George Berkeley: philosophy, basic ideas, biography. To exist is to be perceived Berkeley argued that to exist is to be
One of the main goals of B. is to substantiate, using epistemology, the thesis “God is close to each of us.” This closeness is directly revealed in the coherence and harmony of the world as it appears to each person. This kind of harmony is determined, according to B., by Divine Providence. In this sense, God is the closest and most obvious prerequisite for man's most elementary orientation in the world. Man exists and knows in God. In this attitude, B. does not go beyond the occasionalism of N. Malebranche, to whom he owes a lot. All the originality of English. the thinker lies in the way in which he substantiates this attitude. Despite his adherence to the empiric-nominalistic tradition, the initial premise of his philosophy - a statement of one’s own existence on the basis of a reflexive act - brings to mind R. Descartes. It does not need proof, is immediately obvious and fully meets the requirements of Cartesian rational methodology. B., like Descartes, considers the subject, some I, as the bearer of consciousness and thought. In addition to its own existence, the subject is also directly given the content of consciousness - ideas. The latter are considered to be completely homogeneous. B. rejects, following P. Bayle in this, the division of ideas into “primary” and “secondary”. All of them are equally “secondary” to the extent that they belong to consciousness and only to it. At the same time, the ideas in question are understood in accordance with the sensationalistic model of cognition as elements of perception. The ideas a subject has are all that we can have certain knowledge about. To assert that there are objects outside consciousness that initiate the appearance of ideas in consciousness means, firstly, to go beyond the limits of the reliable and, secondly, to go against logic, combining two incompatible positions: that a) there is a sensory-perceptible object and that b) this object exists independently of perception. Since B. understands ideas only as ideas of perception (abstract ideas are interpreted by him within the framework of the representative theory of abstractions, i.e. as the same ideas of perception, but carrying additional functions), their existence is entirely determined by their perception. The philosopher formulates the famous principle: “To exist is to be perceived” (Esse est percipi). Since B. is talking only about objects of sensory perception, this principle excludes only the existence of natural bodies independent of perception and, more broadly speaking, the condition of their existence - bodily substance, matter. But he does not at all exclude the existence of supersensible existence. Dr. The immediately obvious fact for B. is that the existence (or non-existence) of sensory perceptions does not always depend on our will. Because B. does not allow the existence of a c.-l. other existence other than the existence of consciousness, i.e. spiritual being, then we should recognize the existence of some other spiritual being, on which our perceptual field depends. Empirical experience says: what we are used to calling the body does not behave as we want it to, but as dictated to it by what we are again accustomed to calling the laws of nature. But since the principle of dependence of existence on perception remains in force, the “willfulness” of the world is determined by the perception of a spiritual principle other than ours. This for B. is the existence of God. It is he who ultimately turns out to be the creator of all sensory perceptions, all carriers of consciousness and their sole coordinator.
B.'s philosophy met with a very cold reception among his contemporaries. He was accused of a tendency to affect the reader with paradoxes leading to absurd conclusions; in solipsism; and worse than that - in undermining trust in the Holy Scriptures (if esse est percipi, then how could the world exist in the first six days of creation before the appearance of Adam?). B.'s teaching did include solipsism as one of its consequences (but not obligatory). Threats to discredit the Bible were partly removed by the occasionalist scheme. As for the paradoxes of B., their consideration turned out to be fruitful for the further history of philosophy. thoughts.
Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M.: Gardariki. Edited by A.A. Ivina. 2004.
BERKELEY (Berkeley) George (12.3.1685, near Kilkenny, Ireland - 14.1.1753, Oxford), English philosopher, representative of subjective idealism. From 1734 bishop in Cloyne (Ireland). Basic op.: “The experience of a new theory of vision” (1709, rus. lane 1912) ; “Treatise on Human Principles. knowledge" (1710, rus. lane 1905) ; "Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus" (1713, rus. lane 1937) ; "Alsiphron, or the Petty Philosopher" (v. l-2, 1732, rus. lane 1978) ; "Seiris, or the Chain" Philosopher reflections and research..." (1744, rus. lane 1978) . Philosophy B.'s teaching is imbued with the desire to refute materialism and provide a justification for religion. He criticized the concept of matter as substances. basics (substance) bodies, as well as Newton’s teachings about space as the container of all natural bodies and Locke’s teachings about the origin of the concepts of matter and space. According to B., the concept of matter is based on the assumption that we can, abstracting from the particular properties of things, form an abstract idea of a substance common to them, a substrate. However, according to B., this is impossible: we do not and cannot have feelings. perception of matter as such; our perception of each thing decomposes without remainder into the perception of a certain amount dept. sensations or, in B.'s terminology, “ideas.” For things, “to be” always means “to be in perception.” In contrast to Locke, B. argued that our mind can form a general idea of a thing, but not a general idea of matter, which science and philosophy do not need at all, for the idea of matter does not add anything to the properties of things beyond what it can give to the senses. perception. Using metaphysical the one-sidedness of nominalism, which rejected the objectivity of the general in individual things, B. came out with a denial of the reality of universals and the very possibility of abstract concepts. B.'s nominalism merges with empiricism. limitations, with underestimation of rational knowledge. V. opposed the distinction between primary and secondary qualities: all qualities are secondary, since their existence is entirely reduced to the ability to be perceived. Having recognized the idea of the separation of primary and secondary qualities as erroneous, B. also denied the idea of matter as a “support” or “substrate” based on it. (“substances”), all objective qualities of bodies. Rejecting the existence of matter, B. recognized the existence of only spiritual existence, which he divided into “ideas” and “souls.” “Ideas” - the subjective qualities you perceive - are passive, involuntary; the content of our sensations and perceptions is completely independent of us. On the contrary, “souls” are active, active, and can be a cause. All “ideas” exist, according to B., only in the soul (both thoughts and passions, and various sensations). "Ideas" cannot be copies or similarities ext. things: an “idea” can only be similar to an “idea”. Trying to reject the inevitable conclusions for subjective idealism leading to solipsism, V. argued that there is more than one perceiving subject, and a thing that one subject has ceased to perceive can be perceived etc. subjects. But even if all subjects disappeared, things would continue to exist as a sum of “ideas” in the mind of God - the subject, who eternally exists and “puts” into consciousness dept. subjects the content of their sensations. Here B. “... approaches... objective idealism...” (Lenin V.I., PSS, T. 18, With. 24) . B. did not limit himself to speaking out against atheism and materialism in philosophy. Exploiting Weaknesses modern him metaphysical. and mechanical stitch. materialism, he opposed advanced, materialistic. ideas in science. The philosophy of B., as Lenin showed in “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,” was the prototype and one of the sources of subjective idealism. theories in bourgeois philosophy con. 19 - beginning 20 centuries ( see Machism). The works, ?. 1 - 9, L., 1948-57; V rus. trans. - Soch., M., 1978. B l o n s i i y P. P., B.’s Doctrine of Reality, K., ; Ogomolov A.S., Criticism of subjective-idealistic. philosophy J.B., M., 1959; B y x about in with to and y B. E., J. B., M., 1970; H a p s k i y I. S., Western-European. philosophy.18 V., M., 1973, Ch. 2; M e t z R., G. Berkeley, Stuttg., 1925; Luce A. ?., Berkeley's immaterialism, L., 1945; Warnock G. J., Berkeley, L., 1953; L him in A. L., G. Berkeley, P., 1959; ? 1t-c h i e A.D., G. Berkeley, ; S e ? a r s R. W., Lending a hand to Hylas, 1968.
Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ch. editor: L. F. Ilyichev, P. N. Fedoseev, S. M. Kovalev, V. G. Panov. 1983.
BERKELEY (Berkeley)
George (b. 12 March 1684, Dysart Castle, Ireland - d. 23 Jan. 1753, Oxford) - English theologian and philosopher. Taught that external world does not exist independently of perception and thinking. The existence of things consists only in the fact that they are perceived (esse percipi); In general, there is nothing that really exists (real existiert) except the substance of the spirit, soul and my Self. Ideas (which are imprints of the divine spirit in us) are reality for us, since we are not talking about fantasies, dreams, etc. Main. work: “Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge”, 1710 (Russian translation “Treatise on the principles of human knowledge”, 1905).
Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. 2010.
