Ontological problems of modern science. Fundamentals of history and ontology of science At the same time, despite the significant achievements of modern sciences in constructing a scientific picture of the world, it fundamentally cannot explain many phenomena
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1. Subject, objectives and functions of the academic discipline “History and Ontology of Science”
Ontology - This is a branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental principles of existence. Ontology strives to rationally comprehend the integrity of nature, to comprehend everything that exists in unity and to build a rational picture of the world, replenishing the data of natural science and identifying the internal principles of the interconnection of things.
Subject of ontology: The main subject of ontology is existence; being, which is defined as the completeness and unity of all types of reality: objective, physical, subjective, social and virtual:
1.Reality from the position of idealism is traditionally divided into matter (material world) and spirit ( spiritual world, including the concepts of soul and God). From the position of materialism, it is divided into inert, living and social matter;
2. Being means God. Man, as a being, has freedom and will.
Taskontologies precisely consists in making a clear distinction between what really exists and what should be considered only as a concept used for the purpose of knowing reality, but to which nothing corresponds in reality itself. In this respect, ontological entities and structures are radically different from the ideal objects introduced within scientific disciplines, to which, according to currently generally accepted views, no real existence is attributed.
Ontological function implies the ability of philosophy to describe the world using such categories as “being”, “matter”, “development”, “necessity and chance”.
2. Science and philosophy. Ontological problems of science
Science and philosophy- are independent, but very closely interconnected forms of human knowledge of the world.
Science and philosophy mutually nourish and enrich each other, but at the same time perform different functions. Philosophy is an independent form of worldview, i.e. generalized views of the world and people in this world. Science constitutes the most important part of a person’s spiritual life and enriches philosophy with new knowledge and helps, in one way or another, to actually substantiate this or that theory.
On the one hand, philosophy, unlike science, studies not specific objects, including man, but how these objects are perceived by man and form part of his existence. Philosophy tries to answer worldview questions, i.e. the most general questions of existence and the possibility of its knowledge, the value of existence for man. Science is always concrete and has a clearly defined object of study, be it physics, chemistry, psychology or sociology.
For any science, a mandatory requirement for research is objectivity, understood in the sense that the research process should not be influenced by the scientist’s experiences, personal beliefs, or idea of the value of the result for a person. On the contrary, philosophy is always concerned with questions about the significance (value) of acquired knowledge for a person.
Philosophy and science are related by the presence of cognitive functions. However, philosophy tries to know “is the world knowable” and “what is it like as a whole?”, and science studies specific objects and phenomena of living and inanimate nature.
Ontological problems of science:
A generalization of private scientific studies of the world around humans allows us to conclude that both natural and social systems exist in interconnections. The historical evolution of our planet over the billions of years of its existence has determined three large subsystems in its structure:
Abiotic (inanimate nature), based on mechanical, physical and chemical interactions;
Biotic systems (wildlife), represented by many types of plant and animal forms, based on genetic patterns;
Social systems (human society) based on the sociocultural inheritance of human experience.
Firstly, it doesn’t exist yet scientific evidence both theological and cosmological concepts of the origin of the planet and human life. These concepts remain in a state of hypotheses. The evolutionary approach, based on natural science, is preferred and shared by most scientists.
Secondly, apart from those subsystems mentioned above, nothing has yet been discovered in the universe. Hypotheses about extraterrestrial civilizations, UFOs, etc. scientific data are not confirmed.
Thirdly, between the named three subsystems there is an evolutionary determination, expressed by the dialectical law of the sublation by higher forms of lower ones:
The patterns of abiotic systems are contained in a sublated form in biotic ones;
The laws of biotic systems are contained in a sublated form in social systems.
From a philosophical point of view, this process of increase from lower to higher can and should be traced across all universal categories: law-conforming interaction in inanimate systems - gene-conforming interaction in living systems - expedient interaction in social systems; interaction - life - activity; physical time - biological time - social time; geometric space - ecological space - social space; body - organism - person; elementary reflection - psyche - consciousness, etc.
This interpretation of the universe with its three subsystems allows us to understand the cardinality of two eternal problems of science:
1) the origin of life (?transition from abiotic systems to biotic);
2) the origin of man (the transition from biotic systems to social ones).
The importance of such an understanding of the universe for the sciences is that on this basis a typology of its units, interdisciplinary complexes is possible: natural sciences about inanimate and living nature; technical sciences as a reflection of the interaction of social systems with natural ones; social sciences as the study of social systems; humanities as a doctrine about a person who knows, evaluates, and transforms the natural, technical and social world.
3. Science as a system of knowledge and how social institution
Science as a system of knowledge is a holistic, developing unity of all its constituent elements (scientific facts, concepts, hypotheses, theories, laws, principles, etc.), and is the result of creative, scientific activity. This system of knowledge is constantly updated thanks to the activities of scientists; it consists of many branches of knowledge (special sciences), which differ from each other in what aspect of reality, the form of movement of matter they study. According to the subject and method of cognition, one can distinguish the sciences of nature - natural science, society - social sciences (humanities, social sciences), knowledge, thinking (logic, epistemology, etc.). Separate groups are made up of technical sciences and mathematics. Each group of sciences has its own internal division.
Science as a system of knowledge meets the criteria of objectivity, adequacy, truth, and tries to ensure autonomy and be neutral in relation to ideological and political priorities. Scientific knowledge, penetrating deeply into everyday life, constituting an essential basis for the formation of people’s consciousness and worldview, has become an integral component of the social environment in which the formation and formation of personality takes place.
The main problem of science as a knowledge system is the identification and explication of those features that are necessary and sufficient to distinguish scientific knowledge from the results of other types of knowledge.
Signs of scientific knowledge
Certainty,
Objectivity
Accuracy
Unambiguity
Systematicity,
Logical and/or empirical validity,
Openness to criticism.
Utility
Verifiability
Conceptual and linguistic expressibility.
Science emerged as a social institution in the 17th century. in Western Europe. The decisive reasons for science acquiring the status of a social institution were: the emergence of disciplinary organized science, the growth in the scale and organization of the practical use of scientific knowledge in production; the formation of scientific schools and the emergence of scientific authorities; the need for systematic training of scientific personnel, the emergence of the profession of a scientist; transformation of scientific activity into a factor of social progress, into a constant condition of social life; education regarding the independent sphere of organization of scientific work.
Science as a social institution, an organization with a specific division of labor, specialization, the presence of means of regulation and control, etc. Let us note that today science is a complex, powerful system of scientific institutions (educational, academic, applied), as well as scientific industries, uniting an army of five million the international scientific community (for comparison, we note that at the beginning of the 18th century there were no more than 15 thousand people throughout the world whose activities could be classified as scientific).
Science as a social institution also includes, first of all, scientists with their knowledge, qualifications and experience; division and cooperation of scientific work; a well-established and effectively operating system of scientific information; scientific organizations and institutions, scientific schools and communities; experimental and laboratory equipment, etc., represents a certain system of relationships between scientific organizations, members of the scientific community, a system of norms and values. However, the fact that science is an institution in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of people have found their profession is the result of recent development.
4. The role of science in the history of society
Since the Renaissance, science, pushing religion into the background, has taken a leading position in the worldview of mankind. If in the past, only church hierarchs could make certain ideological judgments, then, subsequently, this role entirely passed to the community of scientists. The scientific community dictated rules to society in almost all areas of life; science was the highest authority and criterion of truth. For several centuries, the leading, basic activity cementing various professional areas of human activity was science. It was science that was the most important, basic institution, since it formed a unified picture of the world and general theories, and in relation to this picture, particular theories and corresponding subject areas of professional activities in social practice were distinguished. In the 19th century, the relationship between science and production began to change. The emergence of such an important function of science as the direct productive force of society was first noted by K. Marx in the middle of the last century, when the synthesis of science, technology and production was not so much a reality as a prospect. Of course, scientific knowledge even then was not isolated from rapidly developing technology, but the connection between them was one-sided: some problems that arose during the development of technology became the subject of scientific research and even gave rise to new scientific disciplines. An example is the creation of classical thermodynamics, which generalized the rich experience of using steam engines. Over time, industrialists and scientists saw in science a powerful catalyst for the process of continuous improvement of production. Awareness of this fact dramatically changed the attitude towards science and was an essential prerequisite for its decisive turn towards practice. The 20th century was the century of a victorious scientific revolution. Gradually, there was an increasing increase in the knowledge intensity of products. Technology was changing production methods. By the middle of the 20th century, the factory method of production became dominant. In the second half of the 20th century, automation became widespread. By the end of the 20th century, high technologies developed and the transition to an information economy continued. All this happened thanks to the development of science and technology. This had several consequences. Firstly, demands on employees have increased. They began to be required to have greater knowledge, as well as an understanding of new technological processes. Secondly, the share of mental workers and scientists has increased, that is, people whose work requires deep scientific knowledge. Thirdly, the growth in well-being caused by scientific and technical progress and the solution of many pressing problems of society gave rise to the faith of the broad masses in the ability of science to solve the problems of mankind and improve the quality of life. This new faith was reflected in many areas of culture and social thought. Such achievements as space exploration, the creation of nuclear energy, the first successes in the field of robotics gave rise to the belief in the inevitability of scientific, technological and social progress, and raised the hope of a quick solution to such problems as hunger, disease, etc. And today we can say, that science in modern society plays an important role in many sectors and spheres of people’s lives. Undoubtedly, the level of development of science can serve as one of the main indicators of the development of society, and it is also, undoubtedly, an indicator of the economic, cultural, civilized, educated, modern development of the state. The functions of science as a social force in solving are very important global problems modernity. An example here is environmental issues. As is known, rapid scientific and technological progress is one of the main causes of such dangerous phenomena for society and people as the depletion of the planet’s natural resources, air, water, and soil pollution. Consequently, science is one of the factors in those radical and far from harmless changes that are taking place today in the human environment. The scientists themselves do not hide this. Scientific data also plays a leading role in determining the scale and parameters of environmental hazards. The growing role of science in public life has given rise to its special status in modern culture and new features of its interaction with various layers of public consciousness. In this regard, the problem of the characteristics of scientific knowledge and its relationship with other forms is acutely raised. cognitive activity(art, everyday consciousness, etc.). This problem, being philosophical in nature, at the same time has great practical significance. Understanding the specifics of science is a necessary prerequisite for the introduction of scientific methods in the management of cultural processes. It is also necessary for constructing a theory of management of science itself in the conditions of scientific and technological revolution, since elucidation of the laws of scientific knowledge requires an analysis of its social conditionality and its interaction with various phenomena of spiritual and material culture.
5. Pre-classical picture of the world (ancient eastern, ancient, medieval)
Philosophical picture of the world of the Middle Ages
The conventional countdown of the Middle Ages begins from the post-Apostle period (approximately the 2nd century) and ends with the formation of the Renaissance culture (approximately the 14th century). The beginning of the formation of the medieval picture of the world, therefore, coincides with the end, the decline of antiquity. The proximity and accessibility (texts) of Greco-Roman culture left their mark on the formation of a new picture of the world, despite its generally religious nature. The religious attitude towards the world is dominant in the consciousness of medieval man. Religion, represented by the church, determines all aspects of human life, all forms of the spiritual existence of society.
