. However, the area of questions that interests him was formed exclusively in the post-Heidegger era of European philosophy - mainly, this is the problem of the end of metaphysics, understood after Heidegger as onto-theology, and the search for a “different rationality.” The search for a different way of thinking is determined in the case of Marion, as it seems to us, by the desire to overcome distrust of the transcendental, fear of the incomprehensible, undesirability of meeting it, in which the philosopher sees the quintessence of metaphysics as a special type of thinking.
basis, which is understood by Marion not as a statement about some empirical observation, but as transcendental <...>IN transcendental Kant's philosophy is possible that which is consistent with the cognitive abilities<...>In Husserl’s phenomenology, contemplation is “framed” by two conditions of possibility – horizon and transcendental <...>data-beings, but the subject through “perceptual means” (whether this is the position about the basis as transcendental <...>On the contrary, since the meaning of the reduction is that transcendental ego's ambitions are bracketed
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No. 1 [Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy, 2014]
The journal is a periodical scientific publication, the oldest philosophical journal currently published in Russia. The journal publishes articles on various areas of philosophical science, information about conferences and critical reviews
a subject to which one can arrive as a result of reduction.<...>Everything that is discussed after the reduction has been completed is understood as the result of the work transcendental Ego<...>, then in order to get into such a state, it is necessary to perform additional actions, “reduction transcendental <...>Formed by my community with Others transcendental intersubjectivity as transcendental <...>Transcendental experience and transcendental naivety in the Cartesian meditations of Edmund Husserl //
Preview: Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 7. Philosophy No. 1 2014.pdf (0.1 Mb)30
Phenomenological psychiatry and existential analysis: history, thinkers, problems [monograph]
M.: Territory of the Future
The monograph represents the first Russian-language study of the existential-phenomenological tradition in psychiatry. Analyzing, based on original texts and biographical materials, the main ideas of representatives of phenomenological psychiatry and existential analysis (K. Jaspers, E. Minkowski, W. E. von Gebsattel, E. Strauss, L. Binswanger, M. Boss, etc.) and building a panorama of their formation and development, the author includes the tradition under consideration in the philosophical context of the 20th century.
The procedure of phenomenological reduction.<...>Husserl distinguishes two stages of phenomenological reduction: 1) eidetic reduction - reduction from individual<...>Transcendental phenomenology is associated by Husserl with transcendental reduction: reduction of psychological<...>Since the author does not follow Husserl along the path transcendental reduction, this is solidarity in spirit<...>Strauss denies the possibility transcendental reduction, therefore, to talk about the complete borrowing of phenomenological
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Anthropogenesis is the implicit focus of phenomenological philosophy aimed at carrying out a genetic analysis of transcendental subjectivity. The historicity of the “life world” of the latter determines that the methodological condition for the positivity of knowledge of anthropogenesis is an appeal to the historiographic content. Historiography turns out to be the subject of phenomenological interpretation and a means of revealing the meanings of primordiality.
Derrida, " transcendental experience in no language”, in phenomenology the problem of language occupies a central<...>phenomenology of perception take into account philosophical activity, without resorting to something that would be a “reduction<...>Isn’t language a witness to this distance, reflection and reduction itself?” .<...>The basis for this conclusion is that “constitutive life transcendental subjectivity<...>After all, in my own way transcendentally-historical nature, phenomenological intention is retrospective and
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The problem of the relationship between cognitive science and cognitivism arises in the wake of the progress of scientific knowledge in the field of information, which has influenced the situation of all, not only natural, technical, but also the humanities. Naturally, this influence turned out to be different and has different theoretical and practical consequences.
The coincidence of empirical and transcendental, thus, occurs in reality of practical<...>In such a “thing” there is also a connection transcendental and empirical, but empirical here<...>He calls this process transcendentally-phenomenological reduction, i.e. method of movement from the outside<...>of the experienced world to an all-encompassing, constitutive absolute being, i.e. To transcendental <...>Accordingly, the intentional object plays the role of “ transcendental hint", "guiding thread" to
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CATEGORY OF FREEDOM IN PHILOSOPHY M.K. MAMARDASHVILI
The purpose of this work is to consider the category of freedom in the works of M.K. Mamardashvili. The researcher’s task here is to analyze philosophical texts in which the author attempts to define this phenomenon. It is known that Mamardashvili was not completely original, relying on the texts of his predecessors (primarily Descartes, Kant); in particular, this is manifested in his definition of freedom as a necessity. But at the same time, the philosopher gives his own, unique interpretation of the concept of freedom that exists in the philosophical tradition. CATEGORY OF FREEDOM IN PHILOSOPHY M.K. MAMARDASHVILI // Anthropology of law: philosophical and legal aspects (state, problems, prospects) : Statistics of the participants of the International “Round Table” (M. Lviv, 3-5 years 2010). − Lviv: Galician Drukar, 2010 - P. 244-254. -http://law.lnu.edu.ua/uploads/media/Antropologija_prava_zbirka_statei_VI.pdf
Arising from the necessity of oneself, it requires freedom of consciousness, and on the other hand, its purification and reduction.<...>Thus, the role of legislator is initially not empirical, but transcendental subject<...>And this act of “phenomenological reduction”, within the framework of which a person self-defines as a person possessing<...>In this case, the empirical subject is left “outside the brackets”, and self-determines only transcendental <...>But we are already talking about transcendental subject, and not about the empirical.