BERKELEY, George (March 12, 1685 - Jan. 14, 1753) - English. philosopher is a subjective idealist. Genus. in Ireland in English noble family. He received his education at the University of Dublin. In 1734 B. took the episcopal see in Cloyne (Ireland). Already from a young age, B. entered into the fight against modern times. him with advanced thought. Observing the successes of philosophy. materialism, B. decided to strike not at K.-L. individual manifestations of materialism, but at its center. concept - the concept of matter as substances. bases (substance) of bodies. B. also opposed Newton's teaching about space as the container of all natural bodies and against Locke's teaching about the origin of the concepts of matter and space through abstraction from the properties of real objects. Already in his early work “An essay towards a new theory of vision”, 1709, Russian translation 1912), B. led the preparation. work in this direction. According to B., we cannot abstract the extension of bodies in space from all other tangible and visible qualities and cannot arrive at a general idea of space that is unrelated to any of these qualities. If the abstraction of space is impossible and even absurd, then, in his opinion, the situation is no different with the abstraction of matter. B. devoted his “Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge” (“A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge”, 1710) and the dialogue “Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous...” to an attempt to prove this idea. , 1713, Russian translation 1937). In these op. B. stated that his main goal is the fight against atheism and, consequently, against materialism and all manifestations of materialism in science. “... Even if those arguments,” wrote B., “that we put forward against it (“matter”) were considered insufficiently conclusive (as for me, I consider them quite obvious), then I am still sure that all friends of truth, peace and religion have reason to want these arguments to be recognized as sufficient" (quoted from the book: V.I. Lenin, Soch., 4th ed., vol. 14, p. 16). According to B., the concept of matter is based on the assumption that we can, abstracting from the particular properties of things, form an abstract idea of the substance common to them. substrate. But this, according to B., is impossible: we do not and cannot have feelings. perception of matter as such; our perception of each thing is completely decomposed into the perception of a certain sum of individual sensations or, in B.'s terminology, “ideas.” For things, "to be" always means "to be in perception." But, according to B., we cannot have a general abstract idea of matter. It cannot exist, just as there cannot be a general abstract idea of space. In contrast to Locke, B. argued that our mind can form a general idea of a thing, but not a general abstract idea of matter; philosophy and science do not need the latter. This idea, firstly, is unnecessary for cognition, because cannot add to the properties of things any more than those that reveal feelings in them. perception. Secondly, it cannot explain how our sensations and ideas arise. Thirdly, the abstract idea of matter is internally contradictory and therefore impossible. B. opposed the distinction between secondary qualities and primary qualities: all qualities, without exception, are secondary. Their being is entirely reduced to their ability to be perceived. Since the idea of two classes of qualities, according to B., is erroneous, the idea of matter based on it as a “support” or “substrate” (“substance”) of all objective qualities of bodies is also erroneous. All ideas exist, according to B., only in the soul - not only our thoughts and passions, but also various sensations. Ideas cannot be copies or similarities of external things, which are usually thought to exist outside the spirit. An idea can only be similar to an idea, and not to a thing that exists independently of the spirit. B.'s teaching is the teaching of subjective idealism (see Idealism). Rejecting the existence of matter, B. recognized the existence of only spiritual existence. At the same time, B. divided the entire area of spiritual existence into two parts: “ideas” and “souls.” “Ideas”—the subjective qualities we perceive—are passive, involuntary. The content of our sensations and perceptions is completely independent of us. “When I open my eyes in full daylight,” says B., “it is not up to my will to choose between seeing or not seeing, and also to determine which objects will appear to my gaze; the same applies to hearing and other sensations: ideas imprinted from them are not the creation of my will" ("The Works", v. 1, Oxford, 1901, p. 273). On the contrary, “souls,” according to B., unlike “ideas,” are active, active, and can be a cause. Being a supporter of subjective idealism, B. tried to reject the inevitable conclusions leading to solipsism. To avoid this conclusion, B. introduced a number of reservations into his teaching. Although things (i.e. sums of “ideas”) exist only as an object of perception, the perceiving subject, according to B., does not exist alone in the world. A thing that one subject has ceased to perceive can be perceived by other subjects. But even if all subjects disappeared, things would not turn into nothing. They would continue to exist as the sum of "ideas" in the mind of God. God is such a subject who, although existing eternally, cannot disappear. And therefore the entire world of things created by him cannot disappear. It is God, according to B., who “puts” into the consciousness of individual subjects the content of the sensations that arise in them when contemplating the world and individual things. Here B. “approaches... to objective idealism” (V.I. Lenin). Like his older contemporary - the French. to the idealist Malebranche - B. taught about the reality of things in the mind of God. Thus, his teaching came closer to the teaching of the Neoplatonists (see Neoplatonism). B. did not limit himself to speaking out against atheism and materialism in philosophy. Using the weaknesses of modern him metaphysical. and mechanistic materialism, as well as the lack of clarity of certain concepts of new mathematics, B. spoke out against materialism and advanced ideas in science. Thus, in mathematics, he took up arms against the infinitesimal calculus created by Leibniz and Newton. In modern physics. In his era, B. criticized those concepts that are associated with the recognition of the existence of matter, as well as with the recognition of causality and space. In the ideological struggle that took place in the first half. In the 18th century, B. acted as a convinced militant reactionary in philosophy and science. His teaching is not only in modern times. his era, but also in the 20th century. turned out to be an ideological support for theories of subjective idealism. B. expounded extremely clearly the doctrine that was in the later bourgeoisie. idealistic currents - empirio-criticism and others - was clothed in an extremely confused, scholastic. form. The importance of B. in the history of philosophy was determined by Lenin, showing in “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism” that one of the sources of reaction. subjective-idealistic theories that arose at the end of the 19th century - beginning. 20th centuries in bourgeois science, was subjective idealism B. Having reduced all these theories to their prototype in the teachings of B., Lenin proved them theoretically. failure and their reaction. essence. Op.: The works, ed. by A. A. Luce and i.e. Jessop, v. 1–9, L., 1948–57. "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" – main. prod. B. First ed. – 1710, Dublin, second – 1734, London. The first translations on it. language 1869, in French. 1920, in Italian. 1909, in Polish. 1890. In Russian. language there is a translation of E. Φ. Debolsky (St. Petersburg, 1905). Lit.: Lenin V.I., Materialism and empirio-criticism, Works, 4th ed., vol. 14; Diderot D., Collection. soch., vol. 1, M.–L., 1935, p. 248–49, 378–79; Τyurgo A.R., Letters to Abbot Sise the Elder, Izbr. Philosophical works., M., 1937; Smirnov A., Philosophy of Berkeley. Historical and critical essay, Warsaw, 1873; Blonsky P. P., Berkeley’s Doctrine of Reality, Kyiv, [b. G.]; him, Berkeley as the founder of modern immanentism, “Questions in Philosophy and Psychology,” 1910, book. 103; Deborin A., Berkeley's Phenomenalism, in his book: Introduction to the philosophy of dialectical materialism, P., 1916, p. 70–107; History of philosophy, vol. 1, M., 1957, p. 443–48; Bogomolov A. S., Criticism is subjective idealistic philosophy J. Berkeley, M., 1959; Jessop T. E., A bibliography of George Berkeley, Oxf., 1934; Luce A. A., Berkeley and Malebranche. L., 1934; his, The life of George Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, L., ; Wild J., George Berkeley, L., 1936; Warnock G. J., Berkeley, L. - Baltimore, 1953; Gueroult M., Berkeley..., P., 1956. V. Asmus. Moscow.Philosophical Encyclopedia. In 5 volumes - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by F.V. Konstantinov. 1960-1970.
Berkeley BERKELEY (Berkeley) George (March 12, 1685, near Kilkenny, Ireland - January 14, 1753, Oxford) - Anglo-Irish philosopher and scientist, bishop of the Church of England. Born into an English noble family. Educated at Dublin University. In 1734 he took the episcopal see in Cloyne (Ireland). The greatest influence on the formation philosophical views Berkeley influenced English empiricism, represented by the works J. Locke , as well as continental philosophy represented by the Cartesian N. Malebranche and skeptic P. Bayle . Berkeley's philosophy, called immaterialism, denies the doctrine of the existence of an absolute material substance based on the theory of general abstract ideas and recognizes the true reality exclusively of spiritual entities. In his early work “An Essay towards the New Theory of Vision” (1709, Russian translation 1912), Berkeley, based on the assumption that distance itself is not directly perceived by vision, argues that our judgments, according to in which material objects, perceived by sight, are at some distance, or outside the spirit, are entirely the results of experience; material objects as objects of vision only seem external to the perceiving mind, but in reality do not have an existence independent of the human spirit. From this Berkeley concludes that the objects of visual experience do not exist objectively. In his main philosophical works - “A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge” (1710, Russian translation 1905) and the dialogue “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous” (1713 , Russian translation 1937) Berkeley develops the thesis that material things exist only by being perceived by us. Starting from the position that there cannot be general abstract ideas, Berkeley on this basis denies that we are able, abstracting from the sensory qualities of material things, to form the idea of an absolute bodily substance that would act as a “substrate” or “support” individual sensory qualities. Physical objects are combinations of sense data (called “ideas” by Berkeley) that are perceived by our minds. Since the existence of an idea consists entirely in its perceptibility (esse est percipi), it is not capable of existing “outside the mind”. In contrast to specific individual ideas of the sensory qualities of material things, the general abstract idea of absolute material substance is, according to Berkeley, internally contradictory and therefore impossible. According to the doctrine of immaterialism developed by Berkeley, matter should not be considered either as 1) an absolute substance existing outside our mind; neither as 2) a “stand” or “carrier” of the objective sensory qualities of things that is not directly perceived by us; nor as 3) an efficient cause that produces in us sensations and perceptions of external physical objects; nor as 4) an occasional cause of our sensations and ideas (see. occasionalism). Berkeley opposed Locke's division of all sensory qualities into primary and secondary; for him all qualities are secondary, or subjective. Locke's concept, according to which ideas of primary qualities are copies, or reflections, of properties inherent in external material things, Berkeley considers meaningless: “I answer, that an idea cannot resemble anything else but an idea; a color or figure cannot resemble anything other than another color, another figure” (Soch., 1978, p. 174). Berkeley divides all mental entities into two large classes: “ideas” and “spirits.” Ideas - the sensory qualities of material things - are completely inert and inactive, there is no force or activity in them. Because of this, an idea cannot be the cause of anything. In contrast to “ideas,” “spirits” are cognitive, active beings. As beings that perceive ideas, spirits are called mind, and as beings that produce or act on ideas, they are called will. Berkeley recognizes the existence of three qualitatively heterogeneous spheres of existence: the absolute Spirit, or Creator of nature, finite “spirits” created by the absolute Spirit, and sensory data (“ideas”), which are invested by the absolute Spirit in finite spirits, or souls, and the combinations of which constitute physical objects outside world. For physical objects, “to be” means to be perceived (esse est percipi). Berkeley attributes a special type of existence to “souls” or “spirits”: for them “to be” means to perceive sensory data and their complexes (esse est percipere). One of the central problems that Berkeley faced was the problem of the continuity of existence of material things. Berkeley argues that material things that are not perceived by one subject continue to exist at that moment in the perceptions of other people. But even if all people disappeared, material things would not cease to exist. According to Berkeley, physical objects, which are not perceived by man either actually or potentially, continue to exist continuously in the “divine mind” (in the mind of God), that is, in the absolute Spirit. Berkeley’s moral and ethical views found their most complete expression in the treatise “Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher” (Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher, 1732, Russian translation 1996), dedicated to the refutation of the educational ideas of E. Shaftesbury and B. Mandeville and the apology of Christianity. In the treatise “Seiris, or the Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Research” (Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries, 1744, Russian. lane 1978) Berkeley as the ultimate goal philosophical knowledge puts forward an intellectual contemplation of God, which he interprets as Plato’s highest idea, or Spirit. Op.: The Works, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, v. 1-9. L., 1948-57; Op. M., 1978; Alkiphron. Works from different years. St. Petersburg, 1996. Lit.: Smirnov A.I. Philosophy of Berkeley. Historical and critical essay. Warsaw, 1873; Blonsky P. P. Berkeley’s Doctrine of Reality. K., 1907; It's him. Historical context of Berkeley's philosophy. - In the collection: To Georgy Ivanovich Chelpanov on his 60th birthday. M., 1916, p. 79-100; Bagretsov L. M. A few words about the origin of Berkeley’s idealistic system. Kharkov, 1908; Ern W. F. Berkeley as the founder of modern immanentism. - “Questions of philosophy and psychology”, 1910, book. 103, p. 413-436; Bogomolov A. S. Criticism of the subjective-idealistic philosophy of J. Berkeley. M., 1959; Bykhovsky B. E. Berkeley. M., 1970; Jessop T. E. A Bibliography of George Berkeley. Oxf., 1934; Luce A. A. Berkeley and Malebranche. L., 1934; Idem. The Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. L., 1949; Wild J. George Berkeley. L., 1936; Warnock G. J. Berkeley. L.-Balt., 1953; Wisdom J. The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy. L., 1953; Johnston G. A. The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy. N.Y., 1965; Ardley G. Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy. The Hague, 1968; Olscamp P. J. The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley. Den Haag, 1970; Park D. A. Critical Study of Berkeley's Theory of Concepts. The Hague, 1972; Pitcher G. Berkeley. Boston, 1977. T. A. Dmitriev
New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M.: Thought. Edited by V. S. Stepin. 2001.
George Berkeley
Berkeley was born in the south of Ireland in 1685 into an English noble family, studied first at the school where Jonathan Swift had studied before him, and at the age of 15 he entered Holy Trinity College, Dublin Theological University. In 1704, Berkeley became a Bachelor of Arts, and from 1707 he taught at the same college. In 1709 he was ordained deacon Church of England. At the same time, his first work, “Experiments in a New Theory of Vision,” was published.
After this, Berkeley published his works quite often; he intensively developed his new theory, rooted in Locke’s sensationalism. In 1710, he published a treatise “On the Principles of Human Knowledge” (his main work), and in 1713, Berkeley presented the ideas presented in this treatise in a more popular form in the work “Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus”. These are dialogues between fictional characters (“Gilas” from the Greek word +ul)h - “matter”, and Philonus - “lover of the mind”, “philosopher”).
In 1728, he left for America on Long Island, where he wanted to found a college to train preachers for missionary work in America, but this did not work out, and in 1731 he returned to his homeland. In 1732, Antiphron was published - a theological work, an apology for Christianity. In 1734, Berkeley became a bishop of the Anglican Church and until 1752 he served in the city of Klein in the south of Ireland. At this time he practically does not write, his only work is “Seiris”, where he critically analyzes the mathematical ideas of Newton and Leibniz. In 1752 he was invited to Oxford, but in 1753 he died.