The philosophical picture of the world of the medieval era is theocentric. The main concept, or rather the figure with which a person relates himself, is God (and not the cosmos, as in antiquity), who is one (consubstantial) and has absolute power, unlike the ancient gods. The ancient logos that ruled the cosmos finds its embodiment in God and is expressed in His Word, through which God created the world. Philosophy is assigned the role of the handmaiden of theology: providing the Word of God, it must serve the “cause of faith”, comprehending the divine and created being - strengthen the feelings of believers with reasonable arguments.
The philosophical picture of the world of the era under consideration is unique and radically different from the previous time along several semantic axes: it offers a new understanding of the world, man, history and knowledge.
Everything that exists in the world exists by the will and power of God. Whether God continues to create the world (theism) or, having laid the foundation for creation, he stopped interfering in natural processes (deism) is a controversial question even today. In any case, God is the creator of the world (creationism) and is always capable of interfering with the natural course of events, changing them and even destroying the world, as it already happened once (the global flood). The model of the development of the world has ceased to be cyclical (antiquity), now it is deployed in a straight line: everything and everyone moves towards a certain goal, towards a certain completion, but man is not able to fully comprehend the divine plan (providentialism).
In relation to God himself, the concept of time is not applicable; the latter measures human existence and the existence of the world, that is, created existence. God abides in eternity. Man has this concept, but cannot conceive it, due to the finitude and limitations of his own mind and his own existence. Only by being involved in God does a person become involved in eternity; only thanks to God is he able to gain immortality.
If the Greek did not think of anything beyond the cosmos, which was absolute and perfect for him, then for the medieval consciousness the world seemed to decrease in size, “end”, lost before the infinity, power and perfection of divine existence. We can say this: there is a division (doubling) of the world - into the divine and created world. Both worlds are characterized by order, at the top of which stands God, in contrast to the ancient cosmos, which was ordered, as it were, from the inside by logos. Each thing and each creature, according to its rank, occupies a certain place in the hierarchy of created being (in the ancient cosmos, all things in this sense are relatively equal). The higher their position on the ladder of the world, the closer, accordingly, they are to God. Man occupies the highest level, because he is created in the image and likeness of God, called to rule over the earth2. The meaning of the divine image and likeness is interpreted differently, this is how S.S. Khoruzhy writes about it: “The image of God in man is considered as... a static, essential concept: it is usually seen in certain immanent signs, features of the nature and composition of man - elements of the trinity structure, reason, immortality of the soul... Similarity is considered as a dynamic principle: the ability and calling of a person to become like God, which a person, unlike an image, may not realize or lose.”
Philosophical picture of the world of antiquity
The time of the appearance of the first philosophical teachings within the framework of antiquity is approximately the 6th century. BC e. From this moment, in fact, the picture of the world of the era that interests us begins to form. Its conditional completion was in 529, when by decree of Emperor Justinian all pagan philosophical schools in Athens were closed. Thus, the philosophical picture of the world of antiquity was formed and existed over a very long time - almost thousands of years of Greco-Roman history.
At its core, it is cosmocentric. This does not mean that the Hellenes loved looking at the starry sky more than anything else in the world. Although Thales (6th century BC), who is traditionally called the first Greek philosopher, was once so carried away by this activity that he did not notice the well and fell into it. The maid who saw this made him laugh: they say, you want to know what’s in the sky, but you don’t notice what’s under your feet! Her reproach was unfair, because Greek philosophers did not just look at the celestial sphere, they sought to comprehend the harmony and order inherent in it, in their opinion. Moreover, they called space not only planets and stars, space for them was the whole world, including the sky, man, and society; more precisely, space is the world interpreted in terms of order and organization. Space, as an ordered and structurally organized world, is opposed to Chaos. It was in this meaning that the concept of “cosmos” was introduced into the philosophical language by Heraclitus (6th century BC).
Pythagoras, the author of the term “cosmos” in the modern sense, formulated the doctrine of the divine role of numbers that govern the universe. He proposed a pyrocentric system of the world, according to which the Sun and planets revolve around a central fire to the music of the celestial spheres.
The pinnacle of scientific achievements of antiquity was the teaching of Aristotle. The system of the universe, according to Aristotle, is based on the essentialist concept of knowledge (essentie in Latin means “essence”), and the method used is axiomatic-deductive. According to this concept, direct experience allows us to cognize the particular, and the universal is deduced from it in a speculative way (with the help of the “eyes of the mind”). According to Aristotle, behind the changing appearance of the cosmos lies a hierarchy of universals, entities about which a person can obtain reliable knowledge. The goal of natural philosophy is precisely the knowledge of essences, and the instrument of knowledge is reason.
What is the guarantee (condition) of universal order and harmony? Within the framework of the ancient mythological picture of the world, the gods took on this role; they maintained a certain order in the world and did not allow it to turn into chaos. Within the framework of the philosophical picture of the world, the condition for universal order is the logos, immanently (internally) inherent in the cosmos. Logos is a certain impersonal principle of the organization of the world. Being the law of existence, it is eternal, universal and necessary. A world without logos is chaos. Logos reigns over things and inside them, he is the true ruler of the cosmos and the rational soul of things (Heraclitus). Therefore, we can say that the ancient picture of the world is not only cosmocentric, but also logocentric.
The Greeks did not separate themselves from the cosmic world and did not oppose themselves to it; on the contrary, they felt their inseparable unity with the world. They called the entire world around them macrocosmos, and themselves microcosmos. Man, being a small cosmos, is a reflection of the big cosmos, or rather a part of it, which contains the entire cosmos in a removed, reduced form. The nature of man is the same as the nature of the cosmos. His soul is also reasonable, everyone carries within himself a small logos (a particle of the large logos), in accordance with which he organizes his own life. Thanks to the logos-mind in himself, a person can correctly perceive the world. Hence the two paths of knowledge that the ancient Greeks spoke about: the path of reason and the path of feelings. But only the first is reliable (true), only by moving first can you get closer to the secrets of the universe.
The cosmos, finally, for the Greeks is a large animate body that moves, changes, develops and even dies (like any body), but then is reborn again, because it is eternal and absolute. “This cosmos, the same for everyone, was not created by any of the Gods, nor by any of the people, but it has always been, is and will be an eternally living fire, gradually kindling and gradually dying out,” said Heraclitus.
6. The formation of a classical picture of the world
Becoming classical scientific picture world is associated with the names of four great scientists of the New Age: Nicolaus Copernicus (1473--1543), Johannes Kepler (1571--1630), Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton (1642-- 1727). We owe to Copernicus the creation of the heliocentric system, which revolutionized our understanding of the structure of the Universe. Kepler discovered the basic laws of motion of celestial bodies. Galileo was not only the founder of experimental physics, but also made a huge contribution to the creation of theoretical physics (the principle of inertia, the principle of relativity of motion and addition of velocities, etc.), especially in its modern form - mathematical physics. In turn, this allowed Isaac Newton to give physics a complete form of the system of classical mechanics and construct the first holistic (Newtonian) picture of the world known in science. Newton's other major contribution to science was the creation of the foundations of mathematical analysis, which is the foundation of modern mathematics.
Let us define the main features of the classical scientific picture of the world.
1. The position on the absolute nature and independence of space and time from each other. Space can be imagined as an infinite extension, where there are no preferred directions (isotropy of space) and whose properties are the same and unchanged at any point in the Universe. Time is also the same for the entire Cosmos and does not depend on the location, speed or mass of material bodies moving in space. For example, if we synchronize several clock mechanisms and place them at different points in the Universe, then the speed of the clock will not be disrupted, and the synchronism of their readings will remain after any period of time. From this point of view, the Universe can be imagined as an absolutely empty space filled with moving bodies (stars, planets, comets, etc.), the trajectory of which can be described using the well-known equations of classical, or Newtonian, mechanics.
2. The idea of a strict one-to-one relationship between cause and effect: if in some coordinate system the position and vector of motion of a body (i.e. its speed and direction) are known, then it is always possible to unambiguously predict its position after any finite period of time ( delta g). Since all phenomena in the world are interconnected by relationships of cause and effect, this is true for any phenomenon. If we cannot unambiguously predict an event, it is only because we do not have sufficient information about its connections with all other phenomena and influencing factors. Consequently, chance appears here as a purely external, subjective expression of our inability to take into account all the diversity of connections between phenomena.
3. The extension of the laws of Newtonian mechanics to the entire diversity of phenomena in the surrounding world, undoubtedly associated with the successes of natural science, primarily with the physics of that time, gave the worldview of the era the features of a kind of mechanism, a simplified understanding of phenomena through the prism of exclusively mechanical movement.
Let us note two curious and important circumstances for further discussion related to the mechanism of the classical scientific picture of the world.
1) The first concerns ideas about the sources of movement and development of the Universe. Newton's first law states that every body remains in a state of rest or uniform linear motion until it is acted upon by an external force. Consequently, in order for the Universe to exist and celestial bodies to be in motion, an external influence is necessary - a first impulse. It is he who sets in motion the entire complex mechanism of the Universe, which continues to exist and develop due to the law of inertia. Such a first impulse can be carried out by its Creator, which leads to the recognition of God. But, on the other hand, this logic reduces the role of the Creator only to the initial phase of the emergence of the Universe, and existing existence does not seem to need it. Such a dual worldview position, which opened the way to outright atheism and spread in Europe on the eve of the Great French Revolution, was called deism (from the Latin yesh - god). However, a few years later, the great Laplace, presenting his work “Treatise on Celestial Mechanics” to Emperor Napoleon, to Bonaparte’s remark that he does not see any mention of the Creator in the work, boldly replies: “Sire, I do not need this hypothesis.”
2) The second circumstance is related to understanding the role of the observer. The ideal of classical science is the requirement of objectivity of observation, which should not depend on the subjective characteristics of the observer: under the same conditions, an experiment should give the same results.
So, the classical scientific picture of the world, which existed until the end of the 19th century, is characterized by the quantitative stage of the development of science, the accumulation and systematization of facts. It was a linear, or cumulative, accumulative growth of scientific knowledge. Its further development, the creation of thermodynamics and the theory of evolution contributed to the understanding of the world not as a collection of objects or bodies moving in absolute space-time, but as a complex hierarchy of interconnected events - systems in the process of formation and development.
7. Formation of a non-classical picture of the world
The scientific picture of the world is historical; it is based on the achievements of science of a particular era within the limits of the knowledge that humanity has. The scientific picture of the world is a synthesis of scientific knowledge corresponding to the specific historical period of human development.
The concept of “picture of the world,” accepted in philosophy, means a visible portrait of the universe, a figurative and conceptual description of the Universe.
Non-classical picture of the world (late 19th century - 60s of the 20th century)
Sources: thermodynamics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Big Bang hypothesis, Mandelbrot's fractal geometry.
Representatives: M. Planck, E. Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Louis de Broglie, W. Pauli, E. Schrödinger, W. Heisenberg, A. Einstein, P. Dirac, A.A. Friedman et al.
Basic model: the development of the system is directed, but its state at each moment in time is determined only statistically.