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Methodological problems of modern humanitarian knowledge. allowance
M.: FLINTA
IN textbook Some methodological problems that appeared in the humanities by the end of the 20th century are considered in connection with the crisis of classical rationality and the civilizational changes occurring in the world. The manual includes elements of a monographic study and is written on the basis of a course of lectures on the methodology of the humanities and on the history and philosophy of science, which the author read for a number of years at Tyumen state university. It represents a significant revision of the previously published manual “Logic and Methodology of Science. Modern humanitarian knowledge and its prospects.”
Transcendental reduction<...>methods: eidetic and transcendental reductions, closely related to each other, but giving different<...>The result of the reduction is transcendental the position of the researcher, allowing him to directly<...>The concept of reduction. Phenomenological reduction. Eidetic reduction. Transcendental reduction<...>methods: eidetic and transcendental reductions, closely related to each other, but giving different
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The article examines the views of the philosopher A. Reinach (1883-1917) from the perspective of a phenomenological approach to law. The conducted study of the views of A. Reinach allows us to detect the presence of scientific potential in the theory of a priori foundations of law, which can be realized with a creative rethinking of his ideas within the framework of the modern postclassical understanding of legal phenomena.
Reinach as transcendental phenomenology of law. This opinion is held, in particular, by M.V.<...>For transcendental phenomenology.<...>Husserl (Conrad Marcius, Geiger, Ingarden) did not accept the ideas transcendental phenomenology, but<...>Therefore, the whole course of A. Reinakh’s reasoning is an attempt to reduce not the entire life world, but only its<...>The incompleteness of phenomenological reduction leads A.
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Social heterology textbook. allowance
Ural University Publishing House
The textbook covers the principles and methods of heterology, its main methodological and theoretical problems, its heuristic possibilities for modern philosophy and science, and also substantiates the concept of differential sociality. The book is addressed to teachers, graduate students, students, as well as anyone interested in the problems of modern philosophy
transcendental field".<...>In this sense it is described as " transcendental field".<...>This is why the process of reduction or identification is never completed: the differences return and create<...>Of course, these three types of reduction are not constructivism, etc.).<...>Of course, these three types of reduction are not constructivism, etc.).
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The work is devoted to highlighting the principle of social existence, i.e. the principle of unity of participants in a certain community and forcing them to mutually maintain unity in various relationships/interactions. This approach, in the author’s opinion, allows not only to abandon the hopeless search for the “substance” of society, but also to streamline the subject area of the social in contrast to the phenomena of society and communication, political and economic areas, and linguistic communication
In other words, the social individual is called upon by the freedom of moral existence and in his transcendental experience<...>Taken in a purely symbolic form (taking into account eidetic reduction and removal of empirical conditionality),<...>In these word designations of the results of phenomenological reduction (we do not see here the naming,<...>This unity is the living present, unlike transcendental being, which in its purity is for<...>between internal and external, temporalization is both the power and the limit of phenomenological reduction
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M.: PROMEDIA
The article is devoted to the consideration of phenomenology as a methodological basis for the study of various aspects of everyday life. The author analyzes the concept of “life world” as one of the main concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl developed the idea of the "lifeworld", the world of our ordinary daily activities and common sense. At the same time, the unrecognized reality of the life world is the basis and matrix of any scientific activity. Phenomenology as a philosophical direction, having emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, fruitfully developed and became an interdisciplinary humanitarian methodology.