Berkeley saw the task of his philosophy in the apology of Christianity and criticism of atheism. It is on this basis that his entire philosophy should be understood, otherwise we will really interpret Berkeley as a subjective idealist, which he, of course, was not. Otherwise, he would not be a Christian at all, not even a member of the Anglican Church, no matter how it was treated. Even the Anglicans do not undertake to assert the truth of subjective idealism and assert that there is nothing in the world except the cognizing subject.
So, the goal of Berkeley's philosophy is an apology for Christianity and criticism of atheism. Berkeley considered atheism and materialism to be his main enemies. Where does the belief in the objective existence of matter, independent of man, come from? It is the answer to this question that Berkeley tries to find in his first work, “An Attempt on a New Theory of Vision.”
Berkeley finds the reason for this belief in his conviction in the objective existence of space and criticizes Newton's understanding of space as a certain container of bodies. In his next work, the treatise “On the Principles of Human Knowledge” (and in “Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus”), Berkeley is more consistent and sees the reason for the existence of materialism in people’s belief in the existence of matter. It is to the criticism of this confidence that Berkeley devotes these two works.
Berkeley first considers the problem of general concepts. He writes that the main misconception of people is that they believe in the existence of general concepts, in the fact that a general concept is formed through abstraction. A person, observing various objects (say, chalk, sugar, snow), discovers the property of all these objects to be white, so he abstracts the property of whiteness from the bearer of this property and believes that in this way the concept of whiteness is formed. Next, a person can perform the next stage of abstraction - introduce the concept of color, etc. down to the most general concepts, the most general of which is the concept of material substance. Therefore, to refute the belief in the existence of matter (material substance), Berkeley first considers the problem of the formation of general concepts.
He claims that, as he writes ironically, if one of the people has the ability to abstract (the property of forming abstractions), then he is ready to meet this person, because he himself does not possess such an ability. Whatever general concept Berkeley tries to imagine, he always imagines it in conjunction with a certain material carrier. If Berkeley tries to imagine whiteness, he imagines snow or chalk; if he tries to imagine a person in general, then he also fails - an image of a specific person always arises in his mind. Therefore, there are no general concepts - this is a mistake of philosophers, which, according to Berkeley, arises from the incorrect use of words (more precisely, from the abuse of words), since people, using words (and such words as “whiteness” and “man”, of course, exist), they believe that these words really mean something.
According to Berkeley, these words do not mean anything other than a specific material object. There is no person in general - there is only a specific individual person; There is no idea of a person - there is an idea of a specific person. Therefore, the word is a sign (here Berkeley agrees with Hobbes), but not a sign of a general idea existing in our mind, but a sign of an idea corresponding to a specific object. Therefore, there is no concept of matter, just as there is no idea of matter as the most general concept, and Berkeley tries to show in his treatise that this concept is also harmful and contradictory.
Berkeley considers his task from the point of view of the philosophy of John Locke, who, as we remember, said that there are primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley argues that there is no difference between them. Locke (and before him Galileo and even earlier Democritus) calls primary qualities qualities that belong to the material object itself. These are its shape, weight, size, etc., and secondary qualities (taste, color and smell) do not belong to the object, but arise in the mind of the subject who perceives these qualities.
Berkeley argues that there is no difference between primary and secondary qualities, and therefore material objects do not possess either one or the other. In his early work, Essays on a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley criticized only vision, believing that things do not have such a primary quality as color, and then, applying the same principles to all other qualities, he proved that an object has no qualities .
Berkeley proceeds from the principle that we judge the existence of a thing on the basis of what we perceive it, i.e. States that . Therefore, sensory things are those things that can be perceived by the senses directly, and not through words, concepts, etc.
What do we perceive through our senses? Of course, in feelings we are given certain qualities, but not the objects themselves, therefore sensory things are only a set of these qualities or a combination of them, but not the object itself. Berkeley examines each specific quality to show that none of them belongs to the subject.
First, he considers heat and says that since strong heat and strong cold cause suffering, and suffering is a property only of a living, thinking being, then heat cannot belong to an inanimate material object. For example, if a person places one hand in cold water and the other in hot water and then immerses both hands in warm water, the water will appear warm to one hand and hot to the other. Since the same water cannot be both warm and hot at the same time, it means that water does not have heat or cold in it. Warmth and cold are properties of the perceiving subject.
Berkeley does the same with other secondary qualities - taste and smell. Taste and smell also cannot exist in an object; they can only exist in a person. The sound also cannot belong to the object itself, although it represents, as scientists say, air vibrations (a bell does not sound if it is placed in a vacuum). To this Berkeley objects: if sound is vibrations of atoms or molecules of air, then we should see the sound or feel its vibrations. If we hear sound, then, therefore, we also distinguish the sound image that arises in our consciousness from those vibrations that occur in the air or in the body itself. Therefore, sound also belongs only to the subject.
About color. If the color belongs to the subject, then, say, the cloud will be purple at sunset, and not white, as it is during the day. Since antiquity, there have been other proofs of the subjectivity of color. Thus, a person with jaundice perceives colors completely differently than a healthy person; If we look at an object painted in one color through a microscope, then we will see completely different colors. Therefore, it cannot be said that color belongs to the object itself - color is a property of the subject.
But we already know these arguments; they were found in Democritus, Galileo, Locke. Berkeley claims that not only secondary, but also primary qualities do not belong to objects. Indeed, the magnitude, i.e. extension and shape cannot be inherent in the object itself, since the same object can appear both large and small - we are near or far from it. There are small animals to which the same thing may seem significantly larger than to us (a thing cannot be both large and small at the same time). Another primary quality, motion, is also not inherent in the things themselves, because motion is relative and we can say that a thing is moving fast, slow or at rest depending on the point from which we look at it. Density is the body’s resistance to the force acting on it, therefore we also perceive density based on our senses, which means that it does not belong to objects. Therefore there are no primary qualities.
Another argument. How do we perceive primary qualities - say, extension, shape and motion? There cannot be a body that has extension and is not painted in any color. We cannot perceive the density of a body without touch. Therefore, we always perceive primary qualities through secondary qualities. If the body were not painted in any color, then we would not perceive either the shape, movement, or size of this body. Therefore, there are neither primary nor secondary qualities, and the mistake of people who recognize the objectivity of primary qualities is that primary qualities, when influencing a person, do not evoke any emotions in him, and secondary qualities evoke in him a state of pleasure or displeasure. On this basis, the conclusion is drawn that secondary qualities exist in a person, and primary ones are objective. But the fact that primary qualities do not cause any pleasure and no emotions at all does not speak in favor of their objectivity.
What does it mean that matter is extended? What does the word “support” generally mean, which we use when speaking about the substrate, about substance (that substance is, as it were, a support, a certain substance located under all things - something that supports all the variety of material things)? What is “to support,” what is “to extend under,” asks Berkeley. I see specific objects, but I do not perceive what is underneath them, what supports them. I perceive sensations about these objects; I have no feeling about matter. Therefore, the concept of matter does not arise on the basis of sensation, and therefore there is no material substrate (remember that for Berkeley the main principle was to exist means to be perceived).
Based on these arguments, one could conclude that neither matter nor material things exist. But it is not so. Berkeley wants to show what absurd conclusions can be reached if we assume the objective, independent existence of matter. It turns out that the existence of matter is self-contradictory: assuming that matter exists and that it affects our senses, we come to the conclusion that neither matter nor material bodies exist. But Berkeley argues that the materialist falls into his characteristic error: based on the existence of a material substratum, he comes to the conclusion that the material substratum does not exist. That is, if we assume that feelings reflect the properties of the real material world, then we come to the conclusion that this world does not exist. Therefore, the concept of matter is not only redundant (since we cognize only the data of our senses and we do not need any concept of matter for this), but also contradictory, since by admitting that matter exists, we come to the conclusion that no matter exists. Therefore, says Berkeley, we must proceed from completely different principles of knowledge, since we have proven that materialism is self-contradictory and leads to the denial of itself.
Berkeley claims that all the diversity of things really exists, but not as a material reality independent of my mind, but as something that exists only in the mind. Berkeley does not say “in my mind,” but simply “in my mind.” All people perceive the same objects in the same way - therefore, they do not exist in my mind, but in the mind in general. Therefore, if we are sure that the world exists, then there is a certain mind that gives birth to this world. Thus Berkeley comes to the proof of the existence of God. Usually people, says Berkeley, follow a slightly different logical chain: they believe in God and, on the basis of their faith, conclude the existence of the world. I believe in the existence of the world and conclude that God exists.
Berkeley's logic is clear: to exist means to be perceived; if I perceive certain feelings in myself, then I conclude that the world exists; I also conclude that no material substance is absolutely necessary for this. Since I know that this world is perceived in the same way by other people, I understand that the world exists not only in my mind, but also in the mind of others, which embraces both this material world and our souls.
Plotinus had approximately the same system of constructing philosophy: the world exists in the Mind, we cognize sensory objects (the material world) insofar as each soul is contained in the world soul and has ideas belonging to the universal mind. Therefore, Berkeley does not stand on the position of subjective idealism (if anyone can be blamed for this, then, on the contrary, Berkeley’s opponent is a materialist, who, indeed, logically reasoning, comes to the conclusion that there is only the mind, only the cognizing subject, that there is no material carrier and there is no outside world at all).
According to Berkeley, the external world exists, it is real, just as every person is real, and not just the subject, the cognizing Self. This proves that God exists. It would be difficult to admit otherwise, understanding that Berkeley was a Christian and saw the main goal of his philosophy in the apology of Christianity.
Berkeley's teaching did not receive support from the Anglican Church, but it did not raise any particular objections either, since Berkeley continued his diaconal ministry, and was later even ordained a bishop.
So Berkeley criticizes the concept of substance, but only material substance. There is no material substance - only spiritual substance exists, which is God. God is fully active, He creates ideas and our souls. Ideas are completely passive, but our souls can be both passive and active. They are active if we perceive them from the point of view of cognitive ideas, and passive insofar as they are created by God. Therefore, there is no material world - there is only God, and nothing else. God creates souls and puts ideas into them; He creates souls in such a way that he puts the same ideas into all souls. Therefore, all souls work in the same way and perceive ideas in the same way - not only the world around them, but also the laws of morality, logic, aesthetics and in general that which cannot be attributed to the material world.
If we proceed from the belief in the existence of matter, then it is impossible to explain the cognizability of the material world, because like is cognizable by like, spirit can only cognize spirit. If we cognize the external objective world, then this shows that we cognize the spiritual nature, and not the material, otherwise we would not cognize it. If there are sciences that study the laws of nature, then the laws also cannot belong to matter - matter is inert and motionless; these laws can only belong to the Creator of this world. And since we cognize these laws, we have one nature with the Creator and with these laws. For Berkeley it is obvious that there is no matter, that there is only spirit - the Divine Spirit and our souls, and that God creates in us ideas that are connected, follow one another, and from their sequence we conclude that one phenomenon is the cause of another and etc. In fact, no phenomenon is the cause of another, but the cause of everything is the Creator, Who arranges these ideas in our soul in exactly this way and not otherwise.