The object of science is not reality “in its pure form,” but a certain slice of it, defined through the prism of accepted theoretical and operational means and methods of mastering it by the subject (i.e., adding a person + tools + social situation). Individual slices of reality are irreducible to each other. It is not unchangeable things that are studied, but the conditions under which they behave in one way or another.
The non-classical picture of the world, which replaced the classical one, was born under the influence of the first theories of thermodynamics, challenging the universality of the laws of classical mechanics. The transition to non-classical thinking was carried out during the revolution in natural science at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, including under the influence of the theory of relativity.
In the non-classical picture of the world, a more flexible scheme of determination arises, and the role of chance is taken into account. The development of the system is thought to be directed, but its state at each moment of time cannot be accurately determined. A new form of determination entered the theory called “statistical regularity.” Non-classical consciousness constantly felt its extreme dependence on social circumstances and at the same time harbored hopes of participating in the formation of a “constellation” of possibilities.
Non-classical picture of the world.
Einstein's Revolution Period: turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. Discoveries: the complex structure of the atom, the phenomenon of radioactivity, the discrete nature of electromagnetic radiation.
Major changes: - the most important premise of the mechanistic picture of the world was undermined - the conviction that with the help of simple forces acting between unchanging objects, all natural phenomena can be explained
- A. Einstein’s special theory of relativity (STR) came into conflict with Newton’s theory of gravity. In Einstein's theory, gravity is not a force, but a manifestation of the curvature of space-time.
According to the theory of relativity, space and time are relative - the results of measuring length and time depend on whether the observer is moving or not.
The world is much more diverse and complex than it seemed to mechanistic science.
Human consciousness is initially included in our very perception of reality. This should be understood this way: the world is like this because we look at it, and changes in us, in our self-awareness, change the picture of the world.
A “purely objective” description of the picture of the world is impossible. A reductionist approach is taking over. Quantum approach - the world cannot be explained only as the sum of its component parts. The macrocosm and microcosm are closely connected. Measuring instruments occupy an important place in the process of cognition.
8. Modern post-non-classical picture of the world
Post-non-classical picture of the world (70s of the XX century - our time).
Sources: synergetics by Hermann Haken (Germany), theory of dissipative structures by Ilya Prigogine (Belgium) and catastrophe theory by Thomas Rene (France). The author of the concept is academician V. S. Stepin
Metaphor: the world is organized chaos = irregular movement with non-periodically repeating, unstable trajectories. Graphic image: tree-like branching graphics.
Basic model: the world is a superposition of open nonlinear systems in which the role of initial conditions, the individuals included in them, local changes and random factors is great. From the very beginning and to any given point in time, the future of each system remains uncertain. Its development can go in one of several directions, which is most often determined by some minor factor. Only a small energy impact, the so-called “injection,” is enough for the system to restructure itself (bifurcation occurs) and a new level of organization arises.
Object of science: the system being studied + the researcher + his tools + the goals of the learning subject.
V.S. Stepin identified the following features of the post-non-classical stage:
revolution in the means of obtaining and storing knowledge (computerization of science, merging science with industrial production, etc.);
dissemination of interdisciplinary research and integrated research programs;
increasing the importance of economic and socio-political factors and goals;
changing the object itself - open self-developing systems;
inclusion of axiological factors in explanatory sentences;
the use of humanities methods in natural science;
transition from static, structure-oriented thinking to dynamic, process-oriented thinking.
Post-non-classical science studies not only complex, complexly organized systems, but also super-complex systems that are open and capable of self-organization. “Human-sized” complexes, an integral component of which, also become the object of science
is a person (global environmental, biotechnological, biomedical, etc.). The attention of science switches from repeatable and regular phenomena to “deviations” of all kinds, to secondary and disordered phenomena, the study of which leads to extremely important conclusions.
As a result of the study of various complexly organized systems capable of self-organization (from physics and biology to economics and sociology), a new - nonlinear - thinking, a new “picture of the world” is emerging. Its main characteristics are nonequilibrium, instability, irreversibility. Already a superficial glance allows us to see the connection between the post-non-classical picture of the world and the ideology of postmodernism.
The problem of the correlation between postmodernism and modern science was posed by J.-F. Lyotard (Lyotard J.-F. 1979). Indeed, postmodern social theory uses the categories of uncertainty, nonlinearity, and multivariance. It substantiates the pluralistic nature of the world and its inevitable consequence - the ambivalence and contingency of human existence. The post-non-classical picture of the world and, in particular, synergetics provides a kind of “natural science” justification for the ideas of postmodernism.
At the same time, despite the significant achievements of modern sciences in constructing a scientific picture of the world, it fundamentally cannot explain many phenomena:
explain gravity, the emergence of life, the emergence of consciousness, create a unified field theory
to find a satisfactory justification for the mass of parapsychological or bioenergy-informational interactions that are no longer declared fiction and nonsense.
It turned out that it is impossible to explain the emergence of life and intelligence by a random combination of events, interactions and elements; such a hypothesis is prohibited by the theory of probability. There is not enough degree of enumeration of options for the period of the Earth's existence.
9. Scientific revolutions in the history of science
A scientific revolution is a form of resolving the multifaceted contradiction between old and new knowledge in science, fundamental changes in the content of scientific knowledge at a certain stage of its development. In the course of scientific revolutions, there is a qualitative transformation of the fundamental foundations of science, the replacement of old theories by new ones, a significant deepening of the scientific understanding of the world around us in the form of the formation of a new scientific picture of the world.
Scientific revolutions in the history of science
In the middle of the 20th century. historical analysis of science began to be based on the ideas of discontinuity, singularity, uniqueness, and revolutionism.
A. Cairo is considered one of the pioneers of introducing these ideas into the historical study of science. So, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. he views it as a time of fundamental revolutionary transformations in the history of scientific thought. Koyré showed that a scientific revolution is a transition from one scientific theory to another, during which not only the speed, but also the direction of the development of science changes.
Model proposed T. Kuhn. The central concept of his model was the concept of “paradigm”, i.e. universally recognized scientific achievements that, over a period of time, provide the scientific community with a model for posing problems and their solutions. The development of scientific knowledge within a certain paradigm is called “normal science”. After a certain point, the paradigm ceases to satisfy the scientific community, and then it is replaced by another - a scientific revolution occurs. According to Kuhn, the choice of a new paradigm is a random event, since there are several possible directions for the development of science, and which one will be chosen is a matter of chance. Moreover, he compared the transition from one scientific paradigm to another with the conversion of people to a new faith: in both cases, the world of familiar objects appears in a completely different light as a result of a revision of the original explanatory principles. Scientific activity in inter-revolutionary periods excludes elements of creativity, and creativity is brought to the periphery of science or beyond its limits. Kuhn views scientific creativity as bright, exceptional, rare outbreaks that determine all subsequent development of science, during which previously acquired knowledge in the form of a paradigm is substantiated, expanded, and confirmed.
In accordance with Kuhn's concept, the new paradigm is established in the structure of scientific knowledge by subsequent work in its vein. An indicative example of this type of development is the theory of C. Ptolemy about the movement of planets around a stationary Earth, which made it possible to pre-calculate their position in the sky. To explain the newly discovered facts in this theory, the number of epicycles constantly increased, as a result of which the theory became extremely cumbersome and complex, which ultimately led to its abandonment and the adoption of the theory of N. Copernicus.
Another model for the development of science is called “methodology of research programs” by I. Lakatos. According to Lakatos, the development of science is determined by the constant competition of research programs. The programs themselves have a certain structure. First, the “hard core” of the program, which includes starting points that are irrefutable for supporters of this program. Secondly, “negative heuristics”, which is, in fact, a “protective belt” of the program core and consists of auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions that remove contradictions with facts that do not fit into the framework of the provisions of the hard core. Within the framework of this part of the program, an auxiliary theory or law is constructed that could make it possible to move from it to the representations of the hard core, and the provisions of the hard core itself are questioned last. Thirdly, “positive heuristics”, which are rules indicating which path should be chosen and how to follow it, so that the research program develops and becomes the most universal. It is positive heuristics that give stability to the development of science. When it is exhausted, the program changes, i.e. scientific revolution. In this regard, two stages are distinguished in any program: at first, the program is progressive, its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, and the program predicts new facts with a sufficient degree of probability; in later stages the program becomes regressive, its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, and it can explain either random discoveries or facts that were discovered by a competing program. Consequently, the main source of development is the competition of research programs, which ensures the continuous growth of scientific knowledge.
Lakatos, unlike Kuhn, does not believe that the scientific research program that emerged during the revolution is complete and fully formed. Another difference between these concepts is the following. According to Kuhn, more and more confirmation of the paradigm, obtained in the course of solving successive puzzle problems, strengthens the unconditional faith in the paradigm - the faith on which all normal activities of members of the scientific community rest.
K. Popper proposed the concept of permanent revolution. According to his ideas, any theory is sooner or later falsified, i.e. There are facts that completely refute it. As a result of this, new problems appear, and the movement from one problem to another determines the progress of science.
According to M.A. Rozov, there are three types of scientific revolutions: 1) construction of new fundamental theories. This type, strictly speaking, coincides with Kuhn's scientific revolutions; 2) scientific revolutions caused by the introduction of new research methods, for example, the emergence of a microscope in biology, optical and radio telescopes in astronomy, isotope methods for determining age in geology, etc.; 3) discovery of new “worlds”. This type of revolution is associated with the Great Geographical Discoveries, the discovery of the worlds of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms, molecules, elementary particles, etc.
By the end of the 20th century. the idea of scientific revolutions has been greatly transformed. Gradually they stop considering the destructive function of the scientific revolution. The most important is the creative function, the emergence of new knowledge without destroying the old. It is assumed that past knowledge does not lose its originality and is not absorbed by current knowledge.
10. Science as a type of spiritual activity. Structure of cognitive activity
Science is usually called a theoretical, systematized idea of the world, reproducing its essential aspects in an abstract logical form and based on scientific research data. Science performs the most important social functions:
1. Cognitive, consisting of an empirical description and rational explanation of the structure of the world and the laws of its development.
2. Worldview, which allows a person, using special methods, to build an integral system of knowledge about the world, to consider the phenomena of the surrounding world in their unity and diversity.
3. Prognostic, which allows a person, with the help of science, not only to explain and change the world around him, but also to predict the consequences of these changes.
The goal of science is to obtain true knowledge about the world. The highest form of scientific knowledge is scientific theory. One can name many theories that have changed man's understanding of the world: Copernicus's theory, Newton's theory of universal gravitation, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity. Such theories form a scientific picture of the world, which becomes part of the worldview of people of an entire era. To build theories, scientists rely on experiment. Rigorous experimental science received particular development in modern times (starting from the 18th century). Modern civilization relies heavily on the achievements and practical applications of science.