To transcendental to the world.<...>Thus, transcendental phenomenology is a description of the essential structures of the constitution of the world<...>V transcendental subjectivity.<...>in his article “Life World” writes: “In a phenomenological setting (thanks to phenomenological reduction<...>Reduction (epoch+), thanks to which the lifeworld becomes the subject of research, is carried out relatively
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No. 2 [Questions of Philosophy, 2017]
"Questions of Philosophy" is an academic scientific publication, the central philosophical journal in Russia. The magazine discusses the problems of the fate of Russian culture, issues of Russian mentality, the formation of civil society in Russia, general problems of the philosophy of history, political philosophy, philosophy of law.
Richir radicalizes Husserl's phenomenological reduction by introducing the “hyperbolic reduction”, which<...>Transcendental a field opened “as if” by reduction has the character of a simulation, since it is generated<...>simulacrum transcendental cogito, says Richir; let him transcendental <...>Concept “ transcendental visibility" (Schein) appears at the beginning of " Transcendental dialectics":<...>tongue out transcendental field provided by reduction.
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The article analyzes the transformation of metaphysics carried out in the works of M.K. Mamardashvili. It is noted that his philosophy is presented as philosophizing - spiritual knowledge. His understanding of Kant's transcendental philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology and M. Heidegger's existential-fundamental ontology is established. Mamardashvili’s metaphysics appears not as a doctrine of the world, but as a creative activity of transcendence that shapes a moral being.
Morality, Mamardashvili emphasizes, transcendental, because it does not exist as an established empirical fact<...>layers of the phenomenon that Husserl wanted to explore, and those that the latter “dropped off” as a result of reduction<...>Margvelashvili, the philosopher sought through the reduction of the individual “to reach the Absolute, to transcendental <...>As a result, don't we get some " transcendental Platonism." What is its specificity?<...>It is based on the ideas of Kant and Husserl, the philosophy transcendental and phenomenological.
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No. 2 [Questions of Philosophy, 2018]
"Questions of Philosophy" is an academic scientific publication, the central philosophical journal in Russia. The magazine discusses the problems of the fate of Russian culture, issues of Russian mentality, the formation of civil society in Russia, general problems of the philosophy of history, political philosophy, philosophy of law.
Even a phenomenologist transcendental directionality, since he himself is not transcendental subject,<...>In phenomenology - idea transcendentally-phenomenological reduction, an era whose task is to<...>methods, transcendental experience, ascending scale of analysis.<...>V transcendental phenomenology E.<...>reduction: everything plural in the content of consciousness is placed in brackets; after that the subject transcendental
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Michel Henry is an influential French phenomenologist, whose philosophy is still poorly represented and studied in Russia. This author is primarily known for his research on the phenomenology of life and affectivity, as well as his analysis of abstract painting. This article makes an attempt to substantiate the interconnectedness of the philosopher’s epistemological and aesthetic reflections. In particular, it is shown that the epistemological consequence of M. Henri’s project of non-intentional phenomenology is the aestheticization of meaning. The source of all meaning in Henri's philosophy is the ur-phenomenon of life, which is exclusively affective in nature. Intentional meaning-giving, described by Edmund Husserl, is not capable, from Henri’s point of view, of perceiving such affective meanings without distortion. As a result, the process of meaning-making inevitably moves into the affective realm. The thesis of the author of the article is that aesthetic experience becomes the most affectively filled experience, which allows us to establish a correspondence between internal experience and external expression. As a result, it is he who turns out to be the focus of meaning in Henri’s philosophical project. The first part of the article reveals the essence of Henri's non-intentional approach; According to this approach, the active conscious subject is replaced by a passive one affected by inner life. The second part gives a more detailed description of the ur-phenomenon of life, to which Henri assigns a key place in his philosophy. In the final part, the author turns to Henri’s aesthetic heritage and shows that aesthetic experience within the framework of Henri’s phenomenology turns out to be the most complete in terms of meaning.
Before him, phenomenology was traditionally considered " transcendental egology”, and in a positive way<...>Therefore, in order to discover the desired self-appearance of the phenomenon, Henri is looking for such a radical reduction that would<...>What does Henri discover as a result of such a reduction?<...>Thus, the art of painting gives Henri the same access to the phenomenon of life as radical reduction<...>The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.
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phenomenologists, like linguists, when analyzing consciousness, pay special attention to those acts that participate in the constitution of meaning. However, they consider language as a means of expressing logical content, i.e. in the context of his ability to be a bearer of predominantly ideal meanings. Nevertheless, there are still points of contact in the areas of research of cognitive linguists and phenomenologists. The role of phenomenology is that it is called upon to reveal and describe those invariant structures of consciousness that underlie cognitive, and therefore practical, human activity.