Thus, Berkeley fulfilled his task in his own way, showing that materialism is self-contradictory and the recognition of matter as an objective reality is unnecessary and does not follow from any of our sensory data.
Berkeley's propositions, which stemmed from Lockean sensationalism, were developed by another English (or rather Scottish) philosopher, David Hume.
George Berkeley: philosophy, basic ideas, biography
Among philosophers professing empirical and idealistic views, one of the most famous is George Berkeley. His father was English, but George considered himself Irish, since it was there, in the south of Ireland, that he was born in 1685. At the age of fifteen, the young man began a period of study at college, with which he would be associated in one way or another for a long period of his life (until 1724). In 1704, Berkeley Jr. received a bachelor's degree, and three years later - a master's degree with the right to teach in junior teaching staff. A few years later he became a priest of the Church of England, and then a doctor of philosophy and a senior lecturer at the college.
Subjective idealism
Even in his youth, D. Berkeley, choosing between materialistic views and subjective idealism, took the side of the latter. He became a defender of religion and in his works showed the dependence of man’s perception of matter on the way in which the soul (mind, consciousness) formed by God sees and feels it. Even in his youth, works were written that became significant for the development of philosophical thought and glorified the name - George Berkeley.
Philosophy and the search for truth became the meaning of life for the Irish thinker. Among his works are interesting: “An Experience in a New Theory of Vision”, “Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge”, “Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus”. By publishing a work on new vision, the young philosopher set himself the goal of belittling the importance of the primary qualities that prove the independence of our consciousness and the reality of matter. In contrast to Descartes' theory of the extension of bodies, which had already gained popularity at that time, he reveals the dependence of the perception of distance, shape and position of objects through vision. According to the philosopher, the connection between various sensations is an area of logic that is formed empirically.
Significant works of the philosopher
Among the thinker’s works there were various reflections, including those with a theological bias. But one of the most interesting works is “Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonus” (George Berkeley - philosophy), which can be briefly described as follows: the author raised the question of metaphysical perception of the relativity of comprehension of reality, as well as phenomenalism. In his work "Motion" Berkeley challenges Newton's views on the abstract understanding of motion. George's philosophical approach is that motion cannot be independent of space and time. Not only this concept was criticized by the philosopher, but also many other categories of Newton.
Two more works by Berkeley are also worthy of attention: a conversation between freethinkers “Alciphron” and philosophical discussions about tar water, where he raises the question of the medical benefits of tar, and also retreats towards abstract free topics of a philosophical and theological nature.
Family
The philosopher's wife was Anna Forster, a judge's daughter (her father was the Irish chief justice of litigation). It is worth noting George's easy-going, friendly and cheerful character. He was loved by friends and acquaintances. Soon there was an orphanage under his care, founded by a royal charter. His wife bore him seven children. However, in those days, many children did not live to adulthood due to illness. Berkeley had only three survivors, and the rest died.
When George Berkeley received an inheritance, he came up with a proposal to found a school in Bermuda where pagans would be converted to the Christian faith. At first, the mission was fully accepted and approved by Parliament, and also supported by aristocratic circles. However, when the missionary and his companions retired to the island, she was gradually forgotten. And without proper funding, the scientist-philosopher had to stop missionary work. Gradually he leaves his business and spends more time with his son. George Berkeley lived sixty-seven years and died in 1752. The city of Berkeley in one of the American states, California, is named after him.
Berkeley Ontology
Many thinkers, including Kant and Hume, were influenced by the worldview of the great philosopher. The main idea that Berkeley preached in his views was the importance of the touch of the soul and the images formed by it. In other words, any perception of matter is a consequence of the perception of it by the human soul. His main doctrine was the theory of subjective idealism: “There is only me and my sensory perception of the world. Matter does not exist, there is only my subjective perception of it. God sends and forms ideas, thanks to which a person perceives everything in this world...”
In the philosopher's understanding, to exist is to perceive. Berkeley's ontology is the principle of solipsism. According to the views of the thinker, the existence of other souls that have a “final” design is only a plausible probable conclusion, the basis of which is analogies.
Inconsistency of views
However, there is some inconsistency in the philosopher’s teaching. For example, in the same substance “I” he used the same arguments to criticize the material and prove the indivisibility and unity of the beginning. However, his follower David Hume formalized these ideas into a theory, where he transferred the concept of matter to the spiritual component: the individual “I” is a “bundle of perceptions.” One cannot help but be drawn away from a materialistic view when studying the works that philosopher George Berkeley wrote.
Quotes from the theologian and thinker inspire the idea of the eternity and significance of God in human life, his dependence on the Almighty. However, at the same time one comes across some inconsistency and inconsistency in Berkeley’s works, which is revealed in the critical statements of many philosophers.
Continentality and Berkeley Philosophy
Berkeley came to the conclusion about the existence of God, who alone generates sensations in the souls of people with his will. In his opinion, a person has no power over his feelings, even if it seems so to him. After all, if a person opens his eyes and sees the light, this does not depend on his will, or hears a bird, this is also not his will. He cannot choose between “seeing” and “not seeing,” which means there is another will, more high level which produces feelings and sensations in a person.
Studying the works written by George Berkeley, some researchers came to the conclusion (which, however, has not been conclusively confirmed, but has a right to exist) that the philosopher’s views were formed on the basis of Malebranche’s theory. This makes it possible to consider D. Berkeley an Irish Cartesian, rejecting the presence of empiricism in his teaching. Since 1977, a newsletter magazine has been published in Ireland in honor of the great philosopher.
Historical place in philosophy
The teaching that George Berkeley left behind, the biography of the thinker - all this is of great interest and value for the historical development of philosophy. His theory gave some new impetus, a new spiral of development in the direction of philosophical thought. Schopenhauer considers Berkeley's merits immortal and calls him the father of idealism. Thomas Reid was also for a long time impressed by the philosophical thought preached by George Berkeley. The philosopher's basic ideas will be studied by more than one generation of thinkers. However, many of them, including Thomas Reid, subsequently began to criticize them.
Berkeley's teachings were included in philosophy textbooks as empirical views. More than one generation of philosophers will be impressed by his theory and then accept, develop or refute it. His views gained the greatest popularity in Poland, but in many Slavic countries his philosophy was widespread and took its rightful place among similar works.
Subjective idealism of J. Berkeley and agnosticism of D. Hume
According to his teaching, the monad is not sensually comprehensible: it can only be comprehended by the mind. (Comparable to Plato’s “world of ideas,” which can only be known by reason). Each monad is a kind of independent world, reflecting the entire world order. The highest monad is God (absolute).
Leibniz's monadology is objectively idealistic in nature. It is notable for its dialectical insights, among which are ideas about a dynamic understanding of the processes of nature and the interconnection through monads of all forms of manifestations of life: Leibniz believed that all nature is organic, living.
Leibniz's philosophical system was the result of a creative processing of ancient, medieval and contemporary philosophy.
George Berkeley (1685-1753), English philosopher, attributed to the traditions of subjective idealism, continued the empiric-sensualistic line in European philosophy.
Berkeley insisted on sensation, that is, the combination of sensations is, according to Berkeley, the things around us. The thinker put forward the principle: “To exist is to be perceived.” He wrote: “What do we perceive if not our own ideas or sensations?” He began to consider sensations as the only reality perceived by man.
Berkeley introduces four types of existence:
1 – exist – be perceived;
2 – exist – perceive;
3 – exist in the imagination of possible perception;
4 – existence, being of things and the whole world – in God.
Berkeley considered one of the main tasks of his philosophy to be the criticism of materialism and atheism.
He rejected even the very assumption of the existence of matter. Rejecting the existence of matter, he substantiates the existence of spiritual being, which he divides into:
1 – ideas are involuntary and passive subjective qualities perceived by us;
2 – souls – active and active, which have the ability to perceive ideas (mind), cause them or influence them (will).
Berkeley believed, therefore, that there cannot be a general abstract idea of matter, as well as an abstract idea of extension, space, etc. He sought to prove that the human mind cannot form a general abstract idea at all, but only a general idea of a thing.
Although Berkeley adhered to the principles of subjective idealism, in an effort to defend his position, he decided to support it by moving to objective idealistic positions. In particular, the philosopher expressed the following judgments: even if all the perceiving subjects disappear (and to exist, according to Berkeley, means to be perceived by the subject), then not a single thing will disappear. All of them will continue to exist in the mind of God as a sum of “ideas”, i.e. will continue to be perceived by him.
The English philosopher D. Berkeley (1684 – 1753) entered the history of philosophy as a representative of subjective idealism and agnosticism. He received his education at the University of Dublin, mainly teaching theology. In his main work, “Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge,” published in 1710, he outlined the principles of his teaching.
The influence that D. Locke's philosophy had during that period also affected Berkeley's views. He proceeded from sensualistic principles in matters of knowledge of the world. However, his epistemology was already of an idealistic nature, since he rejected Locke’s materialism: sensations, or “ideas,” in his opinion, are the only reality perceived by man. He designates all the qualities of objects as subjective; they are nothing more than subjective sensations. Therefore, he concluded that individual real objects – these are combinations of sensations. Consequently, he completely deprived the sense of objective content. To exist means to be perceived.
D. Berkeley proceeded from the position that everything that exists is singular. Hence the conclusion follows: the general exists only as a generalized image of the individual. This image is of a sensually-visual nature, and not abstract; abstract concepts are false concepts, moreover, they are generally impossible. He distinguished between general and abstract ideas. General ideas are those that can be perceived as visual representations. Abstract – abstract general ideas. At the same time, Berkeley distinguished between two types of distraction. With the first of them, separate parts or properties of an object are presented, which in reality can exist separately. In the second type, distractions are those that are actually inseparable from each other. This is what Berkeley rejects as illusory, as empty words to which no perceptions correspond. As examples of such abstract concepts, he took extension, movement, number, space, time, happiness, and goodness. It is impossible, Berkeley asserted, to form a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension without concrete sensory qualities, such as fast and slow, large and small, round and quadrangular, etc. It is also impossible to form the abstract idea of a circle, four-or triangle.
In contrast to the fictions of abstract concepts, general concepts are single images, distinguished by the fact that they serve in our consciousness as representatives of homogeneous things, their samples, examples of many particular ideas, since they can, in his opinion, replace all other particular ideas of that same kind. Since there are no visual images behind such words as “this”, “thing”, “number”, “infinity”, they are nothing more than empty words passed off as ideas. Berkeley's whole theory of abstraction was aimed at proving that only that which is perceived or imagined is real, but not that which is conceivable. He reduced the concept to representation, the rational to the empirical, the general to the individual. Thus, the qualitative line between the two forms of knowledge disappeared, and the higher of them, which allows one to penetrate into the essence of things, dissolved in the lower.
Reducing concepts to representations and homogeneity to a subjectively determined ordering of perceptions ignores the difference between similar and general. Although both are based on objective signs, similarity is recognized as a result of direct sensory perceptions, and commonality is recognized through abstract thinking in contrast to representations that are indirect in nature.
Based on Locke's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley, from the standpoint of idealistic sensationalism, recognized only secondary qualities, reducing primary to secondary. But for Locke, secondary qualities were not purely subjective, but a sensory refraction of objective (primary) qualities. Berkeley completely separated secondary qualities from their objective basis and gave them a completely subjectivist interpretation. He sought to prove that the subjectivity inherent in secondary qualities is equally inherent in primary qualities. Thus, all qualities are equally secondary, i.e. subjective.