Cognitive activity is carried out through gnostic actions, which are divided into two classes: external and internal. External gnostic actions are aimed at cognition of objects and phenomena that directly affect the senses. These actions are carried out in the process of interaction of the senses with external objects. External gnostic actions performed by the senses can be searching, establishing, recording and tracing. Searching actions are aimed at discovering an object of cognition, establishing actions are aimed at distinguishing it from other objects, fixing actions are aimed at discovering its most characteristic properties and qualities, tracing actions are aimed at obtaining information about the changes that occur in the object. ontological philosophy being
Impressions and images that arise at the sensory stage of cognition are the basis for the implementation of internal gnostic actions, on the basis of which intellectual processes manifest themselves: memory, imagination and thinking. Memory consolidates impressions and images, stores them for a certain time and reproduces them at the right time. Memory allows a person to accumulate individual experience and use it in the process of behavior and activity. The cognitive function of memory is carried out through mnematic actions aimed at establishing a connection between newly acquired information and previously acquired information, at consolidating it and reproducing it. Imagination makes it possible to transform images of perceived objects and phenomena and create new ideas about objects that are inaccessible to humans or that do not exist at all at a given time. Thanks to imagination, a person can know the future, predict his behavior, plan activities and anticipate its results. Thinking makes it possible to escape from sensory perceived reality, generalize the results of cognitive activity, penetrate into the essence of things and cognize objects and phenomena that exist beyond the boundaries of sensations and perception. The product of thinking is thoughts that exist in the form of concepts, judgments and conclusions.
The unification of all elements of cognitive activity into a single whole is also accomplished by language and speech, on the basis of which consciousness functions.
11. Scientific and extra-scientific knowledge. Specificity of scientific knowledge
Science plays an important role in the life of society. Speaking about science, one should keep in mind three forms of its existence in society: 1) as a special way of cognitive activity, 2) as a system of scientific knowledge and 3) as a special social institution in the cultural system, which plays an important role in the process of spiritual production. Scientific knowledge as a special way of spiritual and practical exploration of the world has its own characteristics. In the most general sense, scientific knowledge is understood as the process of obtaining objectively true knowledge. Historically, science has gradually turned into the most important sphere of spiritual production; the product of this production is reliable knowledge, as information organized in a special way. The main tasks of science to this day are the description, explanation and prediction of processes and phenomena of reality. The origin of science is associated with the formation of a special type of rational exploration of reality, which made it possible to obtain more reliable knowledge in comparison with pre-scientific forms of knowledge of the world. Karl Jaspers considers this time to be “axial” in the development of culture.
Currently, the problem of “demarcation” of scientific knowledge, that is, determining the boundary that distinguishes science from non-science, is widely discussed. The first step towards dividing knowledge into scientific and extra-scientific is to separate scientific knowledge from ordinary knowledge. Ordinary knowledge, based mainly on common sense, undoubtedly, can serve as a guide to action and plays an important role in human life and in the history of society. However, it always includes elements of spontaneity and does not meet the norms of integrity in the systemic construction of knowledge that science is guided by, it lacks the necessary clarity in the definition of concepts and logical correctness in constructing reasoning is not always observed. In the variety of forms of extra-scientific knowledge, pre-scientific, non-scientific, para-scientific, pseudo-scientific, quasi-scientific and anti-scientific knowledge are distinguished. Being on the other side of science, extra-scientific knowledge is amorphous, and the boundaries between its various varieties are extremely blurred. The separation of scientific knowledge from numerous forms of extra-scientific knowledge is a very difficult problem associated with determining the criteria of scientificity. The following general criteria, acting as norms and ideals of scientific knowledge, are recognized: reliability and objectivity (correspondence to reality), certainty and accuracy, theoretical and empirical validity, logical evidence and consistency, empirical verifiability (verifiability), conceptual coherence (systematicity), the fundamental possibility of falsifiability ( assumption in the theory of risky assumptions for their subsequent experimental verification) predictive power (fruitfulness of hypotheses), practical applicability and effectiveness.
Specificity of scientific knowledge.
Science is a form of spiritual activity of people aimed at producing knowledge about nature, society and knowledge itself, with the immediate goal of comprehending the truth and discovering objective laws based on a generalization of real facts in their interrelation, in order to anticipate trends in the development of reality and contribute to its change.
Science is a creative activity to obtain new knowledge and the result of this activity is a body of knowledge brought into an integral system based on certain principles, and the process of their reproduction
Scientific cognition is a highly specialized human activity to develop, systematize, and test knowledge for the purpose of its effective use.
Thus, the main aspects of the existence of science are: 1. a complex, contradictory process of obtaining new knowledge; 2. the result of this process, i.e. combining the acquired knowledge into a holistic, developing organic system; 3. a social institution with all its infrastructure: organization of science, scientific institutions, etc.; morality of science, professional associations of scientists, finance, scientific equipment, scientific information system; 4. a special area of human activity and the most important element of culture.
12. Classical and non-classical models of scientific knowledge (comparative analysis)
Classical science originated in the 16th-17th centuries. as a result of scientific research by N. Cusansky, G. Bruno, Leonardo da Vinci, N. Copernicus, G. Galileo, I. Kepler, F. Bacon, R. Descartes. However, the decisive role in its emergence was played by Isaac Newton (1643-1727), an English physicist who created the foundations of classical mechanics as an integral system of knowledge about the mechanical motion of bodies. He formulated the three basic laws of mechanics, constructed a mathematical formulation of the law of universal gravitation, substantiated the theory of the motion of celestial bodies, defined the concept of force, created differential and integral calculus as a language for describing physical reality, and suggested a combination of corpuscular and wave concepts about the nature of light. Newton's mechanics was a classic example of deductive scientific theory.
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The creative nature of cognition
Cognition is not reduced simply to the perception and reproduction of objects of reality. Cognition is also a creative process. This circumstance reveals itself primarily in the following situations:
1) the most important aspect of cognition is the selection of information, which is then assigned the status of essential, significant in the construction of a particular picture of the world. Cognition never deals with all possible information, since such complete coverage of reality is practically unattainable. And this variability in the criteria for selecting essential information actually affects the creative nature of cognitive activity;
2) the creative nature of cognition manifests itself at the stage of generalizing significant information and at the stage of constructing abstract conclusions based on such generalizations. After all, we must not forget that any abstract intellectual construct has only an indirect relationship to reality. Actually, this mediation contains the potential for creative transformation of the world in accordance with the vision of the subject;
3) an integral part of the cognitive procedure is always the reconstruction of past states of reality and prediction of its future states. However, due to the fact that neither the past nor the future actually exists, it is necessary to state the creative nature of the above-mentioned operations.
All this gives us grounds to define the essence of knowledge as a construction based on the creative imagination of the subject. Moreover, in such a context, this imagination is analytical in nature. We are talking about the general ability of the mind of a cognizing person to remain in a certain state of pseudo-observation in relation to one’s own complex ideas, that is, in a state of constructive, constitutive and, at the same time, analyzing discretion and speculation. In other words, analytical creative imagination is an intellectual phantasia that allows you to “see” (“imagine”) various kinds of theoretical landscapes. In this regard, it will be useful to recall some statements of one of the greatest geometers of the 20th century. G. Weyl, who argued that a real mathematician always first “sees” this or that theorem and understands that it is “true”, and only then tries to “invent” a proof for it. In essence, Weil here implies the need for the cognizing subject to have a developed creative imagination, which would allow him to “invent” and “imagine” various theories.
As is clearly seen, logic and analysis do not exhaust the resources of human creative thinking. It is always necessary to remember the possibility of various kinds of intuitive insights, without which, in fact, not a single cognitive procedure can do.
Intuition is the ability of the mind to comprehend the truth by directly observing it without prior justification through evidence. In the act of intuition, the ability of the knowing subject to directly, “suddenly” find the truth is realized. The French thinker R. Descartes defined the essence of this phenomenon in the following way: “By intuition I mean not faith in the shaky evidence of the senses and not the deceptive judgment of a disordered imagination, but the concept of a clear and attentive mind, so simple and distinct that it leaves no doubt that what we think, or, what is the same thing, a strong concept of a clear and attentive mind, generated only by the natural light of reason and, thanks to its simplicity, more reliable than deduction itself.”
In the 20th century the role of intuition in understanding the world was fully described by representatives of the so-called intuitionistic mathematics (for example, L. Brouwer), who argued that in general all mathematical objects were initially constructed intuitively and that mathematics as a whole is a type of intuitive speculation. Moreover, since an intuitively constructed concept is always incomplete and is always in the process of development, according to intuitionists, the application in mathematics and logic, for example, of the concept of actual, completed infinity is impossible.
Of course, we should not forget that intuition is not carried out arbitrarily, that any intuitive insight is possible only in a space prepared for this. Every act of intuition is caused, on the one hand, by a certain intense tension of thought of the subject, striving to understand a certain cognitive difficulty, and on the other hand, by the presence of a necessary and sufficient amount of relevant information that allows the subject to be confident that his own mind is not deceiving him.
Thus, it can be argued that the process of cognition of the world as such should be considered as a set of acts of creativity in which the creative nature of the human mind is manifested.
Induction and deduction
The main direct, practical methods for constructing scientific hypotheses include the methods of induction and deduction.
Induction is a transition in the process of research from single, particular, individual aspects of a particular object to consideration of it in general view, as well as the logical conclusion of any general pattern of development of a certain class of elements based on knowledge obtained for individual objects of this class.
There is complete and incomplete induction. Complete is possible only if all elements of the class under study are checked, therefore in a number of situations it is fundamentally unfeasible: first of all, this applies to situations when the class under study is very large or infinite, as well as to situations where the study has a negative or destructive impact on class elements. In such cases, incomplete induction is used, which is based on extrapolation of knowledge about some elements to the entire class as a whole. It is as a result of incomplete induction that all the basic empirical scientific laws are obtained.
Types of incomplete induction characteristic of everyday thinking are popular induction (generalization based on simple enumeration) and induction from the past to the future (expectation of the occurrence of an event based on the identified connection between this event and some fixed circumstances that took place in the past).
In organized practice and in science, other types of incomplete induction are used:
1) induction through selection, i.e. a logical operation that includes, as auxiliary techniques, procedures for structuring a certain class of objects, identifying subclasses within it and studying a sample of elements presented in proportion to the ratio of these subclasses (an example of such induction is a sociological survey);
2) natural scientific induction, i.e. a logical procedure consisting in substantiating the connection between any generalizable feature and the specific properties of a certain class of elements (an example of this type of induction can be considered the study of the electrical conductivity of metals);
3) mathematical induction, i.e. a logical operation in which the presence of a generalizable feature is first established in the first element of some connected set, and then it is proved that its presence in each subsequent element follows from its presence in the previous one (an example of such induction is any study number sequences).
Typical errors of incomplete induction are overly hasty generalization, as well as the desire to pass off the unique as natural.
To increase the reliability of incomplete induction, it makes sense to take the following measures.
First, you should work to expand the base of induction, that is, the total number of considered elements of the class under study.
Secondly, natural scientific induction can be legitimately used only for the study of objects grouped into real classes according to some essential characteristics, properties or purposes.
Third, it is sometimes useful to use different types of induction within the same study.
Deduction is transition in the process of research from a general vision of an object to a specific interpretation of its particular properties, as well as the logical conclusion of approximate consequences based on general premises.