151 Scientific communications UDC 130.121 PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AND CONTENT CORE OF MEANING S. A.<...>To do this, you must first free yourself from the spatiotemporal space using the reduction method.<...>If we carry out a phenomenological reduction and abstract from specific and subjective components<...>Transcendental the solipsism on which intersubjectivity is based “prevented Husserl from understanding the true<...>IN transcendental phenomenology natural language never acquired the status of an independent object
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The article examines the historical and philosophical process of the formation of a new, social hermeneutics, its basic attitudes and concepts. The focus is on such trends that influenced the formation of social hermeneutics, such as American symbolic interactionism, the understanding sociology of M. Weber and the social phenomenology of A. Schutz and his followers. The fundamental differences between social hermeneutics and classical (textual) hermeneutics are revealed
Husserl, creator transcendental phenomenology.<...>"phenomenological reduction".<...>Husserl derives in the attitude of phenomenological reduction.<...>Husserl's idea of phenomenological reduction is necessary for A.<...>Schutz, can only be found in the installation of phenomenological reduction.
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The use of methods of analytical philosophy and phenomenology allows us to clarify the relationship between the subjective and objective in the ontological status of consciousness. However, the process of such clarification cannot be completed and leads to an endless regress on the path of improving concepts and interpreting the corresponding phenomena. This is due to the fact that phenomenology is essentially a first-person view, while analytic philosophy is a third-person view. This contradiction can only be resolved through synthesis.
The author addresses the problem of choice as a semantic interpretation of the content of the category of freedom. The work attempts to develop a new theoretical model of choice as a phenomenon: the search for the social ideal of choice in modern conditions and its implementation.
Husserl distinguished three types of reduction: psychological, eidetic and transcendental. <...>In this regard, Husserl explains that “after introducing the extended reduction, the reduction to phenomenologically<...>This is a personal (existential) choice that correlates with transcendental reduction, the purpose of which<...>Necessity transcendental problems and, accordingly, the transition to transcendentally-phenomenological<...>reduction is explained by the way of being of subjectivity, “I”.
Preview: The freedom we choose.pdf (0.6 Mb)47
Philosophy of studies. allowance
"The textbook, prepared by the staff of the Department of Philosophy of YarSU named after P. G. Demidov with the participation of scientists from other universities in Yaroslavl, outlines the most difficult to study and not clearly presented in the existing educational and educational publications topics of a systematic course in philosophy for universities . The authors make new semantic accents, offer their own, sometimes debatable, approaches to the disclosure of many traditional topics from different areas of the subject field of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, anthropology, philosophy of history, philosophy of culture. The educational publication is intended for students studying in all specialties (discipline " "Philosophy", block GSE), full-time and part-time forms of study. May be useful for philosophy teachers, graduate students, undergraduates of universities. "
The phenomenological setting is achieved using the reduction method, which includes: eidetic<...>its organization, abstention from any judgments about real being and consciousness, and transcendental reduction<...>That's exactly what it is transcendental scheme" (8; 123).<...>art and exact sciences prompted him to make broad generalizations and to discover the method of phenomenological reduction<...>The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.
Preview: Philosophy Study Guide.pdf (0.8 Mb)48
The book of the famous Hellenistic historian Paul Wen “Foucault: His Thought and Character” is considered, in which he positions M. Foucault as a skeptic.
“A piece of empirical research, a small fragment of history has the power to challenge transcendental <...>Skepticism is an imperative refusal to reduce differences, which at the same time guides the work on<...>the knowledge described by Foucault is neither a relationship of identity or identification (this would imply a reduction<...>cannot be unique, but its universal form, suggesting strict reduction and neutralization<...>"Kant's and Husserl's idea of transcendental Foucault contrasts the origin of thought
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Analysis of modern approaches to solving the problem of the split between two cultures (natural science and humanities) and building a unified science. The thesis is substantiated that the main obstacle to constructive progress in this direction is the continuing ambiguity with the question of the epistemological status and methodological role of reduction in scientific knowledge.
Nagel, reduction, reductionism. V.G. B o r z e n k o v.<...>developed by philosophers in line with empiricism, platonism, apriorism, etc., the most convincing is transcendental <...>Transcendental philosophy sets a certain framework within which all these results can be discussed.<...>Of course, it was clear to supporters of the reduction concept that the real process of reducing biology to physics<...>But from the history of physics we know that, nevertheless, such a reduction was successfully carried out.