Berkeley's reasoning meant subjective idealism: in fact, he recognized the existence only human consciousness, in which he distinguished between “ideas” and “souls”. Ideas are qualities given in our subjective perception. Souls are perceiving, active immaterial subjects of spiritual activity. According to Berkeley, ideas are completely passive. On the contrary, souls, unlike ideas, are active. This distinction is necessary for Berkeley to defend subjective idealism against inevitable and natural objections. He emphasized that the soul is the bearer of ideas as a substance and cannot be perceived in itself, but only by the actions it performs. Therefore, the human soul is incorporeal and immortal.
By defending the principle of subjective idealism, Berkeley wants to avoid solipsism, i.e. the conclusion that there is only one single perceiving subject. Therefore, contrary to the initial position of subjective idealism, he argues that the subject does not exist alone in the world. A thing that one subject has ceased to perceive can be perceived by another subject or other subjects. But even if all subjects disappeared, things would not turn into nothing. They would continue to exist as the sum of "ideas" in the mind of God. God is a subject who, in any case, cannot disappear. Therefore, the entire created world of things cannot disappear: the world of stars, planets and the Earth with everything that exists on it. It is God who “puts” into the consciousness of individual subjects the content of sensations that arise when contemplating the world and individual things. By recognizing a supernatural spiritual force - God, Berkeley takes a step towards objective idealism.
As can be seen, epistemological constructions pass into his ontological inferences. Berkeley saw one of his main tasks as refuting the concept of matter. Since matter as a substance is not an “idea”, it is not something due to which we can only assert the existence of something, our knowledge does not provide any grounds for recognizing the existence of matter. If matter cannot be perceived, if it is something invisible, intangible, etc., then on what basis can we claim that it exists? Matter, in his opinion, is the most abstract and incomprehensible of all ideas. As you know, Berkeley denied the existence of abstract ideas, and therefore believed that we should do away once and for all with what philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. He convinced that denying her would not bring any harm to the rest of the human race, which... would never notice her absence. And, although Berkeley frees himself from matter, nevertheless, he retains the idea of spiritual substance, speaking about the human soul as the bearer of ideas. He denied the internal activity of matter, its self-motion, considering them only appearance, perception. He also attributed space and time to concepts that do not have any objective content, but express only the coexistence of “ideas.” He declared the laws of nature, discovered by natural science, to be derived from the “supreme spirit”, or “supreme agent”, who is capable of both interrupting the course of nature in a miraculous way and directing its movement in the usual way. Moreover, his interpretation of laws did not simply boil down to theological interpretation; he saw them as a certain alternation of sensations generated or aroused in us by God or the soul.
Berkeley solved the problem of causality in a similar way. Physical causation, be it attraction or the action of other material forces, was categorically rejected by him. There is not and cannot be any other efficient cause other than the will of “a certain spirit” that produces phenomena, gives rise to our sensations or ideas. But the connection of ideas does not imply, as he believed, the relationship of cause to effect; these are just signs to the thing designated. So, visible fire there is no reason for the pain I experience when touching him, it is only a sign warning me against it. With these signs - marks, the deity informs us about what we can expect from certain actions and how certain sensations are aroused in our mind. Thus, according to Berkeley, causality is only a symbol of a certain connection between sensations.
If Locke does not resolve the problems that arose on the basis of empiricism, then the bishop from Ireland J. Berkeley speaks more definitely on this matter. The fact is that from empiricism, with its emphasis on the unconditional reliability of sensations, two opposite conclusions can be drawn. Thus, we can conclude that in sensations we are given an existing material world that exists independently of us. But the opposite can also be said: what we call objective world, is nothing other than our sensations. It was this thesis that Berkeley undertook to prove, arguing that to exist means to be perceived.
George Berkeley (1685-1753) was born in Ireland near Kilkenny and came from an English noble family. Berkeley's life is not rich in bright events. He graduated from the University of Dublin, where he received, among other things, natural science training. After graduating from university, Berkeley becomes a college theology teacher. Since 1713, he traveled a lot, making trips to Italy and France, where, in particular, he met Descartes' follower N. Malebranche. During these travels, Berkeley visits North America, where he plans to engage in missionary work. But due to lack of funds, he is forced to return to his homeland. Having received the rank of bishop of the Church of England in 1734, Berkeley spent the rest of his life in the town of Cloyne in Southern Ireland. Berkeley died in Oxford, where he had moved shortly before.
Berkeley's first serious philosophical work was published in 1709 and was called An Essay on a New Theory of Vision. Already in it he reinterprets Locke's views in a new way. A year later, another, most famous, work of Berkeley, “A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge” (1710), was published. It sets out the essence of his new philosophical position. In order to popularize these views, Berkeley soon wrote the work “Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus” (1713). In this work he attempts to refute the main objections raised against him. These are the works of the first period of his creativity.
Berkeley's second period of creativity occurred in the 1930s. XVII century. In 1732, he wrote the work “Alsiphron, or the Petty Philosopher,” directed against deism, which limits the role of God in the universe to the first impulse. As already mentioned, these views had many supporters in England at that time. The work “The Analyst, or Reasoning addressed to an unbelieving mathematician” (1734) was directed against Newton’s analysis of infinitesimal quantities. Berkeley's last work, Seiris, or a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries, was written in 1744 and contains an introspection of his own philosophical development. In it, subjective idealism is certainly inferior to objective idealism, which is quite natural for a bishop with 10 years of experience.
Earlier it was said that Locke gave rise to a subjectivist interpretation of sensory experience, declaring secondary qualities to be subjective. But Berkeley also had his own personal reasons for uprooting the materialist tendency in empiricism. And to do this, he essentially reverses one of the main theses in Locke’s teaching. If for Locke complex ideas are complexes of our sensations, then for Berkeley the things themselves turn out to be this kind of subjective complexes.
As already mentioned, being first a teacher of theology and then a bishop, Berkeley was well aware that philosophical materialism was in one way or another connected with atheism. That is why, in his Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, he directly states: “The only thing the existence of which we deny is what philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. Denying it does not cause any harm to the rest of the human race, which, I dare say, will never notice its absence. The atheist really needs this ghost of an empty name to justify his atheism, and philosophers will perhaps find that they have lost a strong reason for idle talk. But this is the only damage that I can see occurring.”
But Berkeley, despite his heroic efforts, was never able to destroy “matter” and defeat atheism. In his declining years, he will be forced to admit: “Of course, there are more and more atheists who do not adhere to any religion...”. And yet, Berkeley’s work was not in vain: he presented all possible arguments that can generally be brought against materialism from the standpoint of sensationalism. Hume in this case did not add anything new, but he turned the same arguments not only against materialism, but also against theism, that is, against God himself.
45 Berkeley J. Works. M., 1978. P. 186.
46 The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, in 9 vols. Ed. A.A. Luke a. THOSE. Jessop. London, 1948-1957. V. 1. P. 253.
Biographical information. George Berkeley (1685 - 1753) - English philosopher. Born in Ireland, he graduated from Trinity College in Dublin, where he studied mathematics, philosophy, logic, and classical literature.
Although the period of Berkeley’s creative activity falls entirely on the 18th century, i.e. era of Enlightenment, Berkeley himself cannot be considered an enlightener.
Main works. “House of the new theory of vision” (1709), “Treatise on the principles of human knowledge” (1710), “Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus” (1713), “Alsifron, or the Petty Philosopher” (1732), “Seiris, or the Purpose of Philosophical reflections and research" (1744).
Philosophical views. Ontology. Berkeley's philosophy is an original combination objective And subjective idealism 4 : objective, since God is recognized as the creator of reality, and subjective, since only the existence of a multitude of human consciousnesses (souls) is recognized as real. Continuing from ancient philosophy The division of existence into the real intelligible world and the illusory, sensory-perceptible one, Berkeley (like Leibniz) denies the real existence of the material corporeal world. According to Berkeley: “To exist is to be perceived”(“Esseest percipi”). Therefore, ontologies as such, i.e. Berkeley, strictly speaking, has no doctrine of being at all.
Berkeley's concept can be assessed as perfect sensationalism 5 , opposed materialistic sensationalism Locke.
Like Locke, Berkeley uses the term “idea” to characterize everything contained in our minds. He divides all ideas into “external” and “internal”:
The process of cognition occurs only where there are ideas. But ideas cannot exist in something that is devoid of both feeling and thinking.Ideas are also divided into simple And complex. And what we habitually call things are just complex ideas consisting of a number of simple ones (for example, the idea of an apple is a set of ideas of green color, round shape, apple taste, etc.). All the meaningful words of language that we use denote different ideas, i.e. something that is in our consciousness and nothing outside it. Therefore, when we talk about, say, time or space (extension), we must take into account that we actually mean ideas that are in our minds. And in substantiating this thesis, Berkeley makes an interesting argument: if time existed outside of our consciousness, then why does the time of suffering feel like it lasts a long time, and the time of pleasure flies by instantly? Similarly, when assessing the extent of bodies, we deal only with our subjective perception: distant bodies seem smaller, close ones - larger, when we look at them through lenses (glasses, telescope, etc.), objects change their size; Besides, different people evaluate the same object differently.
Consistently developing his approach, Berkeley criticizes theory of primary and secondary qualities(Galileo, Locke, etc.). Since there are no things that evoke certain sensations in us, the division into qualities that belong to things objectively (primary ones - length, heaviness, shape, etc.) and those that can be understood as subjective perception of the primary ones loses its meaning. qualities (secondary – color, taste, smell, etc.). Both primary and secondary qualities are just sensations.
The connection between sensations of different types (visual, auditory, gustatory, etc.) is also has no objective character: and only by virtue of experience and habit do we accept a certain set of sensations as this or that thing, although this thing does not really exist. And if it existed and was something different from this complex of sensations, then we still could not perceive it, since we perceive everything that happens from the outside only through the senses, as sensations.
Strictly speaking, we do not need the idea of things existing objectively and outside of us in order to explain the source of sensation. As the facts of dreams and delirium of madmen prove, sensations do not necessarily come from the outside, they can also arise within the mind.
Berkeley also denies the existence of any abstract ideas, recognizing the existence of exclusively concrete ones: we do not perceive “man”, “tree” or “extension”, but always only “this person”, “this tree”, “the extension of this object”. Abstract ideas, according to Berkeley, are dangerous illusions. At the same time, Berkeley is not so much against the materialistic tendencies of the deism of Descartes, Newton, and Locke of his day. He devotes a lot of attention to criticizing Newton's concept of “absolute space and time,” but especially attacks the concept of “matter” or “material substance.” Berkeley argues that this last concept gives us nothing for understanding being, and therefore it is simply not needed. And since its acceptance leads to materialism, atheism and godlessness, it is also very harmful. Therefore, it is generally better to abandon it.
Thus, Berkeley's ontology recognizes the existence of only many human consciousnesses(souls, intellects, minds) perceiving various kinds of ideas. But then, what explains the difference between the ideas that we can create in our minds at will, and those that come to us from the outside without our desire? Solving this problem, Berkeley introduces God into his ontology, who sends sensations to all human consciousnesses as signs so that people can regulate and preserve their lives. This step allows Berkeley to solve another problem - the problem of world stability. When people stop perceiving a certain thing, it does not disappear (as would follow from the previous arguments), since this thing continues to exist in the consciousness of God.