Although the term itself eduction" was first used by Severinus Boethius, the concept deduction- as a proof of a proposition through a syllogism - already appears in Aristotle. In the philosophy and logic of the Middle Ages and the New Age, there were significant differences in views on the role of eduction among other methods for constructing scientific hypotheses. Thus, R. Descartes opposed d eduction intuition, through which, in his opinion, the human mind directly perceives the truth, while eduction provides the mind with only indirect, i.e., knowledge obtained through reasoning. F. Bacon, who rightly noted that in the conclusion obtained through d eduction, does not contain any information that is not contained (even if implicitly) in the premises, argued on this basis that for science eduction is a secondary method compared to the induction method.
In Kantian logic there is the idea of transcendental deduction, which expresses the way of relating a priori concepts to objects of actual experience.
From a modern point of view, the question of mutual advantages eduction or induction has largely lost its meaning.
Sometimes the term "d" eduction"is used as a generic name for the general theory of constructing correct conclusions and conclusions. In accordance with this last usage, those sciences whose propositions are derived (at least predominantly) as consequences of some general basic laws, axioms, are usually called deductive (mathematics, theoretical mechanics and some branches of physics can serve as examples of deductive sciences), and the axiomatic method, through which produces conclusions of this kind of scientific proposals is often called axiomatic-deductive. This interpretation of the very concept of “deduction” is reflected in the so-called deduction theorem, which expresses the relationship between the logical connective of implication, formalizing the verbal expression “if..., then...”, and the relation of logical implication, deducibility. According to this theorem, if a certain corollary C is derived from the system of premises A and the premise B included in it, then the implication “if B, then C” is provable, that is, it is deducible without any other premises, from the axioms of system A alone.
Others related to the concept of d are of a similar nature. eduction logical terms. Thus, sentences that can be derived from each other are called deductively equivalent. The deductive completeness of a system with respect to any property consists in the fact that all expressions of this system with this property are provable in it.
Thus, within the framework of modern science, hypotheses are formulated through the use of logical procedures of induction and deduction. Moreover, it can be clearly stated that deductive inference is most productive when working with various kinds of fundamental, philosophical, mathematical and other systems, and induction is very effective when considering this or that factual material. In a metaphysical context, we can say that induction is appropriate when studying objects, the content of which is fully reflected in the totality of their manifestations, and deduction is meaningful in a situation where the essence of the objects being studied is not identical to an arbitrarily complete set of their specific properties.
Traditional method of analogy
In addition to the methods of induction and deduction, it is necessary to separately consider the method of traduction.
Traduction is a logical conclusion in which the premises and conclusion are judgments of the same level of generality. Russian logician L.V. Rutkovsky characterized tradition as a conclusion in which some definition is attributed to an object due to the fact that the same definition belongs to another object.
A type of tradition is analogy. This term itself means “the similarity of objects in some characteristics,” and analogy as a method of reasoning is a conclusion about the properties of an object based on its similarity with another, previously studied object.
The analogy has different areas applications. In science, it is used to construct hypotheses, for experimental work (after all, any scientific model is based on analogy) and as a method of argumentation. The analogy is also widely represented in technical creativity (many outstanding inventions were the result of the transfer of some technical solution from one area to another).
There are different types of analogies.
1) Analogy of properties. We are talking about the probability of assuming the presence of some common characteristics in objects for which certain common properties have already been identified (for example, since both the Earth and Mars are planets, the assumption of the action on Mars, by analogy with the Earth, of certain physical forces is scientific justified).
2) Analogy of relationships. This implies the possibility of transferring the logic of connections between some objects to the connections of objects that are somewhat similar to them (for example, since the areas of geometric figures related by the similarity relationship are in a certain proportional relationship to each other, there is reason to assume that the volumes of bodies, associated with this relationship will also demonstrate the presence of such a dependence). A complex case of analogy of relations is structural analogy, or analogy through isomorphism, in which something common is established in the organization of various systems (an example is the planetary model of the atom).
3) Analogy of inferences. We are talking about the possibility of constructing, in cases where it is justified, mutually similar discourses (for example, since in empirical sciences it is extremely productive to conduct various kinds of practical experiments, there are grounds for modeling thought experiments in deductive sciences).
One should also distinguish between a simple (from the similarity of two objects in some characteristics they conclude about their similarity in other characteristics) and widespread (from the similarity of phenomena to the similarity of their causes) analogy. It is equally necessary to differentiate between strict (reasoning proceeds from the similarity of two objects in one characteristic to their similarity in another characteristic, which, however, depends on the first) and non-strict (the conclusion from the similarity of two objects in known characteristics to their similarity in such a new characteristic, about which is unknown whether it is dependent on the former or not) analogy. And, finally, it is necessary to isolate conditional (the situation when the connection between the common features of the compared objects is not clearly established and the feature that is assigned to the object under study by analogy with an already known object) and unconditional (the situation when the above-mentioned connection is clearly established , definitely and specifically) analogy.
Typical mistakes when constructing an analogy are excessive simplification and vulgarization of the study, when objects begin to be compared not by essential characteristics, but only by external similarity.
Ways to increase the reliability of analogies in science can be:
1) an increase in the number of basic characteristics on which the analogy is actually carried out;
2) establishing the essential nature of the common characteristics of the compared objects;
3) establishing the heterogeneity and specificity of the general characteristics of the compared objects;
4) fixing the dependence of a feature transferred from one object to another on their common properties;
5) strict consideration of all differences between compared objects that impede analogy.
It must always be remembered that conclusions by analogy are only probabilistic in nature and, as a result, their true or false status can only be established after some time has passed.
At the same time, the probabilistic nature of conclusions by analogy should not be absolutized. After all, in general, probability in science still characterizes some objectively existing connection between things, and any probabilistic judgment that scientists express concerns objectively possible events.
In addition, we should not forget that, unlike popular analogies used in everyday practice, many scientific conclusions based on analogies are close in nature to reliable knowledge. For example, everyone knows that the functioning of such monumental structures as a bridge or a dam is initially studied using models. The model in this case acts as an analogue of the corresponding object. Modeling allows, using a reduced (or in some cases enlarged) model, to conduct a qualitative and quantitative study of the processes occurring in an object that is inaccessible for detailed study. The results of a single experiment are then generalized and transferred to a whole group of objects similar to the one being studied. The modeling method is therefore based on the principle of analogy, which provides a rationale for transferring the patterns examined in the model directly to the actual object itself. At the same time, the final conclusions are more likely to be reliable than probabilistic, since the judgments “the dam will probably withstand the pressure of water” and “the bridge will probably not collapse” cannot be considered sufficient.
Thus, the importance of the traditional method of analogy for constructing scientific hypotheses cannot be overestimated.
The role of interpretation in science
Interpretation, as a special method with fixed rules for translating formal symbols and concepts into the language of meaningful knowledge, is very widely used by modern science (including for constructing scientific hypotheses themselves).
In general terms, interpretation can be defined as the establishment of a system of objects that make up the subject area of meaning of the terms of some theory. It acts as a logical procedure for identifying the denotations of abstract terms and their actual meaning. One of the common cases of using the interpretation method is a meaningful presentation of the original abstract theory through the subject area of another more concrete theory, the empirical meanings of the concepts of which have already been established. Interpretation occupies a central place primarily in the deductive sciences.
In the humanities, interpretation is a fundamental method of working with texts as sign systems. Text as a form of discourse and an integral functional structure is open to the variety of meanings that exist in the system of social communications. The text always appears in the unity of explicit and implicit, non-verbalized meanings.
In modern philosophy and methodology of science, there is an idea that humanitarian knowledge (as a space of working with texts) can be considered as a sphere of application of the organizing principle, called the principle of deconstruction by the French postmodernist philosopher J. Derrida. This principle can be formulated as follows: every explicit meaning is a product of the analytics of signifiers devoid of invariant content. By and large, the essence is that any transformation of humanitarian knowledge, any expansion of its volume is now conceived as being carried out by shifting the usual meanings of signifiers (in the interpretation procedure), which have become the object of analytics within the framework of a particular study. This constantly implies, on the one hand, the tendency of any such displacement to turn into a self-sufficient, i.e., self-absolutizing procedure, and, on the other hand, the impossibility of shifting certain values (meaning the impossibility within the framework of one or another specific attempt at displacement) no conscious effort. Therefore, any humanitarian research now actually begins with reflection on the foundations and circumstances of the displacement being made. Thus, it should be concluded that humanitarian knowledge in general is knowledge that explicates through interpretation the economy of shifting meanings.
In the natural and mathematical sciences, interpretation has the meaning of demonstrating the meaningfulness of scientific expressions, since the meaning of each such expression is assumed to be known from the very beginning. So, for example, one of the basic concepts of differential calculus - the concept of the derivative of a function - can be interpreted as the rate of the process described by this function. Moreover, the very concept of process speed receives full clarity only after the introduction of the concept of derivative. Moreover, the point of view according to which the concept of speed is interpreted and conceptualized using the concept of derivative is quite legitimate.
At the same time, one must understand that the concepts (and proposals) of any scientific theory are interpreted through references to images of human consciousness (in the sense that appealing to objects as such in their pure form is generally impossible), therefore it is necessary to constantly ensure that any the interpretation was isomorphic to its subject.
In addition, the same theory, in principle, can have different interpretations (both isomorphic and non-isomorphic). In such cases, one of these interpretations is usually the area for which the theory in question arose to study. This interpretation is usually called the natural interpretation of the theory.
Finally, the same interpretation of substantially different theories is possible. For example, the range of phenomena considered by optics received a satisfactory interpretation in both the wave and corpuscular theories of light, and additional experimental data and theoretical assumptions were required to reconcile these points of view.
An important circumstance is also that as the logical means of science develop and the level of complexity of its abstractions increases, the interpretability of its concepts with the help of ideas drawn directly from the contemplation of the external world becomes less and less obvious. Thus, the concepts of such branches of modern mathematics as algebra or topology are interpreted, as a rule, not directly in terms of reality, but in terms of other areas of mathematics. As an example, we can recall the construction of an interpretation of the concepts of Lobachevsky's geometry through the terms of Euclid's geometry, carried out by mathematicians A. Poincaré and F. Klein (thereby showing the consistency of Lobachevsky's geometry relative to Euclid's geometry).
The relation of interpretability is transitive, i.e., the interpretation of the interpretation of a theory makes it possible to indicate the direct interpretation of this theory.
The interpretation procedure plays a particularly significant role in logic, since it is thanks to one or another similar procedure that logical calculi become formalized languages (after all, before the interpretation procedure is carried out, the expressions of logical calculus do not mean anything at all, i.e., before interpretation, these calculi can only be considered as formed by certain rules for the combination of special material objects). Different systems of propositional logic and predicate logic correspond to different interpretations of the logical operators used in them.
Thus, the role of interpretation in scientific knowledge in general and in the construction of scientific hypotheses in particular is enormous.
Topic 9. THE PROBLEM OF PROOF AND REFUTATION
Acceptable methods of polemics
In real scientific practice, evidence or refutation of certain scientific hypotheses is very often formulated in the course of scientific polemics, discussions in which each participant seeks to confirm his point of view by refuting others. Polemical argumentation is very diverse, since in any dispute (including scientific) the goal is not only to establish the truth of a certain thesis, but also to substantiate its significance, feasibility, relevance and effectiveness. As a result of this circumstance, polemics use not only strictly logical, but also rhetorical and emotional methods of influencing the interlocutor.