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No. 5 [Philosophical Sciences, 2019]
The journal publishes articles by domestic and foreign experts in the field of history and philosophy of science, cultural studies, religious studies, political science, globalization, conflictology, philosophy of law, terrorism, philosophy of crime, philosophy of the unknown, psychology, virtual studies, esotericism, universal history, education, philosophy for children . The journal is included in the list of publications in which publications are required for the defense of dissertations. The journal is included in the Abstract Journal and in the databases of VINITI RAS. Information about the journal is published annually in the international reference system for periodicals and continuing publications “Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory”.
At the stage of phenomenological reduction, a methodological switch of focus occurs, excluding<...>Phenomenological reduction involves a shift in attention and “look” at one’s own experience.<...>If in transcendental phenomenology, reduction is understood in the described way, then in the analytical tradition<...>Thus, reduction can be considered as a reference procedure without reference to the conditions of content verification<...>Thus, phenomenological reduction in the semantic interpretation Copyright JSC Central Design Bureau BIBKOM
Preview: Philosophical Sciences No. 5 2019.pdf (1.4 Mb)It can be said that transcendental philosophy began with Descartes, and phenomenological psychology with Locke, Berkeley and Hume, although the latter appeared first not as a method or discipline serving the purposes of psychology, but as an attempt to solve the transcendental problem formulated by Descartes. The theme developed in the Metaphysical Meditations remained the dominant theme in the philosophy that arose from it. According to this philosophy, any reality and the world as a whole, which we perceive as existing, exists, one might say, only as the content of our own ideas, as something expressed in judgments or, better said, tested in the process of cognition. This impulse was sufficient for all the legitimate and illegitimate variants [of the transcendental problem] known to us (Ibid, S.287; the English translation speaks of transcendence - V.M.).
Descartes' doubt discovered, first of all, "transcendental subjectivity", the first conceptual treatment of which was his EGO COGITO. But the Cartesian transcendental "MENS" then became the "Reason of Man" which Locke undertook to study; Locke's study, in turn, turned out to be the psychology of inner experience. And because Locke believed that his psychology could cover the transcendental problems for which he began his research, he became the founder of a false psychological philosophy, which proved tenacious because no one examined the concept of “subjective” in its dual meaning. But if the transcendental problem is properly posed, then the ambiguity of the “subjective” becomes apparent, and it is established that phenomenological psychology deals with one of its meanings, while transcendental phenomenology deals with another.
This article focuses on phenomenological psychology, partly because it seems a convenient stepping stone to philosophy, and partly because it is closer to the everyday attitude than transcendental phenomenology. Psychology, within both the eidetic and empirical disciplines, is a "positive" science, with its "natural attitude" and the world as the basis from which it draws all its themes, while transcendental experience is difficult to realize because it is "ultimate" and "unworldly" experience. Phenomenological psychology, being relatively new and completely new to the extent that it uses intentional analysis, is open to any of the positive sciences. And all that is required of those who have learned its method is the constant use, in the strictest possible manner, of its formal mechanism of reduction and analysis for the discovery of transcendental phenomena.
However, there should be no doubt that transcendental phenomenology could be developed independently of any psychology. The discovery of the dual orientation of consciousness presupposes the implementation of both types of reduction. Psychological reduction does not go beyond the mental at the level of reality of the animal world, for psychology contributes to real existence, and even its eidetics is limited by the possibilities of real worlds. But the transcendental problem seeks to embrace the whole world with all the sciences in order to “cast doubt” on the whole. Descartes forced us to admit that the world “emerges” within us and from within shapes our inclinations and habits; definitely, the general meaning of the world and the specific meaning of its components is something that we are aware of in the process of perception, representation, sawing, evaluation of life, that is, something “constituted” "in this or that subjective genesis.
The world in its certainties, the world “in itself and for itself,” exists as it exists, regardless of whether I or anyone else happens to be aware of it. But when this common world “manifests” in the consciousness of humanity of “this” world, when it is connected with subjectivity, then its being and the way of its being acquires a new dimension, becoming completely understandable and “problematic”. This is where the transcendental problem arises; this “manifestation”, this “being-for-us-of-the-world”, which can only acquire its significance “subjectively”, what is it? We can call the world “internal” because it is related to consciousness, but how does this very “general” world, whose “immanent” being is as vague as the consciousness in which it exists, manage to appear before us in all its diversity? their "separate" aspects, the experiences of which assure us that the aspects also belong to an independent, self-existent world? This problem also affects any "ideal" world, of pure numbers, for example, the world of "truths in themselves." But not a single existence or mode of existence are not on the whole less intelligible than ourselves. Each in himself and in community, we, in whose consciousness the world finds its reality, being human beings, we ourselves belong to the world. Should we therefore relate ourselves to ourselves in order to find meaning and being, belonging to this world? Should we, calling ourselves on the psychological level people, subjects of mental life, be at the same time transcendental in relation to ourselves and to the whole world, be subjects of the transcendental life constituting the world? Mental subjectivity, such as “I” or “We,” in the everyday sense can be experienced as it is in itself during phenomenological-psychological reduction, and with eidetic consideration can become the basis for phenomenological psychology. However, transcendental subjectivity, which due to the paucity of language we can again call only “I myself”, “we ourselves”, cannot be discovered by the method of psychological or natural science, since it does not represent any part of the objective world, but belongs to the very subjective conscious life in which the world and all its contents are created for us,” “for me.”