The fate of the teaching. Berkeley's ideas had a significant influence on the further development of European philosophy, especially modern (XIX-XX centuries): on the philosophy of life, empirio-criticism (Machism), phenomenology, existentialism.
Introduction p.3
1. Life and significance of scientific heritage p.4
2. Research program and first essays. p.8
3. Berkeley's philosophical concept. p.12
4. God, world and man in Berkeley’s concept p.18
Conclusion p.25
References p.26
Introduction
George Berkeley is the most significant English thinker of the first half of the 18th century. He devoted himself to defending religion and idealistic philosophy against materialism, atheism and freethinking.
Berkeley criticized the concepts of matter as the material basis (substance) of bodies, as well as I. Newton’s theory of space as the container of all natural bodies and the teachings of J. Locke on the origin of the concepts of matter and space.
Berkeley develops a theory of knowledge based on nominalism and phenomenalism, rich in witty argumentation and premonitions of those discoveries that, after his death, will excite and interest many philosophers for a long time.
The original postulate of Berkeleyism: to exist means to be perceived. Any object, for example, an apple, really exists for me, because I see it - it is red or green, of a certain size. I can bite into an apple and feel the taste. Finally, you can easily determine the density of the fruit, etc. An apple, therefore, is a complex of subjective sensations and nothing more.
Berkeley's teachings were initially met with disapproval, with poorly concealed contempt and statements that the philosopher was simply a madman in need of treatment. The wits of that time addressed him a question full of malice: Mr. Berkeley, but then your wife does not exist, since you do not perceive her at some point?
1. Life and significance of scientific heritage
An Englishman by nationality, George Berkeley was born in March 1685 in Ireland in Kilkenny and was the eldest of six children in the family. He was brought up at Dysert Castle in the vicinity of Thomastown; at the age of eleven he entered college in Kilkenny, and at the age of fifteen he became a student at Trinity College in Dublin. There he studied mathematics, philosophy, logic and the classics. In 1707 he became a college teacher; between 1707 and 1708 writes a number of critical notes (“Philosophical Notes”), which contain in basic terms his philosophical ideas. In 1709, Berkeley published “An Essay on a New Theory of Vision” in Dublin, and a year later, in 1710 (being only twenty-five years old), he published “A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge.” (Given the importance of both the first and second works, we will analyze both in detail during the presentation of Berkeley's philosophical views. Now I would like to note that, despite the solemn title "Treatise", the work has a small volume: 16 pages of introductory part, 14 pages theoretical propositions, 23 pages of replies to supposed objections and, finally, 37 pages of appendices of the "new principle" modern science".) In 1710, Berkeley, in the rank of an Anglican priest, took the position of supernumerary professor of Greek at Trinity College in Dublin. In 1713, he moved to London, where he published “Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonous.” This work is a a real literary masterpiece, written in English, returns to the theses of the Treatise: Philonus defends the idealistic theory in a dispute with Hylas, a supporter of the doctrine of the reality of matter: “I,” says Philonus, “do not hold the opinion that things change in ideas, rather , ideas change in things; and if these immediate objects of perception, from your point of view, are only appearances of things, then I consider them and accept them as the real things themselves" (10, p. 237).
In London, Berkeley met another prominent Irishman, Jonathan Swift, who introduced him to the court and recommended him to the Earl of Peterborough. In 1714, accompanying him as a chaplain, Berkeley made a long journey, during which he visited Paris and Lyon, and then traveled through Italy to Livorno. In 1716, Berkeley undertook a second long journey, ending only in 1720. This time he accompanied George Ashe (the physically underdeveloped son of the Bishop of Clogher) first to Paris; then he went to Turin, stayed there for some time and moved to Naples, where he stayed for a long time. Later, he carefully traveled throughout the entire region of Apulia, settled for four months on the island of Ischia, and spent the winter in Sicily. In 1718 Berkeley went to Rome. In the autumn of 1720 Berkeley returned to London; already in 1721 he defended his dissertation and received his doctorate, and after several years of teaching theology, Greek and Hebrew at Trinity College, he was appointed dean of Derry Cathedral.
It was at this time that he conceived a project - to found a college in Bermuda in order to evangelize the "savages" of America. Berkeley was convinced that Europe was doomed to inevitable moral degradation and moral decline. In his opinion, civilization, culture and religion can only be saved by transferring them to new soil, namely by instilling them in young peoples. Swift's lover Esther Vanomrie (nicknamed "Vanessa") gave Berkeley half of her property for charitable purposes, and, confident that he had convinced everyone of the nobility of his project, he sailed from England to America in 1728. He spent three years in Rhode Island, waiting for the financial assistance promised to him, but since the subsidies never arrived, he returned to England in 1731 (6, p. 24).
As Bertrand Russell recalls, Berkeley is the author of the famous poem “The Movement of Empire Takes the Road to the West,” thanks to which the university city of Berkeley in California was named after him. During the three years he spent in Rhode Island, Berkeley bought an estate there, built a house and wrote Alciphron, which was published in London in 1732.
"Alsiphron" is the most voluminous and, perhaps, the most beautiful of all Berkeley's works. In seven dialogues that recreate the conditions of the setting and environment of America (where the book was written), Berkeley returns to presenting, without any changes (despite the distance of twenty years), the philosophical views that he held in his youth. "Alsiphron" documents Berkeley's attitudes in the field of ethics and philosophy of religion. We are talking about a work specifically directed against "free thinkers" (specifically, against Mandeville). All actual historical figures are designated by nicknames: Collins is called Diagora, Shaftesbury is called Cratylus, Alsiphron called a free-thinker, Euphranor sets forth the ideas of Berkeley himself and believes that God himself “speaks daily and everywhere to the eyes of all people. From Berkeley’s point of view, “free-thinking” subjects “distort.” human nature and they reduce the dignity of man to the level of a wretched and insignificant life, because they are trying to determine for us a short period of time for life instead of immortality."
In 1734, Berkeley was appointed bishop of a small diocese in Cloyne, Ireland. Here, in Cloyne, completely devoting himself to philanthropic activities and preaching religious morality, Berkeley lived almost until his death, which occurred in 1753 (6, p. 26).
Epidemic 1739 - 1740 forced Berkeley to write (and publish in 1744) his last work, Seiris, a chain of philosophical reflections and studies concerning the merits of tar and various other subjects related to each other and arising from one another. The work begins with a statement of considerations regarding the beneficial properties of tar tincture, the beneficial effects of which the author experienced himself: “As for me, a sedentary lifestyle has long and for a long time doomed me to poor health, accompanied by various ailments, and especially nervous colic, which turned my life was a heavy burden; the situation was aggravated by the fact that my suffering worsened when I worked. But since I began to use tar tincture, I feel, although not a complete recovery from my old illness, but, nevertheless, a gradual return to health. and restful sleep, and I consider this medicine the greatest of all worldly graces and am deeply convinced that I owe my life, except, of course, to Providence, to this medicine.” According to Berkeley's instructions, tar tincture is recommended for fevers, pneumonia, smallpox, gout, shortness of breath, nervous breakdown and other diseases. In his book, he thinks not only about the body, but also about the mind. “Seiris,” in addition to various considerations of an epistemological nature, offers closely intertwined reflections on the universe of the Neoplatonic type: “The order and course of things, the experiments that we carry out every day, show us that there is a Mind that controls and activates this system. This the world mind is the real agent and true cause; the lower cause, which serves as the means or instrument of the mind, is pure ether, fire, or the substance of light, which is applied and directed by the infinite Mind in the macrocosm, or Universe, with unlimited power and ability, according to established rules. , just as in the microcosm it is applied by the human mind with limited power and skill."
In the summer of 1752, Berkeley moved to Oxford, where a few months later, on January 14, 1753, he died. After his death, in 1871, his diary notes were published in the form of a report on a trip to Italy.
2. Research program and first essays
First mature philosophical study Berkeley - "Philosophical Notes" - consists of two "Notes", "A" and "B", written by the young Berkeley between 1707 - 1708. Already in these notes we find clearly indicated polemical goals, i.e. the central nodes, from which Berkeley's philosophy will develop. The controversy will revolve around “what philosophers call matter or corporeal substance,” around atheism and criticism of free thought. The central core, on the basis of which the positive provisions of Berkeley’s philosophical worldview unfold, is the principle “to exist is to be perceived.”
In note 290 from Notebook B, Berkeley writes: “The great danger lies in supposing that extension can exist outside the mind, that is, it should be considered infinite, unchanging, eternal, etc. This would mean that God is also extended (which seems risky), or would presuppose the existence of an uncreated, eternal, unchangeable, infinite being other than God." And although it is true that Newton did not at all connect his mechanistic concept of the world with materialism, John Toland, in contrast to Newton, categorically rejected the idea of the need to turn to God to find out the causes of gravity and understood matter as something internal, active. Thus, Toland excluded the need for divine intervention from the phenomena. Berkeley believed that such conclusions already follow from the general meaning of the premise according to which matter exists outside the mind (7, p. 45).
This premise, in his opinion, the real stronghold of atheism, must be destroyed in favor of the opposite doctrine, proving its superiority and effectiveness. According to this doctrine, “to exist is to be perceived.” This principle at the same time serves as the main argument for confirming the fact that extension cannot be an unthinking substance, since it is not perceived without any tangible or visible qualities." According to Berkeley, the notorious principle is confirmed by a large number of arguments (reduction to absurdity as a method of proof), for example, in the sense that it is impossible to perceive any smell if no one has smelled it before (and does not know it), “if it costs to exist before being perceived, then we will never be able to know what it is.”
Denial of the existence of matter, the assertion that only the souls of people and God exist - this is what Berkeley's new apologetics aimed at from the very beginning, indeed refuting some of the main scientific and philosophical ideas of his time. Berkeley, however, refutes it by analyzing from within, and not by a priori rejection. Here we should look for the novelty of Berkeley, who supported his denial of matter with a huge number of cunning and talented arguments (B. Russell). And, as will become clear later, these cleverly developed arguments will have a very noticeable impact on the subsequent development of scientific and philosophical theories.
1. All meaningful words are used to represent ideas.
2. All knowledge is carried out around our ideas.
3. All ideas come either from the outside world or from within.
4. If they come from the outside, then it means from the sense organs, and then they are called sensations.
5. If they arise from within, they represent the actions of the mind and are called thoughts.
6. A person deprived of senses cannot have any sensations.
7. One who is deprived of thinking cannot have any thoughts.
According to Berkeley, if words are to be given any meaning, they must serve ideas. And all our ideas are sensations or influences of the mind on sensations: “All ideas are either simple ideas or created from simple ideas.” Therefore: it is necessary to rely on sensations. This is the fundamental imperative of Berkeley's epistemology. However, if you adhere to the notorious imperative, then its first two immediate consequences will turn out to be really important: a). “Time is a sensation, which means it exists only in the mind”; indeed: “Why is the time of suffering always longer than the time of pleasure?”; b). “Extension is a sensation, which means it is not outside the mind”; “It has been proven that primary ideas do not exist in matter, just as it has been proven that secondary ideas do not exist in matter”; “The assertion that extension can exist in something that does not think is a contradiction,” in the sense that, in order to be able to speak of extension, one must experience whether a thing is extended by itself or extended by someone else; With). The same can be said regarding motion: “Motion apart from a moving thing is inconceivable.”