In the most general form, three types of polemics can be distinguished.
Firstly, we should talk about cognitive polemics, which are one way or another aimed at achieving agreement regarding true knowledge about its subject (scientific polemics themselves are one of the varieties of this type of polemics).
Secondly, there is a business controversy aimed at achieving and fixing some specific socially significant result, which can be a contract, minutes of a meeting, an agreement, a verdict, etc. It is important to understand that the goal of a business controversy is a mutually acceptable settlement that suits all parties involved .
Thirdly, a gaming type of controversy is distinguished. It is characterized by highlighting the motives of personal interest. Such polemics are similar to a sports match, where the achievement of subjective goals is more important than truth and agreement.
There is an idea of the principles and acceptable methods of polemics (and the limits of this admissibility include all its types).
1) First of all, you should always clearly define the subject of discussion, since there are things that are unproductive to argue about (for example, about tastes, about unverifiable subjective feelings, about trifles, etc.).
2) The positions of the parties participating in the debate must have common ground and at the same time must include significant differences, since, on the one hand, a discussion between representatives of completely disparate views always inevitably turns into absurdity, and on the other hand, generally enter into serious a dispute makes sense only if there are some fundamental disagreements.
3) The participants in the debate must have a comparable level of knowledge regarding its subject, otherwise a full-fledged discussion is generally impossible.
4) Participants in a debate should always agree in advance on its rules and the limits of the significance of its results.
5) Polemics generally make sense in their quality only if each of its participants is, in principle, ready to listen to the other and adjust their position.
Practical polemical techniques are divided into completely acceptable (for example, displaying creative initiative, concentrating actions around the defense of the main concept, using the effect of surprise, anticipating the arguments of the opposite side, etc.) and techniques that are on the verge of acceptable (for example, raising the “stakes” on some point). at the stage of discussion, instilling consent by force of persuasion, etc.).
The main principles of the actual cognitive (including scientific) polemics are the following.
1) The principle of cognition, according to which the competitive side of the controversy should be completely ignored. At the same time, you need to clearly understand that for the sake of the triumph of truth in a dispute, you can retreat, since a tactical retreat is not a defeat. The purpose of educational polemics is not the moral satisfaction of victory and not the receipt of practical benefits, but only to achieve completeness of knowledge. As a result, cognitive polemics (if carried out correctly) are never completely fruitless: even a failed step towards the truth is part of the movement towards it.
2) The principle of logic, according to which in any cognitive discussion its actual topic must be clearly formulated, the appropriate terminology must be used correctly, only reliable arguments and arguments must be used, and all reasoning must comply with the laws of formal logic.
It is unacceptable to confuse your opponent with the help of various kinds of tricks and sophisms, and one should adhere to the principle of logic even if the parties involved have different goals.
The principle of collegiality, according to which the parties entering into a cognitive debate are not enemies and rivals, but act as co-authors in a single and common creative process of learning the truths, therefore they should be characterized by extreme correctness and the desire for mutual understanding. At the same time, the application of this principle is not universal, since the very possibility of its use is limited by the nuances of each specific discussion.
The principle of certainty, according to which contradictions between participants in cognitive debates must be clearly identified from the very beginning. Human thought, by its nature, tends to infinity, and our mind is capable of deploying any even somewhat significant chain of reasoning in a huge number of directions. However, no reasoning (no matter how fundamental) can cover all the richness of manifestations of factual reality, so it is necessary to realize that the first step to competently speaking about the truth is to unambiguously define the boundaries of the sphere about which nothing will be said. Only by forbidding yourself to talk about things that are not related to the actual subject of the discussion can you ensure the integrity and meaningfulness of the discussion.
However, when entering into controversy in order to prove or refute one or another intellectual concept, one must keep in mind that there are a number of problems that have arisen around the study of the very idea of the possibility of final justification. First of all, two similar problems should be mentioned.
Firstly, the proof always goes back ultimately to the axioms. The truth of any statement must be substantiated, for which other statements are involved whose truth status has already been verified. Therefore, there must be some ultimate statements whose truth cannot be logically proven. However, the question arises on what is the basis for our confidence in the truth of these ultimate statements, axioms, and whether they are not simple conventions, that is, conditional agreements that could be different. And doesn’t it follow from this that our knowledge as a whole is conventional?
Secondly, exhaustive empirical confirmation (verification) of any hypothesis is generally impossible, since the affirmative mode from the consequence of a conditional categorical syllogism is a probabilistic conclusion (in other words, any affirmative thesis is conditional in nature). Only the negative mode of consequence has coercive force, i.e., the empirical refutation (falsification) of a certain hypothesis, since its prediction regarding experience is not realized (in other words, only denying theses are unconditional). Doesn't this mean that we can be sure of falsity, but we can never be completely sure of the truth of any proposition?
Thus, for the development and improvement of true knowledge about the world, it is extremely important to be able to competently debate about this knowledge and correctly build systems of arguments.
Ontological foundations of knowledge
The term "knowledge" has many meanings. When trying it philosophical understanding highlights the need to consider this concept in the following semantic contexts:
1) knowledge is always associated with an attempt to establish the true existence of things. The very claim to knowledge of something contains an indication of the possession of more or less complete, exhaustive information about the nature and structure of the object of knowledge, as well as about its place in the implied series of other similar objects;
2) knowledge is always addressed to a kind of “wrong side” of things; it appeals to what is hidden in the depths of the world. Genuine knowledge is an abstraction from the immediate given; it marks the transition from visible existence to the universal laws hidden behind it;
3) knowledge is focused on the creation of sign systems that represent reality; it finds its ultimate embodiment in the terminological apparatus of various sciences, in thesauri of certain discursive practices, in the transformation of words of natural language. Thus, on the basis of knowledge, special artificial realities are modeled, which imitate the patterns of the real world, allowing a person, using the example of these models, to understand the principles of the functioning of the universe;
4) knowledge contains the intention to transform the world in a direction that meets human ideas about what should be. After all, among other things, “to know” means “to distribute the world”, “to establish internal connections of the world.” Knowledge is always associated with subsequent purposeful action.
If we talk directly about scientific knowledge, about its specific characteristics, then we can conclude that, firstly, scientific knowledge is always “detached” from its subject. This detachment should be understood either as a desire for objectivity of the information being “in work”, or as the focus of the scientist working with it on impartiality. In turn, such impartiality can appear both as a claim to the “purity” of the research, and as a declaration of conscientiousness and selflessness.
Secondly, scientific knowledge is systemic and discursive, it is formulated in accordance with a certain set of recipes for obtaining truth, which also results in its inevitable rigorism.
Thirdly, in scientific knowledge as a semantic form there is an intention towards universality and universality. Knowledge implicitly implies an orientation towards limitless expansion of its scope.
Fourthly, scientific knowledge, by definition, cannot be complete, since it presupposes mandatory systematization and schematization of reality. Science, therefore, always sacrifices particular facts for the sake of general laws.
Finally, fifthly, in modern conditions, scientific knowledge is increasingly viewed not only as an ideal of knowledge, but also as something valuable in itself, valuable formally. However, we must not forget that such an idea about the immediate value of scientificity as such is not a scientific truth.
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the very appeal to the phenomenon of knowledge presupposes its consideration in the unity of ideas not only about its content and form, but also about knowledge as a special state of human thinking, about knowledge as an essential event in the process of knowing the world.
It is necessary, therefore, to take into account how exactly the knower knows, what is the essence of the moment the knower realizes that he has knowledge, the moment when questioning turns into conviction, confidence, the moment from which knowledge becomes an object of faith, since it is not subject to revaluation every time, re-checking, it becomes simply a background for further development of thought. Thus, “to know” also means “to have faith.” Faith here is taken as a psychological state of self-authenticity, the internal integrity of a person. In a certain sense, faith places a person in reality, since from now on it certifies any ontological series. The tightness of the world of knowledge is sealed by the accompanying psychological state of confidence in it, therefore, in fact, every thing in this world has its own place.
In modern Russian epistemology, the concepts of “faith” - faith and “belief” - faith are considered to clarify the relationship between faith and knowledge in general, where faith - faith is the spiritual attraction of the soul to the ultimate basis
All objects and phenomena of the surrounding world are characterized by relative stability and certainty, otherwise they simply would not exist. This moment of constancy, stability, unity, diversity and continuity is reflected in the category of identity (Identity is the equality of a phenomenon to itself, the moment of stability of phenomena).
Instead, every object and phenomenon is in constant motion and change. You cannot step into the same river twice. Heraclitus expressed in this formula the mobility, variability, uniqueness of objects or their difference (Difference is the moment of variability of phenomena).
From the point of view of dialectics, in real life there is no absolute difference, just as there is no absolute fluidity. These concepts exist only in thinking. In reality, identity and difference are interconnected and intertwined, so in reality each thing is not only equal, i.e. identical to itself, but also different at the same time.
Thus, any object, while retaining for the time being a number of its characteristics, at the same time loses a number of other characteristics and acquires new ones. Stability and variability, i.e. identity and difference oppose each other in an object as two opposite sides included in a given unity. That. opposition expresses one of the interacting sides of an object, phenomenon, process. Every object is a unity of opposites. Thus, a living organism includes variability and heredity, electricity is characterized by positively and negatively charged particles, productive forces and production relations act as aspects of the method of production. In all these phenomena, one opposite does not exist without the other and at the same time denies the other. If their unity is violated, the object is destroyed or transformed into a new thing. Opposite sides of objects mutually determine each other and, interacting, form a contradiction. Contradiction is a certain type of interaction of opposite sides, properties, tendencies in objects and between them. Contradictions are inherent in the very essence of things, therefore they are a form of manifestation of the activity of matter.
In dialectical contradiction, the following elements can be distinguished:
1) mutual position of opposites;
2) interpenetration;
3) mutual exclusion.
Mutual position and interpenetration mean the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of the object. Mutual exclusion "struggle", internal tension in the subject and the need to destroy contradictions.
Question No. 6: Ontological foundations of science
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE is one of the central concepts of modern philosophy of science, denoting a set of philosophical ideas through which the fundamental ontological, epistemological and methodological principles of scientific knowledge are substantiated.
Ontology (from the Greek ón, gender óntos - existence and...logy), a section of philosophy that examines the universal foundations, principles of being, its structure and patterns. In its essence, philosophy expresses a picture of the world that corresponds to a certain level of knowledge of reality and is fixed in a system of philosophical categories characteristic of a given era, as well as for a particular philosophical tradition (materialism or idealism, etc.). In this sense, every philosophical and theoretical system in general is necessarily based on certain ontological ideas that constitute its stable substantive basis and undergo changes as knowledge develops.