As people existing in the world mentally and physically, we are “phenomena” for ourselves, part of what “we” constituted, particles of meanings created by “us”. The captured “I” and “We” presuppose the covered “I” and “We” in relation to which they are “present” (3).
Transcendental experience gives us direct access to this transcendental subjectivity. Just as with psychological experience, in order to achieve the purity of transcendental experience, reduction is required. Transcendental reduction can be considered as a continuation of the reduction of psychological experience. The universal now reaches the next stage. From now on, “bracketing” extends not only to the world, but also to the sphere of the “mental.” The psychologist reduces the habitual stable world to the subjectivity of the “soul,” which itself forms part of the world in which it lives (in the original German: “... the psychologist reduces the subjectivity that has a place in the world within the world that habitually means for him to purely spiritual subjectivity" (Ibid, S.293) - V.M.). The transcendental phenomenologist reduces psychologically already purified subjectivity to the transcendental, i.e. to that universal subjectivity that constitutes the world and the layer of “mental” in it.
I no longer survey my experiences, imaginations, psychological data that my psychological experience reveals: I am learning to explore transcendental experience. I no longer place my own existence within the sphere of my interest. My interest is now focused on the purely intentional life within which my actual psychological experience takes place. This step raises the transcendental problem (the problem of the meaning of the transcendental being correlated with consciousness (Ibid, S.289) to its actual level. We should recognize that being related to consciousness seems not only an actual property of our world, but from the point of view of eidetic necessity - a property of any comprehensible world. In fantasy we can vary our actual world as much as we like. We can transform it into any other world that we are able to imagine, but at the same time we will also be forced to modify ourselves, and we can modify ourselves into boundaries prescribed to us by the nature of subjectivity. Whatever world our imagination creates, it inevitably becomes the world that we can have in experience, confirm on the basis of the evidence of our theories and inhabit it, acting practically. The transcendental problem is the eidetic problem. My psychological experience, perception, imagination, etc. remain in form and content what they were, but I now consider them as “structures”, since I directly encounter the ultimate structures of consciousness.
Like any other meaningful problem, a transcendental problem presupposes an unquestionable basis in which all means for its solution must be contained. This basis here is nothing other than the subjectivity of the life of consciousness in general, in which the possible world is constituted as an actual one. On the other hand, it goes without saying that the fundamental requirement of the rational method is that it must not confuse this posited and unconditionally existing basis with what the transcendental problem calls into question in its universality. The sphere of this problematic is the region of transcendental naivety; it therefore grasps any possible world as a world simply taken in a natural attitude. In accordance with this, all positive sciences must be subjected to the transcendental era, as well as all their subject areas, and also, consequently, psychology and the entire totality of what is considered mental in psychology. We would find ourselves in the transcendental circle if we were looking for an answer to the transcendental question in psychology, whether empirical or eidetic-phenomenological. Subjectivity and consciousness - here we face the paradox of duality (the transcendental question returns us to this) - may not in fact be the same subjectivity and consciousness with which psychology deals (Ibid, S.291-292). Psychological reduction is replaced by transcendental one (4). [...The transcendental I and the transcendental community of the I, grasped in full concreteness, represent a transcendental parallel to the I and We in the ordinary and psychological sense, again concretely grasped as the soul or community of mental life (Seelengemeinschaft), together with the psychological life of consciousness (5). My transcendental Self is obviously “different” from the natural Self, but in no way is some second Self, to the Self, separated in the ordinary sense of the word, and vice versa, in the ordinary sense of the word, it is in no way connected with it or intertwined. Captured in full concreteness, this is precisely the field of one’s own transcendental experience (Selbsterfahrung), which each time through a simple change of attitude must pass into one’s own psychological experience. In this transition, the identity of the Self is necessarily established; in transcendental reflection on this transition, psychological objectification is revealed as self-objectification of the transcendental Self (6) and this is revealed in such a way as if apperception is required at every moment of the natural attitude (Ibid, S. 294). We must only realize: what makes the psychological and transcendental spheres of experience parallel, the “identity” of their significance, what distinguishes them is a change of attitude; Moreover, it is clear that psychological and transcendental phenomenology will also be parallel (7). When implementing a more strict era, psychological subjectivity is transformed into transcendental, and psychological intersubjectivity - into transcendental intersubjectivity. This latter is that specific fundamental principle, thanks to which everything that is transcended by consciousness, including any reality in the world, acquires the meaning of its existence. For every objective existence is already essentially “relative” and owes its nature to the unity of intention, which, being established according to transcendental laws, gives rise to consciousness with its character of faith and belief (8).