Ideas - secondary and primary - are sensations. But there are no sensations outside the mind. Thus, there is nothing outside consciousness: “Nothing truly exists except people, that is, conscious beings; everything else is not so much existence as modes of existence of individuals.” We don't really see "things"; and what actually exists are most likely “ideas”, within which we see “things”: “Has a person ever seen, in addition to his ideas, other things in order to be able to compare them with each other and make are the first like the second?" Berkeley asks himself this question. After all, we do not understand “things in themselves” to such an extent as to be able to compare them with our “ideas”: what we understand and possess are always and only ideas. "There is nothing understandable except ideas." Berkeley is amazed that people do not see such an obvious truth: “there is no extension without thinking substance.” Only minds exist; ideas are in the minds, and ideas are reduced to sensations. But, on the other hand, Berkeley asserts: “I do not reject substances. I should not be accused of excluding substance from the rational world. I reject only philosophical meaning the word "substance". Ask any man, who is not yet corrupted by this jargon, what he understands by corporeal substance, or the substance of any body. In response, he will list volume, mass, hardness and similar tangible qualities. This is what I support and want to preserve" (6, p. 81).
With all this, Berkeley, having excluded the idea of the existence of matter, does not at all believe that he has impoverished the world. Everything remains as it was before, only the interpretation of the world and reality changes: “I invite any person to imagine perception without ideas, or some idea without perception.” We have ideas in our minds. Undoubtedly, there is a mind with its ideas, so “to exist is to perceive or to be perceived,” but “the horse is in the stable, and the books are in the university, as before.” However, Berkeley assures: “I stand for reality more than any other of those philosophers who have raised a lot of doubts, but themselves know for sure only that we can be mistaken. I say the diametrically opposite. In short, don’t be upset, you have nothing to lose. Any thing, real or chimerical, you can understand or imagine in some way, albeit wild, strange and absurd, but you will be able to do it, in my opinion, you can enjoy reality: I am not at all going to take it away from you.
3. Berkeley's philosophical concept.
In 1709, Berkeley published his “Essay on a New Theory of Vision” specifically for the purpose of refute the general preconceived (in his opinion) opinion. “My idea is to show how we perceive distance, size and position of objects through vision.” He focused on this because "distance, size and position of objects are the most visible, and therefore important, distinctive features of the external world; they are some of the most significant and noteworthy aspects of the supposed external reality, independent of us, with existing objects in it."
And the result, according to Berkeley, successfully achieved, was to prove that the distance, size and position of objects are not at all the primary, objective (i.e., independent of the subject) qualities of objects, but rather our interpretations. In fact: “When we look at a nearby object with both eyes, then, as it approaches or moves away from us, we change the direction of our gaze, reducing or increasing the gap between the pupils; this change in the direction of our gaze or movement of the eyes is accompanied by a sensation, and it is this which gives the mind the idea (idea) of a greater or lesser distance.” Attention should also be paid to the fact that “an object located at a certain distance from the eyes, at which the pupils are quite noticeably dilated, gradually approaches the eyes and becomes less clearly visible; the closer it gets, the more vague, blurry its image becomes; and since this has been observed to occur regularly, a habitual connection arises in the mind between distance and varying degrees of vagueness of the image, the relationship being established in such a way that greater vagueness of the image is always associated with less distance, and clearer outlines are observed at a greater distance from the object. In addition, “when an object is at some distance and then moves closer to the eyes, we cannot avoid, at least for a short time, that the image does not become more blurred, even by strong eye strain. In this case, the sensation replaces vague vision, helping the mind to estimate the distance from an object; it is considered closer, the greater the effort or strain of vision in order to obtain a clearer vision" (12).
So, the perception of distance does not reflect real distance; such perception does not convey an image of the external world, since the distance depends on the form of activity of the subject. Against this theory of vision we could effectively use the rules of geometric optics, for which space, measured from a distance, would have to be considered something objective. However, Berkeley reminds us that if these rules of geometric optics were valid, it would follow that the perception of distance should be the same for everyone. But it is obvious that this is not the case if we reflect on the fact that the perception of distance differs among different individuals, and in the same individual it changes with experience. The desire to explain vision “through geometry,” according to Berkeley, is just a “fantasy” or “whim.” Just as it would be a great mistake to believe that the connection uniting visual impressions with tactile sensations relates, if not directly to external bodies, then to the nature of these ideas. Indeed, in the usual display of things real world visual ideas and tactile sensations seem to be fused together in a “natural” and “inseparable” manner (9).
Nevertheless, epistemological reasoning can show us that the notorious connection is neither natural, nor indissoluble, nor causal. Berkeley cites as an example a case discussed by Locke, from Molineux's optics - the story of one blind from birth, who, thanks to an operation, gained the ability to see and became sighted. So, will this blind man, who before the operation created for himself an idea of the world around him with the help of tactile sensations, after the operation be able to correlate and connect the visual representation of an object with his previous tactile sensations, which created in him a certain image of this object? The answer to this question is clear - NO.
Indeed, what similarity and what connection exists between the sensations of light and color, on the one hand, and the sensations of resistance or compression, on the other? There is no natural, objective, obvious connection that would help connect sensations of one type with sensations of another type. Only experience, that is, exercise, practice and habit, can show us the constant coexistence of some sensations with others. The connection between different types of sensations is not a matter of logic or objectivity: it is only a matter of experience. Only the human soul establishes a connection between the “hints” of the diverse content of different types of sensations. Thus the soul creates "things" and gives form to "objects." The coincidence of tactile sensations with visual ideas (images) has no other explanation than practice and experience. Both one and the other are signs of the language of nature, which God sends to the senses and reason so that a person learns to regulate his actions necessary to maintain life, and adapt them to circumstances, so as not to endanger his life. This means that vision is a tool for preserving life, but in no case is it a means of proving the reality of the external world. According to Berkeley, “objective reality appears before us only on the basis of interpretation, the interpretation of “signs” by sensations, the only ones known initially. And only when we establish a certain connection between different classes of sensed reflections and consider them according to the mutual dependence that has developed between them, only then can we consider "that the first step in building reality has been taken."
De Ruggiero rightly recalls that Berkeley wanted to contrast his Theory of Vision as a scientific treatise with Descartes' Dioptrics, Barrow's Lectures on Optics, Newton's Optics and Molina's Dioptrics. The topic was highly relevant and won the attention of scientists, despite the attempt to complicate it with a pile of metaphysical and epistemological problems. But Berkeley was truly interested in the notorious piles of a specific nature. In one of his letters to Sir John Percival in March 1710, he reports that the "Essay on a New Theory of Vision" is likely to be useless, but adds that he hopes to show in the next treatise that the "Experience" "shows emptiness and falsity many areas of speculative science, will serve as an incentive to a deep study of religion and useful things." The work that Berkeley mentions in his letter to Sir Percival is “A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge” (6, p. 56).
In 1710, “A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge,” Berkeley’s most famous work, was published, the first part of which (and the only one that turned out to be published) was entitled as follows: “Part one, in which the main causes of errors and difficulties in the sciences are examined.” , as well as the foundations of skepticism, atheism and unbelief." And yet, the main misconception that Berkeley wants to eradicate is the substantial-materialist image of the universe. According to Berkeley, the main reason for this error is the confidence regarding the meaning and value of abstract ideas and the subsequent conviction associated with it that, along with secondary qualities, there are also primary ones. The main targets of Berkeley and his Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge were Newton and Locke, namely Newton's theory of a universe consisting of material substance independent of consciousness, and Locke's psychology, which assumed, for example, that most of our knowledge consists of abstract ideas .
Just like Locke, Berkeley supports the view that our knowledge is the knowledge of ideas, not facts. “In any consideration of the objects of human knowledge, it becomes evident that they are either ideas impressed upon the senses at the present moment, or ideas perceived when attention is directed to the emotions and activities of the mind; or, finally, ideas formed by the imagination and memory by the combination , division or only the presentation of ideas originally obtained in the two previous ways." Consequently, the objects of our knowledge are ideas. Where do these ideas come from? Berkeley answers the question without hesitation: "By sight I obtain ideas of light and color range with all their shades and intensity. With the help of touch I feel hardness and softness, warmth and cold, movement and resistance, and so on, and all this can be in greater or lesser quantity and to a greater or lesser extent. Smell brings me smells, taste brings me sensations of taste; hearing transmits sounds to the mind in all the variety of tones and combinations." So, ideas are sensations. And the latter come from the senses.
It is by reason of the primary coexistence or constant stable combination of ideas that what we call things or objects appear: “It is therefore seen that some of these sensations appear together, they are marked by one general name and, in consequence, they are considered one single thing. Thus, for example, observing for a time that a certain color is always accompanied by a certain taste, and they are accompanied by a certain smell, shape and density, people consider all these sensations as one single thing, different from others, designated by the name "apple", while other collections of ideas form a stone, a tree, a book, and other tangible things, which, being pleasant or unpleasant, excite in us feelings of love, hatred, joy, anger, etc. (6, p. 62).
Necks are sensations, and objects (or bodies) are complexes or stable, permanent combinations of sensations. Moreover, according to Berkeley, there are no abstract ideas, such as man, extension, color, etc. In a word, Berkeley rejects the theory that the human mind has the capacity for abstraction. We perceive only ideas, and every idea is only a single sensation. We perceive not “a person”, but “this person”; we have a sensation not of “color”, but of “this color” having “this shade”; to the same extent, we hear not “sound” in general, but “this sound.” “What are light and colors, heat and cold, extension and forms - in a word, everything that we see and touch, if not a multitude of sensations, concepts, ideas or impressions of the senses? And is it possible to separate, even if only in mind, any of them from perception? Therefore, if I do not have the opportunity to see or touch a thing, I cannot really feel it, nor can I understand how a thing or a perceived object differs from the sensation or perception of this thing or that subject." After all, every sensation is unique, and not abstract. I cannot have the idea of a triangle unless I am at the same time thinking about a scalene triangle, an isosceles triangle, or an equilateral triangle. “Man” is just a word: our sensations, memories or impressions, that is, our ideas, usually concern one specific person. Abstract ideas are illusions, and dangerous illusions at that, because they encourage us to engage in ontologization, to “create” substances or substrates that are beyond the limits of our sensations. They push us to invent fantastic worlds of entities ("man", "color", "material bodies", etc.), forcing us to assume that they really exist.
This is where Berkeley's nominalism originates. From this concept, among other things, he would draw interesting conclusions that “played” against the philosophy of science of his time. In short: we know only ideas; they coincide with impressions received through the senses; these sensory impressions are always singular, that is, individual and concrete; as a result, Locke's theory of abstraction is erroneous. And only when we take a particular idea and use it to give an idea of all ideas similar to it, only then do we call such a particular idea general. However general idea- is by no means an abstract idea that leaves aside all the distinctive features perceived by our senses. We are not familiar with a “person” in general, but we are always familiar with this or that (specific, private) person; we do not know what “extension” is, but we always know certain extended things; we don’t know “house” at all, but we always know this or that house, etc. (7, p. 70)
In reality it is this way: from time to time we receive individual, concrete and distinct sensations, which, constantly appearing together, contribute to the emergence of the idea of a house, a person, a river or an extension. This means that Locke’s thesis about abstract ideas, the belief in a substance independent of our sensations, should be rejected. It is Locke's theory that is responsible for that "strangely widespread opinion" according to which "houses, mountains, rivers - in a word, all sensible objects have a real or natural existence, different from the ideas perceived by the mind." However, Berkeley reminds: "Great may be the confidence and approval with which this principle has hitherto been accepted, yet anyone who is in a position to question it will find (if I am not mistaken) that this theory implies an obvious contradiction. In fact, tell me, what are the above objects if not the things that we perceive with our senses? And what can we perceive other than our own ideas or sensations?