Its functions are also closely related to the subject of philosophy of science. It seems appropriate to highlight those of them that are capable of forming the ontological, epistemological, logical, methodological and axiological foundations of science. The ontological foundations of science represent the views accepted in science on the structure of being, types of material systems, the nature of their determination, general laws of functioning and development of material objects, etc. The most important starting point of the ontological foundation of science is the recognition of the existence of a present, capable of being in the field of visibility of an object knowledge. Many components of the world cognizable by man do not exist in an easily accessible and unchangeable form. Moreover, in cognition, scientists often have to deal, for example in nuclear physics, with instantly changing objects whose existence is short-lived, and even then under the conditions of complex experiments. Often the boundary between their existence and non-existence can be fixed only with great difficulty. In this regard, discrepancies in the understanding of objects and differences in overcoming the difficulties of their knowledge create the basis for the formation of differing ontological concepts. Some philosophers did not doubt the reality of the existence of the world and the possibility of knowing it, others questioned its existence and doubted that true knowledge about it was possible. To carry out scientific activities, it is important to know that in this activity you are dealing with a real object, and not with a phantom of consciousness. An important component of the ontology of science is the concept of matter. In modern Russian philosophy, matter is defined as a reality independent of man, capable of being reflected in his consciousness. Matter is believed to exist in motion, space and time. Such an understanding of matter has significant ideological significance, since it opens up the possibility of its rational knowledge and transformation by people in order to improve the organization of their own life support.
The ideas about existence developed by philosophy, combined with natural scientific ideas about matter, movement, space and time, are reflected in the general scientific picture of the world. As the basis of science, it represents a holistic system of ideas about the world, formed in the course of systematizing the achievements of science. In the system of scientific knowledge, the scientific picture of the world, along with the ideals, principles and norms of research activity, serves as the basis for scientific research activities and the application of acquired scientific knowledge.
There are three blocks of philosophical problems of modern science: ontological, axiological and logical-epistemological.
Ontological problems are divided into three types:
1. Construction of a universal theory of the Universe. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:
a) unification within the framework of one theory of 4 fundamental physical interactions: gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear and weak nuclear (el-magnetic and weak are already combined into el-weak);
b) solving the problem of the origin of matter (during the formation of the Universe, an asymmetry in the generation of particles of matter and antimatter was observed and the nature of this asymmetry is unknown);
c) determining the future state of the Universe. Two scenarios are discussed:
“thermal death” due to its endless expansion and “big bang” - a decrease in the expansion rate, and then the dominance of gravitational processes over it;
To determine the scenario, you need to know the density of matter in the Universe, which has not been established to date.
d) the problem of the semantics of torsion fields - the dominant form of movement is development and, according to some physicists, its source is particles of the microworld, which impart to everything that consists of them an impulse to unfold potential possibilities into actual ones;
d) search for extraterrestrial intelligence.
2. Also, ontological problems in modern science include some difficulties associated with information technology: philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of virtual reality and the consequences of design at the nanotechnology level.
Virtual reality is an image of reality generated by PCs and information networks, as well as similar technologies.
Peculiarities:
a) generation - the effect of the action of complex systems that form a constant reality;
b) relevance - virtual reality exists only when it is reproduced by constant reality;
c) autonomy - she lives according to her own laws;
d) interactivity – it can be influenced from the outside;
Philosophical problems of virtual reality are concentrated around the theme of its subject.
Nanotechnology. The most important design problem at this level is not knowing the consequences of a total redesign of the world.
3. Also, the ontological block includes anthropological problems of the anthropic principle and the effects of passionarity. Passionarity is the ability of some part of ethnic groups (in accordance with the teachings of L.N. Gumilyov) to respond to heliocosmic processes with a burst of activity. The philosophical problem is how deeply these processes can affect society.
Axiological problems of modern science.
1. The problem of co-evolutionary development. Coevolution is the joint development of humanity and nature, considered as parts of the whole. The direction and pace of development of one part must be consistent with the same in the second part.
2. The problem of cloning. Philosophical problems associated with cloning:
a) a significant number of unsuccessful consequences or results associated with cloning (failed experiments on people in science are considered crimes);
b) the problem of socialization and adaptation in society of cloned people;
c) conflict with the church and religious groups;
d) this is a hidden form of encouragement of homosexual relations;
e) when cloning brilliant individuals, it is possible to spread pathologies without the guaranteed genius of the clones.
3. Suspension of aging using stem cell transplantation.
4. Consequences of the introduction of robotics - this is due to the displacement of people from the “sphere of making money.”
5. The problem of genetically modified food products.
Logical and epistemological problems of science.
1. The problem of creating AI. The creation of AI is based on attempts to simulate the human brain. This path has a number of currently insoluble difficulties:
a) the structure and functions of the brain are extremely far from a level of knowledge sufficient for modeling;
b) a huge amount of information contained in the brain is not formalized;
c) the brain forms a single system with the body and reacts to the external environment through this body;
d) functional asymmetry of the brain has not been studied, which is associated with the specificity of the right hemisphere.
2. An important philosophical problem is the development of heuristic methods for working with information. Heuristics is a theory of organizing intellectual activity in a situation of epistemological uncertainty. Examples of heuristic methods are: brainstorming method, focal group method, morphological analysis and synthesis method.
V.E. Budenkova
ONTOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF MODERN SCIENCE
The transformations of epistemology associated with the search for new scientific ontologies are considered. Based on the analysis of some modern concepts, general trends in the development of ideas about the reality of science and its object have been identified. The author emphasizes that the transfer of emphasis in knowledge from the subject to its connections and interactions actualizes the communicative approach to reality.
In modern philosophy, there has been a steady tendency to consider a variety of problems in a broad cultural context. The problem that will be discussed is no exception, although it certainly has its own specifics. This is the problem of the foundations of modern science and knowledge in general. According to the definition of V.A. Lektorsky, one of the manifestations of the transformations that philosophy is experiencing today is the process of “revision” or “rethinking of epistemology.” A new vision of sociocultural reality (pluralism, multiculturalism) and new ways of philosophizing (anti-substantialism, anti-fundamentalism) actualize the search for new ontologies of knowledge and new forms of rationality.
Among the most popular and influential trends that can reconcile the anti-fundamentalist aspirations of modern philosophy with science as a special way of understanding the world is communicative ontology. The idea of communication has become widespread in social philosophy(communication as the basis of a new sociality), political science, cultural theory and other disciplines related to the study of man, culture and society. And if in the field of social and humanitarian knowledge its prospects are more or less clear (not in the sense of solving all issues, but in terms of acceptance by the research community), then in relation to the natural sciences the possibilities of its application are not so obvious.
But if we assume that humanitarian knowledge will follow the path of “communicative restructuring”, and natural science will not, then this can finally “separate” them and cast doubt on the possibility of science as such. Indeed, in addition to differences in subject and method (behind these differences), fundamental differences in ontologies will be revealed, beyond which “there is nowhere to go.” Moreover, here lies a threat to epistemology: there will be no need for it at all, but on the contrary, it will become clear that it is completely meaningless. What kind of epistemology or theory of knowledge is there if the reality of each scientific discipline is built on its “own” foundations and according to its “own” rules.
I somehow don’t want to believe in such a gloomy prospect for epistemology and science, especially since in recent decades approaches have appeared that are in tune with some general philosophical trends. Among them, we can note the views of J. Petitot and B. Smith, who proposed replacing the usual “quantitative” ontology of science with a “qualitative” one; the ideas of B. van Fraassen, speaking from anti-realistic and anti-metaphysical positions, and the concept of “relational ontology” by B. Latour, designed to remove the traditional opposition of the object
and subject and proclaimed the “mixed” nature of reality. A detailed analysis of the positions of these authors is not within the scope of this article, but for further discussion it will be interesting to compare some of their positions.
At the same time, let’s try to find out what communicative ontology can give to knowledge in general and in what direction, taking this ontology as a basis, knowledge can develop.
But before considering possible solutions to the problem posed, one should identify the features of the traditional, or “classical” ontology of knowledge (including scientific) and understand the difficulties of its “adaptation” to modern conditions.
The basis of classical science is the principle of a strict separation of subject and object, the knowable and the knower. Reality here is presented in the form of a two-level “construction”, on the surface of which there are things and objects, and in the depths there are laws that determine their “behavior”. The desire to understand the world “as it is,” i.e. to identify the laws of nature, since, knowing the laws, one can control the things themselves, leads to getting rid of everything random and inessential in an object and transforming the latter into a theoretical construct that embodies one or more important properties. Essentially, an object is identified with some property (a material point, an absolutely black body, etc.), and the reality of science is a “network” of such properties, separated from objects. “Throwing” this net “out into the world,” a person, who, by the way, is also deprived of all his qualities except rationality, receives in return knowledge of the “true” reality and the ability to predict events based on identified patterns. But if “artificiality”, i.e. The “madeness”, “constructedness” of the object of classical science is recognized as a necessary given, then the “artificiality” of the classical subject, as a rule, remains “in the shadows”.
Here, however, one important circumstance should be noted. The reality of science is not its “ultimate” foundation. Its understanding and “construction” is a consequence of a certain philosophical position expressed by a number of principles. Firstly, this is substantialism and associated monism. The idea of a single substance (single beginning) guarantees the knowability of the world and provides the predictive function of science. At the same time, unity (of substance) is rather an object of faith or ideological belief and is more psychological than actually ontological in nature. After all, if we assume that the world is heterogeneous in its foundations and unpredictably changeable, then its cognizability immediately affects
is in question. Secondly, this is fundamentalism, which allows us to see behind the variety of phenomena the “hidden” patterns of the “genuine” world, which, as already said, is an obligatory function of science and reveals the essence of knowledge. Thirdly, this is reductionism, which is a consequence or continuation of fundamentalism and is present in one form or another in any concept of knowledge based on the desire for “true” knowledge.
But if from a scientific point of view this strategy seems completely justified, then from a philosophical point of view there is something to think about. The fact is that the consequence of fundamentalism is a paradox: the reality of science is identified with the “true” reality, the idea arises that the world itself is represented by a being of fast-flowing, highly isolated colorless particles. But the reality of science is conditional and non-objective. It does not have an autonomous existence, as is assumed by fundamentalism. On the other hand, “true” reality is inaccessible to us, since the reality of science is always placed between us and it. But then what do we know?
The doubling of reality, which underlies all classical knowledge, turns out to be nothing more than the “replacement” of ontology with epistemology. The mechanism of this “substitution”, or, to put it mildly, the identification of two realities, is approximately the following. Initially, the reality of science does not have an ontological status, but only an epistemological one, because it is formed as a theoretical construct, i.e. a tool or means of knowledge. It is subjective in origin and objective only to the extent that it reflects certain properties or qualities of objects. But in the process of cognition, when an obvious result is achieved, an “illusion” arises that the reality on which the theoretical “grid” is “thrown” and the “real world” coincide, that this “grid” is reality. The subjectivity of the quasi-reality of science, and with it its instrumental character, recedes before the objectivity of the revealed truth. On this basis, the theoretical reality of science is “assigned” ontological status, or more precisely, the epistemological object acquires an independent (its own ontology). From this it is clear that the “replacement” of ontology with epistemology in classical science is not inevitable, but quite predictable and even “justified” consequence of philosophical fundamentalism. But for us, what is more interesting is the paradoxical fact that the objectivity of classical knowledge is achieved by purely subjective means, and subject-centrism (in the terminology of V.A. Lektorsky) of the classical paradigm is combined with the interpretation of the subject himself as a passive “reader” of the book of nature.