Phenomenological reduction- one of the central concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology, associated with the process of liberating consciousness from a naturalistic attitude. The origins of this practice can be found in Descartes' radical doubt. Phenomenological reduction literally means the reduction of things to phenomena and the exclusion of discussion of their real status. Husserl calls this transition from a natural attitude to a transcendental-phenomenological one the “Copernican revolution.”
Phenomenological reduction is carried out along with epoch - abstention from preliminary judgments about the real world.
“Phenomenological reduction” as a whole is a set of various reductions: phenomenological-psychological, eidetic And transcendental. Phenomenological-psychological and eidetic reduction allow us to make a turn from the perception of the world into natural installation to focus on the experiences of consciousness themselves, and then move from considering experiences in their individuality to considering their essences. Next, the transcendental reduction reveals pure consciousness: the empirical components of consciousness are bracketed, the existence of the empirical subject and the phenomena of his mental life cease to be the subject of attention. A noetic-noematic structure of consciousness is revealed.
Natural and phenomenological attitudes
Phenomenological-psychological reduction
By making a phenomenological-psychological reduction, we turn off the natural attitude: we, as it were, bracket the world, things in a natural attitude, refrain from judging their physical, “spatio-temporal existence here,” “from making a decision about the existence or non-existence of the world” - and we direct our gaze not at what is perceived, but at the perception itself (phenomenon, experience of consciousness). There is a reduction of the transcendental “to the purely mental”; “is not the [external] world or part of it, but the “meaning” of the world.” If in the natural attitude the intentional object, transcendental to the act, was realized, now attention is transferred to the act in which it appears. We do not live in intentional acts, we do not dissolve in them, but we reflect on them. Now “real existence” does not matter, that is, whether what is observed turns out to be a hallucination, illusion, etc. - the phenomenological composition of perception does not depend on this. We are considering the perception of the color red, and not the transcendental perceived color itself inherent in the real object.
In other words, we are performing a phenomenological era(epoché - abstinence from judgment, which is “combined with an unshakable or even unshakable - for obvious - conviction" in its truth). We do not reject the indication of the existence of a real thing inherent in the phenomenon (the experience of consciousness), but we only refrain from judging this and confine ourselves to the phenomenon itself, and we consider this indication as part of it.
I look at everything as if in a dream, in a daydream: there is no external space-time world, only experiences remain as facts of my consciousness, ““states” of such and such a human “I”, in the succession of which the identical mental properties of a person reveal themselves.” That is, I continue to exist as a concrete soul, an empirical subject, in whose consciousness concrete experiences causally connected with each other take place (as concrete facts, and not as entities) - although, as it were, in the absence of the external world, and therefore in absence of one's own body.
When carrying out phenomenological-psychological reduction, all sciences about nature, as well as sciences about the spirit (since they are all also based on a natural attitude), are subject to “switching off”.
Eidetic reduction
Eidetic reduction - purification of the phenomena of consciousness from factuality. Carrying out phenomenological-psychological reduction cleared phenomena from external reality, turning them into experiences of consciousness, but they remained facts consciousness, realities of consciousness. In the mode of eidetic reduction, “we can neglect the factual side of our phenomena and use them only as “examples”.” In other words, experiences of consciousness are taken not as given concrete phenomena existing at a given moment in time, but as such like timeless essence, “just as an example of a certain soil for ideation.” “Phenomenological reduction reveals the phenomena of truly internal experience; eidetic reduction - essential forms of the sphere of mental existence." “The typical feature of any mental fact becomes apparent.”
So, eidetic reduction is a transition when considering the experiences of consciousness from existence to essence, from facts to their essences (eidos), seen in ideation.