4. God, world and man in the Berkeley concept
With the elimination of matter and the new confirmation of the existence of the spirit or soul of man, the project of defending religion was well advanced, but not completed. The world Berkeley creates still lacks the presence of God. And this is how Berkeley complements and completes his project. There is a human spirit, and "it is a simple being, invisible, acting: in so far as it perceives ideas, it is called 'intellect'; in so far as it produces ideas and acts upon the world, it is called 'will.'" Yet Berkeley notes: "As far as I understand, the words “will”, “intellect”, “mind”, “soul”, “spirit” do not denote ideas; they mean something strikingly different from ideas and cannot be similar to any idea, nor be represented by any idea, because it is an active force." So, there is a spirit, consciousness, i.e., mind. And objects knowledge, in other words, ideas are in the mind.
If the external world (the world against which the real value of ideas could be tested) is only an illusion, then how can we distinguish between ideas that depend on our imagination from those that, on the contrary, cannot appear at will? Berkeley gets out of the situation by resourcefully turning, as is his wont, the stumbling block into the driving force of reasoning. He explains that "whatever may be my power over my own thoughts, I believe that ideas perceived directly from the senses do not depend in any way on my will. When I open my eyes in clear light, I have no choice - to see or not to see, to determine exactly which objects should fall into the field of my vision; the same thing happens with hearing and other senses: all the ideas imprinted by them are not the creations of my will. This means that there is some other will or something else. consciousness, the spirit that generates them" (7, p. 102).
Ideas born of feelings are stronger, more vivid, brighter, more distinct than those created by the imagination. In addition, they are stable, orderly and connected. They do not appear by chance, as often happens with ideas caused by human will, but in a regular manner, that is, in an ordered sequence." And yet, where does this stability, orderliness of non-randomly evoked ideas come from? What is their cause and basis? On this a question decisive for his philosophical system, Berkeley answers as follows: “...the amazing coherence proves the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. And the constant, unchanging rules, according to which the Mind, on which we depend, arouses perceptions in us through the senses, are called “natural laws.” We will study these laws through experience, which will show us that certain perceptions in the ordinary course of things are accompanied by certain ideas."
So, the cause of stability, orderliness and coherence of perceptions is God; it is God who, according to unchangeable, constant rules, calls ideas into us. It gives us a certain ability of foresight, thanks to which we are able to direct our actions depending on the needs dictated by life. Without such an ability, we will constantly find ourselves in hopeless situations, our life will turn into hell: we will not be able to use a single thing without getting hurt or causing pain to ourselves. We will not know that food nourishes, that sleep restores strength, that fire warms, that the only way to harvest grain is to sow it at the right time; we will not know at all that certain activities lead to certain results. We know all this not because we have discovered any necessary connection between our ideas, but only thanks to the observance of the laws established by nature, without which we would become uncertain and confused, and a grown man in Everyday life would not be able to behave like a newborn baby" (7, p. 109).
This means that our ideas are not accumulated by chance by our minds. They demonstrate "consistent and uniform functioning" aimed at preserving life. Our knowledge is a tool for preserving life. And the “consistent and uniform functioning” of perceptions, according to Berkeley, “clearly proves the goodness and wisdom of the spirit-ruler, whose will lies in the laws of nature.” However, instead of being guided by his instructions, we wander in search of secondary reasons.
Despite this interpretation, Berkeley still does not intend to take anything away from nature from its richness and brightness of colors: “Everything that we see, hear, touch, or in any way understand and conceive remains as stable and constant as before; There is a certain nature of things due to which the distinction between reality and chimeras retains all its force." Berkeley's world tends to be permanent, a world that we experience and in which we have to live forever. “Everything that is said in the Holy Scriptures on behalf of the common people against the opinion of scientists, I also support. In all matters, I stand on the side of the crowd.” Berkeley doesn't take anything out of our world. The only thing he denies is what philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. However, by discarding matter or corporeal substance, humanity suffers no harm and does not increase its suffering. Denial of matter does not impoverish life, and people will not even notice or guess what they have given up. The purpose of denying matter is only that atheists have nothing else to justify and justify their “disbelief.” For Berkeley there are real tables, houses, squares, gardens with plants, rivers and mountains. From his point of view, only matter does not exist.
If the world is only a collection of human ideas, asks Bertrand Russell, what about the continuity of the world's existence? Don't things cease to exist whenever a person stops perceiving them? To answer these questions, Berkeley again resorts to the help of God: The world when it does not perceive it this person or other people, continues to exist in the perception of God; Eternal Spirit by its influence on the souls of people, it causes the appearance of perceptions in them and their alternation, otherwise what are called natural objects would exist in “glimpses”, “jumps”.
Nominalism (according to which in objective reality nothing corresponds to general concepts, and they are just names for individual objects; our knowledge is woven from specific individual sensations and ideas) and phenomenalism (according to which only phenomena such as color, taste, sound, etc. are accessible to human cognition ., and the essence is unknowable; he separates phenomena from essence) - these are two epistemological foundations on which Berkeley’s project of new apologetics rests and develops. And yet, despite the fact that nominalism and phenomenalism play an openly apologetic role in Berkeley, in his philosophical system they lead to very important consequences in terms of the philosophy of physics. The consequences mentioned "are of a surprisingly modern character. We are talking, first of all, about the rediscovered and reintroduced concepts used during the discussion of modern physics by Ernst Mach, Heinrich Hertz and, later, by several philosophers and physicists who at different times were influenced by Mach (Bertrand Russell, Philipp Frank, Richard von Mises, Moritz Schlick, Werner Heisenberg, etc.)". Karl R. Popper, in an essay entitled "A Note on Berkeley as the Precursor of Mach and Einstein" (1953), admires Berkeley's work, although he disagrees with him in principle. Popper cannot agree with Berkeley and his instrumentalism. As a realist, he sees scientific theories not only as tools for speculation, but also as truthful explanatory descriptions of reality, “even if unreliable”).
In the "Analytic," or argument addressed to the "unbeliever of mathematics," and "Philosophical Notes," Berkeley writes: "Newton's calculus of fluxions is useless," "We cannot discuss things about which we have not the slightest idea. Therefore, we cannot discuss the differential calculus and the calculus of infinitesimals." Notes on mathematics, scattered throughout Berkeley's various works, appear constantly. Berkeley devoted his treatise “On Motion” exclusively to the philosophy of physics. Once again confirming one of the basic principles of his theory of knowledge, Berkeley writes: “It is unworthy of a philosopher to utter words that mean nothing.” Newton's “absolute space” and “absolute time” have no meaning and therefore have no place in a serious physical theory. “As for absolute space, that specter that haunts mechanical philosophers and geometers, it is enough to note that its existence has neither been proven by reasoning nor perceived by the senses”; and for the purposes of mechanistic philosophy it is enough to replace “absolute space” with “relative”, defined by areas of the sky with constant stars; the same applies to absolute motion. A body can be considered to be in motion under a certain condition: “It is required... that it change its position or distance relative to some other body, since “it is impossible to discern or measure any motion without the aid of sensible objects”.” Everything that has been said so far about “absolute space” and “absolute motion” also applies to the concepts of “gravity” and “force”. If we say that “gravity” is an “essential quality” inseparable from the nature of bodies, then we are just uttering a meaningless word: what we see is not gravity at all as an integral part of the essence of bodies, but bodies moving relative to other bodies . We cannot talk about force as the actual cause of movement: who has ever seen this actual cause? And why reintroduce “hidden qualities” into physical theory? “The real effective causes of motion... of bodies in no way belong to the field of mechanics or experimental science. And they cannot even shed at least a little light on these phenomena...”. Berkeley's thoughts and his concept are commented on by Popper: "They cannot shed any light, because to talk about the 'true and real nature', about the 'internal qualities' or about the 'real essence' of bodies means idle chatter. There is nothing physical that is placed behind physical bodies, no hidden physical reality. Everything is a surface; physical bodies are reduced to their properties. Their reality is the way in which they are combined with each other" (6, p. 93).
Of course, Berkeley did not deny the fact that Newtonian mechanics leads to correct results and that it is capable of making accurate assumptions. He denies the fact that Newton's theory is suitable for studying the nature or essence of bodies.
In reality, Berkeley explains, it is necessary to distinguish between mathematical hypotheses, intended as tools for explanation and speculation, and theories involving investigations into the nature of bodies. According to Berkeley, Newton's theory is simply a set of mathematical hypotheses for the development of research: “Everything that is asserted regarding the forces inherent in bodies, both the forces of attraction and repulsion, should be considered only as a mathematical hypothesis, and not as something that actually exists in nature ". Newtonian mechanics is required to be able to derive conclusions from the premises that could “save” or at least take into account phenomena. Berkeley argues that this would be sufficient even if Newton's theory fails to describe the true reality of the world.
Conclusion
Berkeley criticized the concepts of matter as the material basis (substance) of bodies, as well as I. Newton’s theory of space as the container of all natural bodies and J. Locke’s doctrine of the origin of the concepts of matter and space.
Berkeley is an attractive writer with an elegant style (and he wrote his many works before the age of 28!). He was not only a priest (bishop of Cloyne, Ireland) and a philosopher, but also a psychologist. Berkeley sought to prove that we perceive only the properties of things, i.e. how these things affect our senses, but we do not grasp the essence of the thing itself, and yet the properties are very relative to the perceiving subject. Sensory impressions are phenomena of the psyche. If one hand is cold and the other is warm, put your hands in warm water and you will feel cold with one hand and warm with the other. Berkeley proves the right idea - about the relativity of our perceptions, their dependence on the state of the subject.
All this is true, but this does not save Berkeley from extreme conclusions leading to subjective idealism, of which we are accustomed to consider him an apologist. But he is a priest who sincerely believed in God, and by this alone he is rather an objective idealist! Therefore, he cannot be accused (as is usually done) of solipsism. Solipsism is subjective idealism taken to extreme conclusions: the recognition that the only reality is only one’s own self - there is nothing outside of me!
Bibliography
1. Introduction to philosophy. Textbook for higher educational institutions. In 2 volumes. T.1. – M.: Politizdat, 1989.
2. History of dialectics. – M.: Education, 1978.
3. History of philosophy of modern times. – M.: Progress, 1981.
4. History of philosophy: Tutorial for universities / Ed. A.N. Volkova. – M.: PRIOR, 1997.
5. Brief outline of the history of philosophy. – M.: Progress, 1981.
6. Krasavin V.N. Berkeley. – M.: Mysl, 1978.
7. Ovsyannikov M. F. Berkeley. – M.: Mysl, 1971.
8. Ovsyannikov M.F. Philosophy of the New Age. – M.: Nauka, 1991.
9. Radugin A.A. Philosophy: course of lectures. – M.: Center, 1998.
10. Reale D. and Antiseri D. Western philosophy from its origins to the present day. Volume 3. - St. Petersburg: Petropolis, 1997.
11. Philosophy: course of lectures. / Ed. V.L. Kalashnikov. – M.: Vlados, 1998.
12. Philosophy: Textbook for university students / Ed. V.P. Kokhanovsky. – Rostov-on-Don: Phoenix, 1998.
© Posting material on other electronic resources only accompanied by an active link