Thus, fundamentalism “unmasks” itself: the pathos of the search for true knowledge about the world “as it is” turns into numerous conventions and “conventions” of subjective origin. This is a consequence of the ontological opposition between subject and object. In fact, in the classical paradigm there were two “independent” realities, the establishment of a connection between them represented one
one of the main difficulties, or problems, of epistemology. These difficulties influenced the development of anti-metaphysical and anti-fundamentalist tendencies in many modern concepts of cognition.
Despite the differences in approaches and conclusions, the fight against fundamentalism is going on under the common slogan of “return to things.” The “things” themselves can be represented by “phenomena”, as in B. van Fraassen, a “phenomenological world”, preserving the fullness of qualitative diversity, as in B. Smith and J. Petitot, or “hybrids” inhabiting the world, as in B. Latur. The main thing that unites them is “the reality of presence” (my italics - V.B.). They are the reality surrounding the subject, which is not separated from us by an invisible line, but in which we ourselves are included as a necessary link. The statement of B. Smith is indicative: “...we choose as the starting point of our reasoning such examples of individual entities... as human existences, bulls, stacks of logs, icebergs, planets. In addition to entities, our theory must make room for individual incidents—smiles, tans, efforts, confidences—that are inherent in these entities and, in addition, essential parts of both entities and incidents, such as the humanity that constitutes an important element of your personality ...". J. Latour takes a similar position: “Things (“quasi-objects” or “risk”, the word does not matter) have the specific property of being indivisible into primary and secondary qualities. They are too real to be ideas, and too controversial, indefinite, collective, changeable, challenging to play the role of unchanging, frozen, boring primary qualities with which the Universe is always equipped. What the social sciences could do, together with the natural sciences, is to present things to people themselves, with all their consequences and ambiguities."
It is important to note that B. van Fraassen, J. Petitot and B. Smith talk about physical reality, i.e. about the ontology of the natural sciences, and B. Latour - about the social one, but this only emphasizes the closeness of their attitudes. Another important similarity between these concepts is the transfer of the emphasis of cognition from explanation to description. As B. van Fraassen states, “scientific explanation does not refer to pure science, but to the application of science. Namely, we use science to satisfy some of our desires (desires), and these desires vary from context to context. At the same time, all our desires presuppose the desire for descriptive information as the main one” (quoted from:). Explicit or veiled discriminatoryness is a consequence of the rejection of fundamentalism. This is a natural result of “overcoming” substantialism and focusing on the “surface”. But the same phenomenon can be described in different ways depending on the positions, goals and “languages” of description. Consequently, descriptiveness gives rise to epistemological pluralism, and the named concepts affirm it in knowledge. At first glance, such a development of events contradicts the original principles of science, especially since some authors recognize another difficulty associated with anti-substance
Leaf’s attitude: “The most vulnerable position of the proposed idea is precisely that the theory in question does not have predictive ability in the usual (causal) sense.” But it is possible to assess the possible prospects and consequences of the development of knowledge along this path only on the basis of real experience. And here it should be noted that pluralistic ideas are not something completely external to modern science. On the contrary, scientific knowledge itself reveals a “tendency” towards ontological pluralism. For example, in modern physics “to describe the fundamental forces of nature” the “concept of string” is used. But along with string theory there is the concept of the “bag”. Moreover, these are not even different descriptions of the same reality, but different ontologies.
Let's look at this problem not from a physical, but from an epistemological point of view. When science raises the question of what underlies the universe - “strings” or “bags”, it is absolutely clear to us that there is neither one nor the other. But we don’t yet know or cannot name what is actually there. The reason for the first is a lack of experimental data, the second is a limited vocabulary. Most likely, everything is in order with our dictionary (after all, we found definitions for “strings” and “bags”), therefore, we lack “experience”. But it is safe to assume that in their attempts to expand its boundaries, supporters of “string theory” will look for “strings”, and adherents of the “bag concept” will look for “bags”. The whole point is that we already know in advance what to look for, since our experience is predetermined by theory (theoretically loaded) and language. By giving something a name, we thereby “create” it as an object.
But it may happen that something completely special will be discovered, not similar to either a string or a bag. What then? Then, from an epistemological point of view, we will receive another, new ontology of physics. Moreover, all these ontologies will be “equal” (although different “pictures of the world” can be built on their basis) until they “save phenomena” equally well or the advantages of one are identified experimentally. A.A. Pechenkin writes: “Depending on research program... empirically equivalent (or almost equivalent) theories may arise - theories that “save” the same (or almost the same) range of phenomena, but postulate different unobservable entities.” But there is one nuance here: in modern science, theory is much ahead of practice (experiment). In the case of our example, “the difficulty with ... theoretical calculations is that they describe physical phenomena occurring on the Planck scale, while Galilean science requires reproducible experimental results.” Therefore, in relation to modern science, it is more correct to talk about theoretical constructivism, and not about constructive empiricism, as B. van Fraassen does. In addition, recognizing the possibility of the existence of different ontologies in science (in particular, in physics), B. van Fraassen believes that this does not affect “phenomena”, they are the same for everyone. But the theoretical workload of experienced
facts: they are “at the same time artificial and natural, invented and independent,” and the constructive nature of the object of knowledge itself. Consequently, the theory should “save” not phenomena (this is, rather, “in the spirit” of classical science), but the reality we create in the course of interaction with the world. This, by the way, is insisted on by supporters of “science and technology studies” (STS), for example B. Latour: “After several centuries of modern times, STS simply returns us to the usual definition of things as ensembles, and this definition makes us see that the boundaries between nature and society, necessity and freedom, between the spheres of natural and social sciences are a very specific anthropological and historical detail... One need only look at any of the quasi-objects filling the pages of today's newspapers - from genetically modified organisms to global warming or virtual business - to be convinced that it is only a matter of time for social scientists and "physicists" to forget about what separates them and to unite in a joint study of “things” that, being hybrids by nature, have already (for many decades) united them in practice.”
But if we accept this strategy, then many theoretical models (and many ontologies) turn from a “temporary inconvenience” or shortcoming into a natural result of the development of knowledge. The potential set of ontologies should be discussed separately. The formation of ontology is determined by several factors, including: understanding of the object and subject, methods of their connection, sociocultural context of the era, etc. In this case, differences in ontologies are associated with different understandings of the object, its “scales” and methods of creation, which, in fact, is what the concepts under consideration demonstrate to us. However, the multiplicity (potential) of ontologies “does not reduce” their “realism” and does not mean “the end of scientific knowledge” in the above sense. We are already seeing a variety of ontologies in science and, strictly speaking, it does not hinder its development, but, on the contrary, contributes to the progress of knowledge. An example would be competing theories in science, since the “debate” between them always contributes to the enrichment of any discipline. Here it is appropriate to refer to B. van Fraassen, who argues that scientific research is “the construction of models” and “not the discovery of unobservable entities.” In other words, science (modern, in any case) seeks to answer the question not “what the world really is,” but what it can be, based on the achieved level of knowledge.
But “the achieved level of knowledge” is a relative concept. Our ideas about the world are constantly changing, “bringing to life” new ontologies. Consequently, the “polyontological nature” of modern knowledge is not only natural, but to some extent inevitable. Moreover, it is fully consistent with the pluralism of the foundations of culture, although this does not mean that we must completely abandon the idea of unity as a principle constituting our being and knowledge. True, now we need to look not for a single thing, but for a unified
a fundamental principle, and not in substance (the consequences of sub-substantialism were discussed above), but (in the light of pragmatic transformations of culture and cognition) in communication as a way of overcoming the incommensurability of cultural worlds and theoretical models of reality. Let us immediately note that all the concepts we are considering are in one way or another connected with the idea of communicability. Both the “mereological approach” of B. Smith, which consists in the study of objects of the “universum, primarily in the light of the species diversity of their constituent parts,” and the “constructive empiricism” of B. van Fraassen, and the “relational ontology” of B. Latour are assumed as one of the conditions the existence of reality, the presence of connections between its elements. This is equally true for the natural sciences and the humanities. From this point of view, the concept of “relational ontology” looks even more appropriate, since it is free from “excessive” sociality.
The new reality of science - the reality of connections, relationships, interactions - is formed by communication. It should be noted that this understanding of reality turns out to be very close to post-non-classical science and allows us to see continuity in the development of scientific knowledge. But communicative ontology changes the role and place of the subject in cognition, and with it the idea of the object.
The subject of classical science can also be considered as a participant in communication: he asks reality his questions and receives answers to them. But communication here is of a fundamentally different nature, being essentially one-way. The subject's task is to ask the “right” questions, and the “answers” are predetermined by the nature of the object. In modern science, “what “nature” tells us depends not only on its “real” structure, but also on the position of the questioner, while the latter, in turn, is also not immediate: it is determined by a system of relations.”
Communicative ontology allows us to remove the rigid opposition between subject and object precisely in the ontological plane. Both the subject and the object are a “product” of communication; they exist insofar as they are included in a single communicative space. The “constructiveness” of reality takes on a meaning different from that in classical science. The subject now not only reveals connections between objects and the patterns of their existence, while remaining “indifferent” to them, he forms connections that ensure
defining the existence of the object and its own. In modern science, reality is “held” by the subject, and the object is the relationship in which it is included. It “reveals” in interaction. O.E. Stolyarova notes: “The differences between subjects and objects... are not absolute and are not given a priori... The properties and ontological status of any object are unique, i.e. are the result of the network position he acquired - a place in the series of connections and relationships of the communication system."
This has important implications for epistemology. Firstly, reality becomes accessible, we find ourselves not on one side or the other, but in it itself. It retains its constructive nature, but we are freed from the need to “double” it in cognition, because the reality of the knowable and the knower are one and the same - communication. In this regard, the concept of “empirical constructivism” can be given a new meaning: in modern science, not only theories, but also facts are constructed. “Construction is a creative process, the continuous birth of qualitatively new, unique events, irreducible to previously existing ones.” Therefore, “the disruption and transformation of connections within the communication system can lead to the disappearance of a scientific fact, as happened, for example, with abiogenesis, when microbes appeared. As for microbes, their objectivity is constituted by network relations, part of which were the experiments of Pasteur, who “created” them, just as they, in turn, “created” the scientist Pasteur...”
The result of communicative transformations of the ontology of modern science is a revision of the concept of truth. On the one hand, “refusing the truth” is tantamount to abandoning science itself. But, on the other hand, traditional correspondent theories of truth lose their meaning in the conditions of a new vision of reality. In classical science, truth was understood as already existing, and the task of knowledge is to “find” it and “discover” it. This approach is a natural consequence of substantialism and fundamentalism. In modern science, when reality is “not determined in advance”, but is created in the very process of cognition, truth, like an object, fact, theory, also becomes constructive, contextual, situational. Thus, communicative ontology allows us to bridge the “gap” between the world of theoretical ideas and the world of practical actions and connect the cognitive and sociocultural functions of science.
LITERATURE
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The article was presented by the Department of Theory and History of Culture of the Institute of Arts and Culture of Tomsk State University, received by the scientific editorial office “Philosophical Sciences” on March 21, 2005.