See also: Ideation (philosophy)Transcendental reduction
After the phenomenological-psychological reduction, which “turned off” the natural attitude, there is no longer an external world for us, we are limited by internal experience, the field of consciousness, it has become our “reality”. It is now necessary to make consciousness itself (cogito), its content, the subject of research: the amazing fact that I am aware of something, experiencing something, even regardless of whether some reality corresponds to these experiences. It is now necessary to do with consciousness itself (as the consciousness of an empirical subject) the same thing as previously with the natural external world. .
Phenomenological-psychological reduction, even together with the eidetic one, is still limited to the real world (as the semantic horizon of the “internal” experience of the subject, since the subject of mental life is still thought of as a part of this world). Transcendental reduction (alternative terms: transcendental-phenomenological reduction; transcendental epoché) raises the question of what consciousness and the real world, “manifesting” in consciousness, are in general. This question also covers the existence of any ideal world (the world of entities) and its “being-for-us”. Entities, although they are not part of reality perceived in a natural setting, are nevertheless just as alien, transcendental to the immediate composition of consciousness, as real things.
The facts of internal experience and the “psychological Self” remaining after the phenomenological-psychological reduction also turn out to be part of the world, transcendental in relation to the transcendental Self. Now we turn off not only the external world, but also the internal one, that is, empirical subjectivity.
“Transcendental reduction can be considered as a continuation of the reduction of psychological experience. The universal now reaches the next stage. From now on, “bracketing” extends not only to the world, but also to the sphere of the “mental.” The psychologist reduces the familiar, stable world to the subjectivity of the “soul,” which itself forms part of the world in which it lives. The transcendental phenomenologist reduces psychologically already purified subjectivity to the transcendental, that is, to that universal subjectivity that constitutes the world and the layer of “soul” in it.”
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Encyclopædia Britannica article]. §3
Transcendental reduction reveals not only “disembodied”, but also “soulless” consciousness, that is, not constituting the “empirical “I”-subject” in the same way as material experiences constitute intentional objects. Consciousness is now taken not as the mental experiences of a certain living being, “the components of a person’s mental life,” “the “states” of such and such a human “I,” in the succession of which the identical mental properties of a person express themselves,” but as “absolute,” “pure experiences ", "pure, or transcendental" (absolute, transcendentally pure) consciousness - consciousness in itself, completely cleared of reality. What remains is the “pure experience of the act” and the pure “I” - a transition occurs from empirical consciousness and the empirical “I” to pure consciousness And pure "I". Being transcendental ego and him cogitationes(taken, of course, as essences) - apodictic evidence, which could not be discovered before the transcendental reduction, since it is not part of the objective world. “Thus, in reality, the natural existence of the world - the one about which I only speak and can speak - is preceded as a more primary existence in itself by the existence of pure ego and him cogitationes. The natural soil of being is secondary in its existential significance; it always presupposes the transcendental.”
Thus, transcendental reduction reveals the noetic-noematic structure of consciousness. In place of the world perceived in the natural setting now - in pure consciousness - its meaning (noema) remains. “Transcendental reduction makes εποχή regarding reality - however, what it preserves from reality includes noemas with the noematic unity contained in them, and thereby the way in which the real is recognized and given in a specific sense in consciousness.”
Phenomenological reduction as a series of “switch-offs”
Carrying out phenomenological reduction, we “turn off” everything transcendental in relation to pure consciousness, with the exception of some entities and pure “I”.
Transcendent to consciousness:
Notes
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. P. 271.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Encyclopedia Britannica article]; Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 76.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. p. 164-165, 172.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. I, § 34.
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 38.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. § 23.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Article in the Encyclopedia Britannica]. § 2.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. M.: DIK, 2001. S. 51, 337, 372-373, 382, 384-385, Vv., § 1, 3; Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. § 31-33, 50, 54, 56-57, p. 196-199.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 202-203, 219.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 21-22.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. M.: DIK, 2001. P. 372-373.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. pp. 28-30.
- Husserl E. Logical Investigations. T. 2. Vv., § 1.
- Husserl E. Ideas I. § 33-34.
- Husserl E. Phenomenology: [Article in the Encyclopedia Britannica]. § 3.
- Husserl E. Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. T. 1. M.: DIK, 1999. P. 129, 162.
- Husserl E. Cartesian reflections. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2001. § 11, p. 91.
- So in the English text of the Encyclopedia Britannica. In him. in the original: “...the psychologist reduces the subjectivity that has a place in the world within the world that habitually means to him to purely mental subjectivity.” - Approx. transl.).